Canadian troops trade comfy digs to meet Afghans

[Teddy Ruxpin]

Canadian troops trade comfy digs to meet Afghans: New assignment will put soldiers in closer contact with the population

Canadian troops in Afghanistan have been too isolated from the population in their luxurious Camp Julien in Kabul, but defence chief Gen. Rick Hillier says that will change when the Forces deploy to the southern city of Kandahar later this year.

"We've got to be actually much more in touch, in contact with the local population," Gen. Hillier told the Senate's security and defence committee yesterday.

Canada is winding down its operations in Kabul and will refocus on the more dangerous and volatile southern region of Afghanistan. The Forces will send a 250-member provincial reconstruction team to Kandahar in August, and will follow that up with 1,000 combat troops in February to be based at the U.S. Kandahar airbase, at the city's old airport.

Last year, Gen. Hillier commanded NATO forces from Camp Julien -- the most modern facility in war-torn Afghanistan. The federal government invested $40 million into the camp, which sits on 325 hectares of land and has state-of-the-art prefab tents, 750 computers, hundreds of telephones, gym and recreation facilities, laundry and a general store, among other amenities.

That luxury contrasted sharply with the harsh daily living conditions in Afghanistan, something Gen. Hillier suggested was not lost on the young soldiers stationed at Camp Julien.

"As you watch young men and women go out the gate of those camps, you can see the stress levels rising because you're effectively isolated from the population until you go out on patrol or out to do something specific," said Gen. Hillier. "And that's not a good thing. So we're not going to end up building a large camp like that."

The Canadian mission to Kandahar, one of the main hotbeds of the Taliban insurgency, is part of NATO's overall efforts to extend its security force outside the capital of Kabul.

Kabul has been relatively safe compared to the rest of the country, but has not been free of violence either. A roadside bomb in Kabul killed two Canadian soldiers in 2003. In January 2004, another Canadian soldier was killed by a suicide bomber near Kabul.

Gen. Hillier said Canadian troops would face all threats with as much force as they could muster during their reconstruction efforts.

"You've got to be seen as capable and seen as too big of a bully to take on," said Gen. Hillier. "We're not the folks who decide whether it goes violent. They will, on the ground. So if we're not ready, obviously we would be doing our soldiers and our nation a disservice."

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

From the Ottawa Citizen today.  To my mind, the CDS is saying the right things...

Cheers,

Teddy

 

[Cloud Cover]

Canadian troops trade comfy digs to meet Afghans: New assignment will put soldiers in closer contact with the population

Canadian troops in Afghanistan have been too isolated from the population in their luxurious Camp Julien in Kabul, but defence chief Gen. Rick Hillier says that will change when the Forces deploy to the southern city of Kandahar later this year.

Was it really necessary to describe the camp in that way? I doubt the CDS believes his troops are living in "luxury." Comfortable, perhaps.

Reporters for the Ottawa Citizen may be living in luxury, but certainly not the troops over there.

 

[Teddy Ruxpin]

Well, "luxury" is perhaps too strong a word, but the camp is very "comfy".  However, there are literally hundreds of people on Julien who never leave the camp, which is likely what the CDS is getting at.

IMHO, Julien is an example of "welfare creep" at its finest and I'm sure others who have been there will agree.  In part, this is due to the requirement to cater to large numbers of civilian contract staff - quantities unlikely to be seen in Kandahar.

 

[paracowboy]

IMHO, Julien is an example of "welfare creep" at its finest and I'm sure others who have been there will agree.

We were getting potato chips before my troops had a complete combat load of ammo. It's plenty damn luxurious.

 

[Cloud Cover]

We were getting potato chips before my troops had a complete combat load of ammo. It's plenty damn luxurious.

Be that as it may, the descriptive issue is for chaps like you to decide, and not the media. 

 

[pbi]

Great to see this happening, and to hear a CDS (and the MND recently as well...) speak in such decisive, "politically incorrect" tones about getting back into the real game in Afghanistan, instead of hanging out with the Euro-tourist crowd in the Kabul backwater. We have been steadsily building this "fortress mentality" since Yugo and we need to break out of it: more emphasis on mobility and flexibility and less on niceties.

Cheers.

 

[AcornsRus]

The Forces will send a 250-member provincial reconstruction team to Kandahar in August, and will follow that up with 1,000 combat troops in February to be based at the U.S. Kandahar airbase, at the city's old airport.

Has our location been decided yet?  Last I heard we were leaning towards going our own way. Anyone know what the U.S airbase is like, I don't imagine they are exactly roughing it.

