The State of Army Doctrine

[pbi]

:goodpost:

... a baseline for common understanding but not a ready-made structure for our templating by the enemy.

I would add, regarding the ME, It definitely makes sense to identify the task and unit/sub-unit; but at the very least the actual task for situations where you have a unit with a task of 'Follow and Assume/Support'

Yes. In the end , it's about clarity of communication and shared understanding. There's nothing to say that one force element couldn't be the ME throughout, in all its major tasks, but I think this could get confusing and would risk diluting the meaning of ME. You could also say that the ME is just a "Something" and not specify a "Somebody" (I guess...) but that could result in the ME either never being achieved, or a mass "convergence" on trying to achieve the ME.

As usual, there is no replacement for the human factors: a bunch of skilled commanders who know each other, have worked together, led by a commander who understands and trusts them all, but sets clear guidance. Wargame and ROC drill are also (IMHO) vital to ensure a common grasp of ME.

 

[Kat Stevens]

So many buzzwords and AcRoNyms... I miss the days when DOCTRINE was whatever the f*ck my section commander told me it was.

 

[daftandbarmy]

So many buzzwords and AcRoNyms... I miss the days when DOCTRINE was whatever the **** my section commander told me it was.

Agreed!

Luckily, he's been immortalized on You Tube  ;D

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3pzxb2sxbDU

 

[a_majoor]

Doctrine needs to be more than buzzwords, or even a well written document. It should accuratly reflect the "culture" of the organization that uses it as well.

We use "Manouevre Warfare" doctrine in theory, but despite mountains of .ppt slides saying so, the organizational culture runs towards massive headquarters to "command" diminutive field forces and total fear of failure; resulting in micromanagement and a very "Directive Command" structure being in place and used in actuality.

There are very good reasons to use "Manouvre Warfare", including the need for highly dispersed force structures, adaptation to local conditions and the sheer impossibility of running complex operations from the top in "real time" due to the "Local Knowledge Problem", but if it is "culturally impossible" to use, then it is only a series of nice graphics and slides.

 

[daftandbarmy]

We use "Manouevre Warfare" doctrine in theory, but despite mountains of .ppt slides saying so, the organizational culture runs towards massive headquarters to "command" diminutive field forces and total fear of failure; resulting in micromanagement and a very "Directive Command" structure being in place and used in actuality.

I would argue that this ridiculously self-defeating 'fail safe' approach has resulted from us being too closely associated with a US military that is paranoid about being called on the carpet by a fussy, hopelessly parochial Congress and Senate.

I think we should swing back to aligning our world view and general approach to that of the British. They've got their problems, for sure, but I was never micromanaged to the extent I see and hear from the US (and now by extension Canadian) experience, especially when my job involved being at the sharp end of taking out bad guys.

And besides, if we're putting the pips and crowns back on....

http://www.army.mod.uk/documents/general/v_s_of_the_british_army.pdf

 

[Edward Campbell]

You might want to consider the very real differences in British versus continental/US views of command and staff relationships.

The British came from a maritime strategy and a colonial empire that, of necessity, empowered local commandeers and devalued HQ staffs in London. The result was a C2 philosophy that said ~ still says? ~ commanders decide and order while staffs manage and facilitate.

One emblem of the British and, formerly, Canadian Army staff structure was that the most senior staff officer in any HQ, including AHQ in Ottawa, was never, under any circumstances, senior in rank to the principle subordinate commanders and, generally, was lower in rank.

(Thus, while Gen Harry Crerar, commanding 1st Canadian Army in Europe in 1944/45 was a four star general, LGen John Murchie was in Ottawa as Chief of the General Staff, the professional head of the Canadian Army and the officer responsible to manage the Army in war, all over the world. That was how it should have been. The Royal Canadian navy got it all back-asswards in that war: while the most senior officer with a sea command was the estimable RAdm Leonard Murray ~ the only Canadian to command an allied theatre of war ~ the Chief of the Naval Staff in Ottawa, VAdm Percy Nelles, who should have been in a supporting role, was in fact senior in rank and used his rank to interfere with Murray's command. Fortunately, in early 1944, he was posted to a largely administrative (almost ceremonial) job in London with no authority over naval matters and was promoted to Adm to keep him quiet.)

