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Three Rifle Companies not enough. Bring back #4!

MCG said:
I'm a little surprised at the choice.   Most of our deployments are BGs to which the artillery are more than capable of providing a mortar battery and to which the engineers will provide a field squadron (and very soon the LdSH will provide a PPCLI TOW section).

I am fundamentally opposed to this hackney approach of deployments.   What is the purpose of keeping Artillery Regiments, Armoured Regiments, and CER's on paper if all you're going to do is break them up for operations.   Get rid of them as independent organization with their battalion level staff and support and subordinate them to a battle-group headquarters.

Why don't we just eliminate the Brigades as fighting formations then?

You can see where I'm going.

I guess you could hinge my opinion on the fact that I believe that Canada should still do it's best to maintain the capability for Brigade level operations.   As such, the Armoured, Engineer, and Artillery units are the Brigade commanders assets.   To eliminate them is to eliminate his "combined arms" capability.   As well, the plug-and-play method defeats the notion of the combined-arms team from top to bottom.   We are expanding the capabilities of commanders at the Company level (The Armoury Floor concept).   As well, Brigade Commanders are having their capabilities enhanced with things like ISTAR, etc, etc.   In expanding combined-arms capabilities at lower and lower levels, to strip the Infantry Battalion of its integral support assets seems foolish and backwards - we are essentially turning our infantry organizations into 19th century Rifle Brigades with nothing more then the Riflemen to use in battle; we may as well line them up in close-order to ensure maximum firepower.  

Hence, in an effort to rationalize plug-and-play, not only have we ruined our Brigade level capabilities (by farming out the support assets piecemeal), but we've also ruined our Battalion level capabilities (by removing the notion of the organic, combined-arms team at the unit level).   Thus, the Infantry Company has become the largest organization capable of presenting a dependable, cohesive and unified tactical threat (60mm, Eryx, Javelin?, C-6).   Doesn't speak much for the projection of combat power.

As well, I don't see this as a matter of "giving Battalion Commanders the same capabilities but simply with different capbadges".   The fact that these supporting assets are not organic means that the Battalion Commander never has them "on call".   What if the Brigade Commander needs his Artillery Battalion?   Shitty, looks like the Infantry are out-of-luck.   What if the Armoured Regiment needs a Engineer Troop (former Assault Troop) to clear out a defile in order to advance, but the Engineers are tasked with clearing a minefield for a coalition division or building a school or something.   Oh well, damn the torpedoes....

The plug-and-play system is not an example of "flexibility" or "maximizing skill-sets", it's simply Robbing Peter to Pay Paul (for the sake of empire protection) and a reduction in capabilities is the only thing that can come out of it.

Finally, my rationale behind preserving the Brigade stems from my notions of the evolution of the Regimental System and its effects on cohesion and familiarity.   I think A Majoor articulated the principle well with the following statement:

a_majoor said:
Each scenario will require a slightly different organizational slant. The "Fellowship of the Cav" model is ideal for mix and match organizations, with the advantages of almost unlimited flexibility, but the disadvantage of lack of corporate identity, corporate memory and unit cohesion. A "Demi Brigade" will have more utility, since there are more "boots" available for the various tasks, bigger and more capable sub units, and the component sub-units will have internal cohesion by virtue of living and working together even prior to standing up and deploying as a "demi-brigade". Cavalry Regiments on the US model are efficient all arms formations (although they also are structured to employ organic aviation and heavy elements as well). A CF "Mechanized Cavalry Brigade" will have the most flexibility due to its self contained nature, and can undertake virtually all of the patrolling, screening, flanking and rear area security tasks a Cavalry unit may be asked to perform.
 
I believe very strongly in four companies in a battalion, but to me there is no question that the vote has to go to restoring Cbt Sp Coy. In the "pre-transformation" Cbt Sp coy we had the structure that provided for an extremely capable and flexible Infantry battalion: in a pinch the Cbt Sp Coy could even be employed as a "rifle coy" substitute in some types of ops.

