The Spitfire and the Battle of Britain

[vonGarvin]

MR

This is where we differ. I don't believe the Germans could have put together a successful invasion in the time available in 1940, even if the RAF had been defeated. For all intents and purposes the army especially would have been a collection of type 4 officers - hardworking and ill-informed - as regards amphibious operations. You rather blithely assume that they could have towed barges and light shipping across the channel and continued to do so. However, to maintain the tonnage of passengers and cargo to conquer the British Isles without a port was surely beyond the capacity of the available bottoms.

This is a most interesting discussion, I admit, and much both more fun and less useful than many.

OS

OS
(I admit, when I saw "MR", I thought you were calling me "mister") ;D
Getting a port would probably have been a priorty; however, I must agree that they could not have successfully invaded for the simple reason that they couldn't plan it. They could have, given proper guidance, etc from higher; however, the cards were already set for the USSR.  At most, from "Adlertag" forward, the Germans hoped to force the Brits to the bargaining table.  I do believe, however, that we are giving the UK too much credit in terms of what they would have had on the ground to oppose the Germans.  The BEF was a shallow army: 300 000 men wide, but one man deep in reality.  Their capability to take on all the landings would have been severely limited, and even with the slow movers, etc, the Germans could have got enough through.  Perhaps the build up would have taken much longer than it took for us in 1944, but in the end, they  could have done it, IMHO.

But, I also agree, and maybe the "what if" of Sealion could be moved?

 

[geo]

Let's not forget that the Brit gov't at the time had certain reservations on their own ability to withstand the German tidal wave.

After Dunkirk, the only "fully equipped" division in the UK was the 1st Cdn division.  From what I understand, they were being moved back and forth all over the countryside to make them appear to be much larger than they actually were.

The UK Treasury & Crown jewels had been moed to Canada for safe keeping
English children were being shipped to Canada & Aus for the duration of the war

 

[Danjanou]

I feel another MR alternate history tale coming on here.  8)

 

[Signalman150]

Old Sweat,

Have read yr posts many times and enjoyed them; thoughtful and intelligent.  However, on this one I'm going to have to go with Mortarman.  I've been doing a good deal of research on this for a specific project of mine over the last three years, and I am certain that Germany could successfully have launched an invasion.  My reasons are:

a) that dirty rotter General Billy Mitchell, who proved that Capital Ships were no match for aircraft, (I won't say it was easy, but it was proven already).  The Luftwaffe wouldn't have sunk the whole fleet or anything like that, but it could have disabled a good portion of it (merchant losses in the Channel during the phony war sort of demonstrate this);

b) the state of the British Army three months after Dunkirk. Most of the BEF's equipment was left in France, and Churchill (in his memoirs) says they didn't even have enough rifles left in Britain to arm the soldiers they had (let alone the Home Guard etc).  I have never doubted the spirit of the British, but even THEY need something to fight with.  I believe coastal defence would have been lacking;

c) Part of Britain's success in repelling invasion, was due to specific German Failures; someone mentioned Radar, and had the German's not switched their targets from Radar stations to the Air Bases, the Germans would have had air superiority in nothing flat, (Hurricane and Spitfire notwithstanding).  The Luftwaffe then changed from Air Bases to urban centers, their second major mistake.  It allowed the RAF the respite it needed to do the job.

There were many factors that prevented the invasion: the Luftwaffe's' changing targeting priority, Radar, and of course Sidney Camm and RJ Mitchell, and the "gallant few". But I am convinced that the German's could well have pulled off an invasion had things been only slightly altered.  

I've been seeing a lot of what I'll gently refer to as "revisionist crap" about The Battle of Britain the last few years.  It has less to do with old documents being recently declassified, and more to do with people trying desperately to destroy any sign of nobility or rightness in western history.  

Sorry about that; I'll get off my soap box now.

Cheers,
Sig150

 

[time expired]

The key factor in the winning of the Battle of Britain was the obstinance
of one man, and his decision to fight it,Winston Churchill.His rhetoric
convinced the British people that they should fight this battle and that
against all expert opinion they had a fighting chance of winning it.
Another key factor was the abysmal German intelligence services,the
other side of the channel could have been the other side of the moon
for all the Germans knew about it.Not understanding the importance
of the British radar,bombing the wrong airfields,were just two examples
of how out of touch their intelligence were.
                                          Regards

 

[MarkOttawa]

Old Sweat: If I remember Bungay's book correctly
http://forums.milnet.ca/forums/threads/67816/post-634735.html#msg634735
http://www.amazon.ca/Most-Dangerous-Enemy-Stephen-Bungay/dp/1854107216/ref=sr_1_2/701-3535795-9036326?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1194557983&sr=1-2

his basic (revisionist and I think he's right) argument is that the Luftwaffe really didn't stand a chance .