The point of the former Canadian Army system was that there was absolute clarity about the chain of command, while able staff officers are allowed to shine by demonstrating their expert military and management skills in a vital supporting role. This was not how Napoleon or Clausewitz/Jomini and the Americans saw things: they had a far different tradition, one in which central command and control was useful, perhaps even desirable ... perhaps.

Personally, I think one of the major flaws in the continental/US system is that it allows for the institutionalization of erroneous doctrine and bad leadership and management. I think Marshall and Eisenhower managed and commanded so well because, principally, George Marshal was a genius, on several levels, and Dwight Eisenhower was an extraordinarily able man, again on many levels. But I think the system is more likely to produce Ferdinand Foch, Maxwell Taylor, William Westmorland and Wilhelm Keitel. The British notion of C2 did produce some dunces, but not, I think, as consistently as does the continental/US C2 philosophy.

 

[quadrapiper]

The British notion of C2 did produce some dunces, but not, I think, as consistently as does the continental/US C2 philosophy.

Could that be in part due to a system that may have forced the dunces into independent action much earlier in their careers, encouraging a filtering of those unsuited for command somewhere around Captain-Maj or Lt-LCdr, and polishing the command skills of the good ones at an earlier stage?

 

[Edward Campbell]

Could that be in part due to a system that may have forced the dunces into independent action much earlier in their careers, encouraging a filtering of those unsuited for command somewhere around Captain-Maj or Lt-LCdr, and polishing the command skills of the good ones at an earlier stage?

That's certainly possible. I'm guessing that was the Royal Navy's idea back in the age of sail. That service appears to have valued and rewarded independence of thought and action ~ within the limits imposed by some pretty general orders ~ and punished caution (consider the unfortunate Admiral Byng after the Battle of Minorca) and according to some historians (see e.g. Nicholas Rodger's The Command of the Ocean : a Naval History of Britain, Volume 2, 1649-1815 (2004)) it (Byng's execution) was responsible, in some large measure, for the very real aggressiveness of Royal Navy captains and admirals.

Perhaps, in the same era, colonial service ~ which also frequently put an officer far, far away from political control ~ exercised the same function for the British Army.

As far as I can tell the idea of a clear chain of command, with smallish, quite low ranking staffs was common in the East India Company's army in the 18th century as well as in the British Army proper. Of course, real staffs didn't appear until after there Napoleonic wars and British staff work was not famous for its quality in either Crimea or South Africa. It appears, to me, to have improved somewhat in 1914-18 ~ see, especially, the excellent (largely British) staff of 1st Canadian Corps who under LGen (later FM) Byng planned and executed, inter alia, Vimy Ridge and which included e.g. then LCol (also latter FM) Alan Brooke. Staff work seems to have gotten a lot better in 1939-45 and after, based, largely, I assume on lessons learned in 1914-18 and in subsequent colonial skirmishes. In any event, by the time I saw it, I concluded, based on observation of several armies, that British and Canadian Army tactical staffs (brigade through corps) were smaller in number, lower in rank and markedly better in doing what staffs need to do (supporting their commander in the functions of command, by controlling and looking after details, and helping subordinate commanders to execute their tasks, by managing resources, including time).

One marked difference between British and Canadian staffs, on one hand, and American, French and German staffs, on there other, was that relatively few officers in the British/Canadian system were tied to their commanders, while one often saw commandeers and several principle staff officers move from one command to the other in the latter cases. That's a bad practice because it encourages "yes men" and deprives an incoming commander of some needed institutional knowledge.

 

[daftandbarmy]

You might want to consider the very real differences in British versus continental/US views of command and staff relationships.

The British came from a maritime strategy and a colonial empire that, of necessity, empowered local commandeers and devalued HQ staffs in London. The result was a C2 philosophy that said ~ still says? ~ commanders decide and order while staffs manage and facilitate.

One emblem of the British and, formerly, Canadian Army staff structure was that the most senior staff officer in any HQ, including AHQ in Ottawa, was never, under any circumstances, senior in rank to the principle subordinate commanders and, generally, was lower in rank.

