Why does Haig get the shaft?

[reccecrewman]

I realise that this is a thread on Canadian Military history, however, due to our close historical ties with Britain and specifically with respects to our involvement in the first world war, I figured I'd toss this out there.....I recently finished reading a book on yet another of many books I have read on Passchendaele (and World War I in general) and I'm noticing a running theme..... nearly EVERY single author seems to love hammering Sir Douglas Haig into the ground as an incompetent idiot sending hundreds of thousands of men to their deaths without any qualms whatsoever...... am I the only one out there who disagree's and think that Haig was perhaps, one of Britain's only Generals at the time, who KNEW what it would take to win the war? Passchendaele is considered one of Haig's biggest blunders in the sense of what it accomplished and the cost in human life.

I personally believe that 3rd Ypres accomplished a great deal. First, consider this - By the late summer and fall of 1917, the Russian Army was essentially a non factor..... it was evident that the Tsar's Army would soon be a total non factor. As late as December 1916, the average Russian soldier wanted peace at any cost and by the late summer/early fall of 1917, the revolution was at hand. The Tsar abdicated on March 1, and after the failed Kerensky offensive of June 1917 that was Russia's last gasp as soldiers began deserting en masse afterwards.

The French Army was is total chaos as the mutinies swept the Army. After the failed Nivelle offensive, the French Army collapsed as an offensive force. Over 70 Divisions of the French Army flat out refused to attack..... they would defend the homeland, but attack they would not. Between June 1917 and July 1918, the French attacked nowhere along the Western Front.

Now, this presents the British with the burden of carrying on the fight against the Germans. 3rd Ypres and Passchendaele HAD to be fought by the British and Haig was correct to persist in that slugging match with the Germans. By attacking, Haig kept the German attention on them. Had the Germans caught wind of what was happening in the French Army, and made a weighty effort against the French, with the prevailing mood in the French Army, they may well have broke the French line wide open, which would have forced the BEF to fall back to the Channel to protect their flank, opening a huge hole in the Allied line which would enable the Germans to move on Paris AND roll up the entire French Army in flank, thus ending the Great War on German dictated terms.

Haig had the intestinal fortitude to keep hammering away at the Germans despite the losses. The Germans never did catch wind of the French Army's troubles and were content to let the French portions of the line fall into quiet sectors as the sheer weight of the British offensive was requiring every resource the Germans could muster to handle the British assault. David Lloyd George, that absolute fool of a British Prime Minister did everything in his power to try and foil Haig. Lloyd George was a fan of the strategy of "knocking away the props" to Germany. He wanted British troops to fight everywhere BUT France in an effort to curtail British casualties. Turkey, Greece and the Middle East were all options he tried desperately to get the British more heavily committed to. What he seemed to fail to realise was that by knocking out the props, he could never win the war. Germany would not capitulate if Turkey, Bulgaria or Austria-Hungary were defeated. The Germans were the Army that HAD to be beaten in order for victory to be achieved.

Therefore, by continuing to fight the battle of 3rd Ypres, Haig ensured the French Army had sufficient time to recover from 2 and a half years of getting mauled, and more importantly, to keep the Germans tied down until American troops could arrive in strength and alter the balance of power. Haig's persistence in fighting that battle may not have resulted in the war being won in 1917, but it certainly guarenteed the war wasn't lost to the Allies in 1918. I genuinely believe Haig has gotten treated badly by history.

 

[Gorgo]

Agreed.  I'm right now reading Shock Troops by Tim Cook, which chronicles the last 2 years of the Canadian Corps' battles as part of the BEF in France during World War One.  Passchendaele would be a slaughterhouse no matter which Allied army or corps took it on; the Germans had pretty much seen to that.  And since the technology of the period was still transitioning from what had been done in Napoleon's day to what would happen in World War Two, there was simply no way to actually succeed without a lot of hard slogging and lots of people dying and getting maimed as they advanced through No Man's Land, even with a creeping artillery barrage to help out.

LGen Currie understood that when he was tasked to deal with Passchendaele.  And so did FM Haig.

Arthur Currie, at least, was able to salvage his reputation after the war (thanks to what Sam Hughes pulled on him in Parliament sometime after the guns went silent).  But that cost him his life.

