Why does Haig get the shaft?
- Thread starter reccecrewman
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T6
I STRONGLY encourage you to read the Corrigan book that Michael O'Leary endorsed.
It goes the heart of the beliefs that Haig could only countenance a tactic widely associated (in British terms anyway) with the US Army ...."hey-diddle-diddle, straight up the middle." It also points out that he was also criticized for NOT waiting until the tank had been tested more.... he rushed the tank forward in 1916 before it was ready for service, thereby spoiling the surprise. He did that because he need to carry machine guns forward to give support to the infantry.
He was also criticized for NOT deploying cavalry - even though there were no open flanks, nor any good going to get them across the FEBA nor any means of communicating with them when they got across nor any means of supplying fire support when they got there.
He also had to deal with expanded from 4 expeditionary Divisions in Sept 1914 to 50 some in July 1916. How long did it take you lads to figure out how to get updated Vests and MRAPs into Iraq? His CO had to figure out how to get boots and puttees for 50 Divisions in 18 months, not to mention rifles, bullets, trainers and "hay-boxes" for the tea.
He then was confronted in 1917 with a defunct French Army and a Russian Army that quit the field.....
As Michael says... take a run at Corrigan.
I STRONGLY encourage you to read the Corrigan book that Michael O'Leary endorsed.
It goes the heart of the beliefs that Haig could only countenance a tactic widely associated (in British terms anyway) with the US Army ...."hey-diddle-diddle, straight up the middle." It also points out that he was also criticized for NOT waiting until the tank had been tested more.... he rushed the tank forward in 1916 before it was ready for service, thereby spoiling the surprise. He did that because he need to carry machine guns forward to give support to the infantry.
He was also criticized for NOT deploying cavalry - even though there were no open flanks, nor any good going to get them across the FEBA nor any means of communicating with them when they got across nor any means of supplying fire support when they got there.
He also had to deal with expanded from 4 expeditionary Divisions in Sept 1914 to 50 some in July 1916. How long did it take you lads to figure out how to get updated Vests and MRAPs into Iraq? His CO had to figure out how to get boots and puttees for 50 Divisions in 18 months, not to mention rifles, bullets, trainers and "hay-boxes" for the tea.
He then was confronted in 1917 with a defunct French Army and a Russian Army that quit the field.....
As Michael says... take a run at Corrigan.
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Pray tell me what strategy should have been used on the Western front?,
flanking maneavers that may have been available to the Union troops at
Cold Harbour were not much use on a front that stretched from the North
sea to the Swiss border.Surprise was also eliminated by the requirement
of massive bombardment to cut the German wire.No friends there was no
alternative to the to the frontal assault and Haig did that as well as any
General could have.Attrition was the name of the game and that was not
because of any decision that Haig made rather it was strategy imposed
on him by his political masters.France had 1/3 of her territory occupied and
were politically and militarily doomed to attack,Britain as Frances main
partner were doomed to support them anything else would have been
politically unacceptable,so what choice did Haig have?none that I can see.
Another thing that is often forgotten is Haigs handling of the 100 days
battle,this was the battle that ended the war and was an entirely British
run affair.Haig made his long awaited breakthrough pierced the Hindenburg
line and drove the Germans before him till they had enough and funnily
enough had great success with his beloved Cavalry.This was hailed as
the greatest victory by any British General in the entire war and rightly so.
Regards
flanking maneavers that may have been available to the Union troops at
Cold Harbour were not much use on a front that stretched from the North
sea to the Swiss border.Surprise was also eliminated by the requirement
of massive bombardment to cut the German wire.No friends there was no
alternative to the to the frontal assault and Haig did that as well as any
General could have.Attrition was the name of the game and that was not
because of any decision that Haig made rather it was strategy imposed
on him by his political masters.France had 1/3 of her territory occupied and
were politically and militarily doomed to attack,Britain as Frances main
partner were doomed to support them anything else would have been
politically unacceptable,so what choice did Haig have?none that I can see.
Another thing that is often forgotten is Haigs handling of the 100 days
battle,this was the battle that ended the war and was an entirely British
run affair.Haig made his long awaited breakthrough pierced the Hindenburg
line and drove the Germans before him till they had enough and funnily
enough had great success with his beloved Cavalry.This was hailed as
the greatest victory by any British General in the entire war and rightly so.