Since Inf is the basis of all we do, since it is the Arm most in demand in most types of ops, and since current cbt ops involving our Allies are proving beyond any doubt the need for high quality Inf and lots of it, I have to say that we have struck ourselves a body blow in gutting the Inf and farming out the jobs to other Corps, as high-sounding as the reasons given may be. If you ask me, the knife should have gone the other way, except possibly for Sappers. In the case of the Armour and the Artillery I think that we sacrificed Inf capabaility to provde job insurance to two Arms whose future and relevance in our Army was much in question, in a way that Infantry's never will be.

Under the old Cbt Sp coy we had Inf soldiers trained in all the major combat functions, but also capable of taking their place as fully-fledged Inf soldiers (and leaders). To a great extent the flexibility and capability inmparted by Cbt Sp Coy came from the fact that it tended to contain the most skilled and experienced soldiers and NCOs. They brought their understanding of Infantry operations to their roles in Cbt Sp Coy, and in turn when rotated back to the Rifle Coys they brought the skills and knowledge gained in their Sp Pl roles to the great benefit of the coy. This rotation could be repeated several times during a soldier's Regtl duty, thus strengthening the capability of the entire bn. It was an excellent system and IMHO was a directly contributing factor to the very, very high quality and experience of our RegF Inf NCO and WO: they, IMHO, had no equal in conventional Inf force anywhere incl the UK.

One of the most important aspects of the Cbt Sp Coy was that these soldiers were not "visitors" or "attachments" they were part of the battalion, every day, all day, always. You cannot underestimate the value of this. This structure was, IIRC, based on empirical evidence that in cbt ops an Inf bn needed to "own" its primary cbt functions so that the CO could be guaranteed that they would be there. I fear very much that, unless we either a) revert; or b) permanently post back sp troops from the other Branches (as we do for Maint Pl, etc) then we have lost something that was of great value on a number of levels.

Cheers.
 
Stripping a maneuver unit of the organic support required for it to fight its was forward is a big step back. Asking BDE level troops (Arty regts and Field Eng SQNs) to cover off the old organic support PL is , IMHO, a bad idea and may yet lead to a decrease in the abilt of the Artillery and Engineer units to function at their bde  level tasks....


Please note fellas that I AM NOT, in any way slagging our Gunners or Sappers, nor am I casting aspersions on the fine Regiments of the RCHA or RCE. I just wanted to point out an obvious concern. 

When the army stopped focussing on Div level ops, the requisite support units were lost...(DIV Troops)...
Now with the focus on 'plug and play' battle groups I wonder if the bde level skills will atrophy......
 
In an ideal world, with a fully funded CF and a clearly articulated defence/foreign policy that acknowledges the reality of combat operations, we should probably seek to keep the various Arms at full capability, in their discrete forms. If we had decided to equip our Armour with weapons systems that offered a true "steel fist" capability, or to equip our Artillery with more lethal and modern systems, then I would argue for keeping them at full strength, because they would be diong something that perhaps the Infantry could not.   If we were focused on formation-level operations, or if we actually had the ability to project, protect, sustain and recover formations, things would be different. But, those are not our circumstances nor are they likely to become so. IMHO we have actually turned away from that path.

In that case then, we should IMHO focus on the Arms that must be preservedat full capability in order to take part in the widest possible span of types of operations, in the most economical yet effective way, while still preserving combat power to some degree.

The capabilities resident  in a pre-Transformation Inf Bn included:

-C2;

-ISTAR through several means;

-direct fire support in several forms (over the years this has included both tube and missile systems);

-indirect fire support including coordination of arty, air and seaborne fires;

-close combat skills;

-light cbt engineering skills;

-sustainment and mobility.

Modern developments in technology, especially in the ISTAR and C2 fields, would only strengthen these capabilities further.To me this means that we preserve the Infantry (and probably the Sappers as well), while making our cuts and economies in the Armour and Artillery structures. We may have to relegate most of our "Bde-level" capabilities to the Reserve (accepting the risk that could entail) and preserve the Armour and Arty skills in the RegF in an instructional cadre only, or perhaps as MOCs (or MOSIDs) within Inf bns, intended to deliver certain skill sets in direct sp of Inf ops. (much as Sigs, EME and Med do now). Cheers.
 
