- Reaction score
- 33
- Points
- 560
Real Clear Defence has a very interesting article looking at the factors behind the Schlieffen Plan. The plan has always been one of the central planks in the histories of the Great War, so this brings it more into focus:
https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2018/02/01/a_re-examination_of_the_schlieffen_plan_112995.html
It is a very long article, so follow the link.
https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2018/02/01/a_re-examination_of_the_schlieffen_plan_112995.html
What best explains the German General Staff’s decision to go to war in 1914? Was Alfred von Schlieffen’s war plan a self-fulfilling prophecy that pushed the Triple Entente to balance together against Germany? This article argues that the best, most recent scholarship concerning the impact of pre-war German military planning depicts a situation in which not one, but a multitude of of causal factors led Germany to go to war in 1914. The most compelling scholarship illustrates that the primary factors that led Germany to war include: the culture of nationalism, militarism, and the ideology of the offensive that was prevalent in the General Staff; pessimism about the prospect of victory in the future and optimism about victory in the present (preventive war thinking); perception about the strength and unity of the Triple Entente; the psychology and cognitive biases of German War planners; incoherence of strategic planning and organizational politics; and last, the idea that “grand strategy in this era was a three-level game in which the need to cobble together working coalitions on the domestic and alliance levels often seemed more pressing than even the life-and-death threats posed by foreign competitors.”[1]
It is a very long article, so follow the link.