Regards
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All this reminds me of the effort in the past to restore MG Walter Short's Lt Generalcy because it wasnt his fault that the defense of Hawaii was a fiasco. He like Field Marshall Haig ,were in command and are completely responsible,good or bad warts and all. Both deserve the criticism each have gotten over time. Decisions have consequences. It was our experience in WW1 that US troops are commanded by US generals - until recently that is. 
A bit about FM Haig. ;D
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r3ZvI3_q0n0&NR=1
A bit about FM Haig. ;D
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r3ZvI3_q0n0&NR=1
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TOMAHAWK6
The difference is that Haig won his war.
PS For a great read and a somewhat different take on Haig
Tommy,The British Soldier on the Western Front 1914-18 By Richard Holmes
covers all aspects of the war.
Regards
The difference is that Haig won his war.
PS For a great read and a somewhat different take on Haig
Tommy,The British Soldier on the Western Front 1914-18 By Richard Holmes
covers all aspects of the war.
Regards
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Haig was on the winning side just as MG Walter Short [he was demoted] was. Perhaps it isnt fair to judge Haig but its common today to do so with figures from history. I guess a fair question would be what other British general could have done a better job thus saving the lives of thousands of men.
A funny story about generalship.Maybe it doesnt fit into ths discussion but I liked the story. ;D
A funny story about generalship.Maybe it doesnt fit into ths discussion but I liked the story. ;D
Old Sweat said:
- Let us consider the NEED to re-organize: The British Prime Minister would NOT release soldiers to France - but kept them in England instead to try and limit the BEF's ability to attack. The re-org was due solely to declining troop strength. The re-org - and a move south to take over miles of non-dug French trenches - doomed the Brits (Gough's troops in particular) to a very bad go when the Germans attacked in March 1918.
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To add to TCBF's comment on L.G denying reinforcements to France..... In 1917, he also agreed to take over another 28 miles of front that the French Army had been previously holding. This was an effort to have the British Army spread out over a wider AOR and thus deny more reinforcements to a selected area of front (ie Passchendaele) The travesty of that action led to 5th Army being placed right in the bullseye of the location the Germans chose to unleash their Micheal offensive of March 1918 in an all or nothing bid to win the war. 5th Army was crushed in the opening phases of the Micheal offensive.
To the detractors of Haig, he had no choice but to fight it out at Passchendaele. A refusal to accept casualties and just hang back only gives the Germans time to choose where and when they want to attack. The eastern theatre was nearly finished and the collapse of the Russian Army allowed for 50 plus Divisions to be brought to the west.... Not mediocre Divisions either...... The Eastern Army enjoyed nothing but a successive string of victories in the East and these men brought a renewed hope to the west to break the stalemate.
As well, Haig had some very good commanders underneath him who took great care to minimize casualties, and allowed them some freedom to execute his plans on their own with Plumer commanding Second Army a prime example. Plumer made every effort to minimize casualties within his Army.
To the detractors of Haig, he had no choice but to fight it out at Passchendaele. A refusal to accept casualties and just hang back only gives the Germans time to choose where and when they want to attack. The eastern theatre was nearly finished and the collapse of the Russian Army allowed for 50 plus Divisions to be brought to the west.... Not mediocre Divisions either...... The Eastern Army enjoyed nothing but a successive string of victories in the East and these men brought a renewed hope to the west to break the stalemate.
As well, Haig had some very good commanders underneath him who took great care to minimize casualties, and allowed them some freedom to execute his plans on their own with Plumer commanding Second Army a prime example. Plumer made every effort to minimize casualties within his Army.
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Over the summer and fall I read "At GHQ" and "Field Marshal Earl Haig" by Gen John Charteris who served as Haig's G2 in WW1.