Doug Haig, by the looks of it, never got the chance.

 

[time expired]

I think Haig`s reputation is a good example of "popular history" being
given more credit than factual history,there have been other examples
the Vietnam war is another more recent one.The people responsible for
are the authors with an axe to grind.David Lloyd George for instance in
his memoirs blamed Haig for all the losses on the Western front while
in fact Haig was merely carrying out the orders that originated from the
same D.L.George however  Haig was from an upper class background
and D.L.G. was the son of a coalminer,a"working class ero" so to speak
and in 1920s Britain his self serving story was accepted as fact.Many of
the very bitter war memoirs were written in the middle to late 20s and
the bitterness stems more from the economic conditions that were faced
by the soldiers on their return to a Britain in financial crisis.Many felt
their sacrifices had been in vain and were looking for someone to blame,
Haig seemed the perfect scapegoat,and has he steadfastly refused to
defend himself or deflect all the criticism,he has gone down in popular
history as the incompetent General who unfeelingly sent thousands to
their deaths.
              Regards

 

[Michael OLeary]

I agree that Haig has mainly been the target of such hatred simply because the masses felt that someone needed to beheld responsible for the "slaughter."  So much of our societal understanding of the Great War is dependent upon those few authors and poets who were published after the war, most having an anti-war bias at the time, that were  undoubtedly found acceptable by the buying pubic and thusly willingly supported by publishers looking to make money (not necessarily to spread balanced viewpoints).  Later authors also sought to sell books, and trying to overturn the flood of blame directed at Haig over so many decades was not going to guarantee any best-sellers.

Even today, for many researchers and Great War enthusiasts, Hag's "incompetence" is taken as an inviolable pillar of understanding for the War.  Questioning it, to many, is an ultimate act of heresy.

In my mind, the one critical shortcoming of his many detractors has been that none have written the alternate estimate - at strategic and tactical levels - that might have guaranteed at least no worse operational result, and also guaranteed significantly fewer losses.

 

[Kirkhill]

In my opinion one of the best defences of Douglas Haig was written by Corrigan: "Mud, Blood and Poppycock".

He makes the point that Haig was treated as a hero in the immediate aftermath of the war.  It was, apparently, only during the pacifist era of 30s that he came to be seen as the Butcher.

 

[Michael OLeary]

In my opinion one of the best defences of Douglas Haig was written by Corrigan: "Mud, Blood and Poppycock".

He makes the point that Haig was treated as a hero in the immediate aftermath of the war.  It was, apparently, only during the pacifist era of 30s that he came to be seen as the Butcher.

I second the motion that "Mud, Blood and Poppycock" is a worthy read by anyone interested in the Great War.  He critically examines a number of myths about the war and, if nothing else, opens the door to further examination of the records vice just believing what we've always heard.

 

[tomahawk6]

Before commanding I Corps Haig commanded the 17th Lancers. I would have liked to see him command as a Colonel/BG and MG.He was commander of the 1912 Manuevers amd was beaten by Grierson which should have been a tip off that commanding a Field Army might not be his forte. To be fair no one had experienced or even trained for the new type of warfare that WW1 would bring.However I dont think he was the best choice to command a Corps or a Field Army in WW1.

 

[Old Sweat]

Haig was the chief of staff of the Cavalry Division in the Boer War. The division was commanded by French who commanded the BEF before Haig. I don't know enough about all back room stuff that eventually saw Haig appointed as the CinC to comment. I do know that there is a school of thought that General Horace Smith-Dorrien, who had bought enough time by his defence at Le Cateau for the rest of the BEF to stabilize the situation, was shunted aside so others could prosper.

 

[Kirkhill]

T6, I'm not so sure that Haig's career was that much different than Pershing's beyond Pershing's Brigade Command in Mexico.  1 level up.

Haig became GOC in an army that only had 6 nominal field Divisions (4 tasked to the BEF).  There was no Corps level structure in Britain much less Army, or Army Group.  Nor was there even the thought of raising those types of forces.  Much like you in the US.  

Even the Division level of command was exercised rarely.


In Sep 1914 Arthur Currie was a bankrupt real estate developer and a part time LCol commanding an understrength militia battalion.  By July 1917 he had advanced through Bn, Brigade and Division to Corps command.  Monash likewise along with very many other Brit and American Generals.

