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Ref "what if " history I saw this one last night "WHEN HITLER INVADED BRITAIN."
http://www.offthetelly.co.uk/reviews/2004/hitler.htm
The above linked review is right on the money, show had some good ideas but it failed on others.
http://www.offthetelly.co.uk/reviews/2004/hitler.htm
The above linked review is right on the money, show had some good ideas but it failed on others.
I also saw the show and was a little let down.
Now, let me throw something really odd into the equation. I quoted figures from a Canadian Military Headquarters report of 19 September 1941 in my previous post. In the Summer of 1940 the only mobile reserve in the UK was 7 Corps commanded by Lieutenant General AGL McNaughton, consisting of 1st Canadian Infantry Division, 1st British Armoured Division, a New Zealand Brigade (+) and elements of 2nd Canadian Infantry Division, which were beginning to arrive. None of the formations had any anti-aircraft guns and the 2nd Division as well as the Corps Troops had little to one operational equipment.
On 30 August 1940 McNaughton headed a Canadian team which attended a meeting at the War Office to discuss the above and the equipment state in general. The following was the British position:
a. "equipment will be placed where it is most needed" and large consignments to the Middle East were necessary.
b. No Bofor guns were available in England except for ADGB (Air Defence of Great Britain); all others were going to Haifa and Alexandria.
c. The whole output of Boys Atk Rifles is going to the Middle East until 15 September. Then two brigades - one for Iceland and one for West Africa - had to be equipped before the 2nd Division could receive its 25% training scale.
d. The situation re field guns was even worse.
If the situation in the UK was that dire, why was the War Office giving priority to overseas theatres? What did they know, or were they gambling, or did they have to make difficult decisions? By the way, Churchill acted as his own Minister of Defence at the time.
Now, let me throw something really odd into the equation. I quoted figures from a Canadian Military Headquarters report of 19 September 1941 in my previous post. In the Summer of 1940 the only mobile reserve in the UK was 7 Corps commanded by Lieutenant General AGL McNaughton, consisting of 1st Canadian Infantry Division, 1st British Armoured Division, a New Zealand Brigade (+) and elements of 2nd Canadian Infantry Division, which were beginning to arrive. None of the formations had any anti-aircraft guns and the 2nd Division as well as the Corps Troops had little to one operational equipment.
On 30 August 1940 McNaughton headed a Canadian team which attended a meeting at the War Office to discuss the above and the equipment state in general. The following was the British position:
a. "equipment will be placed where it is most needed" and large consignments to the Middle East were necessary.
b. No Bofor guns were available in England except for ADGB (Air Defence of Great Britain); all others were going to Haifa and Alexandria.
c. The whole output of Boys Atk Rifles is going to the Middle East until 15 September. Then two brigades - one for Iceland and one for West Africa - had to be equipped before the 2nd Division could receive its 25% training scale.
d. The situation re field guns was even worse.
If the situation in the UK was that dire, why was the War Office giving priority to overseas theatres? What did they know, or were they gambling, or did they have to make difficult decisions? By the way, Churchill acted as his own Minister of Defence at the time.
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How many places could the Germans have landed? Does anyone have any idea what the ranges of the invasion barges?
The problem I have with this statement is that no battleship had ever been sunk by aircraft when out of port in 1940. Wasnt until the two British battleships got sunk by the Japanese that people really realised how vunerable the battleships were.
And the Germans were practising landings, I know this because they carried out landings on Dieppe and figured that you couldnt land tanks there because it was a rock and not sand beach (hence the Canadian tanks were a suprise).
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On 11-12 November, 1940 (eg: 67 years and one day ago from today), the RN attacked the Italian Fleet, in port, at Taranto. The conventional wisdom at the time suggested that such attacks could only occur in deeper water. At least for torpedo attacks. The Germans may have resorted to dive bomber attacks on ships that would be approaching the invasion force. I believe it was the Soviet Battleship MARAT that was sunk in this manner, by Hans Ulrich Rudel, but I'm not certain.FascistLibertarian said:
Now, throw this into the mix. Assume that the Germans (for some reason) decide to focus on the UK and not the USSR throughout 1940/41. WHAT IF the Germans waited until spring, 1941 to hit the UK? WHAT IF the Bismarck (and Prinz Eugen, naturally), headed out to the Jutland instead of the North Atlantic to intercept an RN counter-invasion force? I am of the opinion that nothing like that would have happened due to many factors, not the least of which was the opinion in Germany that the UK was finished as a threat to German expansion to the East.