(Thus, while Gen Harry Crerar, commanding 1st Canadian Army in Europe in 1944/45 was a four star general, LGen John Murchie was in Ottawa as Chief of the General Staff, the professional head of the Canadian Army and the officer responsible to manage the Army in war, all over the world. That was how it should have been. The Royal Canadian navy got it all back-asswards in that war: while the most senior officer with a sea command was the estimable RAdm Leonard Murray ~ the only Canadian to command an allied theatre of war ~ the Chief of the Naval Staff in Ottawa, VAdm Percy Nelles, who should have been in a supporting role, was in fact senior in rank and used his rank to interfere with Murray's command. Fortunately, in early 1944, he was posted to a largely administrative (almost ceremonial) job in London with no authority over naval matters and was promoted to Adm to keep him quiet.)

The point of the former Canadian Army system was that there was absolute clarity about the chain of command, while able staff officers are allowed to shine by demonstrating their expert military and management skills in a vital supporting role. This was not how Napoleon or Clausewitz/Jomini and the Americans saw things: they had a far different tradition, one in which central command and control was useful, perhaps even desirable ... perhaps.

Personally, I think one of the major flaws in the continental/US system is that it allows for the institutionalization of erroneous doctrine and bad leadership and management. I think Marshall and Eisenhower managed and commanded so well because, principally, George Marshal was a genius, on several levels, and Dwight Eisenhower was an extraordinarily able man, again on many levels. But I think the system is more likely to produce Ferdinand Foch, Maxwell Taylor, William Westmorland and Wilhelm Keitel. The British notion of C2 did produce some dunces, but not, I think, as consistently as does the continental/US C2 philosophy.

Excellent synopsis, thanks!

I have been fascinated (and horrified) to watch LCol COs and LCol COS's play the 'big balls in cowtown' game. Unfortunately, we seem to have set up our most senior Staff Officer (at Bde level anyways) as a de facto A/Bde Comd.

This can work fine where the personality of the incumbent suits the situation. Where this is not the case, everyone suffers.

 

[pbi]

Excellent synopsis, thanks!

I have been fascinated (and horrified) to watch LCol COs and LCol COS's play the 'big balls in cowtown' game. Unfortunately, we seem to have set up our most senior Staff Officer (at Bde level anyways) as a de facto A/Bde Comd.

This can work fine where the personality of the incumbent suits the situation. Where this is not the case, everyone suffers.

Then if this isn't what the Comd wants, the Comd needs to change it. If it was what he wants, the CO's will have to suck it up.

Personally, I think the CF normally reduces the COS to little more than a glorified office manager. I'm much more a fan of the old German Army system, that saw the Comd and the COS as two inseparable parts of the command team. The Comd retained ultimate authority and bore the responsibility for success or failure, but IMHO the system made best use of human material. And, lets not forget, we are talking about some pretty strong Prussian command personalities here: not shrinking violets defaulting their jobs to the COS.

The COS should never obstruct the CO/Comd relationship, but he can certainly help to foster it. By putting an experienced officer in as COS, one who complements the Comd, it gives both the Comd and the CO's a "foil". The COS, if he has the wherewithal, can take a CO aside before he blunders into the Comd's office, and offer something like this:

"Y'know, John, before you run headlong into the Boss with that issue, here's a couple of things you might want to think about".

He can also say (again, relationship dependent):

"Actually, Comd, that might not be a very good idea. LCol Bloggins will object violently to that because XYZ. Perhaps....."

I remember the severe discomfort in the Army when the idea of Bde COS was brought up, in an Army that for some reason felt that Bde was the only level of comd that didn't require a 2IC to help out the Boss. I suspect a big part of it was people's own insecurities.

 

[daftandbarmy]

I remember the severe discomfort in the Army when the idea of Bde COS was brought up, in an Army that for some reason felt that Bde was the only level of comd that didn't require a 2IC to help out the Boss. I suspect a big part of it was people's own insecurities.

Why have an organization so large and complex that you need another very senior guy to help run it?

We've got a huge Bde overhead these days. At last count there were 9 'G' shops in ours. Do we really need that amount of (resource sucking) brass at Bde level?

 

[Infanteer]

Personally, I think the CF normally reduces the COS to little more than a glorified office manager. I'm much more a fan of the old German Army system, that saw the Comd and the COS as two inseparable parts of the command team. The Comd retained ultimate authority and bore the responsibility for success or failure, but IMHO the system made best use of human material. And, lets not forget, we are talking about some pretty strong Prussian command personalities here: not shrinking violets defaulting their jobs to the COS.

That is the Prusso-German model, one that would be very hard to implement due to our institutional genetics.  In the Prusso-German model, the line between command and staff was blurred, with the COS acting almost as a co-commander.  In our Commonwealth heritage, command and staff are distinct, and it'd be very difficult in my view to graft something like this on considering the cultural conventions that led to this development.

