The Canadian Peacekeeping Myth (Merged Topics)

[MarkOttawa]

Bogie: Afstan was not the Middle East and what about the Balkans (yet again?):
http://mironline.ca/?p=11350

It just goes to show that you never can tell:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RoDPPgWbfXY

Mark
Ottawa

 

[childs56]

Even Americans seem to have realized the value of having armor, as evidence by their use of tanks during their Kandahar surge.

The Americans never valued Armour in Afghanistan until Canada proved its worth. Which is funny because other countries had Tnaks deployed but the US never though of them as a force multiplier. The same as they never valued the Lav 3 series of Vehicles until Canada proved their worth in Afghanistan.
After the Americans took a look at the safest and most efficient equipment to deploy they ordered the Lav3 series and deployed them right away.

 

[Altair]

The Americans never valued Armour in Afghanistan until Canada proved its worth. Which is funny because other countries had Tnaks deployed but the US never though of them as a force multiplier. The same as they never valued the Lav 3 series of Vehicles until Canada proved their worth in Afghanistan.
After the Americans took a look at the safest and most efficient equipment to deploy they ordered the Lav3 series and deployed them right away.

Pretty much what I've heard and read.

So while Canadian publications might sprinkle things with pixie dust, the  Americans saw the value of armor in a COIN environment

 

[childs56]

Anyone one who thinks a Tank is not as valuable as an attack Helicopter and needed in today's force is kidding themselves. That is why the modern attack helicopter was built was to take out tanks. Even in Peacekeeping, the use of heavy armour is a valuable asset that should not be over looked.
Often when we look at the best case for deployment of equipment we base the decision  on doctrine from past war and the Cold War. That does not leave much lee way into the operations we actually do day to day. Including Peacekeeping.
Because Canada has very limited assets it makes it even harder to base equipment choices on needs, wants  and doctrine verses deploy what we have. Usually we deploy the least amount of assets we an get away with and still play with the big boys. Often with our limited assets we provide a much higher level of service then expected. Because we have gotten away with it in the past we got very complacent.

Never kid yourself using Armour is a force multiplier. I would prefer we had Tanks deployed and using Chinooks and Griffons for over watch and transport  then just have attack helos with no tanks.

 

[Humphrey Bogart]

The Americans never valued Armour in Afghanistan until Canada proved its worth. Which is funny because other countries had Tnaks deployed but the US never though of them as a force multiplier. The same as they never valued the Lav 3 series of Vehicles until Canada proved their worth in Afghanistan.
After the Americans took a look at the safest and most efficient equipment to deploy they ordered the Lav3 series and deployed them right away.

The highlighted bit in yellow is completely untrue but let's not let facts get in the way of a good argument.  The Stryker family of vehicles is the brain child of former US Army Chief of Staff, General Eric Shineski.  The US Army begun exploring the adoption of the LAV family of vehicles in the late 90s as a way to provide the US Army with a medium-weight force optimized for expeditionary operations and rapid reaction.  The US Army was losing on that front to the USMC and the Stryker was seen as a way to get the Army out the door quicker in a crisis situation in comparison to its heavy armour divisions which required more time and resources to build combat power in theatre.  It had nothing to do with the involvement of the LAV III family of vehicles which did prove their worth in that theatre.


http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9C01E5D9153FF93AA15753C1A9649C8B63&legacy=true&pagewanted=print

October 29, 2002
Army Takes On Critics of an Armored Vehicle

By THOM SHANKER
The Army's most senior general has complained that ''misinformation'' is damaging prospects for the Stryker, a light armored vehicle that the service argues is central to its transformation into a more mobile fighting force.

The comments, by Gen. Eric K. Shinseki, the Army chief of staff, come as Pentagon budget officials are said to be focusing on at least three Army programs for significant reductions.

One proposal said to be circulating among senior budget planners is to cut the number of brigades outfitted with the Stryker to three from six, for a saving estimated at $4.5 billion.

In uncharacteristically strong public language, General Shinseki defended the Stryker during a speech to the Association of the United States Army last week, saying: ''We must see the Stryker fielded to provide soldiers the capabilities that they've needed for the last 12 years. It's time, and the right number is six.''

