Re-enter the Battle Rifle?

[KevinB]

Your right, the Arms Room Concept is expensive and logistical intensive, and is usually only instituted by SOF entities that can both fund, and support them.  For elements than can do it, it does offer a extreme amount of flexibility.

I doubt that it can be done effectively in a convensional setup, however looking at some of the options, and incorporating them into the Pl and Section, can offer more fexibility, for little added costs and minimal logistical burden.

The Section DM/Battle Rifle really does not take away from the shooter capability and only adds.

I'm not really knoweldgeable about the Mk43 and Mk48 to offer much of an employment opinion on them, beyond seeing that they have pluses and minuses when compared to the M240/C6/Mag-58.  For the CF, the Mk43 is a tough sell as its M60 based, and the country has no M60 history, while it may be usefully to CANSOF, it would be extremly awkward to field for the rest of the CF.

 

[Kirkhill]

Your right, the Arms Room Concept is expensive and logistical intensive, and is usually only instituted by SOF entities that can both fund, and support them.  For elements than can do it, it does offer a extreme amount of flexibility.

I doubt that it can be done effectively in a convensional setup, however looking at some of the options, and incorporating them into the Pl and Section, can offer more fexibility, for little added costs and minimal logistical burden.

With the greatest respect, but in an Army that can only field 27 active companies I would strongly suggest that the whole force could be financed as a "special" force.  Given the high price of everything else fielded I have difficulty accepting that maintaining a 20 to 33% overage in rifles and mgs at the company level is going to break the bank. (33% overage means 4 weapons for every 3 soldiers).

As to logistics, the Coy is already carrying 5.56 and 7.62 in its current scale (not to mention 25, 40 and occasionally TV2s 60 and a bunch of 66 and 84s).

It would seem to me theat there would be some merit in at leaste a whole section carrying the same calibre of ammunition ( as in a heavy squad equipped with DM?SS?SASS?Battle Rifle and C6.  Let the DM pair up with the C6 gunner  with the DM acting as asssitant gunner and both of them spotting for the other.  Precision and Area Support.

 

[Illegio]

It's the money, or if you prefer, the lack thereof that currently dictates the number of active companies that we have. SOF-type forces tend to be inordinately expensive relative to their size, and as they say, money does not grow on trees. For the Arms Room Concept that Mr. Boland is talking about, there is considerably more than a "33% overage." Taking into account procurement costs, support contracts, spare parts and training drives up the unit costs even further. New systems are not bought in a vacuum. This is money that has to come from somewhere, and given that the military budget scheme is a zero-sum game, money for this enterprise must invariably be drawn from someplace else.

As far as the sharpshooter concept goes, I wholly support the integration of a sharpshooter at the section and platoon levels. I was, admittedly, not sold on the 7.62mm solution at the section level, as I think that keeping ammunition commonality is important, but having actually used the C7CT... suffice it to say that I can't support the use of a 5.56mm sharpshooter rifle, at least not to complement the section/platoon level MGs.

Going back to the money issue... There is a fairly straightforward argument to be made for the procurement of a sharpshooter rifle, especially if that rifle is also selected as the new short-range semiautomatic sniper rifle. I think it would be next to impossible to sell the Arms Room Concept on an army-wide scale. As Mr. Boland mentions, the sharpshooter rifle takes away nothing (or very little) from the current section capability while adding a medium-range precision fire capability that the infantry currently lacks at any level.

 

[KevinB]

One Arms Room I have heard discussed is:
Hk45C (pistol)
HkMP7
Hk416 (10.4") or Mk18 Mod0
Hk416 (14.5") or M4A1
Mk12 Recce (16")
Mk12 Mod1 (18")

Mk11 Mod0 (or Mod2)
Mk11 Carbine (SR-25 Battle Rifle w/ Stainless Steel barrel)

Mk46
Mk43

And suppressors for all systems
For one shooter...

  As well some of the guns may have a spare to ensure one is operation on a deployment.

You're talking about a 900%+ overage.


A more realistic Arms Room for conventional forces would hold
C8A3 (C8SFW) 16", with additional 11.5" and 20" uppers (at 50% overage each).

Additionally 2 Battle Rifle / section - with both 16" and 20" uppers.

It is still however a HUGE increase in weapons, and the required CQ and Pl HQ headaches, and logistical support.

