The CCV and the Infantry

[Fishbone Jones]

Thats the US. If you ever served in a battalion equipped with LAVs, we take a much different mind set than the yanks to training on LAVIII crews and career progression in and out of the LAV. We are too small an army to treat our grunts like nothing but armoured crewman.

I'm not sure if that's a kick in the nuts or not? 8)

 

[MikeL]

“To add to this trend the Infantry Center’s decision to separate the enlisted force into 11M mech infantry and 11B light infantry (including airborne, air assault and Ranger) has created an unfortunate side effect.  Until the mid-1980s, NCOs routinely transferred from mech to light.  The airborne guys brought in foot skills; the mounted folks taught combined-arms tank ops.  Pre-Bradley M-113 mechanized units knew how to fight on the ground.  In an under-gunned, thinly protected M-113, trying to do it any other way got very risky very fast.

“But those days are over.  The force has divided. The 11Bs have gone to Ranger school and out on patrols and night infiltration.  The 11Ms opt for master gunner courses and live-fire battle run ranges.  Although mech leaders acknowledge a need for dismounts with the “full skills and toughness of light infantry,” that’s one bunch of jobs too many for mechanized soldiers fully committed to learning the ins and outs of a complex, capable armoured fighting vehicle.  The 11M specialty naturally puts a premium on the highly challenging Bradley turret skills, running and gunning, not fighting on foot.  Rank as an 11M is made by learning the hull and engine, then the turret.....

“The 11B-11M enlisted separation and the latter’s emphasis on the fighting vehicle, not the fighting men, leads to disturbing consequences if not checked by a determined chain of command.  In some U.S. Army mech battalions, riflemen come from the newbies, the mechanically inept, and the unwanted. Thus the Bradley infantryman – already a minority in his own battalion – can become a disadvantaged minority at that.”

Just an update to that since you are using an older text.  The MOS 11M(Mech Inf) is no more, all Infantry pers are either 11C(Mortars), or 11B(everything else).  Not sure if the 11Z(Inf Senior Sgt) MOS still exists or not though.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

I guess for me the question is , what is more important to have in the CCV?

I think mobility that equals the Leo 2 is a must.

Armour protection that at least attempts to get close to the Leo 2

The next question is: Is a mounted weapon system with FCS more important to the mission than the dismounts?

If the weapon system and attending FCS is the most important part of the equation than you can suffer fewer dismounts. if the dismounts are the most important element than you need to focus on that and dispense with all but a small MG turret.

The networking is a bit of a red herring in my opinion, I could network a Ferret and armoured CMP truck.

 

[a_majoor]

One possible way to upend this debate is to rerole the CCV:

Give it and the associated dismounts to the Armoured Corps and task them with close protection of Armoured assets in close terrain. (This would be similar to the role of the Happohammi in ancient times). The CCV is tied to the tanks anyway more or less by design since it is to fight in the same conditions and elements alongside the tanks. Manning, maintainence, training and logistics would fall on the RCAC (and yes, the dismounts would actually be an assault troop in the Squadron).

Standard model Canadian Infantry would continue to go to work in LAV's, Helicopters, ATV's, snowshoes or whatever else seemed appropriate for the mission at hand. As noted in so many threads, the logistical and maintainence bill for all the various mini fleets we have today puts an excessive burden on the various branches. Taking a 100 or so strong CCV fleet and all its associated costs from the Infantry and handing it off the the Armoured would result in some consolodation of the Infantry fleet (even if it means an increased bill for the Army, the burden would go to those who have IMO the most need for it). In the ideal world infantry battalions would receive LAV mortar carriers, LAV ATGM carriers and LAV pioneer vehicles capable of light engineering support, but that is an argument for another day.

 

[Kirkhill]

I know I'm picking at a scab here..... but I can't help myself 

Ignore as you choose.

I've found myself digging down into the current US land force structure to determine the number and distribution of combat arms sub-units (combat arms - those elements that close and destroy, but exclusive of the recce/rsta elements).

Results:

Light Infantry Rifle Coys - 288 (of which 72 (25%) will be mounted in Strykers by 2013)
Bradley Infantry Coys - 64
LAV-25 Infantry Coys (USMC) - 12
Tank Coys - 76 (including 12 USMC)

Total of 440 active companies

1/3 of the force is Heavy (50% Heavy Infantry - 50% Tank)
2/3 of the force is Light (Plain, old-fashioned leg infantry)

The Light Force is variously transported under silk, by helicopter, by amphibian, by boat and by Stryker (25% of 2/3 = 16%)

Dividing the numbers by 10 (the usual Canadian Discount), we would end up with a force of:

27-28 Rifle Coys
8-9    LAV/CCV Coys
8-9    Tank Squadrons (14 tanks/squadron)

The Rifle Coys would require an additional lift capacity of 6-7 LAVIII-RWS (which, like the AA7s of the USMC, could also be tasked as armoured logistics vehicles when not transporting troops).

