We are driving good soldiers out of the Army

[Lance Wiebe]

An Armour Regiment or an Infantry Battalion was never a self contained combat team.  Yes, they had much more capabilities than they do now, but nobody expected either one to stand on their own. 

The ideal is to follow either the German lead, or the new US Unit of Action lead, where the mix of combat arms Units are moved from the Brigade level down to the Battalion level.  Then, if a Unit deploys, it deploys with its own armour, infantry, CSS etc.  Especially as it is extremely remote that we will be moving Brigade size forces anywhere, but we will be depoloying combat teams.

 

[Infanteer]

I've started a new thread for the lowering of the combined arms organization

http://army.ca/forums/threads/19094.0.html

 

[Lance Wiebe]

I missed it!

Ok, let me try to gather my thoughts in to a reasonably coherent process, and I will respond to that thread....but give me some time!

 

[Kirkhill]

By Satelliteslayer

All pers must know how to dig a slit trench for pers protection, They should also know how to dig a fighting posn to stage 6; however It is not likely that a CSS trade is going to be manning one for long periods of time in a def posn.

Is that a true statement if we assume an expeditionary mindset?  If the CF starts doing more Kabuls, Eritreas, Qandahars, Kosovos, Bosnias, Rwandas..... (Maybe you have already started?).....aren't the Sigs and the CSS trades likely to find themselves isolated in neutral/hostile territory and subject to bombardment, sniping, mining etc. 

If the Forces are organized and deployed as Battle Groups, Regiments, Demi-Brigades, Field Forces, Brigades, Brigade Groups, how much distance is there between the Front Line Own Troops and the BMA?  I can't see there are many opportunities for concrete buildings, fluorescent lights and a coffee-pot.

Cheers

 

[Lance Wiebe]

Now I'm curious.

You made the statement

Lew's a great guy, but has lost touch with reality...

What is your basis for this statement?

 

[KevinB]

Now I'm curious.

You made the statement

What is your basis for this statement?

DITTO

 

[Bruce Monkhouse]

She was on at 1600 hours today but...........

 

[IPC10]

An Armour Regiment or an Infantry Battalion was never a self contained combat team. Yes, they had much more capabilities than they do now, but nobody expected either one to stand on their own.

Sorry, that was my point.  An Infantry Battalion now needs augmentation from Gunners, Engrs, etc just to have the capabilities that it had five years ago.  So instead of creating a combat capable force by forming a Battle Group we are merely creating a formation that, as you identified, cannot be expected to stand on their own.

 

[Kirkhill]

Quote from IPC19

Quote from: Lance Wiebe on September 09, 2004, 08:42:46
An Armour Regiment or an Infantry Battalion was never a self contained combat team. Yes, they had much more capabilities than they do now, but nobody expected either one to stand on their own.


Sorry, that was my point.  An Infantry Battalion now needs augmentation from Gunners, Engrs, etc just to have the capabilities that it had five years ago.  So instead of creating a combat capable force by forming a Battle Group we are merely creating a formation that, as you identified, cannot be expected to stand on their own.

But I think Lance's point is that Infantry Battalions in particular were never deployed without support from other trades.  Either they were deployed as units in a Division or a Brigade Group and had access to the services of the other arms on a demand basis (at the discretion of the formation commander) or else they were beefed up to form a BattleGroup. 

The net effect is that although an Infantry commander had his own Arty (the mortars), his own Engineers (the Pioneers), his own Direct Fire Support (TOW) and his own light cavalry (vehicle mounted recce) he never deployed with just those assets.  He was always augmented by trades dedicated to those crafts.  The proposed reorganizations based on formalized Battle Groups merely codifies those relations and stipulates that Arty tasks will be performed by gunners, Engineering by sappers, DFS and mounted recce by Blackhats.  Now we can talk about manning levels and trying to create these formations on the cheap by reducing 4 sapper/pioneer  troops/platoons to 2 (1 squadron + 1 platoon to 1 squadron minus) as an example, and you won't get an argument here.  But the notion of creating standing battle groups or regiments formed from all arms is a good thing, as Martha would say.

It has often been brought up that the Battalion CO will be losing control over the mortars, pioneers, recce etc.  But....... where the Battalion is the lead element in a BattleGroup deployment isn't he gaining direct control and the dedicated support of an Arty Battery as well as his mortars,  a squadron of Engineers instead of his platoon of pioneers, armoured recce and fire support?