Never being loathe to join a rush up a blind alley, I believe the first major fleet units sunk at sea by aircraft were the Prince of Wales and Repulse in December 1941. They feel prey to a combination of torpedo and level bombing attacks by a large number of trained Japanese aircrew based in Vietnam. Did the Germans have crews trained in the use of these disciplines against capital ships in mid-1940? Remember, the target is moving which complicates hitting what is a small target given the inaccuracy of delivery in those days. Presumably the Stuka would have improved things, but again the target was moving and a ship could apply concentrated AA fire.
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I believe the purpose of navy dive bombers was to hit moving ships on the deck, where there was no armour belt.
The dive was to provide the accuracy and limit the AA exposure. The ship couldn't concentrate AA fire if the torpedo
planes were attacking at the same time.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dive_bomber
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Though not sunk by aircraft attack, the Bismarck was certainly wounded enough by them to be finished off by....the Germans (it was scuttled, though certainly would have sunk without further help, but I digress). That of course was in May, 1941.
Though not trained in the use of Dive Bombers to attack ships, they were relatively slow moving targets, and the Marat was indeed sunk by Hans Ulrich Rudel using a Ju-87 in 1941. Necessity being the mother of invention, and not having an effective surface fleet anywhere near the capabilities of the RN, the Germans would have had to resort to air attacks, level and dive. Though I'm pretty sure that they would have resorted to dive bombers, given their increased accuracy over level bombers. And the survivability of the Fairey Swordfish facing off against the Bismarck at speeds of less than 100 knots gives credibility to some aircraft getting through.
Remember, the RN was built "for the high seas". Only under a LOT of air cover could it venture near shore. I am just stating that the RN moving into the Channel would have had to at least contend with wave after wave of Luftwaffe attacks, especially if it entered the channel from the East, where on a good day one side of the channel could see the other. Given the shorter range to their bases, the Luftwaffe bombers would have had a much better air cover than they "enjoyed" over the UK. And the RAF would not have had "home field advantage" that they had over the UK, when shot-down pilots could bail out, make their way back to the aerodrome and fly another day.
Though not trained in the use of Dive Bombers to attack ships, they were relatively slow moving targets, and the Marat was indeed sunk by Hans Ulrich Rudel using a Ju-87 in 1941. Necessity being the mother of invention, and not having an effective surface fleet anywhere near the capabilities of the RN, the Germans would have had to resort to air attacks, level and dive. Though I'm pretty sure that they would have resorted to dive bombers, given their increased accuracy over level bombers. And the survivability of the Fairey Swordfish facing off against the Bismarck at speeds of less than 100 knots gives credibility to some aircraft getting through.
Remember, the RN was built "for the high seas". Only under a LOT of air cover could it venture near shore. I am just stating that the RN moving into the Channel would have had to at least contend with wave after wave of Luftwaffe attacks, especially if it entered the channel from the East, where on a good day one side of the channel could see the other. Given the shorter range to their bases, the Luftwaffe bombers would have had a much better air cover than they "enjoyed" over the UK. And the RAF would not have had "home field advantage" that they had over the UK, when shot-down pilots could bail out, make their way back to the aerodrome and fly another day.
TangoTwoBravo
Army.ca Veteran
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Speculative history is fun if not very rigorous.
I would add to this, however, that the Norwegian foray had severely depleted the Kreigsmarine (in terms of damage and sinkings). That campaign was a very near-run thing and the Narvik episode showed what could happen when the RN (both light units and the Warspite) came to grips with surface units.
The naval covering force given Overlord was truly impressive, and the Germans could not have even come close to matching that against a much more formidable threat.
To give some credence to the possibility of success, however, we can look to the Japanese Malaya campaign where a rather small joint Japanese force (ie a mix of naval, air and ground units) used the sea and mobility to hustle the British forces into a pen and utlimately surrender. Now, the Japanese had uncontested control of the sea and pretty much the air. The Germans could not have realistically achieved those two conditions for a channel attack. Unlike Malaya in 1941, the Home Fleet would have come down under the cover of the RAF and with its own aircraft carriers in 1940.
