The CCV and the Infantry

[Kirkhill]

Then there is the current point of contention:

From US Army FM 3-21.10 The SBCT Infantry Rifle Company

“This manual addresses the doctrine of the SBCT at the company level. The SBCT infantry rifle company capitalizes on the strengths and minimizes the limitations of mechanized and light doctrine. The light infantry ethos is the foundation of this organization but is combined with the speed, mobility, and precision of mounted warfare. Success is achieved by integrating the complementary characteristics of each type of infantry where decisive action must occur.

1-1. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SBCT INFANTRY RIFLE COMPANY

Because the fundamentals of fire and maneuver are unchanged, the majority of the combat power of the SBCT infantry rifle company lies in its highly trained squads and platoons. The organic vehicles in the platoons are for moving infantry to the fight swiftly and providing tactical flexibility while tailoring the soldiers' loads through a "mobile arms room" concept. ......

1-2. OPERATIONAL PREMISE

The SBCT was developed to address some of the changing situations the US Army currently faces. At the brigade level, there are significant changes that affect the way this unit fights. Although the changes at brigade level do not significantly change tactics at company level and below, they do affect the frequency with which companies, platoons and squads execute certain missions.”


In my opinion this clearly represents the Stryker Brigade Rifle Company as a Light Infantry company with transport so that it can cover a large operating area and bring a variety of weapons to the fight.  Basically the Light Infantry Company gains a strengthened CQ capability – more transport and more storage with the carriers armed with their own defensive weapons and manned by dedicated transport personnel.

"1-7. SBCT INFANTRY RIFLE PLATOON
The platoon includes the following personnel and equipment:
 Platoon headquarters, which includes platoon leader (PL), platoon sergeant (PSG), RATELO, forward observer (FO), and platoon medic (attached).
 Four ICVs, each with driver and vehicle commander. The PL and PSG are the vehicle commanders of two of the ICVs while the platoon is mounted. Three 9-man squads of infantry with antitank assets (Javelin).
 One 7-man weapons squad.
The SBCT infantry platoon has one officer and 44 enlisted personnel in three elements: the platoon headquarters, the mounted element, and the infantry squads.

Note the separation of the Vehicle Section of 4 vehicles each with two crewmen, separate, discrete and different from the Pl HQ, the strong Weapons Squad and the three standard issue, general duties, full strength Rifle Squads (complete with Javelin - available because of the useful transport).

This is a Light Infantry Rifle Platoon with a large, integral weapons squad and an attached light armoured transport section.  But it is still a Light Infantry Rifle Platoon that could, can and does fight on its feet with or without the presence of its transport.

It can be deployed without its transport and fight effectively without its transport until such time as its transport arrives or it reaches ground favourable to operations with wheeled transport.

With the wheeled transport it can support the Bradley/Abrams forces in depth or on the flanks, just as heliborne or airborne Light Infantry can support them in the assault by taking the fight to the enemy’s rear.


More to follow ....

 

[Kirkhill]

The Vehicle as Section Vehicle or as Adjunct.

The working position seems to be that the LAV belongs to the section and that the crew are to be found from within the section.  The related thought is that these infantrymen, these riflemen, will easily maintain skills in both mounted and dismounted disciplines and be able to transition between them.

In my opinion that position seems to be at odds with the decisions of the British Army, the US Marines and the US Army.

All three organizations focus their Infantry, even when provided with armoured transport like Bulldogs (FV432s or M113/TLAV clones) or Strykers, on dismounted operations.  The transport adjusts to fit the organization.  The organization does not adjust to fit the vehicle.

Where the US Army and the British Army have adopted vehicles that require the organization to adjust to the transport (Bradley Mech or Warrior Armoured Infantry) they have created specialist units that have significantly different TTPs when compared with their Light Infantry brethren.

In the case of the Brits the section, including the dismounts crews the vehicle.  They, like gunners and tankers, serve the vehicle.  The focus of their lives is moving that vehicle forward so that its guns can do the killing.

The Americans, with their Bradleys, have a slightly different take.  The dismounts in the back are NOT part of the vehicles crew. 