Among the Stryker's more well-known opponents is Newt Gingrich, former speaker of the House, who has written of his doubts that the vehicle can perform as promised. General Shinseki did not identify any critics during his speech or in a subsequent round-table discussion with military affairs correspondents.

But in that round table, he said the program's opponents were proceeding from ''misinformation,'' in particular that the Stryker could not be flown into combat aboard a C-130, the smaller workhorse of the Air Force cargo fleet, designed to land on short, even unimproved forward airstrips.

Three of the Strykers can be carried on the larger C-17, which can haul only one Abrams main battle tank. But fitting the Stryker aboard C-130's is required to fulfill the Army's pledge that a Stryker Brigade Combat Team of 3,500 to 4,000 troops will be able to deploy with the armored vehicles anywhere in the world within 96 hours.

General Shinseki joked that the Stryker could fit aboard a C-130 every way except sideways -- and even then only because its wheels do not roll that way -- and praised the performance of a fly-and-drive presentation this month at Andrews Air Force Base, Md., intended to sway those who doubt the vehicle.

At the exhibition, a C-130 landed and disgorged one Stryker, and a C-17 landed to unload three more. Mr. Gingrich was in the audience at Andrews when the planes landed, as was Stephen A. Cambone, who as the Pentagon's director of program analysis and evaluation is a powerful voice on budget matters within Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld's inner circle.

Still, an e-mail campaign among some industry analysts, Pentagon budget specialists and retired Army officers who favor heavy tanks has challenged the reliability of the Army's statements about the Stryker's capabilities.

''There are some who are still skeptical about Stryker, and I appreciate the debate,'' General Shinseki said in his speech last week. ''But some of these skepticisms, at times, have gotten a bit bothersome, to the point of accusing the Army of deception about the Stryker's performance and transportability.''

General Shinseki invited critics to ''look at our numbers, challenge our metrics, question our analytics -- they're all on review.''

''But don't question our honor,'' he said, ''or our integrity.''

There is little question that when General Shinseki became chief of staff three years ago, he was keenly aware of what he saw as a need to transform the most obstinately conservative of the four armed services. It is now clear that after laying out a plan for Army transformation, he will spend the months before his retirement next summer fighting for that vision.

The Stryker is to be the mobile armored force of this new Army that could be sent rapidly on missions around the world. It would serve as an interim force between today's heavy tanks -- which were designed for slugging it out against a cold-war-style enemy and which remain the service's steel spine -- and a Future Combat System of next-generation weapons still on the drawing board.

General Shinseki said that when people asked what the future Army would look like, he replied: ''I don't know; we're looking for breakthrough technologies. But what I do know is that transformation will involve change of our doctrine, our training, our leader development, our organizations, mat?el, people and facilities.''

But one proposal now circulating at the Pentagon would trim money allocated to the Future Combat System and slow the onset of its deployment by at least two years, from 2008 to 2010.

The Army, which earlier this year lost a fight to buy a new artillery piece called the Crusader, is also now battling to preserve full financing for a new armed reconnaissance helicopter, the Comanche. Pentagon acquisition officials are pushing the Army to buy 650 Comanches, fewer than the 679 requested.
Photo: The Stryker, a light armored vehicle, on exercises at the Yakima Training Center in Washington State. (Russ Carmack/The News Tribune, via Associated Press)

Anyone one who thinks a Tank is not as valuable as an attack Helicopter and needed in today's force is kidding themselves. That is why the modern attack helicopter was built was to take out tanks. Even in Peacekeeping, the use of heavy armour is a valuable asset that should not be over looked.
Often when we look at the best case for deployment of equipment we base the decision  on doctrine from past war and the Cold War. That does not leave much lee way into the operations we actually do day to day. Including Peacekeeping.
Because Canada has very limited assets it makes it even harder to base equipment choices on needs, wants  and doctrine verses deploy what we have. Usually we deploy the least amount of assets we an get away with and still play with the big boys. Often with our limited assets we provide a much higher level of service then expected. Because we have gotten away with it in the past we got very complacent.

Never kid yourself using Armour is a force multiplier. I would prefer we had Tanks deployed and using Chinooks and Griffons for over watch and transport  then just have attack helos with no tanks.

