The Canadian Peacekeeping Myth (Merged Topics)

[The Bread Guy]

From the moment of his appointment, he was a good party soldier, I doubt he would have veered much from the party line.

He's had some moments of clarity ...

It is in Canada’s interest to play a leadership role in United Nations peacekeeping, former military commander Romeo Dallaire said Monday even as he delivered a pointed critique of how the world body runs such missions.

The retired senator and lieutenant-general, who famously led the UN’s ill-fated mission in Rwanda more than 20 years ago, told a Senate committee that the world has failed to act on some much-needed reforms when it comes to peacekeeping.

The problems he cited include poor mission planning and the appointment of unqualified military officers and diplomats to lead missions and diplomatic efforts.

“There are regions where you’ve got four or five missions right beside each other that could be reinforcing each other that have no capability of doing that,” Dallaire said. “That’s why the guys don’t like to work with the UN.” ...

... and I'll give him at least a  >>hair<< of the benefit of the doubt re:  the advice he can give about how things shouldn't be done.  Will the boss listen?  We'll see ...

 

[OldSolduer]

Learn from the past, don't live in the past.

Again, it makes no sense to be talking about the ROEs because we have not seen them yet. You're assuming they will be the same ones that were in effect in the 90s.  It's not the 90s. Assume. A s s-u-me.

The ROEs need discussion. And don't presume to lecture me. I'm a big boy who may have been a few places and have a few experiences.
You do know who the UN is made up of?

 

[McG]

ROE are important and need be part of the discussion.  That does not mean we assume the worst of possible ROE and use that as a strawman to attack the concept of a mission in general.  In the past we had a UN that was anti-use of force and inefficient, while today we have a UN lamenting national caveats that see nations stopping well short of authorized ROE and a CDS who has made a personal commitment to effective ROE and C2 ... but there is still nothing real to look at.  We cannot critique what does not exist, so for the time being we could instead attempt to define the criteria that such ROE would have to achieve.  We could also look at what other requirements must be satisfied for a mission to succeed. 

Here is one author's take on defining the requirements for a successful mission:

Why peacekeeping needs bigger guns in 2016
An African mission could overtax an already stretched military
Elinor Sloan
iPolitics
04 Oct 2016

Asked in a Senate hearing last May what the UN needs for its peacekeeping missions, the undersecretary-general for peacekeeping answered with two words: “attack helicopters”.

That response is telling. If Canada deploys to a UN operation in Africa, something the Trudeau government seems intent upon, it will have to be prepared for war. And with large commitments already in Europe and Iraq, it will have to make some choices.

Peacekeeping missions of the Cold War era operated according to three principles: The UN force acted at all times impartially, used force only in self-defence and deployed only with the consent of the parties to conflict. The principles worked because the fighting parties were usually state actors that could control what their military forces did. It meant that, in most cases, risks to peacekeepers were relatively low — so they could carry out their mission while lightly armed.

Driven by events, each of these principles has fallen away. Impartiality was abandoned in the Congo in 2013 when the UN deployed an intervention brigade to carry out targeted offensive operations against Congolese rebels. Peacekeepers have had to use force beyond self-defence in the Congo and to protect civilians in places like South Sudan. The UN makes a distinction between host nation consent and tactical consent, arguing strategic consent is what’s necessary. But the practical reality of UN forces facing rebels and terrorists reveals the distinction’s fallacy.

When the three principles don’t work, peacekeepers become a party to the conflict themselves — with predictable results. In Africa, UN forces are being targeted and killed by gunfire, rocket fire, mortar shells, suicide car bombs, and improvised explosive devices (IEDs).

In this environment, what are Canada’s options for peace support in Africa? One is training. Canada could help a state build competent military and police forces so that it can address its own internal security. Canada’s expertise here includes training the Afghan national army and Iraqi security forces. Security sector reform takes many years but it’s vital for stabilizing a country.

Another option is enabling. Canada could provide high-end capabilities like signals, logistics, intelligence, engineering and air transport to assist UN combat arms units already in an African mission. But there are challenges. Our signals technology is digital, for example, while the UN mostly uses analog. The interoperability that Canada takes for granted in NATO does not exist in the UN. Canada would need to place officers in the UN force headquarters to ensure enablers are effectively used. And it also needs these enablers in Europe and Iraq, presenting the real possibility of an overstretched force.