 

[SeanNewman]

With the greatest respect, but in an Army that can only field 27 active companies I would strongly suggest that the whole force could be financed as a "special" force...

You would suggest that, but you would be wrong  ;D and not wrong because of funding weapons but wrong because of how much we are paid (and other personnel-related costs).

The human body (as in "us", not "stuff") now accounts for over 50% of the CF budget.

Just submit that "We need to make less money so we can have more stuff" memo on Monday...

I say the above somewhat tongue-in-cheek, but we really are absurdly expensive.

 

[Kirkhill]

Petamocto, you're on your own with that one.

I don't need that much grief in my life.  ;D

Let's say, for arguments sake, that somewhere between the 900% solution and the 0% solution there is an affordable compromise.  And frankly, as a tax-payer in a G8/G20 country (what are we?  about 15?) it wouldn't bother me to cough up another couple of nickels if I knew it was going to a good cause.  A good cause does not include funding another mahogany desk ..... but I digress.

From what I understand about the discussion so far the funding envelope extends to buying another 3 rifles per platoon (together with scale).  If the platoon keeps its current weapons that would start pushing us into the 7-10% overage range.  Increasing the issue of C6s (didn't we order enough to equip and 80,000 man army some years ago - or are they all clapped out now?) would increase that overage another 5-10% at a relatively modest cost.  But I don't want to get hung up on the numbers as a statistic.

I am just saying that before supplying everybody with a Mastercraft locker on wheels maybe we could make the craftsman that much more effective if we could find the budget to supply everybody with both a hammer AND a screwdriver..... and with a little bit of luck Scharnhorst's axe as well.

 

[SeanNewman]

They're all from different envelopes so it's hard to judge them on a one-vs-one purchase. 

Each branch down the tree gets their own slice of the money and is allowed to decide what they think is important.  That bin rat with new lockers may have just decided they were important but the infantry wanted to pursue a CCV (hypothetically of course) that drained all the money.

We had the same argument with the AF getting their good rain jackets first; nobody forced us not to buy them.

You need to the charts right from the top though to get the big picture context view, and that view shows that personnel are the big elephant in the room.  Not just salary, but all the other costs involved like moves, casualty care, etc.  All worth while but it all adds up and like I said is now more than half of the budget.

 

[Illegio]

I think the issue is getting a bit muddled. If asked what the proper amount of money to spend on defense should be, any serving member would probably answer "more." That's really neither here nor there, as what we have is what we have, and that discussion is probably outside the purview of this thread.

As far as the sharpshooter rifles adding overage to the platoon or company TO&E... There are already spare rifles in stores, but they are really only considered "overage" in the sense that they are replacements for rifles that accidentally get run over by LAVs and the like. If we were, for example, clearing compounds, I would rather pull the C9s out of the sections and task them with overwatch, posting corners, etc... than put the C9s back in stores and issue C7s.

I think that many of the benefits of a mix-and-match armoury can be had simply by swapping personnel around within a section, platoon, or company. For the big-ticket items like C6s, of which relatively few exist within the TO&E of a dismounted company... As was mentioned in the C6 offshoot of this thread, there's nothing saying that they couldn't be pulled from the pintle mounts on the LAVs, if you keep a spare butt and pistol grip kicking around.

To use the tool analogy, a crowbar can do many things. It can't do brain surgery, but that's why we have SOF...

 

[SeanNewman]

To use the tool analogy, a crowbar can do many things. It can't do brain surgery, but that's why we have SOF...

 

[Kirkhill]

My apologies for pulling an otherwise interesting and informative discussion off on a tangent.

I understand departmental budgeting and interests competing for the same dollar.  But that is what senior management is for.

From my civilian perspective, if over 50% of your costs are personnel related (presumably salary, benefits, training, personal clothing, room & board, long term liability and sundry others exclusive of the operational kit they are issued to complete their tasks - including crowbars) then the usual strategy would be to:

a) minimize the number of personnel
b) maximize the capabilities of the individual.

In my opinion option a) is a non-starter.  For the type of "policing" work you are being asked to engage in there is a need for "faces / hands / boots " to engage in face-to-face/hand-to-hand/boot-to-boot contact.

Consequently option b) seems to me to be the better track to pursue. 

