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Informing the Army’s Future Structure

So, where does that leave the CA?

Well it doesn't look like there is going to be a relook at CCA(V) anytime soon -- so the LAV 6.0 is the only option for now.
There are a lot of LAV 6.0 (Stryker DHVA1) based systems for things Canada currently is missing in the inventory.

1) M-SHORAD, with the 30mm Cannon, and 2 missile options / turret side (4 Stinger or 2 Hellfire) it can fall into one of those ugly MMEV situations - but...

2) ATGM (admittedly the M1134 ATGM Carrier isn't really a modern system as it's just a TUA turret setup - the M-SHORAD variant has the LB Hellfire pod options - and much better suited due to Fire and Forget as well a NLOS launch capability.

3) M1129 120mm Mortar Carrier

4) DE-CUAS (okay only 2 Platoons are fielded so far - and it's not schedule to become a Program of Record until FY25. It does offer the potential for a non kinetic option to combat UAS.


-----------------------------------------

So using a 2 LAV Bn + 2 Tank Squadron Bde what can one do.

Cbt Spt Coy
Armor Defense Platoon 8x M-SHORAD LAV - Hellfire
Mortar Platoon 8x M1129 120mm Mortar LAV
CUAS Platoon 8x M-SHORAD LAV - Stinger

*Any idiot can use a Stinger, it really needs to be viewed as an All Arms VSHORAD system, and more dedicate Ad systems left to the Bird Gunners.

** I think the CUAS Platoons would need to be deployed at the Coy level in 2packs, but linked to the Bn AD cell (I'd put a Bird Gunner cell into the Bn HQ) but the actual troops manning it would be Infantry with a CUAS/AD training package.

It doesn't really help the heavy metal aspect - but it provides the Bn and Bde with integral firepower to support their battle space -- I think that without heavier IFV's a larger focus will need to be on Fires - meaning support from Rocket and Missile forces at lower levels.



MTF
 
I'm torn on the Bde Fires aspect.
I do like the idea of an 18gun Arty Regiment in CS for the Bde, but for the LAV+Tank Bde, I don't like the M777.
As much as I like the M109A7, I don't see the point in getting a Tracked SPA, if your Inf BN's aren't in a Tracked H-IFV

If we use the M777 for the LAV+T Bde, then one needs to allocate more SHORAD and CUAS, as well as Engineer Support to get them dug in (if needed) -- I'm thinking that for mass of fires, that a 18 platform HIMARS Reg't may be the better call.

While the HIMARS would give a LRPF capacity for that role I think one is better served with 18 containerized 'static' systems for that, which would also be collocated with a NASAMS Bty and MEADS Bty for the M/LRAD network.
The POD LRPF gives a 130km to 500km+ Precision Strike capability, while the NASAMS and MEADS give an umbrella of 120km against a multitude of aerial threats.


One can then retain the M777's for Light Bde's.
 
USMC A2AD Group aka Marine Littoral Regiment

1800 to 2000 personnel

1 Infantry Battalion + 1 LRPF Battery
It is designed to provide the basis for employing multiple platoon-reinforced-size expeditionary advanced base sites that can host and enable a variety of missions such as long-range anti-ship fires, forward arming and refueling of aircraft, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance of key maritime terrain, and air-defense and early warning.

1 AD Battalion
The Littoral Anti-Air Battalion is designed to train and employ air defense, air surveillance and early warning, air control, and forward rearming and refueling capabilities.

1 Logistics Battalion
The Combat Logistics Battalion provides tactical logistics support to the MLR by resupplying expeditionary advanced base sites, managing cache sites, and connecting to higher-level logistics providers. It provides expanded purchasing authorities, limited Role II medical forces, distribution of ammunition and fuel, and field level maintenance.


An MLR with Pods = 1900 PYs

From 11,310 Total Force

3x MLRs = 5700

Leaving 5,610

Or, if considering solely Reg Forces of 6,471

Then 3 Reg MLRs and still have 771 Reg PYs and 4,839 Reservists.


.....


1x Reg MLR/A2AD = 1900
2x Res MRL/A2AD = 3800

Untasked Regs = 6471-1900 = 4571 = 1x SBCT (3860) with 710 PYs to be reallocated
Untasked Reserves = 4839 = 1x IBCT (4680) with 159 PYs to be reallocated.

.....

Result

3x A2AD Groups (1 Regular and 2 Reserve)
1x SBCT (Regular)
1x IBCT (Reserve)

710 Regulars and 159 Reserves to be reallocated.

Force fully supported to the same standard as the US Army.
 
TBH, I don't see the appeal of the MLR to Canada.
Mainly as Canada has no means of supporting a Marine Expeditionary Force.

I see the appeal of the AD Bn and the LRPF Bty, mainly as those can support anyone who needs.
They could support the Ranger Patrol Groups for Domestic Deterrence - but frankly that is better done with the RCN and RCAF.

You are also falling into the trap of double counting the support personnel on your A2AD, as you counted them in the 71% force tail overhead.
 
TBH, I don't see the appeal of the MLR to Canada.
Mainly as Canada has no means of supporting a Marine Expeditionary Force.

I see the appeal of the AD Bn and the LRPF Bty, mainly as those can support anyone who needs.
They could support the Ranger Patrol Groups for Domestic Deterrence - but frankly that is better done with the RCN and RCAF.

You are also falling into the trap of double counting the support personnel on your A2AD, as you counted them in the 71% force tail overhead.