The Germans did get the Scharnhorst and Gneiseneau through the channel later in the war, but that was a different proposition than gambling an invasion force in barges. Barges! I think that it was Churchill who lamented mid-war that everything seemed to hinge on these things calls LSTs. The requirement for specialized equipment, organization and training for a successful amphibious operation was highlighted throughout the war. What worked in 1066 would not have necessarily worked in 1940. Could some Germans have reached the shore? Sure. Would enough have made it take the island? Very doubtful. Would the follow-on forces have been able to make it as well in the face of the RAF and RN and without the benefit of surprise? Very doubtful again. A few well-handled destroyer squadrons could make a mess of a barge fleet. If the barges go over at night then the Luftwaffe can't do too much to help and the RN destroyers have a field day. If they go in daylight then they go with all the joy of a daylight opposed crossing of the English Channel.
Now, take away the RAF and the situation changes. Hence the saying about so many owing so much to so few.
Looking at Dieppe, the Germans did determine that the beach was impassible to tanks due to their own trials. That does not mean that they were practicing a beach landing. They could have simply driven one tank across the beach and said, "OK, that sucked." As a further aside the Canadians were also aware of this and took measures to deal with the chert (the lead tank of each three had a bobbin that deployed a chespaling carpet. A surprising amount of tanks actually got across the beach. It was the concrete barriers to the town that stopped the tanks. The bonus of the chert was that the Germans didn't put AT mines on the beach. Anyhoo.
I would add to this, however, that the Norwegian foray had severely depleted the Kreigsmarine (in terms of damage and sinkings). That campaign was a very near-run thing and the Narvik episode showed what could happen when the RN (both light units and the Warspite) came to grips with surface units.
The naval covering force given Overlord was truly impressive, and the Germans could not have even come close to matching that against a much more formidable threat.
To give some credence to the possibility of success, however, we can look to the Japanese Malaya campaign where a rather small joint Japanese force (ie a mix of naval, air and ground units) used the sea and mobility to hustle the British forces into a pen and utlimately surrender. Now, the Japanese had uncontested control of the sea and pretty much the air. The Germans could not have realistically achieved those two conditions for a channel attack. Unlike Malaya in 1941, the Home Fleet would have come down under the cover of the RAF and with its own aircraft carriers in 1940.
The Germans did get the Scharnhorst and Gneiseneau through the channel later in the war, but that was a different proposition than gambling an invasion force in barges. Barges! I think that it was Churchill who lamented mid-war that everything seemed to hinge on these things calls LSTs. The requirement for specialized equipment, organization and training for a successful amphibious operation was highlighted throughout the war. What worked in 1066 would not have necessarily worked in 1940. Could some Germans have reached the shore? Sure. Would enough have made it take the island? Very doubtful. Would the follow-on forces have been able to make it as well in the face of the RAF and RN and without the benefit of surprise? Very doubtful again. A few well-handled destroyer squadrons could make a mess of a barge fleet. If the barges go over at night then the Luftwaffe can't do too much to help and the RN destroyers have a field day. If they go in daylight then they go with all the joy of a daylight opposed crossing of the English Channel.
Now, take away the RAF and the situation changes. Hence the saying about so many owing so much to so few.
Looking at Dieppe, the Germans did determine that the beach was impassible to tanks due to their own trials. That does not mean that they were practicing a beach landing. They could have simply driven one tank across the beach and said, "OK, that sucked." As a further aside the Canadians were also aware of this and took measures to deal with the chert (the lead tank of each three had a bobbin that deployed a chespaling carpet. A surprising amount of tanks actually got across the beach. It was the concrete barriers to the town that stopped the tanks. The bonus of the chert was that the Germans didn't put AT mines on the beach. Anyhoo.
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I still cling to my contention that air superiority was a prerequisite for
an invasion to have had any chance of success.Someone bought up the
fact that the Luftwaffe managed to achieve local air superiority during
the Battle of France,this was against an air defence system without any
sort of central control agency.This cannot can be compared to the very
efficient British system, which would have denied the Germans any chance
of the success they had over a disintergrating France.
Given the range of the German fighters,the limit of effective German
bombing,one must look at the landing beaches available to the Wehrmacht,
the Thames estuary or the white cliffs of Dover a daunting prospect given
that the RAF would at least have control of the air part of the day.A sky
full of JU 52 carrying paras would have caused a major increase in the
number of aces in the RAF.
I have not even included the sea conditions in the channel or the Royal Navy
in this scenario,but IMHO without intervention of the space invaders Operation
Sea Lion was just not on.
Regards
an invasion to have had any chance of success.Someone bought up the
fact that the Luftwaffe managed to achieve local air superiority during
the Battle of France,this was against an air defence system without any
sort of central control agency.This cannot can be compared to the very
efficient British system, which would have denied the Germans any chance
of the success they had over a disintergrating France.
