Three Rifle Companies not enough. Bring back #4!

[Long in the tooth]

I‘d like to add a few things that may not be direct on point here be feel need to be said. My comments are not about the Airborne, nor do I claim to have ever served in it; it‘s loss was a suck up to the PC. LCol Kenward had it squared away and it shouldn‘t have happened.
My comments are about government and military fraud in pretending that 3 coy reg force bns can routinely perform the tasks of 4 coy units. It doesn‘t take a brain surgeon to realize that a 600 man bn is not a 900 man one.
The 4 coy Bns were a blip as we went to 3 10/90 Bns in ‘93 and needed to trans those soldiers to the ‘100‘ units. Once attrition reduced them the 3 coy Bns were the norm (96/97). If you think that we have routinely had 4 Coy Bns then you have fallen for the Liberals ‘bait and switch‘ once again.

 

[Doug VT]

I think that a 4th rifle company would really be usefull in Afghanistan. There‘s a lot of work to be done. Seems we don‘t have the manpower to make 3 companies most of the time.

 

[Jason Jarvis]

I think that a 4th rifle company would really be usefull in Afghanistan. There‘s a lot of work to be done. Seems we don‘t have the manpower to make 3 companies most of the time.

Is this why 2 PPCLI had to send most of a company over to help 3 PPCLI? I wondered what had happened but didn‘t want to believe that NDHQ had sent such an understrength unit into combat.... Silly me!

 

[Infanteer]

That Rifle Company that 2 PPCLI sent was to give the 3rd Battalion a third rifle company, not a fourth. All three battalions of the PPCLI are undermanned.

 

[Long in the tooth]

You‘re quite right about one Bn always having to send (at least) a company to another that‘s deploying. That only compensates for manning shortfalls, not for individuals who are unable to deploy. I knew one soldier who did three deployments in two years! It should not have been allowed, as he quit out of sheer fatigue, not because he didn‘t like the job.
In 1990 we had a brigade group in Germany, and although it only had two Inf Bns instead of three, they were fully up to strength with four coys and double TOW and mortar platoons. No soldier could leave Germany without his replacement being on the ground; this resulted in Bns of 920 troops whereas the ones in Canada had 600. When Gulf War 1 took place 4 CMBG was a fully manned and equipped force in theatre and commitment a valid option.
When we left Germany the Inf actually fared well. Other than the 10/90 blip, they maintained 3 Bns/Regt, although at less strength. The artillery lost a whole Regiment (Bn) when 1 RCHA was moved to Shilo and 3 RCHA disbanded. 1 RCHA also lost a Battery (Coy), dropping down to 3 Btys. 700 Arty guys started to look for a new career that year. On the armoured side, 8 CH went mostly 10/90 and remained that way, leaving three Regiments (Bns) in the Corp (LdSH, 12 RBC, RCD).
Another example of the Liberal ‘Bait and Switch‘, claiming that the troops are just returning to Canada, and then cutting to the bone.
Or maybe I‘m just cynical.

 

[Andrew_Power]

i think my uncle was in the airborne for a bit but some lucky way he got out...perhaps when it disbanded (which was when?)he got out of school and went into the army then into university.
or so my relitives are telling me i havent really asked my uncle about it

 

[Danjanou]

Long in the Tooth,

Nice to know that 4CMBG, Inf Bns were up to strength in the 1990‘s because they weren‘t 10 years earlier.

In 1980 both 3RCR and the 1 R22eR had only 3 rifle companies with the 4th flown over for REFORGER from one of the Canada based Bns.

Even the 3 line companies and the various support platoons (ADP, mortar etc) were understrength with 50-100 reservists flown over to make up the numbers for REFORGER.

 

[Long in the tooth]

Danjanou - obviously you‘ve got first hand info as well, and I don‘t claim to be omniscient. But from what I saw and heard from others who were there, an attempt was made by Conservative Defence Minister Eric Nielson to bolster 4 CMBG (perhaps at the behest of Ronald Reagen). As you state, units are always short for many reasons, which I agree with. But we are now robbing Peter to pay Paul and accepting it as standard business practice (shades of Enron!).

 

[Danjanou]

Centre mass hit there Long in the Tooth. Actually I was looking for something to read tonight and for some reason pulled my copy of Tarnished Brass off of the shelf to flip through. (probably end up reviewing it here sometime)

I just finished the section on Telfon Bob. When Mulroney‘s PC‘s came to power and stated they were going to toss out all of Trudeau‘s senior civil servents, old Fowler suddenly became a Hawk to save his six fugure salary.

The PC‘s actually under Perrin Beatty as Defence Minister started to boost military spending and manning levels (remember their white paper and the 12 nuclear subs planned) and that included beefing 4CMBG back up to strength. Guess who did all the paper pushing to make it happen?