The Bradley Platoon consists of two discrete elements carved up into 5 chunks.  There is the mounted element and the dismounted element.
The mounted element comprises two separate chunks.  Each chunk comprises 6 crewmen with two vehicles that live and work as a unit.
The dismounted element comprises 2 to 3 rifle squads, that may or may not be at full strength, that are assigned to vehicles for transport purposes in much the same way that you have to break up a 3 sections in a Gagetown course when only supplied two Deuce and a Halfs to transport them.  Or you are trying to set chalks for helicopters that won’t carry a full section.

The Dismounts are expected to debus and then find their squad leaders and form up on him.  Presumably this is better done while the enemy is not shooting at them.

US Marine LAVs are similarly organized to the extent that the vehicle crews are paired while the dismounts (1 patrol of 3 or 1 assault element of 6) are separately organized.

More to Follow ......

 

[Kirkhill]

Crewmen are Not Riflemen.  Riflemen are Not Crewmen.

Our allies and peers have seen fit to emphasize General Duties, Bog Standard Riflemen that can be transported any where by any means with any support and fight. 

They have de-emphasised the portion of their force that is specialized to operations associated with a specific platform.

In the US Army, even the Crewmen are discrete from Riflemen in the Bradley Platoon, Stryker Platoons and for all Rifle Platoons. 

The British Army is making a special case for their Warriors and supplying the Warrior, which can effectively be fought with a crew of 3, with a crew of 10.  They are still crewmen and not Riflemen.


Why do we feel that we can effectively do what our allies feel that they cannot effectively do?  Why do we wish to, or feel the need to, put all of our eggs in the LAV basket?  Why do we feel that we cannot separate the Rifles from the Crew and still fight effectively and, I would argue, perhaps train more effectively and deploy more efficiently and flexibly when our allies apparently feel they can?


By Way of Postscript

From some chap name of Owen writing in Infantry Magazine, Jan-Feb 2006 on Patrol Based Infantry Doctrine.

“Current fashionable obsessions with SF, and the ill-conceived promotion of certain formations as being uniquely tactically proficient, have led to what little amount of useful alternate infantry thought there is in the United Kingdom being labeled as "SF tactics" and thus suffering from all the less-than-positive understanding that brings. With the exception of some specialist roles, Special Forces are arguably a light infantry formation,”

Thus the SFSG from 1 Para being formed to conduct "Special" operations.  Special meaning operations that the Government of the Day neither confirms nor denies.  It used to be the Government limited itself to section size operations of that sort.  Now they are up to Rifle Company operations of that sort.

And as my version of 309(3), Chapter 3, Section 5, para 309 says: "The Rifle Company contains the troops who close with and destroy the enemy."

With the Americans adding that the Rifle Company (either Marine or Army) is where you find the depth and strength to "to repel ... assault by fire and  close combat." To Hold.

 

[Infanteer]

:boring:

Our allies and peers have seen fit to emphasize General Duties, Bog Standard Riflemen that can be transported any where by any means with any support and fight. 

Are you implying that we can't do this?

Edit to add:  Much of your statements are right outta 'er.  To imply that U.S. Stryker infantry are much different from our Infantry is disingenuous at best as they both will operate from a 20 ton, modern fighting vehicle.  To imply that Warriors are manned by sections of 10 crewman is nonsensical.  You continue to build a strawman out of a vehicle with a turret and are fixated on an erroneous belief that Canadian Infantry companies equipped with the LAV III are handicapped in everything other than trailing behind a Main Battle Tank.

 

[a_majoor]

I think what Kirkhill is getting at is the forces which use heavier vehicles tend to become "attached" to the vehicle; it is the primary weapons system and the dismounts are there to provide close protection as well as provide the service and first line maintainence of the thing. These dismounts would therefore tend to operate and fight in a different manner than their counterparts who are not provided with a powerful mount.