Mark
Ottawa

 

[Old Sweat]

You are all making excellent points. The key is that the Germans ran out of time in 1940, and the attention shifted to the east. (Not necessarily related.)

Let me hit another track. The British opened No 1 Amphibious Training Centre at Inverary in Scotland in October 1940. Eventually the troops that did the landings in North Africa, Sicily, Italy and Normandy trained there. (Landing craft production lagged behind training by the way.)

What is probably not as well known is that as part of the American partial mobilization of 1940, the US Army opened an amphibious training center in Franklin County, Florida in the panhandle. (The only reason I know that is that last winter we spent some time in a waterfront RV park slap dab in the middle of what had been the training area.)

The Germans were way behind the curve.

Both armies had two years plus to train and had been thinking about amphibious operations before the war. In Guy Simonds' biography mention is made of the exercise the British army staff college had with the Royal Naval College where they planned an amphibious landing.

Having said all that, the British army was in no stage to fight off a major invasion. Sometimes it is better to be lucky than good.

 

[Signalman150]

Amen

 

[MarkOttawa]

3rd Heard: Burma wasn't quite the Pacific .  RCAF members also flew Beaufighters there:
http://www.burmabeaufighters.com/pages/articles/burmarevisited.php

One of my sisters' father-in-law flew with 177 Squadron, though then with the RAF.  Only joined the RCAF after the war .

Mark
Ottawa

 

[ExSarge]

I have to echo the comments of a previous poster; this has been a very entertaining thread. However (ya had to know that was coming!) the problem with “what if” history is the shear number of variables.

What if Hitler did not turn his attention to the east?
What if the Luftwaffe achieved air superiority over the channel?
What if an airborne drop seized a bridgehead?
What if the RN was prevented from striking at the invasion fleet?

For every scenario there are countless numbers of possible outcomes. Although it’s an enjoyable intellectual exercise, one that, frankly I enjoy to take part in (especially while sitting in a comfortable pub being served cold beer by attractive waitress) with like minded amateur historians. Lets not loose site of the fact that it’s just an exercise.

 

[a_majoor]

Amen!

Now to our discussion of "What if Xerxes was defeated at Thermopylae?"

 

[Colin Parkinson]

I suspect the Germans could have gotten a portion of their forces ashore, but the cost would have been huge, they would alos not have the ability to sustain the force. The RAF sttill had lots of useable bases on the West coast untouched by the Germans, the German troops would have very little in the way of ammo or armour with them and fighting in a very hostile population. I usspect they would be defeated, however the cost would effectivly put the UK out of the war for a couple of years, possibly costing them all of North Africa. Also unclear would be the effect on US support.

 

[Rocketryan]

Very intresting topic I've been reading. While I don't really have much to add, but you all seem into this discussion so I thought I'd just suggest reading "Fighter: The True Story of the Battle of Britain" by Len Deighton. Its a very good read. Its mostly just pointing out the facts of the battle. It covers alot including the time building up to it, the stages of the battle, German planning on Sea Lion, and about the fighter industry.
Several pages with pictures which help put things in perspective too.

 

[time expired]

I believe it would be true to say that the key to a successful
invasion would have been Luftwaffe gaining air superiority
over the area of the invasion beaches,and friends they didn't
even come close.the Luftwaffe was from its very beginning
a tactical air force designed to support the army in fulfilling
its aims,nobody in the Nazi leadership seemed to understand
the strategic possibilities of air power.So when called upon to
fight a strategic air campaign against England they were very
illprepared and illequip ed,their bombers were unable to exist
in the air over England without fighter escorts and their fighters
were too short legged to escort the bombers much further north
than the London area.Even in the areas that they appeared to have
some success,the bombing of Fighter Commands 11 Groups
airfields,for example was an illusion.Hurricane and Spitfire sqns
could have operated from a golf course given a long enough
fairway,all they needed was a bus load of fitters, a truck with a
radio, a couple of bowsers of fuel and an officer with a Very
pistol and they were in business.12 and 13 groups airfields
had not been attacked and were intact,aircraft production was
increasing,pilots were beginning to arrive from the Occupied
countries,the Commonwealth and even the USA.Although
the propaganda of the day liked to describe this as a victory
against tremendous odds I believe the Luftwaffe were doomed
to failure from the very start.
                                      Regards

 

[Flip]

Although the propaganda of the day liked to describe this as a victory
against tremendous odds I believe the Luftwaffe were doomed
to failure from the very start.