Never said a tank isn't valuable, it has its place like any other tool in the toolbox; however, should our ability to field tanks come at the expense of other capabilities? 

Is sitting in a static OP conducting surveillance or convoy escort really an effective use of a tank?  Tanks should be out roaming around the battlefield with infantry killing things but if you actually read the Lessons Learned publications put out by the Army you'd know that our tanks didn't necessarily integrate well with the Infantry in Afghanistan and that we had sustainment issues for the entire time we were there that were never rectified, which is why our tanks ended up being tied to FOBs a lot of the time.

Pretty much what I've heard and read.

So while Canadian publications might sprinkle things with pixie dust, the  Americans saw the value of armor in a COIN environment

Altair, the US had 90,000 soldiers in Afghanistan in 2011, they had 15 tanks.  Hardly wholesale adoption of the tank.  The USMC brought 15 tanks to replace our tanks when we left, the Army never brought any and they never saw the value in bringing any because it detracts from the COIN campaign.

Anyone one who thinks a Tank is not as valuable as an attack Helicopter and needed in today's force is kidding themselves. That is why the modern attack helicopter was built was to take out tanks. Even in Peacekeeping, the use of heavy armour is a valuable asset that should not be over looked.
Often when we look at the best case for deployment of equipment we base the decision  on doctrine from past war and the Cold War. That does not leave much lee way into the operations we actually do day to day. Including Peacekeeping.
Because Canada has very limited assets it makes it even harder to base equipment choices on needs, wants  and doctrine verses deploy what we have. Usually we deploy the least amount of assets we an get away with and still play with the big boys. Often with our limited assets we provide a much higher level of service then expected. Because we have gotten away with it in the past we got very complacent.

Never kid yourself using Armour is a force multiplier. I would prefer we had Tanks deployed and using Chinooks and Griffons for over watch and transport  then just have attack helos with no tanks.

I never said a tank is not valuable, it has it's place like any other tool in the toolbox.  My problem stems from the fact that we maintain tanks at the expense of other capabilities that are more urgently required.  We also don't have a robust echelon system that can adequately support them when they're deployed.  Our NSE when we first went in to Kandahar was the exact same one used in Kabul, it wasn't robust enough and we didn't have nearly enough trucks or people to maximize the effectiveness of the combat forces we did have in theatre.  The same can be said for our fighting troops echelons that lack an adequate amount of trucks, equipment and protection. 

For how we use our Army, tanks are overkill and come at the expense of other assets that would be more useful, particularly in an asymmetric war.  Our infantry battalions are completely under resourced when it comes to firepower as are some of other supporting arms and for a military that's supposed to be "joint" we do spend a lot of time only thinking about our own little rice bowl.

I've dragged this thread off topic a bit with this discussion but I believe if we are to be successful on future operations, including peacekeeping, peacemaking and COIN, we need military leaders that can think about conflict across the elements (air, land, sea, cyber and space) and understand how all those elements can interact with each other to achieve greatest effect.

 

[Kirkhill]

The World War 1 battlefield, for which the 4 mile per hour tank was developed as a siege breaker, was measured in yards.

The World War 2 battlefield, which was traversed by Guderian's Panzers by road at 25 miles per hour and on which he manoeuvred at 12 miles per hour, was measured in kilometers.

The modern COIN battlefield is measured in hundreds of kilometers.

WW1 battles involved millions of men delivering effect for months and exhausted nations after 4 years.

WW2 battles were similar to WW1 in numbers of men.  The battlefields were more dispersed but the effort was only sustained for 14 years (Japan-China)  or 4 years (US and USSR - Germany).

The modern COIN battlefield involves only a few thousand men that have to deliver effect indefinitely.

Tanks, we are constantly reminded, are to be husbanded and used en masse.  In an area like Kandahar that means you sacrifice reaction time for effect.  Or else you have to deploy the tanks in penny packets.  Or else you have to deploy a lot of them.

Helos get the effect to the target faster meaning you don't need as many of them to be able to react in a timely fashion.  They may deliver less effect than tanks (although if you compare 8 Hellfires, 38 70mms and a bucket load of 30mm to 40 or so 120mm that could be debatable) and be less able to manouevre in the face of enemy fire (although that too is probably debatable)  but at very least they manage to rapidly reduce the target sets in a timely fashion to a smaller number of isolated tough nuts.

