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Why does Haig get the shaft?

George Wallace said:
Kinda like building a bridge but not knowing what the footings are on either bank.  As you are stating that the Canadians were only a part of the larger British Commonwealth effort, it would be a good idea to know what that overall effort was.  You are only presenting one portion of the puzzle, and perhaps even then missing some key pieces.

And I do find exception in your statements on the Canadian Cavalry.  The Canadian Cavalry Brigade was in the Pursuit at the time of the Armistice.  I would conclude that in the latter part of the war, after fighting in the trenches, they were being employed more actively as cavalry.  Don't get any LdSH(RC) or RCD going on the Battle of Moreuil Wood.


PS.  If you are doing up a paper, I do hope you are more careful of your grammar and spelling.  Just try the Spell Check on your next post and see what we are putting up with.

Thank you George but please rest assured spell check and proofreading is alive and well for my papers!

I do know what the larger overall efforts are.  Ive read the official histories of the British, Canadians, French and Australians.  Thats not the issue, but I am specializing in Canadian.  In a perfect world I would be able to do it all, but I am lucky to keep up with what I have at the moment.  Most other historians are the same in that regard.

As for the cavalry, meh, once the Germans had fallen into disaray sure the Cavalry was put to more use, at least on their horses anyway, but that does not mean they were effective.  I think most scholars out there would agree that Cavalry was not an effective arm at all in the Great War.  The Great War was the death of the Cavalry.
 
yes but the cavalry was the only means of rapid explotation available at the time. Mind you the cav was more effective in the desert.
 
ltmaverick25 said:
........  The Great War was the death of the Cavalry.

Not true.  It was much later, into the 1930's that "Mechanization" brought about the 'Twilight of the Cavalry'.  Cavalry was still employed in the 1940's.
 
sledge said:
yes but the cavalry was the only means of rapid explotation available at the time. Mind you the cav was more effective in the desert.

Well thats just the problem, it was the only means of rapid exploitation, but that means was totally non effective on the western front which is exactly why I have been saying breakthrough attempts were a foolish idea.  The vast majority of the time our cavalry were in the front line trenches playing infantry.  Many historians argue that all the horses that went to waste serving the cavalry that got put to little or no use would have been better served being allocated to artillery or logistics where they were indeed a valuable asset.
 
The British trained their cavalry as mounted infantry hence the hate between French and Smith-Dorien. The amount of fodder saved would have been minimal actually.
 
I dont think it was the fodder they were complaining about, rather they could have actually used the horses to haul ammo and other supplies ect..

Anyway I have to duck out and actually get some work done!  Ill check back in later and make sure George isnt still riding around on a horse with a big silver sign :)
 
Well the brits got more andmore trucks and railways for hauling supplies which tended to eclipse the horse. Plus a cavalry mount may not be suited for hauling supplies and vice versa.
 
George Wallace said:
Not true.  It was much later, into the 1930's that "Mechanization" brought about the 'Twilight of the Cavalry'.  Cavalry was still employed in the 1940's.

And we still employ Sea Kings today!  That doesnt mean its days were done long ago.
 
Two books for you to get Haig's viewpoint - as he was a very inarticulate person with respect to self - inflating history

At GHQ and Field Marshall Earl Haig by John Charteris

You can read most of each book on Google Books

EG try Somme HAIG - you'll see they thought the Germans were almost defeated but early rains shut down the campaign

try march 1918 - they forecast the German advance despite the Brit High Command not agreeing with it

eg - try Cambrai series of battles ---- and see they never changed their view on what they were trying to accomplish --- it was always the wearing down battle which was their doctrine - a point many above forget if they ever knew - even if they didn't no big deal - its standard to overlay your modern ideas on what was the case long ago.