The LAV III comes close to that ideal with the provision of a 25mm cannon in a stabilized turret, under the best circumstances it can provide a great deal of effective firepower directly to the dismounted section, or indirectly grouped with the other platoon vehicles under control of the LAV Sgt. Kirkill sees this as a bit of an unhappy compromise, since the LAV III cannot mount much more armour, nor move cross country very well due to the limits of its wheeled suspension, hence the LAV mounted Infantry are potentially deprived of their support when separated from the LAVs.

The soldiers he describes as "Light" are not as attached to their vehicles, helicopters, trucks or APC's mounting GPMG/HMG class weapons are a convenience, but not as critical in the actual fight (indeed, only APC's provide any sort of tactical advantage during the fight, since they have some limited ability to provide fire support). Weirdly, this argument can even be extended to the Achzarit/Namer class of HAPC's, since they provide protected mobility but not a great deal of protected firepower (that is the job of the tanks).

Now Kirkhill can set me straight if I have misinterpreted the point, but that is what I see as the argument so far...

 

[Infanteer]

If that is indeed the case, then I still say the argument is wrong.  I don't get how one can imply that there is a categorical difference between a Canadian Infantry Platoon in a LAV III with a Delco turret and an American Infantry Platoon in a LAV III with a RWS .50 cal.  They are similarly equipped, drive the same vehicle (one just has a bigger gun) and have the same number of dudes.  They even, surprise, have the same training/maintenance requirements - yep; US Army Strykers need someone to check fluids and learn to steer them too.

I've seen guys attached to much lighter vehicles than a LAV III.  I've seen 82 Airborne guys married to Humvees.  Attachment to a vehicle/platform is a leadership issue, not an equipment one. 

This whole argument seems to rotate on a thesis that Canadian Infantry platoons and companies are somehow over-reliant on the LAV III and lack the flexibility of other nation's infantry who pilot vehicles without 25mm Delco turrets.  Nowhere in all of these silly exercises of counting companies and comparing ratios have I seen any argument or proof that Canadian Infantry soldiers cannot operate away from the LAV III or are tactically deficient due to training/maintenance requirements for such a vehicle.  I have repeatedly offered first hand proof that this is not the case, but that doesn't really seem to matter.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Why not leave the LAVs with the infantry to complete the normal range of tasks in all situations short of WW3, then group the CCV with their crews under the modern equivalent of the 'armoured carrier regiment', which can be called on as required for support:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1st_Canadian_Armoured_Carrier_Regiment

And then again maybe I should just shut my dismounted infantry guy hatch and go hull down, turret down, pants down....  :camo:

 

[Kirkhill]

Beyond saying that Thuc is on point it is well past time for me to join D&B. 

 

[Kirkhill]

.....I have repeatedly offered first hand proof that this is not the case, but that doesn't really seem to matter.

I am not discounting "first hand proof".  I don't doubt that Canadian soldiers did transition easily between LAV supported tasks and plain Infantry tasks. I don't doubt the quality of the Canadian Soldier in general or particular.

I would point out that the Canadian Soldier deployed to Afghanistan included a heavy seasoning of troops that were brought up in Light Companies,

My concern is not about the current soldier.

My concern is for the future soldier.

After 5 years, 10 years of Garrison Duty in Canada, with a change of Governments and a change in financial fortunes, will an Army of 6 LAV Battalions maintain the range of skills that the army currently possesses?

I believe that that is partly why other armies focus skill sets in different units.  I believe that the American experience with the Bradley Infantry demonstrated the skill fade in their dismounts as COs struggled to man the vehicles they had and chose to deploy all their vehicles rather than "full" vehicles.

In addition, I have no doubt that "even" Armoured Crewmen  8) can be re-trained to be adequate infantry, (and the reverse is equally true) given time, but if you want competent units, that can get best use out of their available kit, deployed in a timely fashion (not after a 1 year work up), don't you have to keep a broad range of skill sets alive at any given moment?

Isn't a degree of specialization necessary to ensure competence or can generalists maintain adequate competence across the board?

 

[ArmyRick]

In the infantry, we don't look at as "full" manned vehicles. Even in a LAV equipped platoon, we look at as manning sections, weapons, vehicles. In the infantry we still think of our breakdown as section and platoons.

