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Canada's tanks

I seem recall when under PM Mulroney during the 80's we had planned to purchase 300 M1A1s .
Think had barely dried when we cancelled.
I think the purchase price at the time was under billion dollars.talk about inflation.
As I recall, the tank replacement project still hadn’t selected a model and signed a contract — I believe they had narrowed the options down to M1A1, Leopard 2, Challenger 1 and LeClerc and were in the process of comparative trials when the project was cancelled at the end of the Cold War.
 
I don't think that's fair.

Seems like it would be a far easier "fit" to tweak existing armoured recce doctrine to accomodate for mixed Coyote 2.0 / TAPV squadrons than to completely redefine 2/3's of the RCAC and leave it ill equiped for said new definition for the balance of the decade.

To the contrary I'd say this is a fairly blatant and ambitious long term play for the RCAC to stake its ground for the next round of fleet recapitalization.

If the name of the game is trade commonality, and taking our marriage to a certain London company, my guess is there might be some engineers feverishly copying the homework of the Centauro II.

That London company's parents also produce the M10 Booker and the Ajax as well as the Abrams.
 
In theory, a heavy squadron with Leopard 2A6Ms will use the same tactics as a squadron equipped with TAPVs. Dependent on the threat/situation they are all intended to execute the same tactical tasks. So a Troop equipped with Leopard 2A6M could Screen or conduct a Zone Recce while a Troop with LAV Recce or TAPV could Destroy or Support by Fire.
Theory is going to get soldiers killed because we are too cheap.
This all reminds me of using the good old, reliable 3/4 ton as an APC long ago.
 
Theory is going to get soldiers killed because we are too cheap.
This all reminds me of using the good old, reliable 3/4 ton as an APC long ago.
The theory fits if you treat the Tanks like TAPVs and LAVs rather than treating the TAPVs and LAVs like Tanks.
That seems to be Ukrainian practice.

They keep a healthy distance between themselves and the opposition and rely on their optics and third party drones. They engage at extreme range.

Neither the Russians nor Ukrainians seem to have had much success massing their vehicles.

Sorry for quoting myself but...

I am thinking that some folks are rethinking the vulnerability of the tank and rather than seeing the tank as an invulnerable monster dominating the battlefield and busting through berms and over ditches it is being seen as a less vulnerable form of recce vehicle.

Tanks are being killed. They have always been killed, This is not news. But the American way of war has permitted the tank to dominate the battlefield after the US Air Force had cleared the way and suppressed the opposition. The opposition also didn't have the same quality of anti-tank weapons currently on display in Ukraine.

Canada has a small number of tanks. They are a valuable resource. Small numbers and high value makes them precious and something to be hoarded and used with care. That suggests to me that it is unlikely that Canada will be launching 40 tanks in a single roll of the dice assault against a fixed enemy position.

On the other hand they can add to an aggressive reconnaissance effort. pushing forwards further than troops in lighter vehicles, and giving overwatch support from longer stand off distances.

How long before our tanks add "cope cages"? (Have we stopped laughing at that term yet?)
 
Sorry for quoting myself but...

I am thinking that some folks are rethinking the vulnerability of the tank and rather than seeing the tank as an invulnerable monster dominating the battlefield and busting through berms and over ditches it is being seen as a less vulnerable form of recce vehicle.

TBH the idea of Reconnaissance in Force being viable at this point is a little laughable.


Armor Screen may be the best way to look at what would have been previously considered a Recon in Force.

The fact is the UAS has changed the battlefield forever - probing via Tank or Armored Recce platform isn’t going to be conducted in the manner it has been before unless there becomes a way to effectively thermal mask vehicles and personnel in large quantities.

Tanks are being killed. They have always been killed, This is not news. But the American way of war has permitted the tank to dominate the battlefield after the US Air Force had cleared the way and suppressed the opposition.
Maneuver Warfare, is really just fire and movement at large scale - in this case the USAF being the firebase to suppress/destroy enemy positions.
The opposition also didn't have the same quality of anti-tank weapons currently on display in Ukraine.
After SEAD, the SAD of enemy AT, Arty, AFV etc by the USAF / US Army (and USMC) aviation assets made it impossible for any significant AT effects to be achieved against the advance.
Canada has a small number of tanks. They are a valuable resource. Small numbers and high value makes them precious and something to be hoarded and used with care. That suggests to me that it is unlikely that Canada will be launching 40 tanks in a single roll of the dice assault against a fixed enemy position.
Sometimes one doesn’t get the choice…

On the other hand they can add to an aggressive reconnaissance effort. pushing forwards further than troops in lighter vehicles, and giving overwatch support from longer stand off distances.
see my comments above on RIF, more of a screen of the lighter vehicles, and a wider screen of both ISR and Attack UAS.
How long before our tanks add "cope cages"? (Have we stopped laughing at that term yet?)