Finally, Canada could conduct an operation, deploying Canadian combat arms along with enablers. The force would need Chinook helicopters for troop transport, an armed escort to protect the Chinooks, drones for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, reinforced armored vehicles, lethal firepower and protective body armor. A special concern is medical support and casualty evacuation since, unlike in other places, we cannot rely on the U.S. military.

Canada has light armored vehicles, upgraded to withstand IEDs. But its Chinooks are not at full operational capability, nor are its tactical armored patrol vehicles. Canada has only a limited number of low-flying drones, no armed helicopters like the Apaches used by many of our allies, and no medium altitude long-endurance drones. Again, what is necessary for a high-risk African mission is also in demand elsewhere.

The concurrency challenge goes beyond specific capabilities to include strategic command and control and logistics. If Canada goes into Africa it will be supporting three large geographically dispersed operations at once, placing significant demands on operational staffs in Ottawa.

The Trudeau government will have to prioritize. It will have to decide where it thinks Canada can have the greatest effect. And if it decides on a major mission in Africa, it will have to be ready for war. 

Elinor Sloan is Senior Research Fellow of the Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute, and Associate Professor of International Relations in the Department of Political Science at Carleton University

https://ipolitics.ca/2016/10/03/why-peacekeeping-needs-bigger-guns-in-2016/

 

[Fishbone Jones]

The CDS serves at Trudeau's pleasure. Trudeau wants his Security Council seat so badly, that he will do almost anything necessary to get it. If it means the UN doesn't like the CDS' input on ROEs, Trudeau will change it to what they want. He wants to stand up, at the Security Council, and say "Canada's back!" and will do anything to make it happen. The guy is a weasel.
:2c:

 

[The Bread Guy]

Asked in a Senate hearing last May what the UN needs for its peacekeeping missions, the undersecretary-general for peacekeeping answered with two words: “attack helicopters” ...

A reminder:  a NATO ally (but not a member) Canada's helping out seems to have used helicopter gunships in DR Congo for more than just moving troops under a U.N. mandate ...

Source for photo
More photos attached (source, in Ukrainian)

 

[Altair]

The CDS serves at Trudeau's pleasure. Trudeau wants his Security Council seat so badly, that he will do almost anything necessary to get it. If it means the UN doesn't like the CDS' input on ROEs, Trudeau will change it to what they want. He wants to stand up, at the Security Council, and say "Canada's back!" and will do anything to make it happen. The guy is a weasel.
:2c:

I was going to ask where any of what you said was backed up by any tangible evidence but I see that you covered that aspect of things with the 2 cents emoji.

As MCG posted right before you, the UN is asking for attack helicopters and is criticizing nations that have caveats on their forces preventing them from reacting to events on the ground, but this same UN that is asking for attack helicopters and criticizing nations for not intervening will ask the Prime Minister of Canada to put restrictive ROEs in place for CAF members?

http://www.dictionary.com/browse/truthiness

the quality of seeming to be true according to one's intuition, opinion, or perception without regard to logic, factual evidence, or the like:
the growing trend of truthiness as opposed to truth.

2006 merriam-webster word of the year don't cha know

 

[George Wallace]

I was going to ask where any of what you said was backed up be any tangible evidence but I that you covered that aspect of things with the 2 cents emoji.

And why, pray tell, do you not think that the CDS serves at Trudeau's pleasure?  That Trudeau can not remove him and replace him with a 'puppet' that will follow his bidding?

 

[MarkOttawa]

MCG: Further to Elinor Sloan and "armed escort to protect the Chinooks",
http://milnet.ca/forums/threads/29913/post-1457902.html#msg1457902

could not the CH-146 Griffons do the job in, say, Mali as they did in Afghanistan (the Conservative gov't kept any lethality quite quiet)?

Canadian UN Peacekeeping in Mali? RCAF Helicopters?
https://cgai3ds.wordpress.com/2016/07/26/mark-collins-canadian-un-peacekeeping-in-mali-rcaf-helicopters/

Mark
Ottawa

 

[Altair]

And why, pray tell, do you not think that the CDS serves at Trudeau's pleasure?  That Trudeau can not remove him and replace him with a 'puppet' that will follow his bidding?

The CDS most certainly does serve at the pleasure of the Prime Minister. This is not in dispute at all.

However, the part where Recceguy said that if the UN doesn't like the CDS input on ROEs The Prime Minister will change it to what they want flies in the face of the clear evidence that they are looking for nations currently involved in peacekeeping operations to be more proactive and they are looking for things such as attack helicopters to aid in fighting.

