Why does Haig get the shaft?

[Old Sweat]

I am not an expert on the Great War by any stretch. However one thing that I noted when looking at the 100 days is that Currie fought all the battles after Amiens with only two divisions at a time. In one operation he would employ the 1st and 4th Divisions, then in the next the 2nd and 3rd would be used. The unused divisions would be resting and refitting for the next operation. Finally, on 11 November 1918 when the 3rd Division was liberating Mons with the 2nd Division on its flank, the 1st and 4th were out of the line.

 

[ltmaverick25]

And ltMaverick25:
 You wish us to prove a negative?

I would be more comfortable accepting your position if you had more knowledge of allied and enemy forces and had come to your own conclusions rather than, apparently (and I will apologize again if necessary) accepting the word of others that "The Canadians Were Best Corps On The Front" and seeking to find new arguments to buttress an entrenched hypothesis.

There are Aussie nationalists that make similar claims about their troops (and they have a bigger cheerleading section in London than the Canadians  ;D )

What makes you think I have not come to my own conclusions?  It cant be helped that some of these conclusions were developed before I was born, surely I can be excused for that

As I tried to say previously, I am training to be an academic historian, as well as an officer.  I dont think I would make it very far just accepting the conclusions of others.  In fact, one of the only conclusions about the Canadian Corps from the Great War that I do happen to agree with is their overall combat prowess on the offensive.  The problem I find is that Canadian historians do not do a good job of explaining WHY!!!  They all seem to agree that the Corps was indeed elite, and it was, but how and why?  Tim Cook in my view is the only historian that comes close to developing an adequate explanation but he still falls short (Shock Troops).

The article that I am writing attempts to address the gap.  It will explain Canadian success in the Great War using an in depth method of analysis developed by Steven Biddle.  The same method of analysis is being applied to French, British and German formations.  The differences are conclusive in my opinion.  Its difficult for me to quantify all of this year without copy pasting the entire article, but its not finished yet!

I feel somehow you have been left with the impression that all I have done is read secondary sources by Canadian authors.  That is not the case.  I have read every secondary Canadian source I have been able to identify mind you.  I have also read British and French sources as well, just not as many.  Thats just the start point though.  You always look at prevailing historiography before plowing through archives.  It helps give you a starting point, enables you to develop questions of your own that you want to answer, and should you disagree with interpretations already made, you know what primary documentation to look up so you are looking at the same things that the author has.

I've spent three years going through the war records available at both the LAC and National War museum.  I dont have much on a guy like Cook yet who has been doing it for close to 20 years, but I do conduct my own research and develop my own arguments.  With all that aside, I come back to my previous challenge.

If you or others do not accept the argument that the Canadian Corps was the best formation on the attack from 1917 onwards (which is a legitimate position to take) then indicate why.  Disprove the argument.  What evidence have you, or have you read that would lead you to beleive that the argument posted above is not sound or valid?  If the Canadian Corps was not the best Corps on the attack then who was?  Was there any or did they all perform more or less equally?

Thus far, those who have taken acception to my argument seem to be hinging on the beleif that I dont know much about other armies (granted not as much as I do the Canadian Corps) but have not presented a counter argument.  I get the impression it is more me that is being challenged (no offence taken) then the argument itself.  So take me out of it, was the Canadian Corps the best Corps on the attack?  If not then who?  Why?

I am not making an assertion, I am making an argument.  What makes an argument an argument is that it can be both proven and disproven.  An assertion is more like an opinion.  You cannot disprove an opinion, its an endless circle.  Disprove the argument.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

I think that the onus still lies on the person making the argument to prove their case, not the opposite!

Have you studied the German Storm Troop tactics in detail? Have you compared the Michaeal Offensive to the 100 days? I think that it is a rich field to study, but I find definitive conclusions harder to reach. There is a lot of national mythology to work through.

