Well, I may as well chime in from the armchair.
This thing seems to fit the bill to me. I was discussing this with Matt Fisher the other day, the idea of the "in between" vehicle for SASO operations (what we are essentially conducting. Soft-skin, open vehicles have their advantages and are the vehicle of choice in low threat environments where hearts-and-minds is the key. When we are in full on warfighting, a LAV or similar Fighting Vehicle is desired, as were more concerned about mobility and firepower to deliver shock to the enemy. This vehicle sits in the middle of the two - because it sits in the middle of the two it may fit the bill for Security And Stability Operations (SASO) or COunterInsurgency Operations (COIN) where, although hearts-and-minds is still important, the overlying concern is security against a very active and deadly enemy force. You are establishing presence to tell the enemy that you are not going home - you will most likely draw attacks while attempting to find ways to undermine his capability and will to fight. Trying to conduct this "middle-ground" operation with too little or too much force protection and firepower may be counter-productive.
To date, 633 of the 2127 US servicemen killed Iraq have been caused by IEDs (30%). When you remove the 514 non-hostile fatalities, that means that IED's account for over 1/3 of all KIA's in Iraq (the breakdown is
here, you use the filter to narrow things down). It is the single largest killer of Coalition soldiers in Iraq - to me this high number means that IED's aren't simply another tactic of the Insurgency, but a whole campaign in its own right.
Of the
147 Coalition hostile deaths in Afghanistan, 34 were from IEDs (data can be found
here). That is nearly a quarter of all KIA in Afghanistan (23%) The attack that killed Sgt Short and Cpl Beerenfenger is listed as the first IED attack in Afghanistan (I'm not sure if how it is officially listed with us). Even more alarming is that almost all the IED attacks occurred in 2004 and 2005, two years after the invasion and rout of the Taliban. This indicates that Afghan insurgents (and foreign fighters as well) have learned from (or even been to) the Iraqi Insurgency and the toll that the IED campaign is taking on us there and have imported a very deadly and effective technique to fight against us in Afghanistan :-\.
Of course, these figures don't include the other typical insurgency techniques we see - mines, RPG attacks, suicide bombers and ambushes. These would only bump the already high percentages up even more. As well, the wounded in these attacks aren't addressed, but I can only imagine how high those numbers are.
LtCol Dave Banks'
interviews of US soldiers deployed to Afghanistan highlighted the importance of mobility operations in this "middle-ground" environment of an active insurgency. If we are going to be conducting mobility operations, we want to be able to do so without inviting the deadly toll that IEDs, mines, and ambushes, which are the enemies primary offensive tactics. This indicates the need for a vehicle that can take the punishment but still offer us more flexibility and effective presence than an armoured fighting vehicle. Light, soft skin vehicles simply disintergrate in the face of an effective IED attack - those movies that Hadji puts on the internet tell us as much. The RWS debate is important, as it sacrifices a bit of situational awareness for more force protection, but I think that if in general, this vehicle lives up to its press (which it seems to, according to those in the know) then perhaps it is the right vehicle to have heading into this "middle ground" of active insurgency.
My 2 cents from the armchair,
Infanteer