I may be dense but I fail to see how the Battle Group commander will be worse off with sub-units of other trades attached on a permanent (at least for the duration of the deployment) basis than he would be with integral sub-sub-units and having to beg for support from higher.

Now as I said earlier, if the attached sub-units are made up of the same numbers that made up the sub-sub-units and just designated sub-unit commands, then I see folly.  But if you actually exchange a mortar platoon of arty trained infanteers for an arty batter with an integral troop of mortars, all manned by gunners then I would be all for it.

Cheers.

 

[KevinB]

Kirkhill,

Unfortunately that is not the way it plays out.

Pioneers and Mortars were not job skillsets that the Engineers nor Artillery really did.  We have foisted upon them a role they did not want nor relish.  Futhermore you have dimished the combat power of the Bde - buy cutting up Bde assets and pushing them down to the Btl Gp's to fill them out to their previous power.

Worse with the eventual removal of Recce and TOW Pl's from the Bn you will be left with rifle coy's - now as a solider do you want to spend your 20 (or 25 for those joining us now) years in a Rifle coy?

The CF is going to have to take a very hard look at itself - for the current system in crumbling and the newest changes are not for the better.

 

[Lance Wiebe]

Unfortunately, Kevin is correct.

While the Infantry lost integral, direct, immediate close support, they did not really reap the rewards.  The Battalions are still not at full strength, despite having less positions to fill.  The Engineers and Artillery did not gain any positions, they just got new tasks hoisted upon them.

There are two reasons that this happened.  The main reason is that the highers have decided that Battalions will never deploy as a Unit, ever again.  Which means, of course, that Brigades will never deploy, either.  Instead, as has been pointed out elsewhere, sub-Units will be sent, to join up with other sub-units, to form some kind of Battle Group capable (hopefully) of completing their tasking.  The other reason is much more mundane.  Simply, too small an army, to many empty positions.

 

[Kirkhill]

OK Kevin and Lance

I fully understand your points about manning levels and how playing musical chairs with diminishing number of chairs isn't going to build a new army.

I guess I'll have to lurk on Infanteer's thread http://army.ca/forums/threads/19094.0.html to get the DS solution .


Kevin, you asked on another thread that we first define what we want the army to do for us.  Well this taxpayer would like to see us able to sustain a Kabul mission indefinitely, while still being able to take on a similar mission for a limited duration - 1 or 2 rotos.  At the same time I would like to see a force that could insert a light company team anywhere in Canada and also be available to support an evacuation of nationals as well as repeat what 3VP did in Afghanistan (not necessarily all concurrently).  Finally I would like to see us maintain a medium/heavy capability that could participate in a short campaign.  If the campaign went long term then some of the other capabilities would have to be retrained/reconfigured.

Based on that I was suggesting a Medium/Heavy Cavalry Brigade (Unit of Action now I guess), an Airborne Regiment to backstop JTF2 green ops and then 6 BattleGroups/Regiments designed for long deployments on peace support and stability operations - basically static ops as far as I can gather rather than manoeuvre ops.  The 6 Battlegroups would still be organized under 3 Brigades but the Brigades would also train with up to 3 militia Battle Groups (designed for domestic security ops primarily).

Anyhow I guess the real world sees more need for a light brigade and only 1 or Zero Cavalry battle groups along with an indeterminate number of sub-units organized on an ad hoc basis into an indeterminate number of commands performing an indeterminate number of tasks for an indeterminate purpose. 

Glad somebody knows what's happening. 

Cheers,  ;D

 

[KevinB]

Kirkhill,

  I fully support your force concept - however unless the Canadian Public demands it no one is goign to pony up the cash.

Currently we barely have enough kit to outfit a Bn+ sized battlegroup - the results of this is a monsterous steep learning curve once in theatre with the kit. 

  Before I were to allocate funding or line serials for medium forces (which currently I doubt our gov't would have the fibre to deploy)  I would build up the 3 current brigades to fully kitted out Light units - with Light Armoured Support (LAV and Coyote).    The CF needs to find a niche market as it were and go from there -- Realistically with the calibre of our troops - I would recommned a Rapid Deployment Force (Light) .  Simply have a goal of being able to place a BN anywhere in the World in 48hrs and a Bde within 2 weeks.