A few things come out
The French in the field were repeatedly timid to the unspoken point of being totally unreliable in their cooperation with the British throughout the war until after March 1918
The British Army had the bulk of the Germans on their front throughout
The British Government (under Lloyd George) tried numerous "sideshows" instead of agreeing on a main effort for the British Army
The British Government paid much more attention to the French Strategic outlook which never produced results until after Mar 1918
The military advisory team under Gen Wilson to the British Government was viewed by Haig and his staff as loyal to the Army but unable to get the ear of the government
Any talk of great moves is overly optimistic in retrospect - their only tool kit was artillery barrage - seize ground - repeat and adapt technology quickly as it came on line - ask yourself - how did they control their artillery to get an idea of the logistics to get the ammo and guns in place - plan it all then employ it. This was not an army that used Human Waves at the expense of all else. At the end of Field Marshall Haig he shows the final puzzle that eluded the Allies throughout the war - the rail links at Cambrai - Valenciennes to the Southern American Sector. As long as the Germans could feed troops in there was no point hitting them frontally (big light goes on? Yes?) and so the Brits fell back behind Amiens until the German supply lines cracked. Then the 100 days begin with troops moving into position for the August - Nov up to the Belgian border.
A generally balanced summary for and against Haig is here
http://www.johndclare.net/wwi3_HaigHistoriography.htm
One note that stands out
(Lloyd George employed a staff of 3 secretaries to research the book, he was given privileged access to the Cabinet Minutes, and he liaised closely with Liddell Hart over the military details. The book was also sent to the Prime Minister and to relevant government departments for checking and vetting.)
Which leads me to a conclusion - an author commented on Churchill's Writings on the First World War - "Yes but! That's Winston's version"
And so we continue seeking insights on those time through forums like this
A few things come out
The French in the field were repeatedly timid to the unspoken point of being totally unreliable in their cooperation with the British throughout the war until after March 1918
The British Army had the bulk of the Germans on their front throughout
The British Government (under Lloyd George) tried numerous "sideshows" instead of agreeing on a main effort for the British Army
The British Government paid much more attention to the French Strategic outlook which never produced results until after Mar 1918
The military advisory team under Gen Wilson to the British Government was viewed by Haig and his staff as loyal to the Army but unable to get the ear of the government
Any talk of great moves is overly optimistic in retrospect - their only tool kit was artillery barrage - seize ground - repeat and adapt technology quickly as it came on line - ask yourself - how did they control their artillery to get an idea of the logistics to get the ammo and guns in place - plan it all then employ it. This was not an army that used Human Waves at the expense of all else. At the end of Field Marshall Haig he shows the final puzzle that eluded the Allies throughout the war - the rail links at Cambrai - Valenciennes to the Southern American Sector. As long as the Germans could feed troops in there was no point hitting them frontally (big light goes on? Yes?) and so the Brits fell back behind Amiens until the German supply lines cracked. Then the 100 days begin with troops moving into position for the August - Nov up to the Belgian border.
A generally balanced summary for and against Haig is here
http://www.johndclare.net/wwi3_HaigHistoriography.htm
One note that stands out
(Lloyd George employed a staff of 3 secretaries to research the book, he was given privileged access to the Cabinet Minutes, and he liaised closely with Liddell Hart over the military details. The book was also sent to the Prime Minister and to relevant government departments for checking and vetting.)
Which leads me to a conclusion - an author commented on Churchill's Writings on the First World War - "Yes but! That's Winston's version"
And so we continue seeking insights on those time through forums like this
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Firstly the idea that any General in WW1 fought the battle is an illusion
he planned the battle and passed on his orders and waited for the results,
after the troops went over the top he at Army HQ had no control,nor did
Div.HQ,Bde.HQ,Bat.HQ or even Coy.level, all opportunities to control the
battle were lost,the only person to to have any level of control of the fight
was the platoon commander and then only as far as his voice would carry.
Why was this?,while weapons had developed fairly rapidly comms had not,
it could be argued that comms at Waterloo were better than at the Somme,
Officers on horse back moving to various parts of the line with new orders
definitely not an option on the Somme.Therefore one must come to the
conclusion that any General if he could formulate plans that were clear and
concise would have done as well or as badly as Haig.Haigs major problem
was that he did not write a selfserving memoirs, others did ,and many of
them shifted all the blame for the, in truth ,unavoidable losses on him and
as I said before he made no attempt to defend himself making him an easy
target.