When you are hiring a soldier that, in the best case your are going to have to pay for 2 or 3 years, in the worst case will be paying them or their dependents for a lifetime then the incremental cost of equipping the unit to which that soldier is assigned with an additional $2-5000 system,  appears to me to be pretty marginal indeed.  If I continue with my undertanding of what TV2 and Petamocto have been saying about the DM/SS weapon I don't see why the 3 systems (or 4 or 6 or whatever) allocated per platoon should be anything other than platoon stores, ( just like the CG-84/C6/60mm) with qualified soldiers being assigned to the weapon and grouped as the field commanders deem fit.

Or is this another case of my thickheadedness causing me to violently argue the obvious?

Edit: 27 Companies x 8 new 7.62 systems in the CQ's locker at $5000@ equals an Army-wide cost of $1,080,000 (16 obviously equals $2,160,000).  Given existing ammunition the impact on ammunition logistics would be minimal.  Given the intent to field at least one unit  per Coy  then the logistic burden is not more onerous for 8 than it is for 1.  Given systems that are variants of existing platforms then the impact on training is minimized. 

I agree that we are not talking about crowbars or axes here.  Equally we are not talking about hover tank mounted plasma rifles. I can't believe that the conversion training from 5.56 to 7.62 (or 9mm or 12 gauge) would be particularly difficult. 

 

[Illegio]

I'm going to argue your point on short-term soldiers being a best-case financial investment for one reason - training costs. Setting aside things like experience and maturity which cannot be quantified in a financial sense, it costs more to train a new soldier up to standard than it does to maintain one that'a already trained.

The point of contention on procurement was the implementation of a mix-and-match armoury ala Arms Room Concept. The need for the sharpshooter rifle and the semi-automatic sniper rifle has been identified and the ball is indeed rolling through DLR's courts. When and in what form these rifles will materialize...? Alas, my skills in interpreting entrails and the bones of small animals avail me nothing. If the sharpshooter does become a section-level position (which it should,) then ideally the rifle will become that person's day-to-day weapon, as opposed to something that languishes in stores until someone higher up the food chain feels a need for it.

The issue of costs is more convoluted than you suggest. Weapon systems are not bought in a vacuum, and there are many associated costs, including warranties, spare parts, new training for the techs... etc, even down to the minutiae of transporting the new rifles to their respective units and registering them. New training for the riflemen and new ammo WILL be additional costs. A sharpshooter rifle is not a machinegun is not a sniper rifle is not an assault rifle. Petamocto is the OIC of revising the existing PWTs and the future sharpshooter package, so he can speak to greater effect on that subject that I. As far as ammo goes, unless we start using match-grade ammo for all of our 7.62mm systems, we will require new ammunition for the sharpshooter rifles. Snipers don't shoot machinegun ammo (except in extremis) through the C3A1s, and if we want the sharpshooters to be consistent, they won't use it either.

 

[Kirkhill]

I'll stipulate your point on short-term soldiers.  We agree on a cost-effectiveness basis.  A long-service army is more effective than a short-service army.  My point, unexpectedly opening a weak flank, was in terms of absolute costs - and even there I can stand to be corrected.

With respect to the materiel issues I do think there is an element of "the best being the enemy of the good" in this discussion.  I agree that better ammunition, furniture, optics, training etc will give better results.  However, referencing a study posted on these boards that escapes me just now about the shooting abilities of the US and British armies in the first half of the century past, vice the capabilities of those same armies currently - partly due to kit, partly due to training, partly due to philosophy, I find it difficult to credit that we are incapable of fielding army-wide systems that would enable the section, if not the individual soldier, to engage targets with precision at 600-800 m.

The Lee-Enfield, general issue rifle with general issue ammunition, was used for sniping in WW1 and WW2 and continued in that role well into the 1980s at least.

 

[KevinB]

I would argue that the notional capabilties where a lot less in years previous than today.

Years ago the nation of rifleman started shooting a long time before the Army, however my opinion is that while marksmanship may have been superior - combat marksmanship was often not. 

Secondly advances in Night Vision, IR Lasers, Sound Suppressors have antiquated the majority of weapons systems, especially Sniper Weapon Systems that existed pre 9/11, or forced extensvie modernization efforts.

Our capabilities have increased exponentially since then, and the Militaries of at least Canada, the United States of America, Australia, and the United Kingdom, know a ton more about combat shooting than they did before.

We kill many more of the enemy in small arms engagements than they do of us, and we have adopted weapons systems that take into account the majority of the combat requirements.