We can leave the long dragged out Cyprus and FYR tours to the Eurpoean "rental" armies.             

 

[Infanteer]

The CF needs to find a niche market as it were and go from there -- Realistically with the calibre of our troops - I would recommned a Rapid Deployment Force (Light) .   Simply have a goal of being able to place a BN anywhere in the World in 48hrs and a Bde within 2 weeks.

I don't know if I would want to see the Forces "niche roled.   My rock-paper-scissors analogy to me indicates that we need capabilities across the spectrum in order to properly serve out the interests of the government.   However, I can see a specialization of the Regulars with other capabilities being organized in the Reserves or some sort of shared setting (kind of like the Air Defence).

I like the idea of the Rapid Deployment Force.   Gives us maximum use out of our limited assets, plus, as much as I hate to say it, the glamorous ROTO 0's do so much more in the eyes of public support for the CF then the forgotten ROTO 13s in Cypress and Bosnia.

This would mean that priority purchase number 1 would be 4-8 C-17 Globemasters and priority number 2 decent tactical helo aviation for the Army/Navy.   If that big Support boat of the Navy comes on line, then I could see initial deployment supported by Air Force C-17's with the JSS cruising in to provide more support when it can.

We can leave the long dragged out Cyprus and FYR tours to the European "rental" armies.

Ha.   Agree with you there.   Under the leadership of France and Germany, they were sure eager to stick a finger in the eye of the US to prove that they were no longer dependent on the US defending the Free World.   Let them handle their own backyard for now on.

(PS: I've introduced a proposal for a "fire-brigade" role for the CF here: http://army.ca/forums/threads/19234.15.html)

 

[KevinB]

I would consider that a NICHE BTW  ;D

 

[Kirkhill]

I could accept your plan as well Kevin.   At this juncture, some plan, any plan that we could afford and EXECUTE would be welcome and I think your plan is reasonable.

This would mean that priority purchase number 1 would be 4-8 C-17 Globemasters and priority number 2 decent tactical helo aviation for the Army/Navy.

Infanteer, while I can see your point about the C-17s I take issue with your point about TAC Hel.   TAC Hel seems to be as hard to deploy, if not harder than Heavy Armour, especially if we are talking about Cormorants, Cyclones or God forbid Chinooks.   1 Helo/AC.   A Battle Group would require, what?, 6-8 MSHs?   That's your entire lift and would take a day or two of flights.   How do you get the beans, bullets and bandages into the field at the same time? Not to mention the trendy little John Deere "Gators"?  

Alternatively you could carry three Lynx type LUHs, complete with ground support, or something like the Kiowa/LOH, or maybe a couple of Griffins.   But is that what you mean by TAC Hel?  

While I am a supporter of more helicopters for the CF, in particular the Cyclone or the Cormorant for Domestic Land Forces or for the Long Stay foreign operations, (and I support Up-Engining the Griffins to the UH-1Y standard - which would effectively double their lift capacity), I can't see Helos used in a Rapid Deployment Force.   I am assuming a Rapid Response (12-96 hours Notice To Move) over strategic distances (intercontinental) as opposed to an in-theatre Rapid Reaction Force.

IMHO?   RDF equals Air Deployable equals no TAC Hel. (At least no Troop Tpt / Air Assault type forces)
TAC Hel is for entrenched, deployed forces operating from static bases or for early entry forces operating from ships (mobile static bases if you like)

Anywho.....

Chris.

 

[KevinB]

I would like TAC heli - MH-60's ideally (failing that an Upgraded Griffon that can actually carry troops) as part of the RDF - but they can come in in the next chalks - the primarily 031 assets can seize a airhead [by para insertion in nec] and then vehicle and air assets can be flown over as space arrives - thus we could expand our operating radius.

But I think the key is to get troop on the ground ASAP - then increase mobility.  Troops many times need a few days to acclimitize anyway - so hopefully it would not be nec to conduct combat ops on deployment day.

However the inserion of a Bde sized force would likely have the resutl of hopefully stabilizing a situation - if not we are going to need the light/medium mech/motor weight forces that woudl haver to come off a RO/RO type ship.

 

[McG]

I don't know where the two (2) years of doing "Grunt Stuff" came from, but I do know that there should be a "Basic" course that all will take prior to any Trades training, be it Armour, Fire Fighter, MSE OP, AESOP, FCS Tech, LCIS Tech, Postie, whatever; that will give a basic Infantry training.  