The MLR is an A2AD force. It is deployable. It need not have anything to do with marines or salt water. The LRPF battery could be equipped for Coastal Defence or, equally, it could be equipped with HIMARS and everything from GMLRS to PrSM and everything in between, including LAMs and Cruise Missiles.

As to the double counting - I am counting them the way your CBO counts them. The SBCT count includes the Forward Support Battalion and Companies.
 
The MLR is an A2AD force. It is deployable. It need not have anything to do with marines or salt water. The LRPF battery could be equipped for Coastal Defence or, equally, it could be equipped with HIMARS and everything from GMLRS to PrSM and everything in between, including LAMs and Cruise Missiles.
Nordic C(anadian)-A2AD Group with BvS 10's for the Security Bn* and NSM LRPF Bty for the Canadian Arctic and/or Scandic deployment to help close the Norwegian/put pressure on the Barents/neutralizae Murmansk

Motorized C-A2AD Group with JLTV's/ARV's for the security Bn* and HIMARS LRPF Bty as the deployed deterrence and shield to buy time for a flyover 30/70 Mech Bde in Latvia

* vehicle, sensor, and effector heavy.
 
An interesting discussion in the last few posts. You all know my general views so I won't run through them again but I'll just make a few observations.

Whenever we talk MLRS or HIMARS we're talking highly expensive munitions. They are very useful but I see great troubles in sustaining them in a long conflict. There is a continuing need for much cheaper conventional tube systems to provide cheap precision on tank-only rounds, illumination, smoke, etc. that are very useful in the close fight. These should also be heavily augmented by both aerial observation as well as loitering precision weapons system. i.e. its suite of things we need - each filling its niche.

One of the things we need to decide on is are we filling a deep or close battle role. You can't multi-role that well from day to day - no one is that agile. For a close role the thing is an ABCT - its still relevant and will stay that way for quite a while yet. For a deep role think the UK's 1 Deep Reconnaissance Strike Brigade Combat Team (try saying that fast three times - I dare you). The two are very different animals with very different equipment, doctrine and TTPs. They're not interchangeable. When you're talking Marine Littoral Regiments, you're discussing something in the nature more akin to 1 DRSBCT - and you're right it doesn't matter whether its water or not, just what your aim is which is area denial. The problem is that on islands and water, the MLR concentrates on individual large targets and/or infiltration, while on land you need to deal with a large number of semi autonomous systems spread over a wide area. An MLR will not handle those well - your fires need many more moving parts on both their sense and act sides. Canada is deploying one brigade; it needs to choose and not try to slap something together that tries to do both and ends up doing them badly. One has to remember that essentially, a brigade is the smallest formation there is.

I think at the end of the day, we're in Latvia. We've decided where we'll be. The shortfall there is heavy mechanized forces, (and which we're already a part of). We need to concentrate on rounding the brigade we're forming with the weapons appropriate to the close battle. That doesn't mean they all have to come from Canada. The Danes are providing the Div HQ - let them figure out what we need for deep strike and find it.

🍻
 
An interesting discussion in the last few posts. You all know my general views so I won't run through them again but I'll just make a few observations.

Whenever we talk MLRS or HIMARS we're talking highly expensive munitions. They are very useful but I see great troubles in sustaining them in a long conflict. There is a continuing need for much cheaper conventional tube systems to provide cheap precision on tank-only rounds, illumination, smoke, etc. that are very useful in the close fight. These should also be heavily augmented by both aerial observation as well as loitering precision weapons system. i.e. its suite of things we need - each filling its niche.

I disagree on the MLRS/HIMARS expense (no surprise there, hey? 😁)

Item the first - The MLRS/HIMARS are pods on trucks. The pods are being dismounted and remounted on TEU-20 frames. That makes for one multi-use system.

Item the second - The pods can be used to store, transport and launch a multitude of projectiles in exactly the same manner that the Navy's Mk41 VLS and 21" Torpedo Tubes can be used.

Item the third - The missiles can be expensive or cheap. They can be long range or short range. They can be smart or dumb. They can be ballistic missiles or cruise missiles or loitering UAVs.

The expense of the mission is a function of the missile and not the launcher. Just like the expense of the mission is a function of the bullet and not the gun.

I believe strongly that it will ultimately prove cheaper to build missiles and launchers than it is to build bullets and guns. The mechanics are simpler. The stresses are lower so the material choices are greater. The manufacturing options are greater.

3D printed plastics and carbon-fibre launchers and missiles are a possibility. Can you print a breech and block? A high pressure rifled barrel?

I could see easily printing 70 - 120 mm rockets. And applying a Course Correction Fuse.

I could also see the continuation of the Kratos line that, as I noted else where, takes an existing bomb (SDB to 2000 pounder), bolts on flight controls and a seeker to create a JDAM, bolts on some swing out wings to create JDAM-ER, adds on a micro turbine Jet engine to turn it into a mini-cruise missile and then attaches the same type of rocket employed to launch Tomahawks from the VLS or Kratos target drones from their stands.

No forges, no foundries necessary. You could even revert to ceramic pellets as Shrapnel.

One of the things we need to decide on is are we filling a deep or close battle role. You can't multi-role that well from day to day - no one is that agile.

Agreed. But who says it has to be from day to day? And what is to prevent using a common launch platform for multiple roles? The organizations and the training may have to be specialized but does the equipment have to be?

For a close role the thing is an ABCT - its still relevant and will stay that way for quite a while yet.

I'll stipulate that.