I have not read the Biddle book you mention, although I have read Biddle works and have been impressed. I find it odd to say that the German defences were "pre-modern." The elastic defence devised by the WW1 Germans was fairly advanced. The Germans were indeed alarmed when the Vimy attack succeeded against their new defences, but they concluded that the application had been flawed. While Amiens is a stunning victory, it is notable that the exploitation was halted by German counter-moves. I think that it is also hard to say that "bite and hold" was a Canadian invention. The Terraine book that Time Expired mentioned is a great read.

 

[Kirkhill]

.... but I find definitive conclusions harder to reach. ....

I think this is the essence of my problem: The entire concept that there could be a Best.

Different units, at different times, with different personnel operating under different circumstances performed differently.  Some performed in exemplary fashion and some failed to impress and some the performed well/poorly reversed themselves later.

 

[tomahawk6]

Morale had to be a factor in WW1,sitting in trenches under bombardment knowing that you will die either in the trench or going over the top. Soldiers need hope and there was very little in short supply on the Western Front.

 

[ltmaverick25]

I think that the onus still lies on the person making the argument to prove their case, not the opposite!

Have you studied the German Storm Troop tactics in detail? Have you compared the Michaeal Offensive to the 100 days? I think that it is a rich field to study, but I find definitive conclusions harder to reach. There is a lot of national mythology to work through.

I have not read the Biddle book you mention, although I have read Biddle works and have been impressed. I find it odd to say that the German defences were "pre-modern." The elastic defence devised by the WW1 Germans was fairly advanced. The Germans were indeed alarmed when the Vimy attack succeeded against their new defences, but they concluded that the application had been flawed. While Amiens is a stunning victory, it is notable that the exploitation was halted by German counter-moves. I think that it is also hard to say that "bite and hold" was a Canadian invention. The Terraine book that Time Expired mentioned is a great read.

I think the onus is a two way street.  Be it argument or counter argument you need to prove or support it.  I suppose supporting it properly goes beyond the scope of these forums unless one of us posts our finished product for everyone to look at, which in my case is still a few months away.  I have studied Michael in great detail.  It is the backbone of some of the comparison I am using.  I have also studied the 100 days in great detail.  This includes other armies as well.  Read the Biddle book, he talks about Michael in great detail too actually.  There is no question the Germans executed the breakthrough well, and I would argue the best breakthrough of the war, up until the point it got stopped anyway.

As far as the German defences go.  You have to study the broader picture there.  As I have said myself several times the Germans did migrate over to an elastic system of defence in depth, equating to the modern system of force employment on the defensive.  This is exactly why they pulled back to the Hindenburn line prior to the Arras/Vimy and French Offensives.  They saw the writing on the wall.  The problem here is that they did not employ this defensive system at Vimy.  Vimy was the only area of their entire lines that used a pre modern system.  Many reasons for this.  Overconfidence since the Ridge was considered the most heavily fortified and best defended position of the entire line.  Terrain is also an issue, the terrain did not allow for a defence in depth without losing the ridge. 

Thats why I say you have a modern force employment offensive against a pre modern force employment defensive.

The Germans were indeed worried about Vimy because at the time higher command was under the impression that Vimy was using the modern tactics, they breathed a sigh of releif when they discovered that the modern tactics had not been employed.

As for the bite and hold strategy.  I did not say the Canadians invented it, I dont know if there is conclusive evidence one way or the other as to who invented bite and hold.  At Vimy, Bite and Hold was their objective given to them from higher, so thats what they did.  The success of bite and hold coupled with their new combined arms assault heavily influenced the way they would do business the rest of the war.  They continued to use bite and hold afterwards to great success.