Haigs and the 1WW Generals incompetence has become part of our historical
memory based not on facts but a collective shock and disgust at the huge losses
incurred by the tactics employed by said Generals, non of the critics professional
or amateur have ever presented a viable alternative to these tactics.The 60s
bought a new wave of anti-military feelings to the surface and Haig and the
WW1 Generals came in for another thrashing,The Donkeys,a book by pseudo
historian Alan Clark,Oh What a Lovely War,and even the very funny Blackadder
series cashed in on this anti military attitudes and perpetuated the incompetence
myth,but I digress and I think its time to wrap this up.
Regards
he planned the battle and passed on his orders and waited for the results,
after the troops went over the top he at Army HQ had no control,nor did
Div.HQ,Bde.HQ,Bat.HQ or even Coy.level, all opportunities to control the
battle were lost,the only person to to have any level of control of the fight
was the platoon commander and then only as far as his voice would carry.
Why was this?,while weapons had developed fairly rapidly comms had not,
it could be argued that comms at Waterloo were better than at the Somme,
Officers on horse back moving to various parts of the line with new orders
definitely not an option on the Somme.Therefore one must come to the
conclusion that any General if he could formulate plans that were clear and
concise would have done as well or as badly as Haig.Haigs major problem
was that he did not write a selfserving memoirs, others did ,and many of
them shifted all the blame for the, in truth ,unavoidable losses on him and
as I said before he made no attempt to defend himself making him an easy
target.
Haigs and the 1WW Generals incompetence has become part of our historical
memory based not on facts but a collective shock and disgust at the huge losses
incurred by the tactics employed by said Generals, non of the critics professional
or amateur have ever presented a viable alternative to these tactics.The 60s
bought a new wave of anti-military feelings to the surface and Haig and the
WW1 Generals came in for another thrashing,The Donkeys,a book by pseudo
historian Alan Clark,Oh What a Lovely War,and even the very funny Blackadder
series cashed in on this anti military attitudes and perpetuated the incompetence
myth,but I digress and I think its time to wrap this up.
Regards
- Reaction score
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- Points
- 530
Haig was roundly criticized from the end of WW1 through the 30's and beyond. Maybe its because of the tens of thousands of men killed during his operations that he was the subject of so much conjecture. Maybe it was his public prouncements like this :
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Its clear it was because Lloyd George undercut Haig from day 1 after the Asquith Government fell - to the extent of trying to have him excluded from the 1919 Victory Parade in London, only to be told by the King that "that won't do."
There's a book out there by Gen James Harbord who was #2 to Gen Pershing - James G. Harbord, The American Army in France, 1917–1918 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1936), and he tells us that in June 1917 - Brits and France come to Washington asking for aid when the US has come in - Brits and French have 2 different shopping lists and the Brits included US troops under Brit Officers. Needless to say this was rejected but that should tell you something of their vetting of the request at the highest levels - even when they had lots of manpower in England.
Lloyd George also reveals himself as driven by internal politics in the Newton Baker Memoirs - Baker was Sec of War for Woodrow Wilson in WW1. In this excellent 2 vol memoir we see Baker visit US Troops in France and then to the UK to see Lloyd George asking "why was there no Joint Command?" Lloyd George replies "we would have been turfed out of office."
Quick bio on Baker http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Newton_D._Baker
A link to the above - its all politics all the time
"The abiding image of 1914-18 is the futile slaughter of the Western Front. To have been the prime minister who presided over Passchendaele does not seem an achievement to be celebrated, even if the Allies did win in the end.
In fact, Lloyd George was as appalled as anyone by the slaughter and did his best to mitigate it. But his position was desperately weak. He transformed the premiership out of all recognition from Asquith's gentlemanly amateurism, and in many ways did exercise an unprecedented grip on the direction of the war. Yet as the Liberal leader of a Tory-dominated coalition, he was dependent on the Conservatives for his political survival; and as a civilian head of government he could not – short of sacking them – override the strategic judgement of the generals, who in any case told the despised politicians as little as possible of their intentions. So Lloyd George's war leadership is not so much a study in power, like Churchill's, as in impotence and damage limitation." http://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/books/reviews/lloyd-george-war-leader-by-john-grigg-605636.html
Background on the US mobilisation by a certain student http://www.westernsappers.ca/Wilson/
The memoirs of Walter Page - US Ambassador to the Brits throughout WW1 - great insight into Woodrow Wilson sleeping his way into war - http://net.lib.byu.edu/~rdh7/wwi/memoir/Page/PageTC.htm
What I conclude
Brits and the USA under Wilson were emerging into the future world and WW1 was way beyond what they had dealt with in opening up the North American continent or supposedly running the Empire.