What is the current plan?

0-9 Rifle Coys?
18 LAV/CCV Coys
2-4 Tank Squadrons (14-19 Leos per squadron)

And aren't the LAV/CCV Coys cutting into the need for armoured recce because of their ability to conduct long-ranging small unit patrols?


Waiting Out.  :warstory:

 

[McG]

Light Infantry Rifle Coys - 288 (of which 72 (25%) will be mounted in Strykers by 2013)
Bradley Infantry Coys - 64
LAV-25 Infantry Coys (USMC) - 12
Tank Coys - 76 (including 12 USMC)

Total of 440 active companies

1/3 of the force is Heavy (50% Heavy Infantry - 50% Tank)
2/3 of the force is Light (Plain, old-fashioned leg infantry)

If Marines in LAV 25 are "heavy" then why are soldiers in Strykers "light"?  How many of the 288 light infantry companies are formally HMMVW based?

The Canadian "vision" sees LAV III as medium and CCV as heavy, but your model does not have a place for the medium concept.  Does your model remain valid despite this inconsistency?

 

[Kirkhill]

Of the 288 "Light" Rifle Coys, all 288 are organized to put full sections on the ground to fight.  216 have no dedicated transport of their own at the Coy level (Marines, Airborne, Air Assault, Light, Mountain) and rely on Battalion HMMWVs to bring in the heavier weapons and logistics.  72 (including 18 that have been/will be found from re-roled Armored Cavalry Regiments) dismount full Army sections of 9 men and are capable of operating as Light Units without retasking their Stryker crews - they are additional items to the TOEs of the Light role infantry. 

In other words, of the 288 light coys 216 are dedicated ground pounders but the other 72 are ground pounders with a transport section so that they can either revert to their boot roots or keep up with the heavies.

The heavies of the Army comprise 64 Abrams coys of 14 tanks which are accompanied by 64 Bradley coys of 14 ICVs.  Based on Bolger's comments above those Bradley troops are capable of meeting their NTC training objectives with as few as 3 dismounts in the back of each vehicle.......because the vehicle is the weapon and not the section.  The role of the heavies is to close and destroy - but more in the sense of disrupt than eradicate.  As demonstrated by 3ID in Iraq, the American intervention in Kuwait and Patton's runs across France armour does a great job of busting the line and disrupting the rear - but it doesn't have a great track record in eliminating the threat. (but I'm digressing again....with a purpose though).

The Marines bring another 12 Tank Coys to the fight.

The LAV-25s present a particular point of interest.

They are manned in the same fashion as the Bradleys with the emphasis being on the 3 man crew with a small 3 man dismount team.  They are utilized by the Marines in conjunction with armed HMMWVs as recce forces and as part of  QRFs because of their speed and firepower.  At various times commanders have considered them assault vehicles (perhaps because they had nothing heavier available?) and at other times recce vehicles that do best when kept at a distance from the Close Combat battle.

My own decision to include them with the heavies finally came down to the fact that they were first and foremost Fighting Vehicles and only in a secondary fashion could they be considered Infantry Carriers.  The success of a LAV operation, for the Marines, depends less upon the dismounts than the turret crew.  In my view that put them broadly into the camp of the heavies.

The Strykers are clearly transport for Infantry Sections.  They can be used by the Infantry Section to assist it in patrols in certain environments, perhaps can even be used in assaults in certain environments, but their primary role is to deliver a full section to the Area of Operations where the section, full, complete and entire, can get out and close with the enemy face to face.

Again, in my view, the LAV-25 falls between the two stools of the Infantry Carrier and the Tank Escort.  It is too light for the Heavy force (with mobility issues due to the lack of tracks if I understand the original rationale for the CCV).  It is too small to be able to dismount a full infantry section - and in any event its value does not rely on having a full section of dismounts.

**1013G 17 DEC 1993 RIFLE COMPANY, INFANTRY BATTALION, INFANTRY....

3.  MISSION AND TASKS. 
                          TO LOCATE, CLOSE WITH, AND DESTROY THE
                          ENEMY BY FIRE AND MANEUVER, OR TO REPEL HIS ASSAULT BY FIRE AND
                          CLOSE COMBAT.
.....