Why, pray tell, would Canada be singled out and be given restrictive ROEs? If anything, to get that security council seat that everyone keeps on going on about, the government will need to be seen as doing more than the other nations involved, not less.

 

[Ostrozac]

Historically, the UN has been a little gunshy about using violence against member nations.

Note that for the majority of the UNPROFOR mission, Croatia and Bosnia were both voting members of the UN, and the Bosnian Serbs were not fighting for independence, but for union with Yugoslavia, another voting member. During the Rwanda Genocide, one factor that led to the UN's minimalist approach was that it was two members of the UN that were conducting the genocide.

In some of the UN missions in Africa, particularly Mali and DRC, the threat forces are not backed by a voting member, therefore the UN is much more comfortable with an aggressive approach.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Why peacekeeping needs bigger guns in 2016

Asked in a Senate hearing last May what the UN needs for its peacekeeping missions, the undersecretary-general for peacekeeping answered with two words: “attack helicopters”.

That response is telling. If Canada deploys to a UN operation in Africa, something the Trudeau government seems intent upon, it will have to be prepared for war. And with large commitments already in Europe and Iraq, it will have to make some choices.

Peacekeeping missions of the Cold War era operated according to three principles: The UN force acted at all times impartially, used force only in self-defence and deployed only with the consent of the parties to conflict. The principles worked because the fighting parties were usually state actors that could control what their military forces did. It meant that, in most cases, risks to peacekeepers were relatively low — so they could carry out their mission while lightly armed.

Driven by events, each of these principles has fallen away. Impartiality was abandoned in the Congo in 2013 when the UN deployed an intervention brigade to carry out targeted offensive operations against Congolese rebels. Peacekeepers have had to use force beyond self-defence in the Congo and to protect civilians in places like South Sudan. The UN makes a distinction between host nation consent and tactical consent, arguing strategic consent is what’s necessary. But the practical reality of UN forces facing rebels and terrorists reveals the distinction’s fallacy.

When the three principles don’t work, peacekeepers become a party to the conflict themselves — with predictable results. In Africa, UN forces are being targeted and killed by gunfire, rocket fire, mortar shells, suicide car bombs, and improvised explosive devices (IEDs).

https://ipolitics.ca/2016/10/03/why-peacekeeping-needs-bigger-guns-in-2016/#

 

[McG]

Why peacekeeping needs bigger guns in 2016

..,
https://ipolitics.ca/2016/10/03/why-peacekeeping-needs-bigger-guns-in-2016/#

See eight posts above yours.

 

[Loachman]

could not the CH-146 Griffons do the job in, say, Mali as they did in Afghanistan (the Conservative gov't kept any lethality quite quiet)?

A little busy right now, and supporting two operations in two locations adds an additional challenge.

 

[Humphrey Bogart]

No attack helicopters, no MUAV, no MRAP type Patrol Vehicles, no .50 cal, no integral mortars at the Battalion level, no radios, no logistics vehicles, no data downlink for Griffons, no direct fire support at the Battalion level other than LAV 6.0, no bridging equipment.... The list of things lacking is pretty large.

I can't really see what we bring to the table for the UN other than a plethora of staff officers? 

 

[George Wallace]

..... a plethora of staff officers?

You nailed it.

 

[Lightguns]

No attack helicopters, no MUAV, no MRAP type Patrol Vehicles, no .50 cal, no integral mortars at the Battalion level, no radios, no logistics vehicles, no data downlink for Griffons, no direct fire support at the Battalion level other than LAV 6.0, no bridging equipment.... The list of things lacking is pretty large.

I can't really see what we bring to the table for the UN other than a plethora of staff officers?

Staff NCOs?

 

[Humphrey Bogart]

Staff NCOs?

It's the Canadian Army, we would never do such a thing.  Despite us sending a number of Warrant Officers on every AOC serial, we would never use them in such a capacity.  It's unfortunate because I know a number of Warrant Officers who would make excellent staff. 

CANSOF does this, they've got MCpls and Sgts that have served as Mission Commanders.  The Army?  That would do irreparable damage to the status quo. 

Obviously CANSOF is different than the Army and I'm not saying we should emulate them but we could do a far better job employing NCOs to their maximum potential.  Than again, the same goes for Officers but that's what you get when you've got a top heavy organization and as Mr. Campbell put it, "a glorified corporals guard".