As much as the Luftwaffe suffered for lack of planning and foresight,
the RAF excersised remarkable foresight and planning.

Hermann Goering had no idea how the air defenses were organized or how they worked.
The British people had no idea how close they came to not having the tools needed
to protect their island.

The course of the war could so easily have been altered by a myriad of variables.
Some of them political.  Some technical. What it came down to was that time was
on Britain's side. And the Luftwaffe got stalled.

The Battle of Britain was still a very sharp turning point.

 

[Brad Sallows]

I would not credit the RN with winning the "Battle of Britain", which was an air battle.  The RN did, however, win "Operation Seelowe" by essentially discouraging the KM from bothering to mount a serious planning effort (instead passing the buck to Goering's shop).  Some have speculated that had the river barges ever taken to the Channel, it would not have taken many destroyers and lesser vessels at high speed to swamp the barges with wakes.  Regardless, there were a *lot* of lesser naval vessels in the UK, and had they got in among the invasion fleet it would have been all over even if the issue could only be decided by gunfire.  It might not have been necessary to risk the RN battle line at all.  And the RAF would not have had to defeat enemy anti-shipping attacks by killing them to a man; for the span of only a few hours it would only have been necessary to break up the German formations to render the attacks ineffective.

No matter how weak the land forces in Britain may have been, I can't conceive why so many people accept that so many other and better-mounted amphibious operations were difficult and risky, but a shoestring operation by the KM should have pushed over the UK like a stalk of wheat, as if nothing that could happen after T-Tag - like supplying the army - would matter.  (Hint: remember Market-Garden; the air force didn't want to risk certain options because they knew there would have to be some aircraft left to supply the landing force).

If there is to be a revised credit for the greatest contributor to victory in the BoB, my first candidates would be the bombers which goaded Hitler into shifting his attacks from the British fighter force to British cities.

 

[vonGarvin]

I believe it would be true to say that the key to a successful invasion would have been Luftwaffe gaining air superiority over the area of the invasion beaches,and friends they didn't even come close.  The Luftwaffe was from its very beginning a tactical air force designed to support the army in fulfilling its aims,nobody in the Nazi leadership seemed to understand the strategic possibilities of air power.

What I put in bold is the KEY point.  The Luftwaffe had, as you said, no chance, barring a miracle (meteor shower destroys RAF: Film at 11). So the key then is to put the Luftwaffe back into a tactical fight.  Just as the Luftwaffe was outnumbered over France and Flanders in May, they were nevertheless able to get LOCAL air superiority with their TACTICAL air force.  That would have been key. 

So, key to any invasion would have been to subordinate ALL forces under one commander (not going to happen).  That due especially to the personalities involved.

The Germans were able to pull off some pretty good victories against "all odds" in that first year of the war, so why would gaining and maintaining a beachhead be beyond the realm of possibility?  I mean, the BEF had lost much of its heavy artillery and motor transport in Belgium, right?  1st Cdn Div is running to and fro, but it can only do so much. 

I don't know what the long-term effects would have been, but the UK certainly had one advantage: ULTRA.  Still, I don't know if it would have been enough to stop the Germans from gaining a beachhead and seizing a port.  Look at some of their other "stunning" victories they pulled off, and it was from innovative use of initiative and new ideas.  Eben Emael was supposed to be THE fortress.  The Germans took it in minutes by the very clever use of Paratroopers.

So, given the nut of cracking a port for follow on forces, I'm fairly certain that some young General somewhere would have come up with some smashing plan to take it. 

As for the tactical battle over the channel, I think that the Luftwaffe would have been able to fend off the RAF and the RN long enough to cause them both to back off enough to allow a first wave (mostly infantry, I imagine) followed by the heavier "stuff".