I'm glad to hear that the plan is to get closer to the population. From a HUMINT perspective this is great, and trying to disassociate ourselves from the U.S a little bit sure wouldn't hurt.  As for D&S, one could argue that we would have less of a target on our backs if we base ourselves  away from the US.

 

[Teddy Ruxpin]

The PRT is likely to go its own way and I'll leave it at that for now.  There is a firm plan.

KAF was a s**thole in 2001, as others more familiar with the base can attest.  "Airbase" does not equal luxurious in a US context by any means.  I spent APOLLO on an "austere" US installation (not Kandahar) and it was interesting to say the least.

TR

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

Slamming Camp Julien is a popular sport these days.  I would suggest, however, that the contact that troops have with locals has more to do with missions and tasks than living quarters.  Unless troops are billeted with locals then there will always be some isolation.

At the risk of being an ATHENA apologist, certain parts of the contingent were (are) in close contact with the populace.  It is true that some people never left camp but this was due to their duties as opposed to any unique Camp Julien issues.

I will speak for the Coyote troops in that they spent roughly two thirds of their tour in small Patrol-sized OPs.  The duration could last from a couple of days to a couple of weeks.  Some were in desolate spots but others were right in amongst the locals.  They would return to camp every couple of days to shower and eat in the kitchen.  I am not trying to get into an austerity competition (I slept in camp almost every night), but just to point out that ATHENA was not just about Camp Julien.

Now, I am all for reducing our logistical tail.  The tail is somewhat bigger than the dog right now. 

Cheers,

2B

 

[Teddy Ruxpin]

2Bravo:

You couldn't be more correct.  It was the same for Roto 2.  However, I suspect what cynics such as myself (and perhaps PBI) are pointing out is that what the Sqns do (and, to a similar extent the Engr Sqn, FP Coy, CIMIC and a few others) is not reflected in the posture within the camp itself.  The ratio of those who "do" to those who obstentively support is way out of whack, IMHO.

I used to get notices for events that seemed like they were taking place on another planet:  charity car crushes, mess events, dance lessons, clubs, etc..  The Sqn certainly didn't have time for such things, but they contributed to a very weird atmosphere.

Cheers,

TR

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

TR,
I did have the odd surreal moment, and the camp was certainly more equipped than I had expected!  We ate well, had a great gym and an outstanding laundry service. 

I think that we could have parred down the contingents after Roto 1.  I figured that we could have put the Recce Sqn Gp with a small NSE into the old Canadian Extension at Warehouse (300 people total).  This would have relieved us of maintaining Camp Julien, but perhaps there were other issues at play.

Still, expanding the influence of the Transitional Authority by pushing out PRTs is the right approach.  I just hope that someone keeps a grip on Kabul.

Cheers,

2B

 

[Armymedic]

I am not sure about comfort levels but I do know we have as camp of 700 military and 500 civilians who support the 200 or so Canadians who actually go out and do things for the benefit of stability and security of Afghanistan. This ratio is insane in that we think by by keeping a big lumbering camp we are doing something good, obviously it is time to change.

As for leaving comfy digs to going out to meet Afghans, I can say I do it every day from Camp Blackhorse, and I am loving every minute of it.

Oh, and for those have never been here and who still doubt, I still do not feel completely safe driving around Kabul...call me crazy, but when you have weekly reports of bombers in your area and the road you travel on daily targeted....and it will only get worse between now and Sept.

 

[wack-in-iraq]

i live in a 40 foot container (shared with another person) with a generator that sucks, so we are lucky to have water or power a few days a week, this doesnt make me feel any closer to the iraqis i work with. this camp julien sounds alright to me right about now.

 

[Jarnhamar]

Potato chips before bullets?

Thats pretty funny - in an embarassing way.

God forbid if the camp is ever attacked.  Our troops can leave bags of chips lying around on the ground and wait for the hungry bad guys to stop and pick them up where we can make our rationed combat load count.

 

[Teddy Ruxpin]

God forbid if the camp is ever attacked.  Our troops can leave bags of chips lying around on the ground and wait for the hungry bad guys to stop and pick them up where we can make our rationed combat load count.

Don't get the wrong idea.  Force protection-wise the place is a fortress and has the meanest, most heavily armed units in Kabul to rely on.  Between the Recce Sqn and FP Inf Coy, the Canadians are - by far - the biggest boys on the block with the most firepower in the city, bar none.  We also have a much better attitude towards these things than some of the other Euro-tourists populating ISAF.

Criticism of the camp and the related infrastructure and manning shouldn't be taken as criticism of the contingent, at least from my perspective.

Cheers,

Teddy

 

[Jarnhamar]

Criticism of the camp and the related infrastructure and manning shouldn't be taken as criticism of the contingent, at least from my perspective.

Agreed 100%.