For a deep role think the UK's 1 Deep Reconnaissance Strike Brigade Combat Team (try saying that fast three times - I dare you). The two are very different animals with very different equipment, doctrine and TTPs.
I'll also stipulate that.

They're not interchangeable.
Agreed

When you're talking Marine Littoral Regiments, you're discussing something in the nature more akin to 1 DRSBCT - and you're right it doesn't matter whether its water or not, just what your aim is which is area denial. The problem is that on islands and water, the MLR concentrates on individual large targets and/or infiltration, while on land you need to deal with a large number of semi autonomous systems spread over a wide area.
My understanding is that the marines intend to deploy their MLRs as semi-autonomous platoons and spread them over a wide area. The intent being to either cover multiple choke points or to concentrate fires.

An MLR will not handle those well - your fires need many more moving parts on both their sense and act sides. Canada is deploying one brigade; it needs to choose and not try to slap something together that tries to do both and ends up doing them badly.
Agreed on the Canadian deployment. See my previous on the flexibility of the MLR.

One has to remember that essentially, a brigade is the smallest formation there is.

The ANZACs, I think, would disagree with you. In Korea the Kiwis supplied an Arty Regiment for the Commonwealth Brigade. Heck we contributed a battalion to that brigade.


I think at the end of the day, we're in Latvia. We've decided where we'll be. The shortfall there is heavy mechanized forces, (and which we're already a part of). We need to concentrate on rounding the brigade we're forming with the weapons appropriate to the close battle. That doesn't mean they all have to come from Canada. The Danes are providing the Div HQ - let them figure out what we need for deep strike and find it.

🍻

Again we agree.

Latvia is a Battle Group (-). It is a Canadian Battle Group in the same sense that Monty's 1st Canadian Army was Canadian. And the Canadian Brigade Group will be in kind.

Fundamental Disagreement?

I don't agree that supplying an Armoured Brigade Combat Team is the only way Canada can contribute, nor do I believe that it is the only contribution that would resurrect the reputation earned by Currie's Canadian Corps, the reputation that gained Canada bargaining rights on the world stage.

Slainte, sir! ;)
 
This article is about artillery..... but there again so was the bit about pods.

Swap 105s for 120mm mortars
New 155mm rounds from existing cannons
155mm Ramjets from NAMMO

Shooting for the moon: Army’s 2025 budget to reflect artillery revamp

“If the… 58-cal cannon solution can't deliver on a timeline we want, what are the other options? That can be munitions…new munitions with old cannons and it can be different cannons,” said Army acquisition head Doug Bush.​

By ASHLEY ROQUE and MICHAEL MARROWon October 20, 2023 at 4:00 PM

WASHINGTON — The US Army is grappling with just what mix of artillery capabilities it needs in its future arsenal, and industry is expected to catch a glimpse of that plan by the time the Biden administration delivers its budget request to Congress next year, according to a senior service official.
The analysis, also dubbed the tactical fires study, is expected to be wrapped up in time to help Army leaders sort through funding decisions before their fiscal 2025 budget request is finished, service acquisition head Doug Bush told Breaking Defense and another outlet on Oct. 11. That budget is traditionally delivered to Capitol Hill after early February.
“We’re going to get that [study] in time to inform our finishing of the [FY]25 budget,”
he said. “So, that is when you might see an output of what the strategy and the study tells us.”
The Army currently has a mix of towed and wheeled cannons in its portfolio. But with lessons learned from Ukraine and an eye on the Pacific, the service has a number of different modernization efforts underway, including under its Extended Range Cannon Artillery (ERCA) program. That program includes a mix of new munitions, a “supercharged” propellant and integration of a 30-foot, 58-caliber gun tube onto BAE Systems’ Paladin M109A7 self-propelled howitzer. The goal: launch 155-mm rounds out to 70 km, an increase from the current max range of up to 30 km.
However, ERCA platform development has encountered technical challenges during live fire testing, including excessive wear and tear on the cannon, and the Army needs to decide if it will move into production, revamp the design or abandon the platform for now. Bush explained that ERCA “difficulties” simply placed more “urgency” on the fires community to wrap up that comprehensive study.
“I’ve worked over the summer to try to kind of understand [all the parts of ERCA] in terms of time and costs to address them simultaneously,” he said.
“If the… 58-cal cannon solution can’t deliver on a timeline we want, what are the other options?” Bush later added. “That can be munitions…new munitions with old cannons and it can be different cannons.”
The study is also sorting through the wheeled versus towed artillery debate, in part because the latter has limitations but lighter units still need protection. While there are questions about just how much and which formations to place towed artillery, Bush said the service is also looking at using 120-millimeter mortars for lighter formations. "With the right ammunition, get you very similar capability to a 105-mm,” he said, referring to a towed howitzer. “Does that make sense for light units?”

Options Abound

While options remain publicly fluid, Bush pointed towards what he said were several options for new 52-caliber cannons. One such option was on display at the Association of the United States Army (AUSA) conference in Washington, DC earlier this month: BAE Systems’ M109-52 prototype, which takes the Rheinmetall L52 main gun and integrates it onto an M109A7 howitzer.
Dan Furber, BAE’s Combat Mission Systems director of ground vehicle production, told Breaking Defense on Oct. 11 that the company has been working on the design for almost 18 months. Then this September, it was used for a direct fire demo on a “very short range.” The plan, he said, is to continue testing and produce a prototype that can hit targets out to the 60-kilometers range. “I’m targeting the armored brigade combat team commander and their fight,” Furber said. “We really looked at augmenting the M109A7…. commanders [have] sensors that can look out to 60 kilometers and with the A7 they can only shoot out to 30: I’m trying to fill that gap.”

