As far as I understand (Prime Minister) King's reasoning - and my understanding is, most likely, deeply flawed - he wanted, desperately, to withdraw from the very divisive issue of international affairs. National unity was a big problem in 1945 - the conscription crisis wounds were raw – and Québec was extraordinarily
isolationist, far, far more than it is today.
The
potential UNSC
permanent seat would have committed Canada to the sort of active internationalism that Louis St Laurent enunciated, as Canada’s foreign policy, just two years later. But two years healed a lot of wounds and there was a vast gulf between St Laurent – then in his prime – and King, already ‘failing’ at the end of the war.
(In his last days in power King opposed St Laurent but to no avail. Prime Ministers were, then, much less powerful than they are today. King was
primus inter pares but it was clear to all Liberals, and to King himself, that he was well past his
best before date and that he would have to give way. It was equally clear that St Laurent could beat George Drew’s Conservatives and retain power for the Liberals while many other contenders might not. Thus, St Laurent was, pretty much, free to set and implement a coherent Canadian foreign policy, including e.g. NATO, which King opposed. But, despite their strong disagreement on foreign policy, King remained St Laurent’s biggest supporter. He appears to have trusted St Laurent’s judgement in all matters – even when he, King, disagreed.)
King was a tired, timid man, his decision – pretty much a split second decision,
* I
think – reflected the man, not Canada’s
near and mid term interests.
Had we been on the UNSC, rather than France, I
suspect that Security Council reform would have been a reality by the 1970s. It would have been abundantly clear, circa 1971, that Canada was not a great power, ditto Britain. The ‘change of Chinas’ that occurred in 1971 would, I
guess, have resulted in a new, smaller, UNSC: three permanent, veto power, members: China, USA and USSR and two tiers of temporary members – a small number (also three?) of long term (five or ten year terms) members with veto powers and a larger number (eight or ten?) of short term (two years term) members without veto powers.
On the other hand, had we had a UNSC seat and given our socio-economic situation in the 1950s and 60s, we
might have acted like a leader in the world – spending more on defence and foreign affairs, for example, and it
might have been harder, maybe even too hard, for Trudeau to emasculate the country in 1969/70.
On balance, King and Trudeau reflected what
most Canadians
appear to believe: we are a small, even poor nation that doesn’t want to be ‘out front’ in the world. Looking back, St Laurent was a political aberration: a forward looking, outward looking,
strategic leader who put Canada first. There were almost none like him in the past and none of his successors, up to and including Stephen Harper, have come anywhere near him in character, intellect or
vision.
Pity.
_________
Edit, to add:
It was a "split second decision," I
think because, as I understand it, the offer was only "on the table" for a terribly brief period. It was a quick "take it or leave it" offer from the US and UK. I'm not sure if the offer came from Roosevelt and Churchill (possibly at or after the 2nd (1944) Québec Conference) or from Truman and Atlee in 1945 but it
appears, to me, that the offer was serious but fleeting.
Edit: typo