Anyone remember the lost year in Iraq? http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/yeariniraq/view/
Haig would probably say there was a lost 3 years in NW France
There's a book out there by Gen James Harbord who was #2 to Gen Pershing - James G. Harbord, The American Army in France, 1917–1918 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1936), and he tells us that in June 1917 - Brits and France come to Washington asking for aid when the US has come in - Brits and French have 2 different shopping lists and the Brits included US troops under Brit Officers. Needless to say this was rejected but that should tell you something of their vetting of the request at the highest levels - even when they had lots of manpower in England.
Lloyd George also reveals himself as driven by internal politics in the Newton Baker Memoirs - Baker was Sec of War for Woodrow Wilson in WW1. In this excellent 2 vol memoir we see Baker visit US Troops in France and then to the UK to see Lloyd George asking "why was there no Joint Command?" Lloyd George replies "we would have been turfed out of office."
Quick bio on Baker http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Newton_D._Baker
A link to the above - its all politics all the time
"The abiding image of 1914-18 is the futile slaughter of the Western Front. To have been the prime minister who presided over Passchendaele does not seem an achievement to be celebrated, even if the Allies did win in the end.
In fact, Lloyd George was as appalled as anyone by the slaughter and did his best to mitigate it. But his position was desperately weak. He transformed the premiership out of all recognition from Asquith's gentlemanly amateurism, and in many ways did exercise an unprecedented grip on the direction of the war. Yet as the Liberal leader of a Tory-dominated coalition, he was dependent on the Conservatives for his political survival; and as a civilian head of government he could not – short of sacking them – override the strategic judgement of the generals, who in any case told the despised politicians as little as possible of their intentions. So Lloyd George's war leadership is not so much a study in power, like Churchill's, as in impotence and damage limitation." http://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/books/reviews/lloyd-george-war-leader-by-john-grigg-605636.html
Background on the US mobilisation by a certain student http://www.westernsappers.ca/Wilson/
The memoirs of Walter Page - US Ambassador to the Brits throughout WW1 - great insight into Woodrow Wilson sleeping his way into war - http://net.lib.byu.edu/~rdh7/wwi/memoir/Page/PageTC.htm
What I conclude
Brits and the USA under Wilson were emerging into the future world and WW1 was way beyond what they had dealt with in opening up the North American continent or supposedly running the Empire.
Anyone remember the lost year in Iraq? http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/yeariniraq/view/
Haig would probably say there was a lost 3 years in NW France
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An honest, fair and accurate appraisal (and thus political anathema). The only alternative open was to refuse battle entirely and thus concede German possession of Flanders and Northern France. And that wasn't a political option either.
See my tag line "over, under, around or through".
Over wasn't an option - no helos, no parachutes
Under was actively exploited - mining - but progress was too slow and passageways to narrow for an army to pass under the enemy lines and come up in the rear.
Around wasn't an option as there were no open flanks - and the prospect of a Gallipoli style landing attempt at Cuxhaven doesn't bear thinking about.
That only left "Through"
And in 1916 the only "novelty" that Haig had to try to do things differently than at Loos in 1915, was a packet of a handful of prototype tanks. Beyond that he had a mass of infantry that had been in uniform for less than a year led by officers and nco's that were not much longer in uniform. Some were elected from their peers. The Somme was the first battle for most of those soldiers, their first time on the two way firing range.
......The Somme should not have been fought,
Except for the fact that the Germans had launched the Verdun Meat Grinder with the expressed intention of wearing down the French, and they were succeeding.
The only way to relieve the pressure was to attack the Germans elsewhere and the only force available was the BEF with "No tanks, inadequate arty, no comms, poor training, no air support, enemy entrenched, no surprise."