In my mind the discussion has a mirror in the difference between WW2 artillery (25 pdr and 105mm with ranges of about 10 km) and the modern 155mm (with ranges up to 70 km).  The 70 km gun covers 49 times the area of the 10 km gun.  (Pi r-squared and all that)  That means, in order to deliver timely response) one ammo dump and not 49 ammo dumps, one gun position and not 49, one transport system and not 49, one maintenance system and not 49, one messing system and not 49, one medical system and not 49.

It is entirely justifiable to point out that one gun cannot deliver the weight fire of 49 but even if you had 49 you would have to distribute them across the COIN battlefield so that the result would be you would only have one gun on call in any event.

Likewise, if you distributed tanks you would have a troop, or even a pair, at your immediate beck and call.  A squadron on standby would take hours, if not days, to reach you.  A squadron of helicopters could be at your location in an hour delivering fire support, reinforcements and supplies and evacuating your casualties.

Tanks have their place - as a specialized bit of kit like the engineers - but helos have much more general utility.


:cheers:

 

[childs56]

The highlighted bit in yellow is completely untrue but let's not let facts get in the way of a good argument.  The Stryker family of vehicles is the brain child of former US Army Chief of Staff, General Eric Shineski.  The US Army begun exploring the adoption of the LAV family of vehicles in the late 90s as a way to provide the US Army with a medium-weight force optimized for expeditionary operations and rapid reaction.  The US Army was losing on that front to the USMC and the Stryker was seen as a way to get the Army out the door quicker in a crisis situation in comparison to its heavy armour divisions which required more time and resources to build combat power in theatre.  It had nothing to do with the involvement of the LAV III family of vehicles which did prove their worth in that theatre.

Lets not remember the US at time said that a wheeled IFV was not suitable for keeping up with a tracked force to which the US had mostly in its arsenal at the time. 
It was not until Canada Deployed the LAV3 into Afghanistan and took a few big blasts and the boys were well protected did the US ARMY actually take a hard look at a wheeled IFV vehicle. In a very short period of time after some trials had ordered some 2000 plus Lavs for immediate delivery.

I remember being in Ft Lewis Training Center seeing a LAV3 with a Canadian Flag flying off the Antenna hauling butt across the Artillery range while we were doing live fire. We were put into check fire and then were informed by range control to carry on they were trialing some Canadian vehicle and were going to be all over the ranges. but would stay away from the impact the impact area we were designated.
That was months before they put their order in.

The US Army had a General exploring Wheeled IFVs for the past 15-20 years but they were not going to buy them because in their own defence white paper  identified that a wheeled vehicle did not have the cross country mobility required to keep up with a tracked fleet. IE tanks. they put that project on the back burner.

For Peacekeeping one needs to have a force to reckon with when they deploy.Peacekeeping is job where one needs to intimidate both sides into submission. (Then work them towards an agreement that both sides feel they brokered themselves).  That includes Infantry, Armour Artillery and Air asset. You may not need all 4 together all the time. But when you do one wishes they had the resources. Proper Peacekeeping is an expensive venture, having many assets tied up for years into a mission where the equipment is just sitting is costly and also demoralizing for the Troops kicking tires.

 

[jollyjacktar]

I would rather see attack helos vs armour in the mix for the reasons mentioned above by Chris, but for us they're a hard sell and therefore almost impossible to see happen.  They're more expensive in hardware, maintenance and crew training.  No doubt would give all the raging lefties screaming warmonger fits of outrage, not to mention the present mob on the Hill whom I believe will continue with the Snr Trudeau's concept of supporting the military.

 

[Loachman]

Helicopters cannot occupy ground.

Helicopters are vulnerable to ground fire, including - and especially - light, simple, and plentiful weapons.

Helicopters are maintenance-intensive.

Helicopters are limited by weather and lack of illumination.

Helicopters cannot be on-station in significant numbers for long periods.

All arms have strengths and weaknesses, must cover for each others' weaknesses. and must reinforce each others' strengths.