There was no prologue to the careers of most allied generals that made any difference at all.

The only allied Generals that had training in Corps and higher command were the French and the Russians........and they demonstrated the efficacy of all that previous training through their exemplary handling of the crises.

 

[tomahawk6]

The tactics of the time were essentially human wave assaults on prepared positions which created a meatgrinder and a war of attrition.I do not feel that Haig was well suited to be a theater commander.Being ADC probably did as much to advance his later career than anything else.

 

[Old Sweat]

Haig was a cavalryman, in fact a lancer, so his training and experience would have conditioned him to think of shock action, and the term was used at the time, delivered by a cavalry charge. However to say that the infantry tactics prior to the Great War were based on human waves and attrition is an over simplification. The manuals talked about skirmishing in extended order and winning the fire fight while building up the firing line until a bayonet charge could rout the demoralized enemy.

 

[vonGarvin]

In my mind, the one critical shortcoming of his many detractors has been that none have written the alternate estimate - at strategic and tactical levels - that might have guaranteed at least no worse operational result, and also guaranteed significantly fewer losses.

I'll have some time over the next few weeks.  Perhaps I'll do some research, and see if I can see what the perception of the situation was around, say, 1 January 1917, and see if I can come up with a tactical estimate.  Now, I'm not allowed B1B bombers or A-10 Warthogs, right? ;D

 

[tomahawk6]

Haig once said that the machine gun was overrated. His neat rows of cavalry and infantry advancing at the walk was pure slaughter.At the Some 110,000 infantrymen began the assualt and in a few hours 60,000 were casualties. In our Civil War at Cold Harbor the Confederates shredded the Union Army employing similar tactics to Haigs with the loss of 7000 men in 20 minutes.Haig had no strategy other than to grind up the Germans. Of course this strategy bled Britain white.After the Somme Britain's politicians were adament - no more Sommes. Of course that was the beginning because his next masterpiece was Passchendaele which has the dubious distinction of no other battle in history saw more men die from drowning.

Third Ypres was the battle that gave rise to the story of Haig’s chief of staff being driven to the front and, as he viewed the muddy wasteland, breaking into tears and saying, “Good God, did we really send men to fight in that?”

“It gets worse,” his driver said, “farther on up.”

 

[Long in the tooth]

All the great powers of WW 1 had observers at the Civil war and knew the power of the machine gun.  I consider them all war criminals for allowing the war to happen in the first place.  Churchill especially was negligent.  As first lord of the admiralty he was also in charge of intelligence and should have known that Germany wouldn't collapse in 6 months due to a naval blockade.  Haber had developed a process of fixating nitrates directly from the atmosphere obviating the need to import guano (bird droppings) from south America.

My father lost three uncles in the first world war.  One survived the horror of the first battle of the Somme, only to die a week later when the remnants of his battalion was overrun by two German divisions because his unit did not receive the order to withdraw.

 

[Old Sweat]

I'm not sure Haig should take all the blame for the Somme. (I can't believe I am defending him, because he was in charge when the slaughter happened.) The New Army divisions of 1916 were trained to be no more than cannon fodder, but that was not his decision alone. My inclination is to wonder what the next decades worth of research and analysis will reveal.

Before we jump on his knocking the machine-gun, I suggest we find out when and where and why he said that and in what context. If it was based on his Boer War experience, there could be a grain of truth to it.

 

[tomahawk6]

Haig made that comment in 1915. He just didnt belive in the developing military technologies including the tank.

 

[Michael OLeary]

Sort of like all those modern soldiers who cried doom and gloom at the thought of a wheeled armoured combat vehicle?

 

[Old Sweat]

Good enough, but 1915 was still before much of the tactical developments of the war. Let's divide his stewardship into two areas: his duties as COO of the BEF; and his duties as CEO of the BEF. I think his performance of the first was pretty good. Things like the shell shortage and the need to reorganize the divisions for 1918 were handled well.

I am still not sure on his performance as CEO. Was he in the class of the big three, who bungled the way ahead; was he in the class of the Wall Street financial wizrds blinded by bonuses who created this mess; was he a bumbler lurching from crisis to crisis; was he just promoted beyond his Peter level; or was he a fine general who was forced to create the conditions for victory from barren soil?