Given the range of the German fighters,the limit of effective German
bombing,one must look at the landing beaches available to the Wehrmacht,
the Thames estuary or the white cliffs of Dover a daunting prospect given
that the RAF would at least have control of the air part of the day.A sky
full of JU 52 carrying paras would have caused a major increase in the
number of aces in the RAF.
I have not even included the sea conditions in the channel or the Royal Navy
in this scenario,but IMHO without intervention of the space invaders Operation
Sea Lion was just not on.
Regards
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The RAF was part of that air defence system in France. Even with ULTRA (giving the Brits forewarning of the invasion), there was not enough ground forces to fend off the Germans. And to say that the RAF would have destroyed the ground forces/invasion fleet, well, even with total air supremacy in 1944, the Wehrmacht was able to function for weeks against overwhelming odds. In the end, airpower, though necessary, isn't sufficient to win wars/battles.
Also, the ranges to the beaches wasn't as far as one would think, and the beaches were in some cases "land-able". As well, the Germans were innovative when coming up with battle plans, perhaps seizing a port through a strategem involving paratroops, etc.
As well, someone mentioned the Sandhurst wargame of 1974. I read a review of it online. There were some "fallacies" (IMHO) For example, even as the forces are invading, the Luftwaffe is still hitting London (instead of prepping the beaches: the Luftwaffe was a tactical airforce, designed to support the army, not reduce cities to rubble)
I would LOVE to get my hands on the OOB for August, 1940 and game this using both an intuitive system, and perhaps even see "how it goes".
For starters, though, I would have to inject myself as the ueberfuehrer, and forget for a moment that nothing like this could have been mounted not due to lack of resources, but rather due to incompetence in the German high command
Anyway, back to the drawing board
Also, the ranges to the beaches wasn't as far as one would think, and the beaches were in some cases "land-able". As well, the Germans were innovative when coming up with battle plans, perhaps seizing a port through a strategem involving paratroops, etc.
As well, someone mentioned the Sandhurst wargame of 1974. I read a review of it online. There were some "fallacies" (IMHO) For example, even as the forces are invading, the Luftwaffe is still hitting London (instead of prepping the beaches: the Luftwaffe was a tactical airforce, designed to support the army, not reduce cities to rubble)
I would LOVE to get my hands on the OOB for August, 1940 and game this using both an intuitive system, and perhaps even see "how it goes".
For starters, though, I would have to inject myself as the ueberfuehrer, and forget for a moment that nothing like this could have been mounted not due to lack of resources, but rather due to incompetence in the German high command
Anyway, back to the drawing board
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Hey now, we are still waiting for further installments of Pandora in a Bottle!
You are not allowed to play in this time-line until that other story gets done!
Signed;
The Director of Alternative Universes and Privileged Frames of Reference.
You are not allowed to play in this time-line until that other story gets done!
Signed;
The Director of Alternative Universes and Privileged Frames of Reference.
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:rofl:
I'd like something like that on a bumper sticker.... ;D
Even if there were no plans to invade the British Isles,
which effectively there weren't, the issue remains.
What use would those islands be without the RAF?
The seige if Britain would be the next chapter and
the outcome would be significantly different from
the real world course.
The invasion of Europe from the south might have been
only show going and they might never have acheived the
victory they had in the timeframe ending in '45.
Western Europe might now speak Russian as a first
language!
Just a few idle thoughts....
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The biggest problem with alternative history is that the calculus changes very rapidly once you change multiple starting conditions (or go very far into the past, see http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/64004/post-608893.html#msg608893).
For the Germans to have invaded the UK with any measure of success would have required a lot of changes to the set-up conditions, many which date long before the beginning of the Second World War (German infatuation with Manouevre Warfare can be dated to the late 1917 early 1918 period of WWI as Sturmtruppen tactics were developed. From this came the idea of using airpower as a tactical force multiplier rather than a strategic asset. Both technological and institutional factors prevented the development of a German "P-51 Mustang" analogue). Similar changes can be made about the political institutions of National Socialist Germany, the personalities and interactions of the German General Staff and subordinate formations, German industry and logistics and so on.
Similar arguments can be made for the UK as well. It was not a "done deal" that Churchill would become Prime Minister after Chamberlain, and various factors could have influenced the fighting ability of the Home Guard, 1rst Canadian Division and other formations available to defend the UK. For that matter, the British also had a home grown Fascist movement, who may well have welcomed the imposition of National Socialist rule in the UK (or bitterly opposed it as well).