Kirkhill, my advice, take it for what it worth. You are arguing about how to grow apples with the apple farmer! Yes, it is one thing to put forth a theory and suggestions, quite another to insist that things be done a certain way with people far more experienced than yourself.

Do you not think that our senior infantry guys have not sat down in a room and dreamed up every which way possible to man a battalion and how many we actually need?

I find your approach to be TOO much about numbers and formulas. That does not always work in the real world. The average infantryman, with a small degree of training in each art, can operate in the arctic, desert, jungle, mounted or dismounted, mountain or urban environment. The role Close with and destroy the enemy does not mean only from the back of a LAV for this unit, on foot for these guys. The mission needs dictate what we need to get the job done.

Yes, armoured guys COULD be trained to become infantry, but why? They would be better investing their time in perfecting their current AFVs or learning to crew newer armoured vehicles.

We do a degree of specialization in our battalions. Advance Mountain Ops, advance winter ops (or whatever the course is called now) and urban operation instructors are a perfect examples.

 

[Michael OLeary]

Do you not think that our senior infantry guys have not sat down in a room and dreamed up every which way possible to man a battalion and how many we actually need?

Don't be to certain about that. Our battalion sizes are dictated by manning ceilings and organizational decisions on how many battalions they will be divided between. We struck the Pioneer and Mortar platoons, not on a basis of relative tactical utility, but to address a manpower redistribution challenge. Our last three section vehicles (Grizzly, M113, LAV 3) all coincidentally fit our "doctrinal" 10-man section, so we never had to force ourselves to challenge the model to see if there were better ways to address light, heavy, or any other given specialist infantry role. We deployed the LAVs on their first operation without having had a corps wide discussion on how they might be employed; their use has evolved organically and their employment overseas has lasted long enough to see a critical mass of that experience roll back into the training system to augment the basic technical training on weapons and vehicles - but the current sate has been a reaction to current operational needs, and not developed from a system of considered alternatives prepared before and adapted to the missions at hand. Many still see the infantry as essentially a dismounted capability that is augmented with mobility and firepower when vehicles are available and assigned. We have yet to develop a concept of actual "heavy" infantry where their primary role and combat capability is dependent on close integration with their own vehicles as a primary method of employment. Our infantry organizations have survived and performed to an impressive standard mainly because those on the ground found ways to make them work, not necessarily because they are the strongest foundation for every imaginable role. It's the quality of our people and of our training that has been and continues to be the key combat multiplier.

 

[Kirkhill]

Kirkhill, my advice, take it for what it worth. You are arguing about how to grow apples with the apple farmer!

Isn't it Great?  >  And people pay me in the real world to do that very thing.  :nod:

And by the way I don't insist that anybody do anything.  I propose. I offer. I suggest. I ask. I try to understand.

As you and Infanteer and everyone else on this site are right to point out:  It is your livelihoods and your lives that are at risk.  The decisions can always only be yours.

And I thank you for taking those risks. 

 

[Infanteer]

can generalists maintain adequate competence across the board?

With 90% of the tasks we are expected to do, in my opinion yes.

 

[daftandbarmy]

With 90% of the tasks we are expected to do, in my opinion yes.

As evidenced by the rank 'General'...

 

[Infanteer]

???

 

[HatMan]

Just an update to that since you are using an older text.  The MOS 11M(Mech Inf) is no more, all Infantry pers are either 11C(Mortars), or 11B(everything else).  Not sure if the 11Z(Inf Senior Sgt) MOS still exists or not though.

11B is Directed Infantryman and 11C is In-Directed infantryman. ( Fire of course). As for 11Z will exist so long that They are 1SG/MSG and CSM/SGM. 1SG/MSG = CSM/MWO and CSM/SGM = RSM/CWO. US Army MOS (Trade for my Northern neighbor) break down in such a way. 11B10 mean this is infantry is direct fire role @ basic level. Hope this help out.