I guess it lasted until the end of the Cold War and Papa Jean coming to power and now we‘re back where we started or actually worse with 3 under strength Brigades instead of 4.

 

[Steel Badger]

What disturbs me even more is that after the 4th COY was reduced to nil str in each Bn, Support COY had MOR and Pioneer PL's stripped out.

(I could see a 3 rifle coy Bn if Canada deployed Regiments on the European model....IE: 2-3 battalions at 3 Rifle and 1 support coy plus RHQ and a Regimental Support unit......)

Maybe I'm wrong, but it appears that the "older and wiser heids" have decided that as we can no longer field brigades...We may as well remove those resources from the infantry battalions that allowed them to fight their way forward.

IE: The RCA covering mortars, and the RCE (Sorry for the Anachronistic Title) covering the PNR Pl. Misallocation of pers trained in BDE support roles?
It seems the focus has down shifted from fielding Brigades to ad-hoc battalion sized groups using the Battle Group concept as a cover.
Funding driven vice functional orbats.

Am I mad?

 

[pbi]

When we (1PP) completed our tour in Croatia in 94, one of the strongest points we made in our POR submission was that a battalion absolutely needed four rifle companies, in all types of ops, not just warfighting. On Op HARMONY we held a very lengthy bn gp AO with only three coys (and no Armour or Arty). Of these, only two could actually be on the line, in order to give the CO a capable reserve (a vital asset in ops like that with their many unforseen incidents that require rapid intervention or show of force.) As well, our mission statement was not to "observe and report": it was to defend the Zone of Separation against military incursion, while also securing the UNPA (the Krijena) . As the Croat Op STORM the following year showed, the battalion was far too weak and too thinly spread to offer a real deterrent.

IMHO a three rifle coy battal;ion simply lacks the meat to do the job. Constituting any kind of robust reserve is difficult: even more difficult now that most of Cbt Sp coy has been gutted. If modern war (real modern war, the kind actually being fought right now, not the kind on the pages of glossy magazines...) has shown us any one thing beyond question, it is the need for lots of high quality infantry. Cheers.

 

[a_majoor]

I recall being at the conference when Gen Jeffreys announced the removal of Cbt Support from the Infantry Bn's. The rational was to free up PYs for "new" positions like the ISTAR CC  and other command and control functions required for RMA enabled manoeuvre warfare.

Unfortunately, the new field force will have the ability to "see" everything, but little ability to do anything about it. Someone driving a truck bomb into the high speed field HQ will disconnect everything in the force, with all that implies. Smarter people than I will need to develop an organizational model which is supple, has low latency and does not consume a huge amount of resources, while others need to educate the public why we need more boots on the ground to fill those slots.

 

[Steel Badger]

Ahhh...the sacrifice of operational ability to PY / budgetary concerns brings tears to my eyes.

I'm sure there are adequate funds locked away in a redundancy of  CF postions and holdings outside the Sharp end units to fund more troops.


That Hellyer has a lot to answer for.

 

[a_majoor]

It is easy to blame politicians, but don't forget how they got there in the first place! Educate the voters first, then our job will be easier.

 

[McG]

From the Infantry perspective, which was the greater loss: the fourth rifle coy or the combined loss of the mortars, pioneers, and anti-armour?

 

[Canadian.Trucker]

Will the new 5,000 that PM Martin said fill these roles?  I know the CO of CFRG HQ in Borden mentioned to us that when I was in CFRC Ottawa in October they still did not know what role the new front line troops would fill.  Would the push be for Infantry, or what?  And would the new troops fill up with positions that are vacant or would they add to the existing regiments by switching battalions to active duty such as 4 RCR?  Perhaps this is meant to fill what we are lacking.  Get us up to full strength within the existing Bn's and Coy's and go from there.

I may be swallowing the pill too fast on this one, but there has to be a bit of hope still somewhere.

 

[Infanteer]

From the Infantry perspective, which was the greater loss: the fourth rifle coy or the combined loss of the mortars, pioneers, and anti-armour?

In my opinion (for whatever it's worth) losing the integral support was by far a bigger blow.   Many military forces have utilized a 3+1 formula (3 maneuver, 1 support) to great success.   I look at the TO&E's of US battalions and they only have 3 rifle companies.   As well, Companies get along with 3 Platoons while Regiments/Brigades get along with 3 battalions of Infantry.

Sure, the fourth company can dramatically add to the options and flexibility of a Battalion Commander (PBI's anecdote is a good example).   You could probably make a good case to support the idea that one overstrength Battalion (4 coys, 100% manning) would be more effective then 2 understrength ones (3 coys each, 75% manning).   However, I would advocate getting a fourth company as a lower end priority for the Infantry right now.