There is also the unqualifiable influence of chance. The weather could have helped or frustrated possible landings. Germany always had limited resources, a train crash might have upset the logistical balance preventing the flow of fuel or munitions to the Luftwaffe for a critical period, and so on.
You can see why the activities of the Directorate of Alternative Universes and Privilaged Frames of Reference are so important. Remember to mention the crucial work we do next time you speak to your elected representatives. ;D
For the Germans to have invaded the UK with any measure of success would have required a lot of changes to the set-up conditions, many which date long before the beginning of the Second World War (German infatuation with Manouevre Warfare can be dated to the late 1917 early 1918 period of WWI as Sturmtruppen tactics were developed. From this came the idea of using airpower as a tactical force multiplier rather than a strategic asset. Both technological and institutional factors prevented the development of a German "P-51 Mustang" analogue). Similar changes can be made about the political institutions of National Socialist Germany, the personalities and interactions of the German General Staff and subordinate formations, German industry and logistics and so on.
Similar arguments can be made for the UK as well. It was not a "done deal" that Churchill would become Prime Minister after Chamberlain, and various factors could have influenced the fighting ability of the Home Guard, 1rst Canadian Division and other formations available to defend the UK. For that matter, the British also had a home grown Fascist movement, who may well have welcomed the imposition of National Socialist rule in the UK (or bitterly opposed it as well).
There is also the unqualifiable influence of chance. The weather could have helped or frustrated possible landings. Germany always had limited resources, a train crash might have upset the logistical balance preventing the flow of fuel or munitions to the Luftwaffe for a critical period, and so on.
You can see why the activities of the Directorate of Alternative Universes and Privilaged Frames of Reference are so important. Remember to mention the crucial work we do next time you speak to your elected representatives. ;D
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MR,
The RAF in France was not part of any air defence system simply
because no such system existed,the RAF flew standing patrols in the
faint hope that the Luftwaffe bombers would fly into areas that they
were patrolling.This generally did not happen, instead they were
ambushed by superior numbers of fighters and on return to their
bases found the ruins of there support echelons.There was very little
coordination with the French,who also had no air defence system,
and there were cases of French air bases refusing to refuel RAF aircraft
and French civilians actually hindering RAF personal trying to service
their aircraft on ad hoc airfields.I sometimes wonder why we spent
so much blood and national treasure to defend and liberate this
country.
This thread was started as a discussion of the chances of a German
invasion given the situation as it existed in 1940 but seems to have
degenerated into an alternative history forum,interesting but not
very relevent to discussion at hand,and I will stick to my guns and
maintain that,given the defeat of the Luftwaffe,the lack of preparedness
of the Wehrmacht and the disinterest of the Kreigsmarine,Operation
Sea Lion was definitely "not good to go".
Another point not mentioned, is the intense and largely ignored
work done by Bomber Command in the attacks on the ports of
departure of the German invasion fleet. They apparently did some
good work,night bombing of seacoasts was much easier the finding
targets on the mainland.
Regards
The RAF in France was not part of any air defence system simply
because no such system existed,the RAF flew standing patrols in the
faint hope that the Luftwaffe bombers would fly into areas that they
were patrolling.This generally did not happen, instead they were
ambushed by superior numbers of fighters and on return to their
bases found the ruins of there support echelons.There was very little
coordination with the French,who also had no air defence system,
and there were cases of French air bases refusing to refuel RAF aircraft
and French civilians actually hindering RAF personal trying to service
their aircraft on ad hoc airfields.I sometimes wonder why we spent
so much blood and national treasure to defend and liberate this
country.
This thread was started as a discussion of the chances of a German
invasion given the situation as it existed in 1940 but seems to have
degenerated into an alternative history forum,interesting but not
very relevent to discussion at hand,and I will stick to my guns and
maintain that,given the defeat of the Luftwaffe,the lack of preparedness
of the Wehrmacht and the disinterest of the Kreigsmarine,Operation
Sea Lion was definitely "not good to go".
Another point not mentioned, is the intense and largely ignored
work done by Bomber Command in the attacks on the ports of
departure of the German invasion fleet. They apparently did some
good work,night bombing of seacoasts was much easier the finding
targets on the mainland.