 

[a_majoor]

Found an old ARMY article while looking at the "Block III" program which delves into the US Army's thinking of protected mobility back in the mid-late 80's. A comparison to what is supposed to be accomplished by the CCV is interesting, Here is the description of the Future Infantry Fighting Vehicle:

ARMY May 1991 Armor's Future: From One, Many

By Eric C. Ludvigsen, Associate Editor

• Future Infantry Fighting Vehicle (FIFV)

The salient feature of the FIFV is that it will have the same armor protection as the Block III tank, thus ensuring that its pioneer infantrymen can go anywhere the tank goes. This is the kind of mechanized infantry vehicle the Army proposed in the early 1970s, before the Bradley's predecessor, the XM723 was developed, but could not sell to the Defense Department or Congress—it was deemed as heavy, complex and expensive as a tank and thus incapable of the required proliferation on the battlefield (roughly two infantry vehicles for every three tanks). All parties to this long-running debate, however, appear to have learned the lesson of the Bradley and have accepted the necessity for an infantry vehicle that can advance in the face of the heaviest fire, without the need for compensating tactics. "With this vehicle, the infantry will be able to remain on board until they overrun target," Mr. Wynbelt said, "and then disembark, so that they will not have to fight toward an objective."

Compared to the Bradley, the FIFV will have more than 11 times the effective effective frontal protection and 200 percent greater protection from flank attacks, plus all of the VIDS passive and active countermeasures of the Block III tank.

The FIFV will have missile armament with a degree of antiarmor capability as yet undetermined. The Army is looking for a 150 percent increase in effectiveness—including twice the armor penetration—from an automatic main gun in the 35-mm to 60-mm caliber range. There would also be a centrally controlled area suppression weapon system to deal with enemy infantry in the vincinity of the vehicle; this is expected to be 60 percent more effective than the individual port-firing weapons now operated by infantrymen mounted in the M2 Bradley.

With power and fuel capacity comparable to the main battle tank, the FIFV is expected to have 70 percent greater cruising range than the Bradley and cross-country speeds more than one-third higher. Vetronics and advanced fire control will allow the vehicle crew to be reduced from three men to two, but the size of the dismounted element is not yet certain.

 

[Infanteer]

I recently had the chance to read Mechanized Infantry by Richard Simpkin.  Although the text is 30 years old now, many of the arguments are the same as we see here.  Two key ideas he hits on are the separation of mech and light infantry as trades.  He argues that mech inf and armoured should be combined as a trade, as they shouldn't be apart.
The other argument is that the Mech infantry need a heavy infantry carrier to keep up to the tanks; very similar to what Thucydides just put up.  Simpkin was very impressed with the design of the first gen Merkava and, had he lived longer, would have been a fan of the Namur as he proposed the concept in his book.  For other infantry, he argues for a lighter carrier for mobility to simply get them to where they need to fight with a little mobility and firepower to boot.
While I have my own ideas, Simpkin's writings were pretty good to get some real practical thinking on the roll of vehicles in the engagement.

 

[a_majoor]

I liked Simkin's books as well (they are also clearly written), but the APC/IFV he proposed was rather nightmarish from a logistical/maint point of view.

The turret mounting a 76mm low velocity cannon, a 20mm automatic cannon and a machine gun (plus the idea that the crew commander's seat would counter rotate so the CC did not get disoriented) would have been in the shop most of the time, and trying to coordinate the fire of three very disparate weapons (using early 1980's FCS systems) would have been difficult as well. Obviously the Russians were big fans, vehicles like the BMP-3 and the BMPT follow his prescriptions.

The "today" solution is a large calibre automatic cannon as the main gun (40mm will deal with almost everything we could encounter) and a Fire and Forget missile mount so the commander can shoot from the hip if he suddenly encounters enemy armour (and possibly helicopters). The other arguments remain well thought out and clearly detailed, the only remaining questions are do we have the will to get into this game, and if so, how far are we willing to go (a small handfull of CCV's will just be another orphan fleet).

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Would the German "PanzerGrenadier" of the late 70's-80's not be considered a "heavy infantry"? As I recall there job was to support the tanks in their Marders. Which the Boxer is supposed to carry on this tradition.