4.  CONCEPT OF ORGANIZATION

        A.  COMMAND AND CONTROL
        B.  FIREPOWER.
                          IN ADDITION TO INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS, THE ORGANIC
                          FIREPOWER OF THE RFLCO CONSISTS OF LIGHT AND MEDIUM MACHINE GUNS,
                          LIGHT MORTARS, LIGHT ANTITANK WEAPONS, SHOULDER LAUNCHED
                          MULTIPURPOSE ASSAULT WEAPONS AND GRENADE LAUNCHERS.
        C.  MOBILITY. 
                          THE RFLCO IS PRIMARILY FOOT MOBILE; BUT THE
                          COMPANY IS READILY TRANSPORTED BY TRACKED AND WHEELED VEHICLES AS
                          WELL AS HELICOPTERS, AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS AND CRAFT, AND TACTICAL AND
                          STRATEGIC AIR TRANSPORTATION.
       

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/usmc/to/ground/To1013g.htm

The rest of the Marine TOEs can be found here  http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/usmc/to/ground/index.html

Edit: Having said all of that about the Marines LAVs - ultimately they only represent 12 Coys.  Regardless of whether they are counted in amongst the heavies, the lights or taken off the board completely and counted amongst the proliferation of RSTA Coys that I intentionally excluded from the discussion, the overall trend of the numbers isn't skewed significantly.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

IAnd aren't the LAV/CCV Coys cutting into the need for armoured recce because of their ability to conduct long-ranging small unit patrols?


Waiting Out.  :warstory:

A LAV company may have similar equipment (in the big picture) to a Recce Sqn, but their organization and training give them very different capabilities.

 

[Infanteer]

I'm confused.  Why are we counting American companies?

 

[McG]

... of the 288 light coys 216 are dedicated ground pounders but the other 72 are ground pounders with a transport section so that they can either revert to their boot roots or keep up with the heavies.

While SBCT doctrine was designed to emphasis the dismounts in the vehicle, that vehicle is still integral to the section level.  Calling this organization light infantry is about as accurate referring to our pre-LAV III mechanized units (M113, Bison or AVGP) as light infantry.  If you really want to stick to a distinction by weight class, then you probably need to consider the LAV 25 infantry and Stryker infantry as a separate medium class.

I'm confused.  Why are we counting American companies?

I think there is an underlying assumption that CF structure (at the level of operational units) should be a 1:10 model of the US structure.  That in itself is debatable.

 

[Kirkhill]

While SBCT doctrine was designed to emphasis the dismounts in the vehicle, that vehicle is still integral to the section level.  Calling this organization light infantry is about as accurate referring to our pre-LAV III mechanized units (M113, Bison or AVGP) as light infantry.  If you really want to stick to a distinction by weight class, then you probably need to consider the LAV 25 infantry and Stryker infantry as a separate medium class.

My sense of the American situation is that they have gone through a long debate that pitted Heavies against Light and discovered that they need both in varying ratios depending on the situation.  Currently they are in the process of divesting of Heavies while generating more Lights.  The Stryker force, in my opinion only, represents less of a Medium Force (based in part on its weight for deployability purposes) than it represents a Swing Force: a force that can go light if required, heavy up the lights if required, or add depth to the heavies if required.

I think there is an underlying assumption that CF structure (at the level of operational units) should be a 1:10 model of the US structure.  That in itself is debatable.

There is no such underlying assumption.  There is a well known process call "Benchmarking" where you compare your assets/performance to those of your peers.

In this instance I was curious to see if I could fathom the utility, and the perception of the utility, of various combat arms elements by reviewing our ABCA partners and discern which balance of elements they consider appropriate to their current circumstances (financial and geo-political).

Further to that:

Her Majesty's Forces

7 Brigades - 1 Royal Marines, 5 Combined Arms, 1 Air Assault

Each contains 4 Light Role Battalions (Including Paras and Marines) with 3 Companies

7x4x3=84 Light Role Battalions

The 5 Combined Arms Brigades also incorporate an Armoured Group of 1 Tank Regiment, 2 Warrior Battalions and 1 Armoured Recce Regiment.

Those Armoured Groups represent:

5x1x3 = 15 Tank Squadrons
5x2x3 = 30 Warrior/Bulldog Companies.

Together with the Light Role Companies we find a total of 129 combat arms sub-units, exclusive of the Recce/RSTA elements.

11.6% Tanks
23.3% Armoured Infantry
65% Light Role Infantry.