In addition to whole new platforms, the Army’s study is looking at a cheaper solution that could add capability to existing platforms: new, updated munitions.
As one example of the work in that area, Bush highlighted a new 155-mm round developed under the ERCA umbrella called the XM1155, which could be a candidate for “acceleration.”
“One way to get the range, perhaps sooner, would be munitions focused modernization now versus the cannon which can come later,” he added. “I think [XM]1155 is, in my view, worth pursuing. We just have to line up the requirement and then line up the money, but I think it makes sense.”
Two teams working on that new munition are moving ahead with development touting their progress: BAE and Boeing, with the latter partnered with Nammo on the project. Boeing’s shell is propelled by an airbreathing jet engine, whereas BAE’s uses standard propellants.
RTX was previously working on the weapon. However, a company spokesperson told Breaking Defense on Thursday that it “is not actively in the competition.”

A Fight Over Range​

On the first day of the AUSA convention earlier this month, both BAE and Boeing published press releases touting record-breaking performances by their prospective XM1155 candidates, with BAE claiming a record for the “furthest distance an M109 Paladin ever fired a guided projectile.” BAE’s XM-1155-SC (sub-caliber) prototype was guided to its target by GPS, according to the release, and the shell’s goal was to hit “fixed and moving targets in contested environments at twice the range of existing cannon-launched precision guided munitions,” the company previously said.
Boeing too claimed its own record at the show, in its case for the “longest indirect fire test of a ramjet-powered artillery projectile” after its prototype launched from the ERCA platform. Boeing, which is partnered with Nammo on the project, said in the release that it previously set the same record in a test fire in December 2022, where that exercise used a 39-caliber cannon.
The confusing competing claims became more complicated when Jim Miller, BAE’s vice president of business development for combat mission systems, made bold assertions about BAE’s XM1155 shell in a briefing with reporters.
“We’re pretty confident we’ve got the record” for the M109 range, Miller added, emphasizing that the Army would have to perform the “tie break” on the assertion. Asked directly whether BAE believes they’ve beaten Boeing for the M109 record, Miller said, “We believe we did. Several times over. And we believe we’ve done it guided and they have not.”
Asked about Miller’s comments, a BAE spokesperson said “Our XM1155-SC test in April 2023 was fired from a tactically representative M109A6 (39 caliber length 155mm) using MACS [modular artillery charge system] Zone 5 and guided to and impacted the target. To the best of our knowledge, the XM1155-SC went further than any round fired from an M109.”
The BAE spokesperson also said that the company’s design “has proven success without special propellant charges and is capable of reaching extended ranges with current and future planned US Army armament systems. XM1155-SC is currently and will remain compatible with existing Army validated and tested propellant charges designed to meet barrel wear and firing rate requirements.”
Given available evidence, it’s difficult to compare the performance of the two defense giants. Without the raw ranges, which must be provided by the Army, it’s not clear which company’s shell may be capable of greater distance. And unless the Army discloses how each company’s prototype measures up to the service’s criteria, which is unlikely especially as the prototyping program is still ongoing, performance for other potential factors like precision and maintenance needs will remain unclear.
An Army spokesperson did not return Breaking Defense’s requests for comment.
For its part, Boeing plans to integrate Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) precision guidance technology for a future test, and when asked about BAE’s claims, a Boeing executive told Breaking Defense that range limitations prevented the company’s offering from going its full distance for the test announced at AUSA.
“We went to the physical limit of the range on this test. We have not shot at our maximum range yet,” said Jim Leary, executive director of business development for Boeing weapon systems.
Leary also highlighted what he said are the benefits of ramjet technology for reducing wear and tear on a platform — the logic being that “when heavy charges are used to boost traditional or sub-caliber munitions to achieve range increases, it can damage and reduce the lifecycle of cannons,” as opposed to a ramjet design “that requires much less charge” — as well as the “form factor” of a ramjet-powered shell that “gives it speed advantages that reduce time to target.
“We believe our offering is revolutionary, not just evolutionary, in artillery,” he added. “This is our ‘moon shoot’ for long-range precision fires and we’re proud of what we’ve been able to accomplish in this co-developmental program with the Army so far.”

 
1698113702321.png

From the above

The Close Battle = <100 km
The Deep Battle = 70 to 700 km
The Strategic Battle = >500 km
 
An interesting discussion in the last few posts. You all know my general views so I won't run through them again but I'll just make a few observations.

Whenever we talk MLRS or HIMARS we're talking highly expensive munitions. They are very useful but I see great troubles in sustaining them in a long conflict. There is a continuing need for much cheaper conventional tube systems to provide cheap precision on tank-only rounds, illumination, smoke, etc. that are very useful in the close fight. These should also be heavily augmented by both aerial observation as well as loitering precision weapons system. i.e. its suite of things we need - each filling its niche.
Ukraine shows that volume is required. You definitely need a high-low mix of weapons & munitions and I think that it's vital that Canada develop a military-industrial strategy to ensure high volume domestic production capability of key munitions.

The CAF may not be a large enough customer to support domestic production of some high end munitions but we certainly should be able to support domestic production of many of the key munitions that would be used in large volumes in a major conflict. Things like 155mm artillery and 120mm mortar rounds, tank and autocannon rounds (including air-burst munitions for AD platforms), rockets, AA Artillery rounds, light AT weapons (like Carl-G), etc.