I just found the comment about us having potato chips before bullets was a good indication that our military still needs to sit down and do some serious brain storming about the CF's mentality as an armed force.

 

[Gunner]

I just found the comment about us having potato chips before bullets was a good indication that our military still needs to sit down and do some serious brain storming about the CF's mentality as an armed force.

I don't think the comment was having potato chips before bullets, it was not having a full combat load prior to amenities (potato chips) coming in.  Having a little bit of experience with airlift I would hazard to guess that the full lift of ammo had not yet arrived directly from Canada (using leased airlfit) while amenities were already flowing in from Camp Mirage on sustainment flights.  Two different issues I would say.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

Ghost,

I landed at KAIA (Kabul Afghanistan International Airport) in early Aug 03 and was issued my complete first line ammo in the arrival lounge (5.56mm and 9mm) before heading out for Camp Julien.  It should be noted that the Theatre Activiation Team (TAT) had been there for a few months and with them was India Coy of 2 RCR.  India Coy was geared out properly and had a good grip on the camp and its environs.  The established presence of the TAT may have created a strange impression for troops arriving on "Roto 0."  As for ISTAR Coy (which included the Coyotes), some of us were on the ground for two weeks before commencing operations.  We met our kit in theatre (it was not ours back home), so we used the time to get things squared away and go on familiarization trips in civie pattern vehicles and Iltis.

Now, it is true that we'd have to run things a little differently if we were entering a new theatre without an in-place force to secure the TAT.  The ability to establish Camp Julien prior to the commencement of operations was a luxury we may not always be able to have, and we should maintain the capability to enter a new, unsecure theatre and commence operations without a TAT if required.

Cheers,

2B

 

[Armymedic]

Its not only us who sit with the tail wagging our dog that say we are too tail heavy...

Insight from a recent visit by Sen Kenny:

http://www.canada.com/components/printstory/printstory4.aspx?id=cc5a2273-90bb-4918-8d49-bd3f567b9a7d

Lost in Afghanistan
As Canada prepares to move its forces to the troubled Kandahar region, it must consider whether it's making an impact on the war-torn nation
 
Colin Kenny
Citizen Special


Friday, June 10, 2005

Canada's military presence in Afghanistan is based on sound premises. Unfortunately, that doesn't automatically mean what our troops are doing there -- and will do there -- will have much of an effect on Afghanistan's future, or the future of the world.

The original invasion of Afghanistan was a response to the al-Qaeda-led attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, and the fanatical Taliban, a cruel and despotic regime providing al-Qaeda sanctuary. Afghanistan was a hotbed for terrorist training, and Canada's commitment to fighting terrorism made our participation a no-brainer.

Threats to the security of Canadians are best fought as far away from Canada's borders as possible. Afghanistan represents a case study of trying to eradicate a threat before it arrives on our doorstep.

There are 700 Canadian troops in Kabul, the now relatively peaceful capital, down from the 2,000 that participated in the first rotation of Canada's NATO mission, and fewer than the 1,250 that will be in more-volatile Kandahar by February (250 will move in August).

This is our largest overseas deployment by far right now. If we are going to be there, we should be performing as effectively as possible. Are we? Will we? Is there really any chance of being effective, of transforming this society into anything resembling a peaceful democracy?

I visited Kabul recently as part of an attempt by the Senate committee on national security and defence to get a handle on some of these questions.

We spent $115.9 million on in-theatre operations in Afghanistan last fiscal year. Because Canada is moving on to a new mission, one might argue that there is no point in dwelling on how well it has fulfilled its latest one. But given the commitment of scarce Canadian resources, Canadians should be assured that we will be getting bang for our buck as we move forward.

The current commitment clearly has more tail than teeth. Because of the need to maintain our base at Camp Julien, provide security for it, and man a rapid-reaction force for NATO's personnel across Kabul, we get a limited product for our 700-person deployment.

The main components of that are: a reconnaissance squadron supporting a nearby German Provincial Reconstruction Team; a group of 14 personnel evaluating British, American and French efforts to train the Afghan Army; and some intelligence gathering.

That isn't much for such a large commitment of money and people, especially when there is little to no interaction with the local population.

One would have thought that Kabul would have been the ideal place for Canadian troops to maximize their interaction with Afghans -- to take the helmets off from time to time and try to humanize the NATO mission and earn some genuine respect and admiration from the locals.

It's not for a politician to say where and when this kind of interchange is possible -- that's up to local commanders. However, it is important. And if it isn't possible in Kabul, it is extremely doubtful it is going to be possible in Kandahar, where the Taliban remains an elusive and powerful presence.