I don't know.

 

[mdh]

There have been several attempts to rehabilitate Haig's reputation in recent years. I think John Keegan's observations are apt:

"The energies expended in such reconsiderations seems, to this author at any rate, a pointless waste. The simple truth of 1914-18 trench warfare is that the massing of large numbers of soldiers unprotected by anything but cloth uniforms, however equipped, against large masses of other soldiers, protected by earthworks and barbed wire and provided with rapid fire weapons, was bound to result in very heavy casualties among the attackers. That proved to be the case, whatever the variation in tactics and equipment, and there was much variation, from the beginning of the Aisne in 1914 to the end on the Sambre and Meuse in 1918....The basic and stark fact, nevertheless, was that the conditions of warfare between 1914 and 1918 predisposed towards slaughter and that only an entirely new technology, one not available until a generation later, could have averted such an outcome."

Keegan agrees that it's difficult not to sympathise with the condemnations of Great War generalship: "In no way -- appearances, attitude, spoken pronouncement, written legacy - do they commend themselves to modern opinion or emotion."

However, the historian adds that much of the criticism was unfair.

[The generals] were trapped within the iron fetters of a technology all too adequate fo rmass destruction of llife but quite inadequate to restore to them the flexibilties of control that would have kept the destruction of life within bearable limits."


Quoted from Keegan's The First World War.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Why does Haig get the shaft? Because he wasn't very good... just like many other senior commanders of the time. Some of my earliest memories are of my grandfather (who barely survived WW1 with the 4th Cdn Div) 'speaking ill' of FM Haig. If I remember correctly, he blamed Haig for killing more Canadians than the Germans.

Some Haig dissing sites...

He still had his defenders, but they were in the last trench, barely holding on. Their books argued Haig was a curious, inventive soldier who had, in fact, appreciated the tactical value of machine guns and tanks. Before he died, however, Haig himself gave his critics ammunition by clinging publicly and stubbornly to his outdated certainties. As late as 1926, he was still capable of writing this about the future of warfare:
I believe that the value of the horse and the opportunity for the horse in the future are likely to be as great as ever. Aeroplanes and tanks are only accessories to the men and the horse, and I feel sure that as time goes on you will find just as much use for the horse—the well-bred horse—as you have ever done in the past.
Astonishing that any man who was there could still believe in cavalry 10 years after the Somme. But it is the bit about “the well-bred horse” that really gives the game away. Haig was undeniably a butcher, as his severest critics have claimed, but he was most of all a pompous fool.
http://www.historynet.com/field-marshal-sir-douglas-haig-world-war-is-worst-general.htm

Today, after decades in which Haig's name has been blackened in popular culture (see below), many still regard Haig as an inept commander who exhibited callous disregard for the lives of his soldiers, repeatedly ordering tens of thousands of them to supposedly useless deaths during battles such as Passchendaele. Sometimes the criticism is not so much of Haig personally, as of the generation of British generals which he is deemed to represent - a view aired by writers such as John Laffin ("British Butchers and Bunglers of World War One") and John Mosier ("Myth of the Great War"). As recently as 1998 a major tabloid newspaper celebrated the anniversary of the Armistice by calling for the demolition of Haig's statue on Whitehall. Norman Stone describes Haig as the greatest of Scottish generals, since he killed the highest numbers of English soldiers at any front in history, perhaps a slightly facetious point as Scotland in fact suffered one of the highest proportionate losses of any Allied nation (Niall Ferguson - "The Pity of War").
Paul Fussell, in "The Great War and Modern Memory," writes that "although one doesn't want to be too hard on Haig ... who has been well calumniated already ... it must be said that it now appears was that one thing the war was testing was the usefulness of the earnest Scottish character in a situation demanding the military equivalent of wit and invention. Haig had none. He was stubborn, self-righteous, inflexible, intolerant -- especially of the French -- and quite humourless ... Indeed, one powerful legacy of Haig's performance is the conviction among the imaginative and intelligent today of the unredeemable defectiveness of all civil and military leaders. Haig could be said to have established the paradigm."[9]
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Douglas_Haig,_1st_Earl_Haig