Giving up a capability means that we will never get it back. We will, instead, "learn to do without" while silently suffering the lacks. Infantry battalions make do without mortars and pioneers and fourth rifle companies - once considered key elements due to combat experience. CAS support used to be a regular feature on exercises when we had CF5s. That largely died out when we lost a dedicated CAS capability, and was only revived in Afghanistan. Tac Hel had become tactically irrelevant with Griffon, and was only revived in Afghanistan with great effort and at some cost. It is still only relevant in warm climates as the cabin doors have to be pinned open or removed to operate door guns. There is no cold- or cool/wet-weather armed capability.

As much as I believe in the need for real Tac Hel capabilities - and we have a long, long way to go before coming close to having those - I would not trade any other capabilities in favour of that.

Just because something is not needed for one operation does not mean that we will never need it some day. Afghanistan was a surprise. Some other conflict will be a surprise in the near-enough future. The best guarantee that we can meet it is to preserve an all-round combat capability.

And teach people to stop voting for Kardashians.

 

[Journeyman]

..... we lost a dedicated CAS capability, and was only revived in Afghanistan.

      ???

USAF F-15Es, yes;  RCAF CF-18s, never darkened the skies over me.  :dunno:

 

[Kirkhill]

Helicopters cannot occupy ground.

Helicopters are vulnerable to ground fire, including - and especially - light, simple, and plentiful weapons.

Helicopters are maintenance-intensive.

Helicopters are limited by weather and lack of illumination.

Helicopters cannot be on-station in significant numbers for long periods.

All arms have strengths and weaknesses, must cover for each others' weaknesses. and must reinforce each others' strengths.

Giving up a capability means that we will never get it back. We will, instead, "learn to do without" while silently suffering the lacks. Infantry battalions make do without mortars and pioneers and fourth rifle companies - once considered key elements due to combat experience. CAS support used to be a regular feature on exercises when we had CF5s. That largely died out when we lost a dedicated CAS capability, and was only revived in Afghanistan. Tac Hel had become tactically irrelevant with Griffon, and was only revived in Afghanistan with great effort and at some cost. It is still only relevant in warm climates as the cabin doors have to be pinned open or removed to operate door guns. There is no cold- or cool/wet-weather armed capability.

As much as I believe in the need for real Tac Hel capabilities - and we have a long, long way to go before coming close to having those - I would not trade any other capabilities in favour of that.

Just because something is not needed for one operation does not mean that we will never need it some day. Afghanistan was a surprise. Some other conflict will be a surprise in the near-enough future. The best guarantee that we can meet it is to preserve an all-round combat capability.

And teach people to stop voting for Kardashians.

No disagreement on any of the above (including the Kardashian voters).

I would just point out that while helos can't hold ground they can deliver the boots that do.  Also it is an awful lot easier to get a helo from ship to shore than it is a tank.

Edit to add:  when holding ground it is hard to dig in a tank.

Final edit (fingers working faster than brain today - again): Given the manpower limitations of the force, personally I would just as soon see 3 armoured regiments with limited tank capabilities converted into 2 armoured regiments and an Apache or Tiger or Cobra regiment.

 

[Fishbone Jones]

  (Pi r-squared and all that)

Pi r-round. Cake r-square

Sorry. Cheap diversion. ;D

 

[daftandbarmy]

No disagreement on any of the above (including the Kardashian voters).

I would just point out that while helos can't hold ground they can deliver the boots that do.  Also it is an awful lot easier to get a helo from ship to shore than it is a tank.

If only we had decent combat boots....

 

[childs56]

If only we had decent combat boots....

Funniest quote of the day. and most true.

 

[Kirkhill]

Pi r-round. Cake r-square

Sorry. Cheap diversion. ;D

:cheers:

This keeps up, my Kilkenny stock is going to be rapidly depleted.

And there goes another for the boots.

 

[Altair]

And teach people to stop voting for Kardashians.

Team kardashian, team mortician, neither has a great track record for getting team green a bunch of shiny fancy kit.

I agreed that every option has its drawbacks.

CAS has a nasty potential to misidentify targets, as anyone who has been on the wrong side of a A-10 can attest to.

Artillery isn't always a option with things such as danger close to think about.