As for COSs in general the very existence in our Commonwealth history is what I call the "Montgomery School" - Monty was the first senior British Commander to start to utilize a COS (de Guingand) and brought him from 8th Army to 21st Army Group as the COS.  Since the Monty School was created, it's grown (in conjunction with our adoption, through osmosis, of the Continental Staff system) within the Commonwealth through a very ad hoc manner.

The other school, which I call the Slim School (after FM Slim, who discusses the idea in Defeat...) is the traditional British model of no COS.  Rather, staff is segemented into G (Ops), A (Pers) and Q (Log) departments, with A&Q being combined at most levels.  The senior G and the senior A/Q officer each speak directly to the Comd; generally, the senior G is considered primer inter pares, but they are both of the same rank.

I'm of the latter school - chiefs of staff are a needless appendage if we use the effective G, A and Q structure.  What's more, when the COS model is combined with the Continental model we've adopted, it leads to rank inflation.  A LCol Chief of Staff and bureaus headed by Majors (generally 7-10 of them) does what 2 Majors once accomplished.  The working rank of the Bde staff has shifted up from Captain to Major.  The same thing has occured at every echelon of command.

I remember the severe discomfort in the Army when the idea of Bde COS was brought up, in an Army that for some reason felt that Bde was the only level of comd that didn't require a 2IC to help out the Boss. I suspect a big part of it was people's own insecurities.

I've spoken to the COS above, but the idea of the 2IC is interesting.  at the sub-unit and unit levels, they have real tactical roles as Coy and Bn commander can easily become casualties and/or Rear Parties/LOB are always required.  However, the formation level is different.  Field Marshal Lord Carver made an interesting observation in an old edition of the British Army Review:

Above all, deputy commanders must be avoided.  Nothing must get between the commander and his chief of staff.  I have served under US Armoured Divisions where there were deputy commanders.  They were either miserable or a nuisance, or both.  They were introduced into our armoured brigades after Operations CRUSADER in the desert in November 1941, on the grounds that it was needed to allow the commander to get some sleep.  They did not prove necessary and became a haven for promoted COs of armoured car regiments.  I found an elderly cavalry colonel installed as one when I took over command of 4th Armoured Brigade in the middle of a battle in Normandy, its previous commander having been killed.  Sensibly the colonel had not attempted to exercise operational command, but left it to the senior CO.  He left very soon afterwards to sighs of relief from all, including himself.

The Field Marshal's views are certainly coloured by his own experience and the way Deputies were appointed, but I think it highlights the thinking between the Commonwealth principle of formations selecting alternate commanders from subordinates instead of having a Deputy.

 

[PPCLI Guy]

Personally, I think the CF normally reduces the COS to little more than a glorified office manager. I'm much more a fan of the old German Army system, that saw the Comd and the COS as two inseparable parts of the command team. The Comd retained ultimate authority and bore the responsibility for success or failure, but IMHO the system made best use of human material. And, lets not forget, we are talking about some pretty strong Prussian command personalities here: not shrinking violets defaulting their jobs to the COS.

I have been in a number of jobs where I have been able to closely observe the realtionship between a Comd and his COS.  I have seen good, bad, and indifferent approaches.  The highlights were both with Engr Comds who had real Combat Arms  > Chiefs of Staff.  Their approach was that they would command the organisation, and the COS would run it.  This empowered the COS to get on with the day to day nausea, while allowing Comds freedom to get out there and command.  COs would influence things the way they are meant to - straight to the Comd, unless it was to their advantage to use the COS as a conduit.

 

[little jim]

Their approach was that they would command the organisation, and the COS would run it.  This empowered the COS to get on with the day to day nausea, while allowing Comds freedom to get out there and command.  COs would influence things the way they are meant to - straight to the Comd, unless it was to their advantage to use the COS as a conduit.

I have observed occasions where it is extremely effective to have the COS running what the CG Commands; commanders cannot command sitting behind a desk.  Even with technology in the US at the Division level the CG is in his jump most of the time, or our doing battle field circulation so the COS is a bit of a constant.  This has to be a very well discussed and almost formal arrangement as when the Boss is out and the staff is speaking on his behalf they might be caught unaware of decisions made out in the field at the commander to commander level.  This perhaps is one of the factors when senior US commander’s pick their team.  It allows them to have people whom they trust and more importantly know how they think.  I have witnessed this with a Division Commander bring the officer who was his S3 at the brigade level as his Div G3.  I cannot count how many times the G3 was able to predict and convey to the subordinate commanders on how the CG was likely to go on various issues.