There is such a course.   It is called the Soldier Qualification.   All Army trades do this course after graduating the Basic Military Qualification (and before trades training).

Sorry, that was my point. An Infantry Battalion now needs augmentation from Gunners, Engrs, etc just to have the capabilities that it had five years ago.

An engineer squadron has always deployed with each infantry battalion that has deployed overseas (even 12 years ago).   Force Transformation did not create this requirement.

It has often been brought up that the Battalion CO will be losing control over the mortars, pioneers, recce etc. But....... where the Battalion is the lead element in a BattleGroup deployment isn't he gaining direct control and the dedicated support of an Arty Battery as well as his mortars, a squadron of Engineers instead of his platoon of pioneers, armoured recce and fire support?

I may be dense but I fail to see how the Battle Group commander will be worse off with sub-units of other trades attached on a permanent (at least for the duration of the deployment) basis than he would be with integral sub-sub-units and having to beg for support from higher.

... if you actually exchange a mortar platoon of arty trained infanteers for an arty batter with an integral troop of mortars, all manned by gunners then I would be all for it.

Agreed, except that the engineers and artillery do not have the depth to fill all the positions formerly taken by infantry pioneers and mortars.   To do this properly, the engineers and artillery would have needed to grow by the same number of PYs that the infantry was reduced.   This did not happen.

Now as I said earlier, if the attached sub-units are made up of the same numbers that made up the sub-sub-units and just designated sub-unit commands, then I see folly.

Then folly you should see.   All DFS assets will be inserted on a sub-sub unit (or smaller) basis from the LdSH for all Canadian deployments.   Roto X of Op SOMETHING needs a TOW section?   The LdSH will provide.   Another Op needs an MGS Pl?   The LdSH will provide.   Same for ADATS/MMEV.   DFS is not the only element that will be pieced together like this.   As was already noted, the Admin Sqn will be a composite of the units from which sub-units are drawn (this too has always been the case).   A Mech Bn does not have Leopard techs (nor will it have techs for TUA, MGS, ADATS, Engr hy eqpt, etc).  

No offence the Artillery trade (I saw the light in 94 ;D) - but the only two trades that really should command Btl Gps are Inf and Armd - and historically command has gone to the unit that that has the heavy presence (which in this Roto would have been Inf).

Command of the Battle Group has been chosen that way.   The mission command has never been dependant on such things.   Op ATHENA no longer has a BG and it is the worst possible incarnation of "plug-and-play" for that reason.   The "plug-and-play" concept called for an existing Bn/Regt HQ to be augmented by supporting arms to form the BG HQ.   With no BG, all of a sudden we have a soup of various sub units (and sub-sub units) under a thrown together HQ with the selected CO coming from a staff officer job.

. . . curious here, did a rifle coy HQ deploy with the infantry platoons or did we stick to the original Ottawa plan of having platoons dedicated to specific tasks and under different leadership through the NCE and the Recce Sqn?    

 

[Scoobie Newbie]

"Agreed, except that the engineers and artillery do not have the depth to fill all the positions formerly taken by infantry pioneers and mortars.  To do this properly, the engineers and artillery would have needed to grow by the same number of PYs that the infantry was reduced.  This did not happen."

So if I read that right your saying that there is still no one manning the mortar or doing PNR specific tasks because the Artillery and Eng don't have the manpower?

 

[devil39]

"Agreed, except that the engineers and artillery do not have the depth to fill all the positions formerly taken by infantry pioneers and mortars.   To do this properly, the engineers and artillery would have needed to grow by the same number of PYs that the infantry was reduced.   This did not happen."

So if I read that right your saying that there is still no one manning the mortar or doing PNR specific tasks because the Artillery and Eng don't have the manpower?

CFL,

As an advanced mortarman, I cannot personally agree with the way we have gone.  

However, based on the frequency of Arty deployments, they can absorb the additional mortar role.  

They may not be manning the mortar full time, however as an ex R021 Artilleryman and Infantry Advanced Mortarman, there is not a whole lot of difference when it comes to providing bombs on target, be they 105 or 81mm.

Bottom line is that the Arty has the manpower, the infantry does not when one starts to spread the Army PYs around.