Three company or four doesn't drastically change the capabilities of an Infantry Battalion - extra "boots-on-the-ground" can only go so far in providing an additional threat to a well-prepared enemy.   However, when a CO doesn't have his organic support - whether it be his indirect fire support and assault/mobility assets available for a "hardened target" or his Anti-Armour assets on hand to deal with an immediate heavier threat, there is a big problem.   Three companies or four companies may just sit in the mud and plug away at the bad guy (or worse, just "go over the top" of the trenchline) for lack of their own support.   If any of you haven't, read English and Gudmunddson's On Infantry. you'll see that the most successful Infantry organizations and doctrine at any level were those that were able to most effectively utilize a combined arms approach to the tactical battle.

Without the support assets, the Battalion Commander is simply unable to exercise a combined arms approach at his level of the tactical battle (threats posed in a way that makes an enemy vulnerable to one if he deals with the other).   We've been giving company commanders access to "the Armoury" floor for his coy support and we arm a Brigade Commander with a combined arms team, so why strip the battalion commander of this essential capability?

I remember hearing a rumor that the Brigade was going to take some aspect (or all?) of the duties of the Battalion Recce Platoon and stick in into a Brigade ISTAR function.   IMHO, if this happens, it will spell the end of the Battalion as an independent unit of action - which in this day in age is the completely wrong way to go about things (as for why, see my "Downward Diffusion of Combined Arms" thread).

Anyways, I'll get off my soapbox now....

Infanteer

 

[MCpl Burtoo]

Yes a 4th Coy would be nice , but when you can't even man the 3 Coy's that you have now (5 if you want to include Cbt Sp and Adm Coy).....I think if we had our Cbt Sp Coy back up to strength that would be the best option. As it stands now Cbt Sp Coy is mostly Sigs. Yes Recce is part of it along with Ops, MP/RPs and 9er Tac....but when it use to have Tow, Mortars and Pnrs it was a huge Coy. We are but a shadow of ourself.
It all points to the NEW ArmyTransformation...........................................................................................
.........http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/LF/English/6_1_1.asp?FlashEnabled=-1&id=216

I can remember in 2PPCLI back in the late 90s we tried to have a 4th Coy (Delta) for a while and it turned into a dumping ground for sick/lame and lazy....got a bad name . Not that all the soldiers were this...but they got painted with this brush. Adding that 4th Coy didn't do anything except allow another Officer (or Officers if you include Pl Comds) to get his ticket punched....none of the Coy's were at full strength (might have had 2 full Platoons). I think the writing is on the wall and we have go kicking and screaming (if we don't like it) along with the way of the AMRY TRANSFORMATION.....we may not all like it, but change is all part of life! Think back to unification (my father is still pissed over that) or the old dogs who had to go from a C1 to a C7......if you spend your career in the military....I am sure this will not be the end of change....I would bet on it!!!....I know that most have this has been said...but this is just my 2 cents worth............

 

[a_majoor]

In my opinion (for whatever it's worth) losing the integral support was by far a bigger blow.   Many military forces have utilized a 3+1 formula (3 maneuver, 1 support) to great success.   I look at the TO&E's of US battalions and they only have 3 rifle companies.   As well, Companies get along with 3 Platoons while Regiments/Brigades get along with 3 battalions of Infantry.

It really depends on what you have to do. 3+1 is the traditional warfighting battalion, with lots of organic firepower and support. This was flexible enough to convert quickly to a low threat peacekeeping/PSO type operation (i.e. Cbt Support Coy downs tools and acts as a rifle coy)

I once raised an idea in a conference that formed Reserve platoons be rotated through the Regular Force Infantry Battalions, not just as CRIP/CRIC formations attached for an operation, but on an annual basis. The platoons would fill out the companies at a ratio of one CRIP/coy, requiring only a small pull on the Regular battalion (drivers, gunner for LAV units, a few SNCO's for mentoring) allowing them to deploy without having to "scrounge" another company from another battalion, and equally important, they would provide a core of trained soldiers in the parent Reserve units at the end of their contracts to improve the knowledge base and level of training in the Reserve. After a few years, it would become possible to raise "Special Service Force" battalions from the pools of trained reservists to backfill the Army, even if the SSF Bn only stands up in Canada to cover IRU and DOMOPS tasks while the Regular Battalion goes on OP.

I agree with Infanteer and most of the others that the Regular PYs should go back to reestablishing the Combat Support Coy within the battalion, as these skills and abilities are often the difference between success and failure.

 

[McG]

In my opinion (for whatever it's worth) losing the integral support was by far a bigger blow.

I think if we had our Cbt Sp Coy back up to strength that would be the best option.

I agree with Infanteer and most of the others that the Regular PYs should go back to reestablishing the Combat Support Coy within the battalion, as these skills and abilities are often the difference between success and failure.

I'm a little surprised at the choice.   Most of our deployments are BGs to which the artillery are more than capable of providing a mortar battery and to which the engineers will provide a field squadron (and very soon the LdSH will provide a PPCLI TOW section).