A few lines on Google Books and at least you get the Haig level perspective written by Charteris - without this basis - you are accepting secondary sources which usually have an axe to grind

A sample search on HAIG GHQ AND CHURCHILL
http://books.google.ca/books?id=LG0DAAAAMAAJ&q=haig+GHQ+churchill&dq=haig+GHQ+churchill&pgis=1

And the logistics of the whole thing - http://scotsatwar.co.uk/AZ/HaigFellows'Addresses04.html - which tends to suggest that far from manage the battles that he designed in what he called the 2 year Campaign - Haig had far more to deal with than most readers with thick glasses and moldy popular histories give him credit for.

More from Scots at War here http://scotsatwar.co.uk/AZ/TheDouglasHaigFellowship.html

 
Ltmaverick25, I would suggest that without looking at the broader structure of the BEF  AND the French you have fallen into the trap of "situating the estimate" rather than estimating the situation.  And from your early pronouncements it sounds as if you have been heavily influence by  Pierre Berton and Brereton Greenhouse.  Not to mention Gordon Dancocks.    Dancocks does good work describing the technicalities but is quite Canada-centric.  Berton seldom let a fact get in the way of a good story and IMHO Greenhouse had a notably anti-Imperial bias.

The reason I recommend Corrigan is that it is jammed with stats AND is readable AND is wide-ranging.  Similarly for Holmes's Tommy (He also did an excellent book "Redcoat" on the Brown Bess Army).
 
Kirkhill said:
Ltmaverick25, I would suggest that without looking at the broader structure of the BEF  AND the French you have fallen into the trap of "situating the estimate" rather than estimating the situation.  And from your early pronouncements it sounds as if you have been heavily influence by  Pierre Berton and Brereton Greenhouse.  Not to mention Gordon Dancocks.    Dancocks does good work describing the technicalities but is quite Canada-centric.  Berton seldom let a fact get in the way of a good story and IMHO Greenhouse had a notably anti-Imperial bias.

The reason I recommend Corrigan is that it is jammed with stats AND is readable AND is wide-ranging.  Similarly for Holmes's Tommy (He also did an excellent book "Redcoat" on the Brown Bess Army).

I will no doubt pick up Corrigan when I get a chance but you are assuming a bit much with your statements.  Pierre Berton though a great writer was primarily a journalist, I am not naive as to the style of writing and interpretations that he used.  The same can be said for Greenhouse to some extent.  Also look at the timing of those publications, National Unity anyone?

When it comes to the battle of Vimy Ridge the authors I rely more heavily on for secondary sources are people like Tim Cook, Geoffrey Hayes, Gary Shefield, Paul Dickson, Michael Boire, Mark Osborne Humphries, Patrick Brennan, Andrew Iarocci, David Cambell, and even Jack Granatstein with a grain of sault.  These authors are not without their own biases, but I dont think you can reasonably find an author academic or popular that does not have some sort of bias in their writing.

That is just secondary mind you.  Ive conducted a fair amount of my own primary research, in the course of doing so, I find myself supporting many of Cooks arguments, though most of the authors above tell a similar story.

Besides, I would hardly be able to get away publishing an article that was based solely on secondary sources and surely not by relying on Berton and Greenhouse.

Ultimately though I am attempting to develop new interpretations, some of which I fully concede may be somewhat controversial, but they are interpretations that can be backed up with sound primary research.  If I ever finish the damn thing before its deadline and it gets published I will make sure to provide a link here for you guys to read, and you can let me know what you think.
 
ltmaverick25 said:
I will no doubt pick up Corrigan when I get a chance but you are assuming a bit much with your statements.  Pierre Berton though a great writer was primarily a journalist, I am not naive as to the style of writing and interpretations that he used.  The same can be said for Greenhouse to some extent.  Also look at the timing of those publications, National Unity anyone?

When it comes to the battle of Vimy Ridge the authors I rely more heavily on for secondary sources are people like Tim Cook, Geoffrey Hayes, Gary Shefield, Paul Dickson, Michael Boire, Mark Osborne Humphries, Patrick Brennan, Andrew Iarocci, David Cambell, and even Jack Granatstein with a grain of sault.  These authors are not without their own biases, but I dont think you can reasonably find an author academic or popular that does not have some sort of bias in their writing.