 

[McG]

... no MRAP type Patrol Vehicles ...

We bought the TAPV for this.  It specifically fills the roles that we had RG-31 to do in Afghanistan.

... no integral mortars at the Battalion level, ... no direct fire support at the Battalion level other than LAV 6.0, ... 

We like to form BGs for these things.  If the CJOC staff decide it, the organization can have integral mortars, howitzers and main battle tanks.  We had LAV TUA in 2006 and we chose to leave it in Canada because we could get tanks there instead.  But, if we need those missiles they are being reintroduced to battalions now.

... no radios, no logistics vehicles, ...

These exist.  Total CAF numbers are too few, but that was also true when we were in Afghanistan.  We prioritized.

... no bridging equipment....

We have plenty of bridging equipment.  It has its deficiencies, but it exists and it will traffic a MBT.

... no .50 cal, ....

In a LAV 6 and Leopard 2 equipped BG, is this reason to give up?

.... The list of things lacking is pretty large.

The list is pretty large, but it is largely unchanged from when we were in Afghanistan.  In fact, we have closed a lot of capability gaps from when I first went to Kandahar.  The remaining problems still need to be addressed, but we did not give up because of them before and we don't need to now either.

I can't really see what we bring to the table for the UN other than a plethora of staff officers?

We could bring logistics, medical, engineering, communication and other specialist capabilities.  I know this will sound odd in an infantry centric Army but maybe it is not an infantry mission?  Maybe the infantry is only there in a force protection role (maybe to include a combat team QRF)?

 

[Humphrey Bogart]

We bought the TAPV for this.  It specifically fills the roles that we had RG-31 to do in Afghanistan.

We only have six TAPVs right now, all in Gagetown at CTC being used for vehicle training.  Not an option yet.

We like to form BGs for these things.  If the CJOC staff decide it, the organization can have integral mortars, howitzers and main battle tanks.

Point taken on mortars and howitzers, tanks though?  Not required in Africa and would be overkill.  The French Army has never deployed tanks to Africa and they were quite curious why we did so in Afghanistan.  Sustainment of them in Africa would also be a big problem.

We had LAV TUA in 2006 and we chose to leave it in Canada because we could get tanks there instead.  But, if we need those missiles they are being reintroduced to battalions now.

Only being reintroduced in the dismounted role.  So they're near useless on an offensive operation.  What would make them useful is a vehicle platform to mount them on.  Preferably a lighter vehicle like the TAPV.

These exist.  Total CAF numbers are too few, but that was also true when we were in Afghanistan.  We prioritized.
We have plenty of bridging equipment.  It has its deficiencies, but it exists and it will traffic a MBT.
In a LAV 6 and Leopard 2 equipped BG, is this reason to give up?
The list is pretty large, but it is largely unchanged from when we were in Afghanistan.  In fact, we have closed a lot of capability gaps from when I first went to Kandahar.  The remaining problems still need to be addressed, but we did not give up because of them before and we don't need to now either.
We could bring logistics, medical, engineering, communication and other specialist capabilities.  I know this will sound odd in an infantry centric Army but maybe it is not an infantry mission?  Maybe the infantry is only there in a force protection role (maybe to include a combat team QRF)?

What we do bring to the table is capable people and you're right, this isn't a reason to give up.  My frustration rests in the fact that we talk about enablers but we really have none.  We've got the main server built but we've got nothing to plugin to the server.

Real value would be, being able to supply a Tactical Aviation Group, E-ROC or a UAV flight to a UN Op, a battery of howitzers, FOO/FAC parties, etc.  As for infantry, being able to provide specialized infantry skillsets, snipers, recce, DFS, Anti-Armour, C2 at the Bn Level, Mortars, etc would add value. 

The UN has enough riflemen already, they need enablers and real enablers, not more paper weights, like a Div HQ.

 

[Altair]

Point taken on mortars and howitzers, tanks though?  Not required in Africa and would be overkill.  The French Army has never deployed tanks to Africa and they were quite curious why we did so in Afghanistan.  Sustainment of them in Africa would also be a big problem.

Just curious, but didn't the Leopards prove to be valuable in Afghanistan?( I wasn't there, but I have read just about every book about Canadian involvement)

Most of what I read seems to praise the added firepower, protection and off road abilities. As for the French themselves, I would hazard a guess that Kapisa province wasn't as active as Kandahar.