The bigger question is what do you expect them to do? Generally they are added to do one specific thing - impede the ability of munitions to attack from the top, either guided or unguided systems. But they do that at the expense of being able to see and engage targets where the cage is present.

For operations, that can be both a benefit (enemy unable to drop grenades from buildings or UAS) but also restricts the crew from observing and engaging targets above.
The US Army put cages and the like on Strykers in Iraq, while JSOC units opted for more shooters looking out — guess what worked best?

Active C-UAS/C-RAM systems on maneuver vehicles are a much better choice than simply adding a cage / glass / netting etc.
 
TBH the idea of Reconnaissance in Force being viable at this point is a little laughable.

Armor Screen may be the best way to look at what would have been previously considered a Recon in Force.

The fact is the UAS has changed the battlefield forever - probing via Tank or Armored Recce platform isn’t going to be conducted in the manner it has been before unless there becomes a way to effectively thermal mask vehicles and personnel in large quantities.
Understood. Agreed.

Maneuver Warfare, is really just fire and movement at large scale - in this case the USAF being the firebase to suppress/destroy enemy positions.

After SEAD, the SAD of enemy AT, Arty, AFV etc by the USAF / US Army (and USMC) aviation assets made it impossible for any significant AT effects to be achieved against the advance.
Again. Agreed.

Sometimes one doesn’t get the choice…
But this is Canada - and demonstrably, we choose. We choose our wars, our campaigns, our contributions and our battles.

see my comments above on RIF, more of a screen of the lighter vehicles, and a wider screen of both ISR and Attack UAS.
Again. Agreed.

The bigger question is what do you expect them to do? Generally they are added to do one specific thing - impede the ability of munitions to attack from the top, either guided or unguided systems. But they do that at the expense of being able to see and engage targets where the cage is present.

For operations, that can be both a benefit (enemy unable to drop grenades from buildings or UAS) but also restricts the crew from observing and engaging targets above.
For a lot of the munitions being countered fish net would suffice. Perhaps with kevlar threads. Holes small enough to stop a grenade but big enough to shoot through. And light enough to carry spares and rapidly deploy.

The US Army put cages and the like on Strykers in Iraq, while JSOC units opted for more shooters looking out — guess what worked best?
Which course was the horse running on?

Active C-UAS/C-RAM systems on maneuver vehicles are a much better choice than simply adding a cage / glass / netting etc.
There you go again with that American budget. How many Trophy systems are you buying to donate to Ukraine?

You have been spoiled. 😁
 
That suggests to me that it is unlikely that Canada will be launching 40 tanks in a single roll of the dice assault against a fixed enemy position.
That sounds like Gen George McClellan not wishing to use the nice and shiny new Union army because it might get dirty.

This is a recurring problem with Canadian military procurement. We don't plan for sustainability in anything other than a peacetime environment.

🍻
 
My belief is Canada’s Army is way to small not to get Cadillac equipment.

You can’t afford to lose anything- be it equipment or personnel, so best to hedge towards the best.

We would if we could but we can't so we won't.

Those decisions are not trusted to people in uniform. They can only advise and plead.
 
That sounds like Gen George McClellan not wishing to use the nice and shiny new Union army because it might get dirty.

This is a recurring problem with Canadian military procurement. We don't plan for sustainability in anything other than a peacetime environment.

🍻

See my response to @KevinB above.

I agree we should plan to use stuff and that that requires buying stuff in excess. But our government doesn't.

And our army would rather have a small number of exquisites than a large number of things they can afford. Like mortars and ATGMs.
 
That leads to the logical conclusion that we do not need a military at all because we can forever chose not to participate. The US had that view right up to Dec 7th, 1941.

🍻

You are not wrong. But the view seems to be commonly held in Canada and particularly in our bureaucracy.
 
We would if we could but we can't so we won't.

Those decisions are not trusted to people in uniform. They can only advise and plead.
Honestly the issue can’t solely be laid at the feet of the GoC, the CA does a marvelously shitty job of writing requirements, and often buys obsolete equipment as it’s easy.
 
My belief is Canada’s Army is way to small not to get Cadillac equipment.

You can’t afford to lose anything- be it equipment or personnel, so best to hedge towards the best.
Unfortunately, we don't buy equipment based on how good, how much survivability, what role or much of anything else. We buy equipment based on who is in power and which manufacturers support said government.
 
On the other hand they can add to an aggressive reconnaissance effort. pushing forwards further than troops in lighter vehicles, and giving overwatch support from longer stand off distances.
What would be the point? If we need something that strong for recce, what should we be using for assaults? And if we don't need something that strong for assaults, why would we need it for recce?
 
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