In a world of reducing ability to find qualified recruits and where machines are becoming lighter, more powerful and more capable, why do our premier allies persist in devoting 50 to 65% of their combat strength to light role infantry?

And why do we pursue an alternate course?  What are we seeing that they are not?

Aussies to follow.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Not entirely convinced they see anything beyond the cost savings.

 

[Kirkhill]

Not entirely convinced they see anything beyond the cost savings.

Possible.

And yet, with manpower being such a major cost driver, with Air Force and Navy both reducing the amount of manpower per platform, with the US Army determining that platforms without manpower (NTC success) can fight a Colin Powell type of war, with light role infantry being the antithesis of all that....why do they persist?

In terms of bang for buck surely light role infantry is the LEAST effective use of the defense dollar.  Why not disband half of the Light forces and sinke that manpower budget into putting the remaining manpower into manning pre-existing, if roughly treated, vehicles?

I'm not seeing the dollar savings associated with a light force, at least in terms of effect.

Even with the drawdowns the ratio of light to heavy remains high.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

I think light Infantry looks good cost wise on paper and for the bean counters that's all that matters. The concept of light infantry trying to hold off a full blown armoured attack on their own in open country does not occur to them.

 

[McG]

My sense of the American situation is that they have gone through a long debate that pitted Heavies against Light and discovered that they need both in varying ratios depending on the situation.  Currently they are in the process of divesting of Heavies while generating more Lights.  The Stryker force, in my opinion only, represents less of a Medium Force (based in part on its weight for deployability purposes) than it represents a Swing Force: a force that can go light if required, heavy up the lights if required, or add depth to the heavies if required.

It was a force designed to be heavier in responce to the US realizing how vulnerable its Airbore was on the extreem left flank in the first Gulf War.  It is a force designed to go into operations with its vehicles just like our mechanized battalions since the arrival of the M113.  Stryker battalions are not light infantry.

In a world of reducing ability to find qualified recruits and where machines are becoming lighter, more powerful and more capable, why do our premier allies persist in devoting 50 to 65% of their combat strength to light role infantry?

Because many of these infantry fill very expensive niche roles that do not mix well with armoured fighting vehicles.  There is no airborne mechanized infantry nor airmobile mechanized infantry.  Marines & mountain brigades are other niche roles.  To collectively write these all up just as "light infantry" is to distort your objective of benchmarking.  Some of these niche capabilities require a minimum critical mass in order to provide any utility worth the cost - your model needs to account for these should Canada (at x .10) require fewer companies than whatever that critical mass may be.

What does your benchmark suggest when "light" is seperated by "niche" and "plain"?

If you want to benchmark, the ABCA nation of greatest similarity for size & population would be Australia.  How do we compare there?

 

[Infanteer]

216 have no dedicated transport of their own at the Coy level (Marines, Airborne, Air Assault, Light, Mountain) and rely on Battalion HMMWVs to bring in the heavier weapons and logistics

This is inaccurate.  I've worked with both units of the 10th Mountain Division and the 82nd Airborne Division and they were "motorized" in MRAPs and MTAVs - some US Marines I know reported the same situation; in order for them to operate they had to do the same thing as our "light forces" did and take on a protected platform to maintain some mobility and protection.  As McG has stated, framing a dichotomy of them being "light" vs our LAV III mounted Infantry as "not light" is simply false.  These guys had to drive, maintain and operate from some form of armoured transport.

Also know that these guys have had to be pulled out of rough spots by our heavier armed LAV IIIs on more than one occasion; and this is against a guy with flip-flops, a cell phone and an AK.

Don't build a strawman out of the turret or number of wheels.

 

[Kirkhill]

The British Army Perspective

The British Army describes four separate infantry variants:

Light Infantry;
Air Assault Infantry;
Mechanised Infantry;
Armoured Infantry;

Reference: http://www.army.mod.uk/infantry/role/default.aspx

The cited reference has this to say about the role of Light Infantry:
“Light Infantry battalions operate with minimal transport and sometimes almost entirely on foot..... The Light Role Infantry battalion is a versatile organisation that can work in support of Armoured and Mechanised manoeuvre brigades to dominate urban areas or control mountainous terrain and forests/jungle. They are employed in all major UK operations.”

The same reference says this about Air Assault Infantry:
“Air Assault Infantry are Light Infantry, specialised for the Air Assault role. They provide a hard hitting and versatile force that can be delivered by air, aviation or by land in support of Apache Attack Helicopter Regiments......”