I dont think it necessarily matters who invented tactics in this case, but rather who implemented them better.  My argument is the Canadian Corps did.  As for who invented the tactics.  Very grey area.  Currie learned from the French, McNaughton learned what not to do from the British and and disagreed heavily with the French.  Jeffrey Williams argues that the lessons Currie brought forward from the French and recomended to Byng only reinforced Byngs existing thoughts on the matter, meaning that he was already developing these tactics.  I dont have the answer to who owns the copyright of the tactics.  But the Canadian Corps owned the implementation and execution of those tactics.

When my paper is published ill toss it up here for everyone to haggle through.  I beleive Biddle's framework will offer the analysis engine requird to compare and contrast in a non subjective manner.

What other books have you read from Biddle that impressed you.  Id be interested in reading anything else he has written given the quality of Military Power.

 

[ltmaverick25]

I think this is the essence of my problem: The entire concept that there could be a Best.

Different units, at different times, with different personnel operating under different circumstances performed differently.  Some performed in exemplary fashion and some failed to impress and some the performed well/poorly reversed themselves later.

I think thats fair to say. 

Thats why im looking at 1917-1918 exclusively for this argument.  In 1914-1916 I do not beleive one could argue that the Canadian Corps was the best at anything let alone combined arms offensives.

 

[ltmaverick25]

Morale had to be a factor in WW1,sitting in trenches under bombardment knowing that you will die either in the trench or going over the top. Soldiers need hope and there was very little in short supply on the Western Front.

Not until Vimy Ridge anyway.

For those of you thinking im regurgitating the arguments of others tune in, here is an Ltmaverick25 original

This is something else im working on the side...

My Thesis: Was the battle of Vimy Ridge proof that the war could be won?  Prior to Vimy, morale on all sides was extremely low due to the high casualties for little to no gain resulting in stalemate. Did Vimy Ridge demonstrate to the common allied soldier that the most heavily defended German position could be taken?  If so what were the tangible effects?

My tentative argument:  Yes, the success of the Canadian Corps changed the way the common soldier thought of the war in terms of the prospect of victory.

The research:  Im still going through this now.  Im reviewing personal correspondents with family, friends, loved ones ect... from all allied armies and the Germans prior to Vimy Ridge.  I am also doing the same with correspondence after Vimy Ridge to answer the above question.

Im also looking at taking things a step further.  What did Vimy tell senior military leadership about the war if anything?

What about the politicians?

If I try to do it all, I think that would turn into a book instead of a paper.  But I am definitly going after part 1 for now, the common soldier.

 

[Greymatters]

As for the bite and hold strategy.  I did not say the Canadians invented it, I dont know if there is conclusive evidence one way or the other as to who invented bite and hold.  At Vimy, Bite and Hold was their objective given to them from higher, so thats what they did.  The success of bite and hold coupled with their new combined arms assault heavily influenced the way they would do business the rest of the war.  They continued to use bite and hold afterwards to great success.

I dont think it necessarily matters who invented tactics in this case, but rather who implemented them better.  My argument is the Canadian Corps did.  As for who invented the tactics.  Very grey area. 

I cant recall the title of the thread, but I think I recall reading one here where this tactic was attributed an Australian general...?

 

[Blackadder1916]

I cant recall the title of the thread, but I think I recall reading one here where this tactic was attributed an Australian general...?

It seems that the Australian government doesn't attribute "bite and hold " to one of its own when it has the opportunity while describing the tactics here.

http://www.ww1westernfront.gov.au/battlefields/menin-road-1917.html

The British plan was to batter down this formidable defensive position using mainly so-called ‘bite and hold’ tactics. After an opening bombardment the infantry would advance for a prescribed distance behind a ‘creeping’ barrage of shells. This barrage would keep the Germans in their ‘pillboxes’ until British soldiers were almost upon them. The enemy positions would then be captured, consolidated and protected from counter-attack by artillery. Guns would be brought forward and the next ‘bite’ attempted. In this way the British aimed to work their way from their start lines near Ypres to the heights of the ridge ten kilometres away at Passchendaele village. It was thought that by the time Passchendaele would be reached, the German reserves would be used up. A breakthrough could then be made to the enemy’s rear and towards the Belgian coast to the north. General Sir Douglas Haig, the British commander in chief, viewed the ‘Flanders Offensive’ as his war-winning stroke of 1917.

