Iterator said:
A wealth of corporate knowledge there.
Yes, thank you.
Iterator said:
If the Infantry were to retrieve mortars then what would you propose the organization look like?
I would start with the original 2/52 organization, and reinforce it along the same lines as now being considered for overstrength rifle companies – taking the platoon to a manning level that ‘normal’ LOB requirements would still leave an effective platoon.
I would build it as follows:
51 (FSCC, no change) – Pl Comd, Pl WO, 2 x comms, dvr
51A (no change) – Pl 2IC, comm. x 2, dvr (Comm to be senior MCpl, Adv Mor qual, able to direct fire as Asst if needed)
51B – FC, A/FC MCpl x 2, dvr
51C – FC, A/FC MCpl x 2, dvr
52 – Mor Sect; Gp Comd/CPO, A/CPO; Line Cpl, dvr
52A - #1, #2, Dvr +1
52B - #1, #2, Dvr +1
53 – Mor Sect; Sect Comd/CPO, A/CPO; Line Cpl, dvr
53C - #1, #2, Dvr +1
53D - #1, #2, Dvr +1
54 – Mor Sect; Gp Comd/CPO, A/CPO; Line Cpl, dvr
54A - #1, #2, Dvr +1
54B - #1, #2, Dvr +1
55 – Mor Sect; Sect Comd/CPO, A/CPO; Line Cpl, dvr
55C - #1, #2, Dvr +1
55D - #1, #2, Dvr +1
Pl Stores – 3 pers
Gp Ammo veh x 2 – 3 pers each
(At any time, any detachment size element could be missing one of its personnel, with the remainder capable of functioning.)
Total – 2 offr, 7 Sr NCO, 60 MCpl/Cpl/Pte
Line Cpls and above all Adv Mor Qual
Iterator said:
Knowing how dispersed battalions have been on operations during the last 50 years you would think that mortar sections would be the norm. Not doubting that it can be done, but have you seen it done (I have not)?
It was always part of the doctrine to be able to deploy as independent sections. That capability was sucked from the platoon’s strength when the “Recce Dets” were created. With the simultaneous emphasis on dispersed firing positions, detailed recce/survey and electronic data production, the flexibility for section operations disappeared, along with other aspects of “get in – shoot – get out” tactics.
Iterator said:
The number of available NCOs and Advanced Qualified NCOs is limited and the Line Corporal was always either a Corporal or a Private. Before disbanding the Infantry mortars was there a requirement for an NCO as the Line Corporal?
The Line Corporal provided functions that went beyond the simple passage of data. While the CPO could always pass data by radio, land line etc, he (the CPO) couldn’t leave his post to walk down the line and make sure things were actually happening. In the middle of a mission he couldn’t supervise a misfire-unload by a detachment including inexperienced troops; make sure the right ammo was being prepared, or provide simple leadership contact with the troops when things got busy. A good Line Corporal did all of that, plus provided one more “common-sense-check” on the data as it came from the CP.
Iterator said:
Yet another reason to bring back a full Combat Support Coy. As troops rotate through, they bring all kinds of skills to the Rifle Coys....
Troops seldom rotated back to the rifle companies, except to get their “check in the box” at each rifle company command appointment. I saw NCOs who were very capable Group Commanders, controlling the life fire of mortar groups being sent back to command rifle sections (which they had done as MCpl) because someone needed to see them taking on that responsibility. Most of the “old mortar dogs” spent most of their careers in mortar and were happy to stay there where their specialist skill set was fully appreciated.
The following is an excerpt from a short paper on the topic I wrote a few years and few appointments ago:
. . . , the predominant attitude for NCO career progression remains that each NCO must fill each appointment in the rifle company at each rank level. For example, a newly promoted Sergeant in Mortar Platoon was required to return to the rifle company to act as a section commander in that rank, even if he had performed that appointment as a Master Corporal. Any assessment as a Sergeant in Mortars was given little regard until he had “punched his ticket” with a rifle section. The prevailing argument was the necessary level of responsibility. This argument is not supportable as a rifle section commander was responsible for one vehicle, 9 men and generally followed a Platoon Commander closely in operations. A Mortar Control Post Operator (CPO), the junior Sergeant’s job in a Mortar Platoon, is significantly different. A CPO is responsible for 14 men, four long-range weapons systems, four vehicles, the computation of fire data and the independent movement and readiness of the Mortar Group without continuous supervision.
Iterator said:
While some were eager for the change, many of those assigned to Combat Support Company (especially mortars) did not like the shift away from being "Infantry" (aside from Recce Patrolman which was seen as a honing of the skills).
Not everyone, even in the infantry, is fully suited to being the point man on patrol all the time. Some people have personalities and skill sets (or the potential to develop them) that are very much suited to other roles in the battalion – the varying nature of the Weapons Platoons personalities (collectively and at an individual level) serve only to emphasize this nature. Just as we would never switch the Int Sect Cpl and the Jerry Can Bowser driver, each infantry soldier, given the opportunity, finds his niche.
Quite often I found that soldiers who didn’t fit into the support platoons were most often not there by their own choice – rather the move was someone else’s “solution to a problem” and as often constituted passing on a problem rather than solving one. Mortars (and Pioneers) is as “Infantry” as #1 rifleman in “A” Coy – failing to understand that, as well as the importance of making sure that #1 on 52A is as properly selected for his job as #1 rifleman in “A” Coy is a failure of the system at its most basic level, the command and development of the individual soldier.
Again, from the document quoted earlier:
For many years, the units of the Infantry Corps have paid little attention to the selection and preparation of [mortar] candidates. Significantly, the unit personnel who should possess the strongest vested interest in improving this situation (the Mortar Platoon Officers and Warrant Officers) are often caught up in the prevailing attitudes or are too low in the chain-of command to influence the relevant decisions. Until the Corps encourages change, as was effectively implemented with the SAIC (and its mandatory MG qual prerequisite), and seeks other initiatives to change prevailing attitudes, then improvements will not occur.
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