Fair enough.  I stand corrected and apologise.
 
I am not an academic, but I advise that you broaden your knowledge of doctrinal developments during the war for all the major combatants. If you are going to say that the Canadians were the first or the best at something you should be able to compare it to what others were doing.

The German storm troop tactics were developed over time and I would be very careful about laying credit at the Canadian's door. The Germans suspended offensive operations on the Western Front in 1917 to allow them to work on Russia, but they had been working on the variations of those tactics from 1915/16. Gudmundsson's book gives an excellent view, as well as Martin Samuels. At the platoon level the eventual tactics worked out by the British and Germans had several similarities, but at higher tactical levels it got a bit different. The Germans emphasized deep penetrations and also seemed to subordinate the fire plan to the manoeuvre plan. For an interesting view of British tactics that differs a bit from conventional wisdom try Paddy Griffiths.

Looking at the Russo-Japanese War, the major European powers (France, Britain and Germany) had detachments of attaches who observed the war and wrote about it in great detail. I have read official reports from all three and they make the same basic observations. They all absorbed the impact of the machine gun, and indeed the Russo-Japanese War can be seen as having worsened the First World War as it brought machine guns into European armies on a scale much greater than had existed before. Only the British had had machine guns at battalion level before the Russo-Japanese War, but after the reports from the field these weapons went into much wider service. The need for cooperation between artillery and infantry was noted by all, but the "so-whats" were not universal. One British attache noted that

"During the whole of the operations the thing which impressed me the most in regard to the artillery was its cooperation with the infantry in the last stages of the attack, regardless of the losses they might cause their own infantry...The Japanese consider that any losses they may cause their own infantry can only be slight compared to those which would be incurred were the defenders left free at the critical moment to pour an accurate and concentrated fire on the attacking infantry at a distance of only a few hundred yards."

So it seems that the Japanese had worked on the concept of using artillery to keep the enemy's head down until the last moment.

I think that the Great Powers knew that the war would be bloody. A British Captain observed on the Sha-Ho in Manchuria that: "There was no place in the whole defensive line where a successful attack by the Russians looked practicable, unless the works were first destroyed by heavy artillery." The Europeans also took from that war, however, that standing still as the Russians did would lead to defeat. They could look to the ability of the fiercely nationalistic Japanese to accept casualties in offensive operations and eventually prevail as supporting their own war plans that emphasized the attack.

I believe that the Germans figured they could find an open flank as the Japanese did at Mukden, while the French believed that their morale and flexibility would see them through. Some have suggested that the Germans looked at Mukden in great detail when coming up with their plan to knock France out. The British may have been more concerned with colonial wars, and in any case they took the lessons of the Russo-Japanese War as vaildating their own lessons from the Boer War (skirmishing instead of dense formations, khaki uniforms, machine guns etc). The British were actually ahead of the French and Germans in that regard in 1904. The Germans pretty much caught up while the French made some changes of their own.

I think that it is very hard for an Army to learn from the experience of another without some practical experience of their own. The tendancy is to look for things that validate your own preconceptions and then find ways to sideline lessons that do not jive with your view. Referring to a war as a special case seems to be quite common when looking for a way around a lesson.

I have a paper in draft form on the impact of the Russo-Japanese War on the armies of Britain, France and Germany. I will clean it up and offer it here someplace for criticism.
 
Kirkhill said:
Fair enough.  I stand corrected and apologise.

No need to appologize at all.  As i was saying to someone via PMs, I am just happy to have found a forum of other individuals that are interested in the same things who are also versed in some of the material.  You should see what my grad school discussion groups degenerate into sometimes, its far far worse especially when topics of Canadian military history come up.  I could use a few of you on my team in there, its always myself versus the entire room, not fun at all! :)
 
Tango2Bravo,

Let me first say that I found your post extremely facinating.  As I mentioned before I have zero depth of knowledge with the Japanese/Russian war nor the effects it had on doctrinal development of European powers during the Great War, so I look forward to seeing that paper.  I think you raise some good points about the manner in which various armies chose to interpret the lessons learned from that war.  In my view it is certainly an area worthy of much more study as we are bound to run into the same sorts of situation in the future as we observe other wars unfold and attempt to keep pace with tactical and technological developments.