The Battle of the Menin Road was the first major Australian involvement in the series of British ‘bite and hold’ attacks which began on 31 July 1917. Collectively these operations are known as ‘The Third Battle of Ypres’. After moving through Ypres, the First and Second Australian Divisions manned the front lines opposite Glencorse Wood. The ground was waterlogged in low lying areas but otherwise dry.

 

[Michael OLeary]

How did we get from

Therefore, by continuing to fight the battle of 3rd Ypres, Haig ensured the French Army had sufficient time to recover from 2 and a half years of getting mauled, and more importantly, to keep the Germans tied down until American troops could arrive in strength and alter the balance of power. Haig's persistence in fighting that battle may not have resulted in the war being won in 1917, but it certainly guarenteed the war wasn't lost to the Allies in 1918. I genuinely believe Haig has gotten treated badly by history.

to

If you or others do not accept the argument that the Canadian Corps was the best formation on the attack from 1917 onwards (which is a legitimate position to take) then indicate why.  Disprove the argument.  What evidence have you, or have you read that would lead you to beleive that the argument posted above is not sound or valid?  If the Canadian Corps was not the best Corps on the attack then who was?  Was there any or did they all perform more or less equally?

and now

..., here is an Ltmaverick25 original

This is something else im working on the side...

My Thesis: Was the battle of Vimy Ridge proof that the war could be won?  Prior to Vimy, morale on all sides was extremely low due to the high casualties for little to no gain resulting in stalemate. Did Vimy Ridge demonstrate to the common allied soldier that the most heavily defended German position could be taken?  If so what were the tangible effects?

My tentative argument:  Yes, the success of the Canadian Corps changed the way the common soldier thought of the war in terms of the prospect of victory.

The research:  Im still going through this now.  Im reviewing personal correspondents with family, friends, loved ones ect... from all allied armies and the Germans prior to Vimy Ridge.  I am also doing the same with correspondence after Vimy Ridge to answer the above question.

How do your papers impact on the original subject of the thread? It seems to have become more about you than Haig.

 

[ltmaverick25]

How did we get from

to

and now

How do your papers impact on the original subject of the thread? It seems to have become more about you than Haig.

Your right.  I initially started off by using the Canadian Corps and the leadership within it to contrast it to Haig arguing that Haig was incompetent, comparing him to examples of what I consider to be the opposite.  It went from there.  Out of respect for the original topic, I will duck out.

 

[daftandbarmy]

And here's an opportunity to pursue this topic further and get some letters after your name:

MA British First World War Studies

http://www.firstworldwar.bham.ac.uk/ma/structure.htm


They've even got a module on 'The Donkeys', which is why I also posted this in the 'donkey' thread (on a satirical whim).

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

I hope that we do not stiffle an interesting (to me anyway) debate because it veers from the thread title somewhat.

I have a hard time with arguments about who was the best at something, since it is hard to find an equitable yard stick. The conditions always seem to be a little different (terrain, enemy, weather etc). I can accept an argument that the Canadian Corps was one of the best offensive formations in 1917/18. They would share that place with the ANZACs, several British divisions and the Germans.

Regarding Haig, I think that the British public needed a focal point for their anger and grief from the losses suffered during the war. I don't want to defend the Somme or Passchendaele, but I believe that Reccecrewman has a point about those attacks relieving pressure on the French.

 

[reccecrewman]

I think that it was considered a non-starter by the Brits, in spite of their naval superiority.  If you look at the coast of Belgium, it is roughly 25 miles (according to a quick look at that map you posted).  The Netherlands were neutral, so landing there would also be a non-starter.  I also believe, if I'm not mistaken, that the land near the coast was lower than sealevel (reclaimed lands), thus making it possible for the Germans to flood it, making it impassable.  