We should also ensure high volume domestic production of small, attritable quad-copters/FPV drones/light loitering munitions and ideally VSHORAD AD missiles.

For the more complex/expensive weapons (if we can't get licensed domestic production) we should try to adopt the same systems used by the US so that we can tap into their logistics pipeline if required during a war.
One of the things we need to decide on is are we filling a deep or close battle role. You can't multi-role that well from day to day - no one is that agile. For a close role the thing is an ABCT - its still relevant and will stay that way for quite a while yet. For a deep role think the UK's 1 Deep Reconnaissance Strike Brigade Combat Team (try saying that fast three times - I dare you). The two are very different animals with very different equipment, doctrine and TTPs. They're not interchangeable. When you're talking Marine Littoral Regiments, you're discussing something in the nature more akin to 1 DRSBCT - and you're right it doesn't matter whether its water or not, just what your aim is which is area denial. The problem is that on islands and water, the MLR concentrates on individual large targets and/or infiltration, while on land you need to deal with a large number of semi autonomous systems spread over a wide area. An MLR will not handle those well - your fires need many more moving parts on both their sense and act sides. Canada is deploying one brigade; it needs to choose and not try to slap something together that tries to do both and ends up doing them badly. One has to remember that essentially, a brigade is the smallest formation there is.
I know it's bad form, but I'm going to reference an ORBAT that I posted previously. I believe it's possible to both have a heavy(ish) mechanized capability as well as "other" capabilities. With some fairly modest equipment investment we can have a range of artillery (tube and rocket) capabilities in an Artillery Brigade as well as a range of AD capabilities in 4 AD Regiment.

We can also maintain a "light" capability with the ability to expand that capability to the Reserves. With the right mix of equipment we can make this Light capability pretty much anything we want. It could be a fairly traditional Air Mobile Light capability, an Arctic-focused capability, or it could be an ISR and Fires-heavy capability like a light version of the UK's DRSBCT or the USMC MLR.
I think at the end of the day, we're in Latvia. We've decided where we'll be. The shortfall there is heavy mechanized forces, (and which we're already a part of). We need to concentrate on rounding the brigade we're forming with the weapons appropriate to the close battle. That doesn't mean they all have to come from Canada. The Danes are providing the Div HQ - let them figure out what we need for deep strike and find it.

🍻
I agree that it makes sense to maintain the commitment we've already made to our Latvia deployment. It checks a lot of political boxes and I think it's important to maintain a traditional mechanized capability in the CA because frankly (even though we often don't act like it) we are a nation that is capable of maintaining a fairly broad set of military capabilities.
I disagree on the MLRS/HIMARS expense (no surprise there, hey? 😁)

Item the first - The MLRS/HIMARS are pods on trucks. The pods are being dismounted and remounted on TEU-20 frames. That makes for one multi-use system.

Item the second - The pods can be used to store, transport and launch a multitude of projectiles in exactly the same manner that the Navy's Mk41 VLS and 21" Torpedo Tubes can be used.

Item the third - The missiles can be expensive or cheap. They can be long range or short range. They can be smart or dumb. They can be ballistic missiles or cruise missiles or loitering UAVs.

The expense of the mission is a function of the missile and not the launcher. Just like the expense of the mission is a function of the bullet and not the gun.

I believe strongly that it will ultimately prove cheaper to build missiles and launchers than it is to build bullets and guns. The mechanics are simpler. The stresses are lower so the material choices are greater. The manufacturing options are greater.

3D printed plastics and carbon-fibre launchers and missiles are a possibility. Can you print a breech and block? A high pressure rifled barrel?

I could see easily printing 70 - 120 mm rockets. And applying a Course Correction Fuse.
I agreed that "The expense of the mission is a function of the missile and not the launcher". Ultimately you will need to spend more on munitions than the launchers. I disagree though with your suggestion that the missile/launcher combo will be cheaper than the bullet/gun combo. Some bullets/guns will be cheaper than some missiles/launchers. Horses for Courses. We'll ultimately need a bunch of both in any major war.
I could also see the continuation of the Kratos line that, as I noted else where, takes an existing bomb (SDB to 2000 pounder), bolts on flight controls and a seeker to create a JDAM, bolts on some swing out wings to create JDAM-ER, adds on a micro turbine Jet engine to turn it into a mini-cruise missile and then attaches the same type of rocket employed to launch Tomahawks from the VLS or Kratos target drones from their stands.

No forges, no foundries necessary. You could even revert to ceramic pellets as Shrapnel.
It's not only a question of cheaper munitions but it's also a question of removing human operators from the process where possible. The personnel crisis we are facing in the military in my opinion is not going to go away. We need to identify ways to operate that don't require as many people as they do now.
I don't agree that supplying an Armoured Brigade Combat Team is the only way Canada can contribute, nor do I believe that it is the only contribution that would resurrect the reputation earned by Currie's Canadian Corps, the reputation that gained Canada bargaining rights on the world stage.

Slainte, sir! ;)
I agree 100% that a Canadian ABCT isn't the only way we can contribute to NATO. I do think however that a Mechanized BCT is well within our capability to contribute as well as still having a range of other vital contributions that we can make for our allies.
 
From the above

The Close Battle = <100 km
The Deep Battle = 70 to 700 km
The Strategic Battle = >500 km
It's an interesting time to be a gunner.