About Mechanised Infantry this is said:
“Mechanised Infantry use the Bulldog armoured personnel carrier as a form of protected mobility to move around the battlefield. Bulldog offers protection against small arms and artillery fire and provides good tactical and cross-country mobility. However, Mechanised Infantry operate on foot in the area of the Close Battle, much like Light Role Infantry.”

All three of the above forms of infantry are described as Light Infantry or as Light Infantry with transport.
 
Of the Armoured Infantry, however, this is said:
“The Armoured Infantry are equipped with the Warrior infantry fighting vehicle. The high levels of protection, firepower, mobility and sustainability enjoyed by Armoured Infantry make them well suited to providing both shock action and the endurance element of any operational force. The Warrior is armed with a 30mm Rarden Cannon, capable of engaging vehicle and dismounted targets out to 2000m. It carries a crew of 10: driver, commander, gunner and 7 riflemen.”

This is not a section with transport.  This is a vehicle with crew.  A large crew admittedly, and one that can dismount some of its members to fight on the ground but first and foremost it is a vehicle that supplies protection, firepower and mobility to provide shock action.  Those characteristics render the Armoured Infantry discrete from the other forms of infantry – all of which are described as variants of Light Infantry.  I will accept that Light Infantry could equally be rendered as Plain Infantry, Regular Infantry, Infantry or even Rifles. When situations warrant then the Light Infantry can be supplied with any of a great variety of transport including MRAPs, TAPVs and such like, often crewed independently of the Rifle Companies by an enlarged Motor Transport Platoon or by attached elements from an Armoured Battalion as in the case of 2RTR driving British infantry around in Armoured Carriers instead of driving Tanks.

More to Follow.....

 

[Kirkhill]

The US Marines Perspective

“TO 1013G Rifle Company, Infantry Battalion, Infantry Regiment, Marine Division -- Table Of Organization

3.  Mission And Tasks.
To locate, close with, and destroy the enemy by fire and maneuver, or to repel his assault by fire and close combat.

Mobility.  The RFLCO (Rifle Company) is primarily foot mobile; but the company is readily transported by tracked and wheeled vehicles as well as helicopters, amphibious ships and craft, and tactical and strategic air transportation.”

The Marines are explicit.  They are riflemen, organized in Rifle Companies that can be deployed by any means of transport.  Full Stop.  They are not tied to their Landing Craft, their Amphibians or their helicopters.  Those are merely tools to get them to the fight.


More to follow......

 

[Kirkhill]

The American Army Perspective

US Army Field Manual FM7-8 1992 has this to say about the mission and role of Infantry (unadulterated and unexpurgated Infantry):

“1-1. MISSION
The mission of the infantry is to close with the enemy by means of fire and maneuver to defeat or capture him, or to repel his assault by fire, close combat, and counterattack.

a. Despite any technological advantages that our armed forces might have over an enemy, only close combat between ground forces gains the decision in battle. Infantry rifle forces (infantry, airborne, air assault, light, and ranger) have a key role in close combat situations.”

I would ask you to note the lack of differentiation amongst infantry, airborne, air assault, light and ranger type forces, at least at the platoon/company level of organization.  There do not appear to be separate field manuals describing separate TTPs for those types of forces at that level.

Conversely there are separate manuals for Bradley (HBCT) troops and Stryker (SBCT) troops;

US Army FM 3-21.10 The Infantry Rifle Company offers this:

“The Infantry companies of the SBCT and HBCT mostly use the same doctrine, but cover more specific doctrine in their own manuals”

More to Follow .....

 

[Kirkhill]

Which brings me to FM 3-21.71 The Mechanized Infantry Rifle Platoon (Bradley Fighting Vehicle):

“Section I. MECHANIZED INFANTRY RIFLE PLATOON EMPLOYMENT
Despite any technological advantages our armed forces might have over an enemy, the only way to gain the decision in battle is by close combat between ground forces. Mechanized infantry rifle forces equipped with the Bradley fighting vehicle (BFV) play the following main roles in close combat situations:
 Operate mainly at night or during other periods of natural or induced limited visibility.
 Penetrate and hold existing (natural and man-made) obstacles and difficult terrain as pivots for operational and tactical maneuver.
 Attack over approaches not feasible for armored forces.
 Seize or secure forested and built-up areas.
 Control restrictive routes for use by other forces.
 Conduct rear area operations.”

Compared to the simplicity and clarity associated with the rest of the US Infantry the Bradley Infantry employment seems to be distinctly constrained and subordinated to “those approaches not feasible for armoured forces”.

MTF.....