Another thing the COS gives you at the division level is a bit of an informal mentor.  I know the DCG’s are the formal mentors for the brigade commanders but the COS as a post command Colonel also gives that near-peer person that the brigade commanders can call and bounce ideas off of. 

With respect to the issue of deputies at both staff and command level I have observed that it allows for an escalation of force almost for issues.  A brigade DCO can call the deputy G3 or DCOS in order to sound out how an idea from a subordinate commander might be viewed by the higher commander before bringing it up.  This seems to be a bit more of a trust issue as at times as the staff will have knowledge of discussions that took place and be able to provide some advice.  I have witnessed this go horribly wrong with a sub-ordinate brigade commander who unfortunately decided that the ‘well your staff feel the same way’ was his best course of action over a command decision.  The staff need to acknowledge that what is part of their day-to-day discussion is almost never visible to subordinate formations. 

At brigade level I would suggest that if the COS is a pre-Command LCol then his lanes are more defined in terms of his interaction with the subordinate commanders, almost akin to the relationship in a battalion with a pre-Command Major as the Ops O with the Company Commanders.  It is interesting to watch a commander who understands when he should go to the staff and when he can go straight to the higher commander.  This can be witness almost daily in Canada at the company levels when the platoon commanders go to either the 2IC or the OC.

At the brigade level the US has started to fill their DCO positions with a pre-command LTC and their brigade XO’s remain a Major.  I would be interested to hear what one of our Australian brothers would chime in on their Brigade Major vice COS.

 

[pbi]

I think that the idea of having a Bde Maj alone, or having the G3 act as the primus inter pares or de facto COS (as it was when I joined) both belong to a day when the Bde was a lesser manouevre element of a Division, and probably not expected to do much more than organize its bit of the Div plan. Independent or autonomous operations by bdes were not as well accepted as I think they are today.

IMHO, the last decade of operations, both our own in Afgh, and those of the US in both OIF and OEF, have created a different expectation of what a Bde-sized force (regardles of what it may be called) can and should be expected to do. This was probably exemplified by the US Army shift to a "Bde-based" force, where the Div becomes much more of a framework for employing various mixes of Bdes to do specific things. This requires some more meat in the Bde C2 structure. 

Now, I think you could probably get by with just a DComd OR just a COS: both may not be necessary, but I think the better bet is to have both. They are actually best employed to do two different things. The COS will probably be totally consumed acting as the ringmaster for the staff, while the DComd gives the Comd not only a better chance for R&R, but a senior commander who is not tied to job of commanding a battalion, who can assist the Comd in all sorts of ways.

Admittedly, it is more of a US or Continental idea to have a Bde DComd, and not a British one, but those are actually irrelevant considerations. What matters more, IMHO, is what is needed to make things work, not whose idea it is. And, don't forget, that up until around the late 1980's (IIRC) we did have Bde DComds, usually employed as Base Comds.

 

[dapaterson]

Perhaps in the interest of "getting it right" Canada should cease farting around with Bde and Div structures, and instead ask the key question: Why, with a Reg F trained strength of 55K (+/-), was the sustainment of a mere battlegroup all but impossible?

Doctrinal arguments over Bde / Div, and tactical / operational (if such a level exists) / strategic are all moot when a G8 nation is unable to sustain 2K troops in the field.

 

[Infanteer]

I think that the idea of having a Bde Maj alone, or having the G3 act as the primus inter pares or de facto COS (as it was when I joined) both belong to a day when the Bde was a lesser manoeuvre element of a Division, and probably not expected to do much more than organize its bit of the Div plan. Independent or autonomous operations by bdes were not as well accepted as I think they are today.

IMHO, the last decade of operations, both our own in Afgh, and those of the US in both OIF and OEF, have created a different expectation of what a Bde-sized force (regardles of what it may be called) can and should be expected to do. This was probably exemplified by the US Army shift to a "Bde-based" force, where the Div becomes much more of a framework for employing various mixes of Bdes to do specific things. This requires some more meat in the Bde C2 structure. 