A bit of a tangent to PBI's observations (and argued at length on some other threads BTW), but many of the abilities of Armour and Artillery are coming on line with the newest generation of Infantry weapons systems. Long range anti-armour weapons either exist or are ready for production which give the shooter DF fire to 8km, and some systems can fire much farther in the IF mode. There are also many variations, from weapons which need to be designated by some sort of forward observer, "smart" weapons which can seek out their own targets, and man in the loop weapons which need an operator to guide them to the target. (Look up the various systems in Janes)

Long range PGM's do not substitute for tanks or a barrage of artillery fire, but, if reintegrated into the Infantry battalion (ressurecting the TOW and Mortar Platoons as a "Fire Support Coy", for example), can expand the versatility of the Infantry Bn under most circumstances. Even in PSO's, the requirment for all weather observation at the Pl or Section level, coupled with a very robust and redundent communications system to support the use of PGMs will give the troops a greater level of situational awareness.
 
The powers that be have decided that TOW and 81mm are no longer to be in the Inf BN (I am qualified on both systems)..
Fair enough..
HERE is one of many of my ideas..
(1) Lets get ALAWS fast tracked and into service
(2) Lets get the Company area suppresion weapon into service as well

Now, once we get that kit into service we create a heavy weapons platoon in the Coy (keep C6s at rifle platoons) wich will consist of Javelin (ALAWS possibility), 50s and 40mm MK 19 plus maybe some 60mm mortars. This new weapons platoon would provide fire support up to 2 KM (not bad).. and it lets the other guys in the brigade have our former support weapons..

Also train a section worth of troops or maybe a platoon worth of troops as pioneers and they get dual tasked (pioneers and rifle platoon). During a defensive op the PNR pl can be the COY reserve or depth position and they can assist with coy obstacles and barricades.
 
I like that idea. For area denial, I would also put some serious money into this system: http://www.metalstorm.com/04_video_area_denial.html.  The mortar system is pretty much automatic, so arguments about PY's fall by the wayside, a small team can tow the firing posts into position and do the set-up, and then take turns manning the computer. Imagine an "Area Denial Section" added to the mix.
 
Here's an article that was printed in 1953 (and reprinted in The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin Vol1, No1).

Sounds like it was on the mark, except we're taking the next logical step and moving the seperate trade badges to their respective stovepipes - the wrong way to go about build tactical and operational capability.   How long will it be before maintenence platoon is detached from Brigade as well?

-----

It is 1963. The scene is Petawawa, or Calgary or Valcartier where the Royal Canadian Underground Light Infantry are drawn up on their parade ground to await the inspection of their Colonel-in-Chief (CC) who is visiting them for the first time in twenty years. The parade ground has grown dilapidated through lack of use and there are many potholes in its surface while flowers and weeds can be seen growing through the cracks in it. The potholes make the going a little bit tricky for the "old boy" and as they approach the right flank, the CO is speaking.

CO: "I must apologize for the condition of the parade ground sir, but an infantry battalion is such a highly specialized unit now that we don't get much time for drill anymore."

CC: "Yes, I daresay, my boy. In my day it was just a simple matter of grabbing the old bundook (Hindu term for firearm) and up and at 'em. But surely even today somebody's got to dig the b----s out, don't they?"

CO: "Aaaaaah....well yes I guess so, sir, though we don't have anyone who does that anymore. Now here is Battalion HQ. As you can see it is make up of chaps from various specialist corps since most of their work is of a technical nature. All the clerks are members of the RCASC (Royal Canadian Army Service Corps, which supplied clerks to most of the army prior to unification)-rank structure you know, even the Adjutant is in the newly formed Staff Corps. The RSM is about to be transferred to either Provost or the Service Corps in the near future. You see discipline is now handled almost exclusively by the Provost and since his ammunition duties in the field are merely a continuation of the RCASC supply system, the two corps are deciding who will get the vacancy to fill."

CC: "RSM in the Provost or RCASC? Never heard anything like it before in my life, especially for an infantry battalion. Who will run the other WOs and NCOs, particularly the CSMs? Fantastic!

CO: "Oh the CSMs will go to the same corps as the RSM, sir, and so will the Sergeants. The RQMS and the complete Q staff (Quartermaster staff) are in Ordnance now (The Royal Canadian Ordnance Corps, which was responsible for supply matters). You see, accounting methods became much too complex for the ordinary infantryman. As for the other NCOs..."