Remember, key here is that the entire coast of the UK was not manned to the same extent as the German "Festung Europa" we faced off against in 1944.  The landing would have been opposed, naturally, but not to the same extent that we faced.  In fact, maybe the Germans would have tried a different approach?  Seize the "far bank" of the channel from the other side?  Fallschirmjaeger, instead of dropping inland in blocking positions, instead drop around the landing sites, eliminating opposition (with Luftwaffe support, on the coast, well within range of fighters AND bombers, instead of deeper inland), and allowing the sea borne force to land unopposed?

Maybe I WILL try a "what if", but you'll all have to suspend belief with my first "what if", and that would be that the General Staff was united and Hitler actually wanted to take the UK out of the war by force.

 

[Old Sweat]

David,

You also have to accept, against the experience of virtually every Allied amphibious landing of the war, that the German plan would have gone off without a hitch. And this would have happened in the absence of any joint doctrine, command and control arrangements, specialized trained naval forces, rehersals and . . .

Hope is not a principle of war.

 

[vonGarvin]

David,

You also have to accept, against the experience of virtually every Allied amphibious landing of the war, that the German plan would have gone off without a hitch. And this would have happened in the absence of any joint doctrine, command and control arrangements, specialized trained naval forces, rehearsals and . . .

You're right in the key area: JOINT is key, and the German forces were more like four arms going off in four directions (Army, Navy, Airforce and Waffen-SS).  THAT is why it would never have happened, and why it didn't happen.  If one person rose up and said "I'm in Charge" and Hitler said "I second that motion, and carried", then it would have been pulled off.  Not because of German competence or incompetence, but because of British weakness at the time.  The coast wasn't really that well defended, there were scarcely enough reserves to conduct counter moves.  And I am NOT saying that the Germans would have won, but simply that the first stage, the landings, could have been done successfully, and those forces could have been kept in supply and reinforced, and as early as September 1940.
Had they waited much longer, the British forces had time to build up a much more effective defence.

Though the landings would have been a goon show, consider this.  Look at the situation on the West Front in January 1940.  Suppose we were sitting in a cafe somewhere in February 1940, and I were to say to you that that the Germans had a plan to invade Norway, Denmark, Holland, Belgium and France and that ALL of them would be under COMPLETE German control in 6 months, you would have called me mad.  And I would have been.  NOBODY could have foreseen the complete and utter success of the Wehrmacht in 1940. 

Now, the western Allies liked to have EVERY condition for success set prior to launching.  Well, maybe not every condition, but...
The Russians weren't so keen on making everything just right, and the Germans were somewhere in the middle.  At Kursk, they overprepared.  Crete was run on a shoestring, but somehow pulled that one off.

All I am saying is that the Germans would not have had everything "just right" prior to launching, but they didn't launch because they lacked a personality to give the whole system a kick start in the right direction.  And to maintain focus.

Also, given the disposition of UK forces in September 1940, the defence of the UK was hastily arranged and certainly not thorough.  The landings would not have been "Omaha-beach-esque", but rather more like what happened in Norway or Crete.  Heck, if nothing else, Crete  illustrates what could have happened in the UK if there were a novel plan and an aggressive commander.
So, I maintain that the Germans could have seized a port, and kept it supplied.  As for US reaction, they didn't come when France was overrun, so why would they come if the UK were overrun?  (Not that I'm saying that the UK would have been overrun)

 

[Old Sweat]

To now "quisle"* a bit, the state of the ground forces in the UK at the time was pathetic, and it didn't improve all that much for another year or two. The number of formations did increase, as did their training, but the troops were short of all sorts of equipment well into 1942. Canadian Military Headquarters submitted a report to Ottawa dated 19 September 1941 on the state of the army in the UK on 31 August; it is scarey reading. A few examples in the Canadian Corps will suffice (read - equipment, holdings, establishment): Bren Guns, 2241, 2961; 2-in Mortar, 234, 466; Universal Carriers, 528, 770; Infantry Tanks, 45, 192; 25-pdr Fd Gun, 187, 256; 2-pdr ATk Gun, 96, 198; 40mm LAA gun, 20, 137. This is a year after the invasion was planned to take place. At this time the coprs consisted of the 1st and 2nd Infantry Divisions, the 1st Army Tank Brigade and the 3rd Infantry Division which was arriving in the UK. The last formation would not have been operationally ready for a few months, because the equipment state in Canada was even worse and it required a period of training.

* I used my status as a senior citizen to create the verb 'to quisle" for to abandon one's position and go over to the other side. The word was coined in dishonour of Quisling, the Norwegian who earned his nation's undying hatred by heading the puppet government after the German conquest.