However unlike SOF entities that are generally used for a variety of specific missions, and have equipment that is specialized for those missions, conventional forces are the jack of all trades, and they are equipped to do the broad spectrum of operations with pieces of equipement that compromise.

I will argue against part of my Arms Room concept for a bit:
10-11" 5.56mm guns do not do well with C77/M855 SS109 type ammuntion that relies of impact velocity, and one just has to ready MSG Paul Howe's account of what happend to CAG when they ran out of their specific 50gr BTHP loading for their CAR-15's and M4's in Somalia, and had to use M855 from the Rangers.  The targets (malnourished Somalis) did not have enough tissue for the M855 to yaw and fragment, and they had multiple occasions of failure to neutralise on multiple CoM shots even in very close.
SOF units that can get specialized ammunitions for Short Barrel guns, can do very well with them, also on some missions it makes sence for them to carry a very lightweight relatively underpowered system (like the HkMP7), when they are either doing a specific hit that is expected at close range and they can get head shots, or when they are doing SR, and their backup is a radio and specific fire support from USAF or OGA aerial elements.

So unless an across the board ammunition change - like the USMC going to the ATK SOST round - short barrel gun systems can be a liability especially when needing to make longer range shots with effect.

Prior to Afghanistan, no one really expected the Squad or Section to need shoot beyond a 300m window, and a lot of the equipment for the convenstional Armies where tailored to the <300m fight.
  Iraq for the US Military compounded that, with the majority of engagement being urban in nature.  The same with the British with their NI experiences and Iraq.

Now in Afghanistan, the terrain in a lot of areas does not lend itself to Mechanized warfare, so the LAV/Stryker/Bradley/Warrior and its integral firepower cannot always support the troops, additionally the layout of the conflict does not always allow for the area to be pounded with 155mm/JDAM's etc.

Thus the Section/Squad Dm with a "Battle Rifle" type system can fill the need for precision fire to the 500-600m envelope and beyond.
 
Now 5.56mm can sometimes fill the bill, there was a R22eR CSM in Bosnia years ago that got a 873m kill with a C7A1 - however it did take a number of rounds, and from what I was told the CSM had spent most of his career in Recce as a sniper - so he had skill and experience on his side as well.  5.56mm does have problems with long range barrier penetration, and also unless using match ammuntion, does not have the best long range accuracy, and trajectory does not allow for range or wind errors like some 7.62mm loads (however in others it can be superior), but single loading 80gr SMK rounds (to long for magazine feeding) may be effective for the Long Range KD matches at Camp Perry etc., but does not really make any sense in Combat.

I will agree wholeheartedly with Illegio that adopting a SharpShooter system should mean that the same thought also goes into ammuntion selection as the platform and using C21 ball should be an emergency activity and not standard practice.

The UK Sharpshooter stayed with the Brit 155gr Ball round, as the British, unlike the US, Australian, and Canadians, beleive that OTM rounds should not be issued.  I beleive however in talking with some UK pers, that that was more an interim method, until they can staff a specific round thru the system.
 
Personally I beleive that a 16" 7.62mm M16FOW based System fills the bill for this role, especially when the Country issues a M16based platform as its general issue system.  One of the biggest drawbacks to this was until very recently none of the 7.62mm AR systems where reliable enough for this role.
Now you have our (KAC) SR-25 EM Carbine and to a lesser extent the LMT MWS, and Larue OSR.  That are field reliable, and accurate enough to engage enemy targets and score kills to 800m.

SOF elements have been issuing shorter than rifle 7.62mm systems for some time, and the need has now been identified for conventional forces too.


 



   

 

[daftandbarmy]

I find it difficult to credit that we are incapable of fielding army-wide systems that would enable the section, if not the individual soldier, to engage targets with precision at 600-800 m.

We've already got that... it's called 'fire control orders e.g., "Section, 600, on axis, men in open, rapid, fire!". The disciplined, team based, application of fire is one of our greatest long range killing/supression weapons, and arguably something that we do better than many other armies.

 

[Illegio]

To be fair, he was talking about precision fire. While section fire is hardly indiscriminate, it's not really precise, either.