Regards
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I would argue that any discussion of "what would have happened if..." is the same as a "what if..". I mean, the Wehrmacht did NOT attempt an invasion of the UK. Would it have succeeded? Well, the only way to go down that route is to say "what if.."time expired said:
For example
"What if the Wehrmacht seriously planned to invade the UK? How would the preparations have been different? Could they have pulled it off?"
That is the jist of this discussion. Now, I maintain that even mounting an invasion was impossible. Period. Now, inject the first diversion, that is, somehow make Hitler really really want the UK occupied. Now what?
Some would say "the Germans would have had no chance." I say "Poppy cock". Here's why: in war there are so many variables that there is no "certain thing". To illustrate, suppose that for some reason you and I are sitting in an internet chat room in February, 1940. We are talking about the Sitzkrieg, and what the prospects are for the Germans. I say to you "The Germans will invade through Belgium and Holland, and in ten days will have the entire BEF backed up against the channel, along with a large French force. Then, one month after that, France will surrender. Six weeks is all they need." You would have called me a noob and told me to quit trolling. There was NO WAY that Germany, with its inferior quality and number of tanks, and its inferior number of planes, could even pull ANYTHING like that off. As for Belgium, Eben Emael will stop any invading force long enough to allow reinforcements to come up. And the Maginot Line is IMPREGNABLE.
See what I mean? Innovation is a concept of war that is hard to factor. Could the Germans have seized a port in some sort of Trojan Horse operation? Maybe. And if they did, imagine ship after ship unloading tank after tank. Yes, the RAF comes in, but guess what, the Luftwaffe is ready. And so on and so forth.
So, never say never.
I know that this thread has been resting peacefully for nearly a month, but at the risk of ruining a certain participant's homecoming by tying him to his computer instead of enjoying his family, here is some new material. It, which is based on solid research several years ago, suggests that Sea Lion and even an attempt to bounce an airborne invasion, were non starters. This material is taken from The Most Dangerous Enemy, A History of the Battle of Britain by Stephen Bungay.
First - the airborne option. As early as 18 June General Milch proposed to Goering that the Germans carry out an airborne operation to capture the airfields in south-east England and supply them by air. Goering refused because it was far too risky and he only had one airborne division available.
Second - regarding the German's ability to attack the Royal Navy. According to the order of battle of the Luftwaffe in June 1940, there were only 22 JU 88 bombers trained in maritime attack as well as 29 obsolete torpedo bombers. Moreover their heaviest bombs were incapable of piercing the deck armour of British battleships.
The author assesses Sea Lion as a desperate gamble wich depended upon complete cooperation between the three services, the complete neutralization of the RAF and the RN and benign weather. He notes that the landing barges which were towed in pairs at a top speed of three knots could not withstand more than a force 2 sea state, an unlikely situation in late September which was the planned assault window.
First - the airborne option. As early as 18 June General Milch proposed to Goering that the Germans carry out an airborne operation to capture the airfields in south-east England and supply them by air. Goering refused because it was far too risky and he only had one airborne division available.
Second - regarding the German's ability to attack the Royal Navy. According to the order of battle of the Luftwaffe in June 1940, there were only 22 JU 88 bombers trained in maritime attack as well as 29 obsolete torpedo bombers. Moreover their heaviest bombs were incapable of piercing the deck armour of British battleships.
The author assesses Sea Lion as a desperate gamble wich depended upon complete cooperation between the three services, the complete neutralization of the RAF and the RN and benign weather. He notes that the landing barges which were towed in pairs at a top speed of three knots could not withstand more than a force 2 sea state, an unlikely situation in late September which was the planned assault window.
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I think you are referring to Dame Fanny Lucy Houston (1857–1936), who was quite a character. Here's an extract from her entry in the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography. This episode is featured in the Leslie Howard movie Spitfire.
"As part of her longing to see Britain supreme everywhere she donated £100,000 to enable a British team to compete for the Schneider aviation trophy (1931) and gave large gifts to the Navy League."
http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/34015
"As part of her longing to see Britain supreme everywhere she donated £100,000 to enable a British team to compete for the Schneider aviation trophy (1931) and gave large gifts to the Navy League."
http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/34015
Flip said:
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It was the young men were the tipping point along with the Hurricane and then the Spit.
The hurricane had already been produced in great number's where as the Spit was just getting into production and took more time to build than the Hurricane due to it's design.
The hurricane had already been produced in great number's where as the Spit was just getting into production and took more time to build than the Hurricane due to it's design.
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