As for my observations about the offensive prowess of the Canadian Corps during the Great War...

I do contend that from 1917 to the end of the war the Canadian Corps was the single best army on the offensive, but I am not alone in that argument.  Again, as I've mentioned before, scholars from a variety of different countries have made the same conclusions.

Let me also clarify a few points that I made earlier...

Again I am not trying to argue that the Canadian Corps invented tactics within its own void or bubble and then went on to destroy the Germans single handedly.  What I am saying is that the Canadians took the lessons learned from Verdun and the Somme, and the rest of their own experiences on the front and translated that much better and more efficiently into new training, tactics and doctrine that allowed them to be more successful on the offensive.

Were the Canadians the only ones doing this?  No.  Were the British putting into practice the very same recomendations that Currie made for the preperation of the assault on Vimy Ridge, into their own plans for the wider Battle of Arras?  Absolutely.  The Canadians were not the only ones doing this, but they did do it better then any other army.  I concede that my knowledge and background is not as in depth on the British and French side as it is the Canadian side, but that does not mean that it is non existant, simply not nearly as specialized.  When it comes to the Germans, I have spent alot of time studying their tactics on the defence, but not so much on the offence during the Great War.

The reason that I support the arguments of several other authors much more experienced and wiser then I, that the Canadian Corps was the best offensive army on the western front is simply because of the results.  I am a firm beleiver that the results speak for themselves.  Again lets not forget that the Germans were much more fearful of the Canadians then they were any other formation for a reason, they delivered results.  Thats not to say that other armies did not, it is however to say that the Canadians were doing it better.  Does that mean that the British and the French had zero role to play in Canadian performance?  Absolutely not.  The Canadian Corps could not have engaged in the battles that it did without the immence logistical support of the BEF.  Moreover the multitude of British staff officers assigned to Canadian units were an absolute necessity.  The lessons and innovations provided by the French were also invaluable.  However, when all is said and done, and H hour approached, it was our guys at the sharp end that had to go do it, and their results speak for themselves.

A few other points...

The Canadian Corps became known as Storm Troopers because that is what the Germans started calling them, and no I am not saying that because I saw it on the Passhendaele movie!  Several correspondences from German soldiers to their families that I have been going over for the past few months reveal that same fact.

During the 100 days offensive the Canadian Corps is credited with destroying over 40 German Divisions.  That is quite the tall order for 4 Canadian Divisions, granted they were much larger then conventional ones, so lets be generous and double the size.  8 Divisions destroyed 40, Im no mathematician but that looks pretty good to me.

During all of 1918 Currie was summoned to consult various other British formations and give them advice on the offensive.  Why would that be the case if the Canadians were not out performing?

Although the British and the French were attempting to employ the same tactics as the Canadians, they were not nearly as effective at adopting a more decentralized style of command and control.  This is something the Canadians implemented much better.  Perhaps it was because there was a tiny bit of truth to the myth of the militiamen, or maybe it was due to cultural differences in Canadian society from those of the older European nations.  I dont have the answer to that, but I do beleive the ability to push battlefield authority down to the lowest possible level is what gave Canadians the edge.

Again I am not an expect in the Great War history of the British or French armies, but I do know enough to know that they were not doing things nearly as well as the Canadian Corps on the offensive in the latter part of the war.  The French had mutineed and refused to participate on the offensive until much later on, the British had battered beyond comprehension, the Americans never got it together in the Great War the way the did in the Second World War, and the Germans, although they displayed mastery of combined arms operations in their spring offensive of 1918, took the completely wrong approach.  They went for a breakthrough, and actually succeeded partially before it was brought to a stop, but that was their undoing.  By Contrast the Canadian Corps launched a series of successive, deliberate, limited aims objectives and systematically pushed the Germans back.  Not nearly as sexy as a breakthrough, and most costly in lives then a breakthrough (assuming the breakthrough succeeds anyway) but it did get the job done.