 

[Kirkhill]

D&B - does that qualify as precision support or area support?  From here that looks like a comparable fire order (showing age here) to "C2 group, 600, on axis, men in open, 30 rounds rapid, fire!"  and is different to "No. 2 rifleman, 300, 1 o'clock, man in green and white striped shirt leaning up against lamp-post waving arms about, 1 round, in your own time, fire!".

With respect to the need for a new platform, either as an addition to, or a replacement for, the existing platform I am, frankly, agnostic.  I don't know enough to be able to offer an opinion (though that seldom stops me elsewhere). 

However, I do feel strongly that we (and by that I mean organizations in general - both civvy and uniformed) can get wrapped up in the minutiae to such an extent that inertia ensues. 

Many models have been proposed as to how a mixed 5.56/7.62 capability can be incorporated, if it is necessary, or even transitioning back to 7.62. 

I really don't accept the logistics argument - given not only the mix of calibres available at the section level on general distribution but also the mix of types of the same calibre (ball, tracer, AP, AP-T, SAPHEI-T, Frangible, blank - loose, bandolier, link) that adding one more existing NSN to the scale will impose an insuperable burden.

And even the training argument, with respect to calibre, is not particularly persuasive.  IMHO ther best form of training involves the individual being allowed to practice - not sitting in classrooms with highly trained and disciplined (and paid) trainers showing them how they should be doing it.  Better an hour of instruction and 1000 rounds on the ranges than hours upon hours in class.  It has the advantage tha trigger pullers generally enjoy pulling triggers regardless of the platform or the calibre. 

Buy the weapons, supply the ammunition, allot the range time.  Those are the budget issues that have always tripped up every weapons system and determine whether the equipment gets trained on or is left to languish in the CQ's locker.  In my limited experience training on coy/pl weaons was not hampered by a lack of troops willing to show up at ranges, or a lack or ranges or range time, or range staff, or even the CO's willingness to risk "his" weapons being lost or damaged.  It was always a lack of ammunition due to budget constraints.

With respect to the transition training of units perhaps some of those that were there during the transition from 7.62 to 5.56 could enlighten me as to how that was handled and the problems encountered.

Likewise perhaps some of the armourers could weigh in on how much transition training they needed to add a new system to their repertoire.

All of which, to veer back to the thread, is to argue that, in best Canadian incrementalist tradition, supply the capability and the troops will figure out how to get the most out of it.  We are not talking about equipping  1,000,000 conssripts here.  We are talking about 3-4,000 higly skilled and motivated , and long serving, individuals.  They may not be SOF but they could surely be considered special.

 

[Kirkhill]

To be fair, he was talking about precision fire. While section fire is hardly indiscriminate, it's not really precise, either.

Thanks Illegio.  I saw your post after I hit the switch.

 

[KevinB]

I thought I had posted on the SARP issue yesterday but I guess the net phantom was hungry.

Train the Trainer
SNCO's sent to CTC (Inf School) to learn SARP (which IIRC was a 28 day event).

Unit NCO and Officer Training - which IIRC was about 4-5days.

Troop Training - 3 days plus PWT etc, and remedial work.

 

[SeanNewman]

...While section fire is hardly indiscriminate, it's not really precise, either.

It can be inside 300m though if only your riflemen are engaging and not your C9 gunners.

In theory you could initiate a section-level ambush/raid with 6 x C7 bullets at the same time to kill 6 x specific people if everyone including commanders fired.  Well aware that situation would not present itself unless the 6 x people you were killing were all gate guards standing at attention, but I digress...

The range gap deficiency is precision fire* 300/400-600m.  As mentioned the C7 is quite capable of 0-300m precision fire, and the C9 is capable of beaten zone fire at 600m, but what we were lacking is ability to quickly engage something at 600m and kill it in the minimum time.

In a perfect range environment on a sunny day with no wind when you have several minutes to slow down your heart rate and make range corrections, you can quite reliably bring a C7 onto a Fig11 target from 600m.  The problem is that the average shooter does not have the marksmanship or more importantly the time to make that shot happen.

You have to understand how important it is to make the range corrections with the C7 from that distance because you're talking several metres of rise and fall of the round.  To hit someone at 600m, it's almost like lobbing a football that would clear well above someone standing 400m away. 

*Note* Infantry precision = one man; not the same as sniper precision.

 

[Illegio]

Yes, my mistake. I should have clarified that section fire beyond the effective range of the C7 is not really precision fire. I assumed that we were still talking about precision fire out to 600 - 800m.