Range of artillery does not define where the limits of the close or deep battle are. It's a factor; but just one factor.

Ukraine shows that volume is required. You definitely need a high-low mix of weapons & munitions and I think that it's vital that Canada develop a military-industrial strategy to ensure high volume domestic production capability of key munitions.

The CAF may not be a large enough customer to support domestic production of some high end munitions but we certainly should be able to support domestic production of many of the key munitions that would be used in large volumes in a major conflict. Things like 155mm artillery and 120mm mortar rounds, tank and autocannon rounds (including air-burst munitions for AD platforms), rockets, AA Artillery rounds, light AT weapons (like Carl-G), etc.

We should also ensure high volume domestic production of small, attritable quad-copters/FPV drones/light loitering munitions and ideally VSHORAD AD missiles.

For the more complex/expensive weapons (if we can't get licensed domestic production) we should try to adopt the same systems used by the US so that we can tap into their logistics pipeline if required during a war.
Completely agree. Part of the issue is in the articles that @Kirkhill quoted. There's a lot of high end research going on in a number of countries. We might be able to ramp up production but IMHO we don't have the depth to work on high-end development. That doesn't stop us turning out standard stuff though.
I know it's bad form, but I'm going to reference an ORBAT that I posted previously. I believe it's possible to both have a heavy(ish) mechanized capability as well as "other" capabilities. With some fairly modest equipment investment we can have a range of artillery (tube and rocket) capabilities in an Artillery Brigade as well as a range of AD capabilities in 4 AD Regiment.

We can also maintain a "light" capability with the ability to expand that capability to the Reserves. With the right mix of equipment we can make this Light capability pretty much anything we want. It could be a fairly traditional Air Mobile Light capability, an Arctic-focused capability, or it could be an ISR and Fires-heavy capability like a light version of the UK's DRSBCT or the USMC MLR.

I agree that it makes sense to maintain the commitment we've already made to our Latvia deployment. It checks a lot of political boxes and I think it's important to maintain a traditional mechanized capability in the CA because frankly (even though we often don't act like it) we are a nation that is capable of maintaining a fairly broad set of military capabilities.

I agreed that "The expense of the mission is a function of the missile and not the launcher". Ultimately you will need to spend more on munitions than the launchers. I disagree though with your suggestion that the missile/launcher combo will be cheaper than the bullet/gun combo. Some bullets/guns will be cheaper than some missiles/launchers. Horses for Courses. We'll ultimately need a bunch of both in any major war.
"Yup" on all of that.
It's not only a question of cheaper munitions but it's also a question of removing human operators from the process where possible. The personnel crisis we are facing in the military in my opinion is not going to go away. We need to identify ways to operate that don't require as many people as they do now.
I don't disagree. I just think that technologically we're still a long way away from where we can take the wetware out of the loop. Human beings still have much more flexibility to react to problem situations. On top of that the more complex the machine becomes, the shorter its mean-time-between-failures; especially once the environment changes from the test lab to combat conditions.
I agree 100% that a Canadian ABCT isn't the only way we can contribute to NATO. I do think however that a Mechanized BCT is well within our capability to contribute as well as still having a range of other vital contributions that we can make for our allies.
I'll trade you orbats. These are the ones I'm currently working on.

1 Div is the reserve heavy NATO force - based on partial flyover.

2 Div is regular heavy and quick reaction, defence of Canada and miscellaneous missions.

Note that personnel and equipment holdings are as per current stocks - a 30/70 battalion therefore is not only 30% regular force but also has only 30% of a battalion's worth of equipment. 3 Brigade is prepositioned with a full armoured regiment, two full LAV battalions, a full arty regiment and a full service battalion.

00 CA 4.0 Figure 6.png

00 CA 4.0 Figure 5.png

🍻
 
Just to go a step further, here's the org for a typical 30/70 entity - the reserve component can be two or three subunits.

00 CA 4.0 Figure 2.png

Note the absence of an admin coy. I'm adopting the design of the American Brigade Support Battalion and placing Forward Support Companies in the Svc Bn to provide a manoeuvre battalion's combat service support. I just think it makes more sense in a hybrid structure.

00 CA 4.0 Figure 4.png

🍻
 
Just to go a step further, here's the org for a typical 30/70 entity - the reserve component can be two or three subunits.

View attachment 80866

Note the absence of an admin coy. I'm adopting the design of the American Brigade Support Battalion and placing Forward Support Companies in the Svc Bn to provide a manoeuvre battalion's combat service support. I just think it makes more sense in a hybrid structure.

View attachment 80868

🍻

Might work if those are BRes, not ARes, reservists ;)
 
Ukraine shows that volume is required. You definitely need a high-low mix of weapons & munitions and I think that it's vital that Canada develop a military-industrial strategy to ensure high volume domestic production capability of key munitions.

The CAF may not be a large enough customer to support domestic production of some high end munitions but we certainly should be able to support domestic production of many of the key munitions that would be used in large volumes in a major conflict. Things like 155mm artillery and 120mm mortar rounds, tank and autocannon rounds (including air-burst munitions for AD platforms), rockets, AA Artillery rounds, light AT weapons (like Carl-G), etc.

We should also ensure high volume domestic production of small, attritable quad-copters/FPV drones/light loitering munitions and ideally VSHORAD AD missiles.

For the more complex/expensive weapons (if we can't get licensed domestic production) we should try to adopt the same systems used by the US so that we can tap into their logistics pipeline if required during a war.