The Somme should not have been fought. BUT. The Somme HAD to be fought.
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Odd Kirkhill your argument could have been said about any of Haig's offensives.
Compare Haig to Wellington.Haig had none of Wellingtons qualities including compassion.Wellington once slept on the floor and gave his bed to a dying aide.No such stories about Haig.
I ran across this interesting account about Australians on the Western Front. They were outstanding troops that didnt put up with what today we would call mickey mouse policies inflicted on the troops on the front.I enjoyed this anecdote:
And this:
Finally this nugget.Important now as it was then.
Compare Haig to Wellington.Haig had none of Wellingtons qualities including compassion.Wellington once slept on the floor and gave his bed to a dying aide.No such stories about Haig.
I ran across this interesting account about Australians on the Western Front. They were outstanding troops that didnt put up with what today we would call mickey mouse policies inflicted on the troops on the front.I enjoyed this anecdote:
And this:
Finally this nugget.Important now as it was then.
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I think you will find similar comments about Canadian troops and yet Haig got along fine with Currie, their Canadian (non-Imperial) commander. Despite the back chat he gave him about not having enough guns on line for Passchendaele.
Besides, and here is my trump card, his family produces good whisky ;D
Besides, and here is my trump card, his family produces good whisky ;D
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I'm in! Good find.
Good find.tomahawk6 said:
- In any case, the Australian Corps would be led by LGen John Monash starting in May 1918. I rather doubt anyone had any reservations about his effectiveness as a Corps Commander: during the battle of Amiens, he commanded 200,000 men, inluding 50,000 Americans.
- He did have his detractrors (one of his brother officers thought that the Australian Corps should not be led by a Jew), but 'Monty' thought Monash the best General of the First World War.
exspy
Full Member
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Kirkhill,
While I understand what you are saying when you declare that the Battle of the Somme had to be fought, I think that I (for the first time) will have to disagree with what you have said.
I keep thinking of the hundred's of thousands of private soldiers who were going to have to die in order to win Haig's war of attrition. Would Flanders have been lost if the British offensive had been delayed a year and new technologies allowed to develop? Would France have been lost if the French Army had withdrawn from Verdun to save itself? In both cases I think not.
It's my belief that a soldier has to go into battle with a reasonable expectation that his actions, and possibly his sacrifice, will achieve a victory for his side. No soldier will willingly fight if he knows that the only way to victory is to agree to sacrifice himself in order to wear down an enemy who, at the end of the day, simply cannot endure the casualties that his army can. A victory that may be years away and will see the sacrifice of thousands of his friends and neighbours as well. Soldiers do not volunteer to die, but they will volunteer to risk.
Haig did the best he could. This I can agree with. Does Haig deserve the post-war reputation he got? I think he does. No matter how one dresses up the strategic thinking behind agreeing to fight a war of attrition, nobody wants to be a member of the PBI who is going to be sacrificed in order to achieve it.
Now, let the arrows and missiles commence.
Dan.
While I understand what you are saying when you declare that the Battle of the Somme had to be fought, I think that I (for the first time) will have to disagree with what you have said.
I keep thinking of the hundred's of thousands of private soldiers who were going to have to die in order to win Haig's war of attrition. Would Flanders have been lost if the British offensive had been delayed a year and new technologies allowed to develop? Would France have been lost if the French Army had withdrawn from Verdun to save itself? In both cases I think not.
It's my belief that a soldier has to go into battle with a reasonable expectation that his actions, and possibly his sacrifice, will achieve a victory for his side. No soldier will willingly fight if he knows that the only way to victory is to agree to sacrifice himself in order to wear down an enemy who, at the end of the day, simply cannot endure the casualties that his army can. A victory that may be years away and will see the sacrifice of thousands of his friends and neighbours as well. Soldiers do not volunteer to die, but they will volunteer to risk.
Haig did the best he could. This I can agree with. Does Haig deserve the post-war reputation he got? I think he does. No matter how one dresses up the strategic thinking behind agreeing to fight a war of attrition, nobody wants to be a member of the PBI who is going to be sacrificed in order to achieve it.
Now, let the arrows and missiles commence.
Dan.
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