CC: "Remarkable, my boy. Can't get over it. Suppose it's all very necessary these days though. What about people like drivers and signallers? That always used to be a popular job in my time."

CO: "Here is HQ Company and as you can see, the Signal Platoon is all in the Royal Canadian Corps of Signals. At one time it used to be an excellent training ground for officers and NCOs of the battalion. Today it's all very difficult and the Signals have taken over the complete platoon in order to ensure proper efficiency and standardization....oooops! I am sorry sir. That was a very deep hole, wasn't it?"

CC: "Quite all right, me dear fellow. Now what about these drivers?"

CO: "I guess our infantry drivers were never very highly thought of, sir, though we liked them. In any case, all transport is in the hands of the Service Corps, the complete MT (Motor transportation) section including the Transport Officer. In fact, if you observe the various flashes you will note that there are no men from the regiment in this company anymore."

CC: "Remarkable, remarkable I say. In the old days it was often the custom to post good infantrymen to HQ Company to give them a bit of a rest from life in a slit trench. Used to get some pretty ropey cooks and drivers. I suppose, but it served its purpose well. When I was a platoon commander in the old battalion and got my promotion to Captain, I was made QM. It gave me a rest for a while and the experience served me in good stead when I commanded a battalion and brigade. I knew what was involved in the old Q racket - helped administration to no end. Intelligence Officer was another grand job. What will happen to it now?"

CO: "The task of collecting, collating and disseminating information is vastly complex and quite beyond the mental capacity of an ordinary infantry officer - so we are told. The IO and his section are members of the Intelligence Corps now. Why, a simple infantry officer has a full-time job keeping track of just one moth-eaten chinagraph pencil without having to keep all the colours. As for the QM, as I mentioned before, sir, he is in Ordnance now..."

CC: "Of course, good old Support Company - always used to be rebels in my day. Had a devil of a time getting them to dress alike and in the field they made their own regulations. A great company it was and the riflemen used to like being posted to one of the specialist platoons for a change. Pioneers wore beards then. Looked magnificent, they did".

CO: "They wore beards as recently as Korea (The Korean Conflict, 1950 - 53), sir, but we are told that the Sappers are going to take over all Pioneer Platoons so I imagine that the custom will die out. It's pretty technical work, you know."

CC: "Oh I've no doubt, but it seems a shame to see all the specialist jobs taken over...all too technical, eh? Well what abut the Mortars, anyone can drop a bomb down the old spout, can't they?"

CO: "Actually, sir, all high trajectory fire is in the hands of the Gunners today. They started to operate 4.2-inch mortars several years ago and then the business of tying up the fire plan became so difficult that the whole baby was handed over to the Artillery. The mortar platoon wear Gunner flashes now and the CO has only to deal with one person on matters of fire support - very efficient."

CC: "My goodness, man, this is incredible. (Mutters to himself). There must be an honest to goodness infanteer somewhere here. Somebody's got to dig the b----s out. Just a simple ordinary infantryman!"

CO: "Sir, war today is a very specialized matter. Why even the Anti-Tank Platoon is Armoured Corps and in view of the tracked vehicles in the Carrier Platoon, I am told they will probably take that over as well. Efficiency is the big..."

CC: "Ah yes, the alter of efficiency has seen a good many sacrifices lately. Things have changed. Gracious man, everyone is a technical wallah (an Anglo-Indian term meaning someone who is employed about or concerned with something). Somewhere there must be an ordinary infantryman in this army. Can't imagine what we're coming to at all. I..."

CO: "But, sir, today it's really a most scientific problem. In fact it's nothing less than pure pushbutton warfare..."

CC: "Push-button warfare eh? Ahhh!" (Spies a lone soldier standing on the left of the battalion wearing the traditional regimental flash RCULI). "At last a man who actually belongs to the regiment. An undoubted infanteer. Spearhead of the attack and pride of the armies! Well, my boy, what is your job in this business of so-called push-button warfare? Pushing the old bayonet, eh?"

Soldier: "No, sir, I'm the one who pushes the button."

CO: "Oooops, I am so sorry, sir, another very deep one, wasn't it?"



 
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