See, here is where I perceive a very Canadian take. There is nothing wrong with building for the world. Plan on building products that everybody uses. Grain and oil are used by the whole world. There are competitors for them but we do well enough selling into the global inventory.

The one thing that the current war is demonstrating is that ammunition is fungible. The Russians and Ukrainians both are reaching out to find munitions wherever they can.

And, equally, they are innovating as fast as they can - taking chop saws to anti-tank rifle grenades and slapping plastic fins made on the office 3D printer - taping grenades to Canadian Tire RC vehicles .... They are doing stuff and repeating the stuff that works.

The Ukrainians are also exploiting mortars for exactly the same reasons that the Stokes mortar was developed in the first place. They are cheap. They don't require special steels or skills beyond those of the local machine shop. With a small amount of propellant they loft stuff into the air.
Once that stuff gets into the air it does one of two things. It falls to earth. Or it starts to fly.

If you attach a motor to anything you will extend its range. Add wings and controls and it will fly where you tell it by whatever route you tell it to follow.

The magic is in getting things to fly to a target. My opinion is that that problem has been solved. And solved cheaply. The same controls that work for a $2000 FPV will work for a $2,000,000 missile. Once you have got a round/missile in the air you can fly it to any target. Controls are cheap and getting cheaper.

To my mind it doesn't matter if an aircraft starts its journey locked in the breech of a cannon or in the depths of a mortar tube, if it is launched by gunpowder, gas, air or a rubber band or takes off under its own power, if it is powered by gravity, rocket, jet, internal combustion engine or batteries. The sole question becomes : what is the minimum cost of the flight control package? And I believe that the Ukrainian answer is pretty damn cheap.

They are no longer relying on 1/2 m v2. They are trusting to chemical potential energy. They will using any vehicle, airborne, wheelborne or footborne, to deliver a package of HE to a designated space at a designated time.

It really doesn't matter if it is delivered by a Paladin or an FPV drone. Or a swarm of drones.


I know it's bad form, but I'm going to reference an ORBAT that I posted previously. I believe it's possible to both have a heavy(ish) mechanized capability as well as "other" capabilities. With some fairly modest equipment investment we can have a range of artillery (tube and rocket) capabilities in an Artillery Brigade as well as a range of AD capabilities in 4 AD Regiment.

We can also maintain a "light" capability with the ability to expand that capability to the Reserves. With the right mix of equipment we can make this Light capability pretty much anything we want. It could be a fairly traditional Air Mobile Light capability, an Arctic-focused capability, or it could be an ISR and Fires-heavy capability like a light version of the UK's DRSBCT or the USMC MLR.

I agree that it makes sense to maintain the commitment we've already made to our Latvia deployment. It checks a lot of political boxes and I think it's important to maintain a traditional mechanized capability in the CA because frankly (even though we often don't act like it) we are a nation that is capable of maintaining a fairly broad set of military capabilities.

I agreed that "The expense of the mission is a function of the missile and not the launcher". Ultimately you will need to spend more on munitions than the launchers. I disagree though with your suggestion that the missile/launcher combo will be cheaper than the bullet/gun combo. Some bullets/guns will be cheaper than some missiles/launchers. Horses for Courses. We'll ultimately need a bunch of both in any major war

See above.

One of the advantages that gunpowder gave the state was that it was hard to manage. It required special skills to create the powder, source the metals, run the foundries and bore the cannons. Much more controllable than have the local peasantry hack off a chunk of yew and make their own bows. You never knew where they would point those things.

Now everybody knows the magic formula and can find a cardboard tube and some gravel.

Making lethal weapons from domestic materials is a widely practiced artform.

As to the bullet/gun vs missile/launcher debate I suspect that we agree in principle but disagree on calibre. I see the gun as useful for discharging as directable stream of pellets. I am not convinced that it is worth the effort to launch 50 kg packages when there are so many other options available to deliver those packages.

.

It's not only a question of cheaper munitions but it's also a question of removing human operators from the process where possible. The personnel crisis we are facing in the military in my opinion is not going to go away. We need to identify ways to operate that don't require as many people as they do now.

And here I think the answer was created 20 years ago

1698161874109.png NetFires

CHEP pallets with 16 missiles on board that could be launched vertically, a mixture of Loitering Attack Munitions and Precision Guided Munitions.

Technology and need has caught up with the concept.

I agree 100% that a Canadian ABCT isn't the only way we can contribute to NATO. I do think however that a Mechanized BCT is well within our capability to contribute as well as still having a range of other vital contributions that we can make for our allies.
 
And on a separate tack, but still conforming to force structure


He seems to want to incorporate some of Kraken into the SOF.


Kraken seems more like the original SAS in the sense that it works in conjunction with conventional forces and not detached from them.
 
See, here is where I perceive a very Canadian take. There is nothing wrong with building for the world. Plan on building products that everybody uses. Grain and oil are used by the whole world. There are competitors for them but we do well enough selling into the global inventory.

The one thing that the current war is demonstrating is that ammunition is fungible. The Russians and Ukrainians both are reaching out to find munitions wherever they can.

And, equally, they are innovating as fast as they can - taking chop saws to anti-tank rifle grenades and slapping plastic fins made on the office 3D printer - taping grenades to Canadian Tire RC vehicles .... They are doing stuff and repeating the stuff that works.