And yes, armor isn't perfect, or extremely quick to react to every situation

 

[Good2Golf]

...CAS has a nasty potential to misidentify targets, as anyone who has been on the wrong side of a A-10 can attest to...

So in your opinion, what do you believe to have been the greatest cause of targeting inaccuracy in such situations, particularly where a Type 1 engagement has most likely been the case?

G2G

 

[Kirkhill]

...

CAS has a nasty potential to misidentify targets, as anyone who has been on the wrong side of a A-10 can attest to.

...

Can they?

 

[Loachman]

I would just point out that while helos can't hold ground they can deliver the boots that do.

If the weather and tactical situation permit. We have no ability to deliver troops in close proximity to a significant enemy without allied assistance - CAS, AH, and Arty - and we lack sufficient and effective utility helicopters to lift much more than a platoon in one go. Remember - Chinook was never intended to conduct airmobile insertions and extractions and requires a benign tactical environment in order to survive.

And, once those troops are on the ground, they need external fire and logistic support and XXX Corps had better be quicker linking up with them than they were in 1944.

Also it is an awful lot easier to get a helo from ship to shore than it is a tank.

It's a lot quicker to fly a tank in than it is to sail a long distance, plus, unless one happens to have wisely purchased a couple of ex-Russian Mistrals, those helicopters might not be shipped in readily-flyable condition. That means sea containers, ports, cranes, rebuild time, etcetera.

Edit to add:  when holding ground it is hard to dig in a tank.

Ever tried to dig a helicopter in? Or even drag a cam net over one? Both have been tried, and the effort is either too great or too risky or both.

Final edit (fingers working faster than brain today - again): Given the manpower limitations of the force, personally I would just as soon see 3 armoured regiments with limited tank capabilities converted into 2 armoured regiments and an Apache or Tiger or Cobra regiment.

That would depend upon the tactical situation, allied support, and secure basing with logistical support for the helicopter contingent.

 

[Kirkhill]

If the weather and tactical situation permit. We have no ability to deliver troops in close proximity to a significant enemy without allied assistance - CAS, AH, and Arty - and we lack sufficient and effective utility helicopters to lift much more than a platoon in one go. Remember - Chinook was never intended to conduct airmobile insertions and extractions and requires a benign tactical environment in order to survive.

In the absence of the capability we can't perform the task even when the weather and tactical situation DO permit.

As to the need for allied assistance, agreed.  We could/should be doing a lot more with our own resources.

And close is a relative term that depends a lot on what you can lift into the LZ.  And if you are willing to risk crash-landing on the Orne River bridge.

I understand about the Chinook, but it allows for large bodies of troops and 100 HP vehicles to be lifted close to the point of use.

And, once those troops are on the ground, they need external fire and logistic support and XXX Corps had better be quicker linking up with them than they were in 1944.

So we limit operations to Nijmegen and leave Arnhem for another day.  Or we try to avoid dropping on Panzer Divisions in broad daylight.

It's a lot quicker to fly a tank in than it is to sail a long distance, plus, unless one happens to have wisely purchased a couple of ex-Russian Mistrals, those helicopters might not be shipped in readily-flyable condition. That means sea containers, ports, cranes, rebuild time, etcetera.

True to all of that.  You can't fly a helicopter into Kandahar from salt water.  Can you?
You can't fly a CH-146 or 147 in a C-17 to Cyprus and then have them transit to a RoRo FRP before transiting forwards to an objective - with troops on board the 147s from either Cyprus or from the RoRo?

Ever tried to dig a helicopter in? Or even drag a cam net over one? Both have been tried, and the effort is either too great or too risky or both.

Why would you want to?  Wouldn't the helo maintenance area be better located outside the engagement area?

That would depend upon the tactical situation, allied support, and secure basing with logistical support for the helicopter contingent.

Again, I can't disagree.

But I would argue that the maintenance of capabilities argues for restructuring the RCD, LdSH and 12eRBC as a Divisional Recce Regt (ISTAR), a Tank Regiment and an AH Regiment.  The infantry seems quite happy doing the Dragoon thing of Riflemen mounted in LAVs with some of the rest of them happy to be delivered by truck, boat or helicopter.