What we saw in Kabul in terms of winning hearts and minds wasn't encouraging. We saw Canadian soldiers accelerating through the streets inside their armoured vehicles, decked out in helmets, sunglasses and scarves to protect them from the incessant dust, machine guns swivelling at the ready.

Maybe that was just a snapshot. Maybe there has been plenty of interchange in recent months and we just didn't see any of it or hear about any of it. Let's hope.

But the "Triple D" concept -- combining defence with diplomacy and development -- is supposed to be at the core of Canada's approach to reconstructing failed post-Cold War states, yet there appeared to be little connection between Canada's military presence in Kabul and its diplomatic presence: the Canadian Embassy.

So, is Canada likely to mount a more meaningful contribution toward the rebuilding of Afghanistan when new troops move into Kandahar in August? Gen. Rick Hillier, newly appointed chief of defence staff, testified before our committee on May 30, and suggested, for a start, the force going to Kandahar would focus more on the product.

"I am a little concerned about the ratio of the number of people required to support versus the number of people who operate ... we have to be more ruthless ... if we put 200 men and women in uniform, having another 500-plus contractors to support that in-theatre is something that draws my attention right away."

Everything has to go right in Kandahar. It is a far more dangerous place than Kabul. Even when U.S. forces have scored successes in knocking out large cadres of Taliban fighters, reports indicate that these are quickly replenished by new fighters from Pakistan.

Kandahar will present the increased likelihood of combat, and Canadian fatalities. That is inevitably what you get when you intervene anywhere the bad guys are still a force, and the Taliban is surely still a force in Afghanistan. For the most part, their fighters prefer to engage, retreat to the mountains and wait for the right moment to engage again.

This raises two questions. The first is whether the Canadian government is ready for the risks that will come with the move to Kandahar. It had better be, and it had better ensure the troops are as well supported as they can be.

Second, is there any hope of making a difference?

There is not just a fierceness to the Taliban and their fellow travellers. There is an incredible patience. This patience sustained the relentless opposition to the Soviet occupation of the 1980s. These people exhausted the mighty Soviet military and drained the Soviet economy before Moscow finally acknowledged defeat.

If Afghanistan is going to change, it's going to take a very, very long time. One major I talked to called it a "five-generational project."

The men in the mountains will be there five generations from now. I can't think of anyone I know who wants a Canadian presence in Afghanistan five generations from now. So how long will it take to accomplish ... what?

Christopher Alexander, Canada's ambassador in Kabul, calls Afghanistan one of the great causes of the 21st century. He says the end game will depend on the three Ps -- Pakistan, poppies and the private sector.

Can the West get Pakistan to stop playing host to Muslim extremists training young zealots for war? Can infusions of economic aid help boost the average Afghan income above $1,000 a year, which some very optimistic people contend would undermine the warlords who run the lucrative opium trade? Will international investors shrug off the dangers of Afghanistan and help rescue its stagnant economy?

Perhaps all these things will happen eventually. Then again, perhaps just getting near the poppy fields causes pipe dreams.

There are good reasons for Canada's being in Afghanistan. But as we approach the next stage of our mission there -- one that may well involve body bags -- one has to wonder whether the cost is going be worth the gain.

Is there any strategy in place that will get us where we want to go? I wish I had a good answer to that. So far I haven't seen one.

Colin Kenny is chair of the Senate committee on national security and defence. He can be reached by e-mail at kennyco@sen.parl.gc.ca

 

[Teflon]

Having deployed to Camp Julian in Aug 04 as the Inf Pl of the Mission Drawdown Team dismantling the Canadian Annex of Camp Warehouse initially and then taken on duties with the force protection Coy (B Coy) for Op Athena roto 2 for 3 months- I certainly got out of the camp much more often then my B Coy counter parts. They did not really have time to accomplish much if any hearts and minds activities due to their numbers and the shear volume of tasks they had to cover off particularly after my Pl repatted - Gate guard, Camp QRF, local defensive Ptls immediately surrounding the camp as well as escorts for various tasks.  As to ammo, well even during the election when my sect was deployed to TV Hill the RRB site for added security we still had only our 5 mags worth of ammo (no spare resup in our vehicle) no grenades or other hvy wpns ammo but our LAV did have 2 complete uploads (Although the idea of firing the main gun from the mountain with the city of Kabul as a back stop in all directions wasn't that attractive)

As much as I enjoyed and took advantage of the laundry service or the ability to buy smokes and pop etc from the general store the 500 or so civi employees was pushing it and also added to the tasks for FP Coy (escorting them to and from the airport for their leave and re-deployments)

Although I didn't have time or interest in attending the meetings of the meditation club, wood working club or the various other clubs of almost every imaginable type it certainly added to the very surreal  feel of the camp.