 
I won't argue against the effectiveness of the Canadian Corps in World War 1! To go with Soldat Snuffy's letters home to Heiderlberg, I have read that the allies made somewhat elaborate deception measures regarding the placement of the Canadians to gain surprise at Amiens. Have your read Shane Schreiber's great little book?

I will, however, be careful about using categorical statements. I think that there are more nuances. How do you incorporate the ANZACs? Have you look at all British divisions? Again, I suggest that you read some of Paddy Griffiths works to gain some perspective. I am not saying that he is right, but he offers some balance.

While I think that Western historians give too much credit to the Germans and not enough to British/Commonwealth forces, I would also be careful when making inferences about the German and Canadian methods in World War 1 by looking at the final outcome. There are matters of scale at play.
 
ltmaverick25 said:
During the 100 days offensive the Canadian Corps is credited with destroying over 40 German Divisions.  That is quite the tall order for 4 Canadian Divisions, granted they were much larger then conventional ones, so lets be generous and double the size.  8 Divisions destroyed 40, Im no mathematician but that looks pretty good to me.

This raises a curious point.  While you readily adjust the relative size of the Canadian divisions for being "larger than conventional ones", what was the respective size of those German divisions to your theoretical "conventional division"?

Have you considered conducting an analysis and comparison of actual combat power, rather then a simple numerical strength comparison?

You may find Trevor Dupuy's Numbers, Predictions & War a useful reference for such a comparison.

 
Dupuy is a heretic.  He dared suggest the Germans were the better warriors, hobbled by a lack of materiel to wage war.  And, since the Germans lost, therefore Dupuy must be wrong and there's nothing we can learn from studying them.

Come now, most other Western analysts have tried mightily to discredit Dupuy.  They have opinion and anecdote on their side, Dupuy has mere facts and hard analysis.  Who could ever be persuaded by fact when there's emotion available?
 
I believe that, using von Manstein's methodology, Haig was a 'hardworkig idiot' who should have been fired immediately:

http://www.slowleadership.org/blog/2007/10/are-todays-organizations-creating-hardworking-idiots/

But hey, that's just me.


And below is an article that describes how this theory applied to Haig.

Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig: World War I’s Worst General

The great commanders of history fascinate us, and we read their biographies looking for one or more character attributes we believe accounted for their success. With Napoleon, for example, we think imagination. In Lee, we see audacity. Wellington, composure. Hannibal, daring. Of course, truly great generals seem to possess all these qualities to some degree. They are artists of a kind, blending in one person intelligence, intuition, courage, calculation and many other traits that allow them to see what others cannot and to act when the time is right. For students of military history, the question of what makes great commanders is inexhaustibly fascinating.
We are, naturally, not intrigued by unsuccessful generals any more than we like to read about ballplayers who hit .200 lifetime. There is nothing edifying in the biography of, say, Ambrose Burnside or any of the Union generals tormented by Stonewall Jackson in the Shenandoah Valley.

But Douglas Haig may be the great exception to this rule. First, because he still has defenders who—in spite of those many graveyards and inconclusive, costly battles—would claim he was not in fact an unsuccessful commander. At the end of the war, after all, the army he commanded—and had almost ruined—was, if not victorious, then plainly on the winning side. Still, at the other extreme, one can argue persuasively that Haig did not merely fail to achieve his stated objectives in the great battles of the Somme and Ypres. He failed in a much grander sense; failed classically in the fashion of Pyrrhus, who lamented after the battle at Asculum, “Another such victory over the Romans and we are undone.”

http://www.historynet.com/field-marshal-sir-douglas-haig-world-war-is-worst-general.htm




 
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