King Albert, the monarch of Belgium had already flooded it..... he ordered the sluices opened in the opening phases of the German invasion in August 1914 in an attempt to slow the Germans down while the bulk of the Belgian Army retreated to Antwerp. A Naval intervention in Belgium was simply not a viable option..... now, on the other hand..... a direct amphibious assault on Germany was not nescessarily impossible. Even after the inclusive Battle of Jutland,(Inconclusive because to this day, there is no clear cut answer as to who won it) the British still held a superiority by far in naval power. Jellicoe committed too many errors at Jutland, but make no assumptions that the German High Seas Fleet could actually challenge the Royal Navy..... they couldn't. Have a look at the German ORBAT of naval vessels in 1916 and you'll see for yourself when compared to the RN, the Germans were grossly undermatched. The Germans still counted their Deutchland class pre-dreadnaughts as capital units and these ships could never risk meeting the fast Queen Elizabeth class battleships on even terms. After Jutland, the ratio of capital ships of German to British was 10:24.....  who knows what could have happened had the British made a serious attempt to move into the Baltic to destroy the German fleet and land troops behind German lines.....

 

[Kirkhill]

who knows what could have happened had the British made a serious attempt to move into the Baltic to destroy the German fleet and land troops behind German lines.....

Gallipoli North?

First of all the RN would have had two options:

To land in the teeth of the German Navy based at Wilhelmshaven on the Frisian Coast of Jutland - It fought two battles there, Heligoland Bight in 1914 and Jutland in 1916 -  I suggest that the German Navy was more than capable of busting up a landing in that area let alone the ease with which Germans could have moved troops to that front.

To force its way round Sjaelland by either the narrows between Elsinore and Elsingborg (a 3 km gap between Neutral Sweden and Neutral Denmark) of or to push through the shallow national waters of (still) Neutral Denmark. 

The Germans had the Kiel Kanal connecting the High Seas fleet in Wilhelmshaven on the North Sea to Kiel on the Baltic.  This short-cut gave the Germans an internal line of communication that allowed them to rapidly shift their capital ships from flank to flank.  Interestingly it paralleled the original Hansa trade route from Hamburg to Lubeck which is the source of wealth for one of the oldest royal families in Europe - the Oldenburgs.

At Gallipoli the RN managed to put ashore, on the first day, 2 Divisions on 2 beaches from a jerry-rigged assortment of rowboats, steam tugs, trawlers, transports, battleships and destroyers.  There were no D-Day type landing ships available.
The troops were put ashore in brigade waves of half-battalions (all the battalions of a brigade contributed two companies to the first and second waves).

I find it difficult to accept that we could successfully land a viable force on those shores.

The Germans had enough naval force to contest the North Sea with the RN at least a few times:

In addition to Heligoland and Jutland there was also Dover Straits, Dogger Bank, Whitby and Hartlepool.  That presence would have been enough to disrupt any landing attempt, IMHO.

Jellicoe is often given the benefit of the doubt at Jutland by those that argue that he didn't lose the fleet.

On the other hand,  he finally had a chance to destroy the German Fleet that was protecting Germany from an Amphibious landing - and he failed.

With that success, and some more initiative along the lines of those that developed the tank to develop assault transports, then perhaps an amphibious assault might have worked.   But with that failure to destroy the Kaiser's flank protection on 1 June 1916, one month before the Somme - Haig was faced with only a long, hard slog against entrenched German positions.

Edit:  Who writes this stuff?  He really should get an editor.

 

[Old Sweat]

The British did attempt amphibious raids on Zeebrugge and Ostend in 1918. An account can be found here:

http://www.firstworldwar.com/battles/zeebrugge.htm

In my opinion, any thing more complex was clearly impossible and would have made the proposed Operation Sea Lion 22 years later look like a sure thing.