The Ukrainians are also exploiting mortars for exactly the same reasons that the Stokes mortar was developed in the first place. They are cheap. They don't require special steels or skills beyond those of the local machine shop. With a small amount of propellant they loft stuff into the air.
Once that stuff gets into the air it does one of two things. It falls to earth. Or it starts to fly.

If you attach a motor to anything you will extend its range. Add wings and controls and it will fly where you tell it by whatever route you tell it to follow.

The magic is in getting things to fly to a target. My opinion is that that problem has been solved. And solved cheaply. The same controls that work for a $2000 FPV will work for a $2,000,000 missile. Once you have got a round/missile in the air you can fly it to any target. Controls are cheap and getting cheaper.

To my mind it doesn't matter if an aircraft starts its journey locked in the breech of a cannon or in the depths of a mortar tube, if it is launched by gunpowder, gas, air or a rubber band or takes off under its own power, if it is powered by gravity, rocket, jet, internal combustion engine or batteries. The sole question becomes : what is the minimum cost of the flight control package? And I believe that the Ukrainian answer is pretty damn cheap.

They are no longer relying on 1/2 m v2. They are trusting to chemical potential energy. They will using any vehicle, airborne, wheelborne or footborne, to deliver a package of HE to a designated space at a designated time.

It really doesn't matter if it is delivered by a Paladin or an FPV drone. Or a swarm of drones.






See above.

One of the advantages that gunpowder gave the state was that it was hard to manage. It required special skills to create the powder, source the metals, run the foundries and bore the cannons. Much more controllable than have the local peasantry hack off a chunk of yew and make their own bows. You never knew where they would point those things.

Now everybody knows the magic formula and can find a cardboard tube and some gravel.

Making lethal weapons from domestic materials is a widely practiced artform.

As to the bullet/gun vs missile/launcher debate I suspect that we agree in principle but disagree on calibre. I see the gun as useful for discharging as directable stream of pellets. I am not convinced that it is worth the effort to launch 50 kg packages when there are so many other options available to deliver those packages.



And here I think the answer was created 20 years ago

View attachment 80876 NetFires

CHEP pallets with 16 missiles on board that could be launched vertically, a mixture of Loitering Attack Munitions and Precision Guided Munitions.

Technology and need has caught up with the concept.
You are seriously underestimating the difficulty in making smokeless powder. It is a state/factory level requirement, not something you can make in your backyard.

Maybe you can make blackpowder but there is a substantial difference between blackpowder and smokeless powder.

Arty pieces are actually easier to make than you think, its the willingness to invest in the machines and time to make them. They don’t have to all be M777 advanced, WWII basic designs work just fine and can be adapted to fancy fire control systems. But are you going to invest the millions of dollars required to do it?
 
See, here is where I perceive a very Canadian take. There is nothing wrong with building for the world. Plan on building products that everybody uses. Grain and oil are used by the whole world. There are competitors for them but we do well enough selling into the global inventory.

The one thing that the current war is demonstrating is that ammunition is fungible. The Russians and Ukrainians both are reaching out to find munitions wherever they can.
I think we're basically on the same page here. I don't think Canada needs to limit its production to just what we would use I'm just suggesting that the types of munitions we could/should focus on are those that you describe as fungible. Virtually all our allies use 155mm ammo, similar diameter rockets, 120mm mortar rounds, quadcopters, Carl-G, etc. We can produce these in volume not just for ourselves but can also supply our allies if required.

The higher up the technological food chain you go though you have less universal usage among nations of a particular weapon system. There is also much more involved in plugging one of these systems into your existing structure. It's easier to get your troops to swap out one small quadcopter or disposable AT rocket for a similar model than to swap out or integrate Iron Dome vs MEADS for example. I say we should focus on producing the universal product types and procure the "exquisite" systems from our Allies.
And, equally, they are innovating as fast as they can - taking chop saws to anti-tank rifle grenades and slapping plastic fins made on the office 3D printer - taping grenades to Canadian Tire RC vehicles .... They are doing stuff and repeating the stuff that works.

The Ukrainians are also exploiting mortars for exactly the same reasons that the Stokes mortar was developed in the first place. They are cheap. They don't require special steels or skills beyond those of the local machine shop. With a small amount of propellant they loft stuff into the air.
Once that stuff gets into the air it does one of two things. It falls to earth. Or it starts to fly.

If you attach a motor to anything you will extend its range. Add wings and controls and it will fly where you tell it by whatever route you tell it to follow.
See above. I'd argue it's easier to innovate changes to simple systems than to tinker with exquisite systems.
As to the bullet/gun vs missile/launcher debate I suspect that we agree in principle but disagree on calibre. I see the gun as useful for discharging as directable stream of pellets. I am not convinced that it is worth the effort to launch 50 kg packages when there are so many other options available to deliver those packages.
Again I think we agree here as well. Personally I don't see the logic behind creating a complex and expensive system like the ERCA to squeeze out and extra 20km range for a 155mm round over an M109A7 when rockets can easily strike targets in that range band. I'd say you're better off optimizing systems for a role so you can keep them as cheap and reliable as possible.
And here I think the answer was created 20 years ago

View attachment 80876 NetFires

CHEP pallets with 16 missiles on board that could be launched vertically, a mixture of Loitering Attack Munitions and Precision Guided Munitions.

Technology and need has caught up with the concept.
Definitely modular launchers are the way forward for rockets & missiles.
 
They're not todays A Res reservists. You'll need to read the book.

:giggle:

Oh, I get it.... ;)

Airsoft Bbs GIF by South Park
 
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