Now, I think you could probably get by with just a DComd OR just a COS: both may not be necessary, but I think the better bet is to have both. They are actually best employed to do two different things. The COS will probably be totally consumed acting as the ringmaster for the staff, while the DComd gives the Comd not only a better chance for R&R, but a senior commander who is not tied to job of commanding a battalion, who can assist the Comd in all sorts of ways.

This briefs well, but your argument suffers from some leaps in logic.  Arguing that higher ranking and more staff is required as brigades do more and do it independently these days is fallacious.  What vast difference exists between issuing commands to 3-5 subordinates in 1944 and issuing commands to 3-5 subordinates now?  Was 2 Cdn Inf Bde's task to fight three battalions plus tanks and engineers through Ortona any less complicated than the First Marine Regiments push into Fallujah in 2004?  Probably not, considering the Germans of 1944 had far greater combat power than insurgents in Iraq.  Both commanders (a) took orders from a boss and (b) gave orders to subordinate battalion commanders.  How come one needed 2-3 times the staff?

Yes, some staff functions have devolved downward (e.g. fire planning was largely a divisional responsibility in 1944 while air coordination rested at Corps level), but the downward movement of these capabilities has come with things like the FSCC and the TACP.  Nothing in this tells me that the downward migration of these functions - meaning the expansion of the G (Ops) function - requires a senior ranking officer to stand over the shoulders of the BM/G3 or umpire his talks with the Sustainment guy.  More horsepower IN ops to coordinate?  Sure.  More horsepower ON TOP OF ops to coordinate?  Nope.

What's more, if brigades do more, do divisions do less?  How come there has been parallel growth, if not more growth at high echelons.  Divisional staffs, led by 2 LCols and a staff of just over 20 inflated to about 90 pers by the 1980s.  If we're arguing that Brigades shoulder more of the load, why have divisions grown and inflated by almost 5 x?

As to bringing more to the staff, the substantive difference between a COS and a G3 in a modern Brigade, once you take away individual characteristics, is close to nil - both are post-Toronto Combat Arms officers that have not commanded a battalion.  Often, the only difference is a year of seniority.  So, there is generally minimal experiential difference between a COS and a G3; hence a "ringmaster" doesn't really bring much to the fight except another layer of staff and signatures and briefings (the G3s job is to ringmaster things anyways).

Finally, having a DComd to act as an "assistant" is some pretty high priced help that was never required (as per Carver's remarks) back when Bde commanders can and did become battlefield casualties.  Often, I've seen the idea of more people (COS, DComds) between the subordinate and superior commander (at any echelon) to be as much of a hindrance as a boon - these folks can often interpose themselves into the chain of command, or the subordinate commanders will often defer to talking to their boss and go to a staff guy/Dep.  The strongest relationships I've seen is where subordinate and superior commander talk directly with each other.

You are right in the fact that it irrelevant as to where the origin of the idea comes from.  But it is important to understand the root and essence of the idea.  The institution as a whole generally has a poor understanding of how and why we got to where we are today and little comprehension of the careful equation of how to balance staff inputs and outputs to assist the commander.  Generally, we just add more (and higher ranked) people to the problem, unaware of the consequences this brings to procedure and process.

 

[Infanteer]

Perhaps in the interest of "getting it right" Canada should cease farting around with Bde and Div structures, and instead ask the key question: Why, with a Reg F trained strength of 55K (+/-), was the sustainment of a mere battlegroup all but impossible?

Doctrinal arguments over Bde / Div, and tactical / operational (if such a level exists) / strategic are all moot when a G8 nation is unable to sustain 2K troops in the field.

Bean counters said that between 1919 and 1938 and, when we had to learn the lessons again, it was in war and not peace and the soldier in the mud paid for it.

 

[Edward Campbell]

I think that before discussing appropriate numbers and ranks we ought to confirm the duties of the staff.

I learned that the duties of the staff are to:

    1. Assist commanders in the function of command by relieving them of detail; and

    2. Assist subordinate commanders in the execution of their tasks.

I have no memory of there being a "by" in the second duty statement but I recall that we learned that they, the staff, were, primarily, in the resource control business and resources included the obvious things - ammunition, fuel, and so on, but also things like time and space.

If those two simple statements of the duties of the staff are correct then I do not see any argument against a low ranked staff. Nothing in either "relieving the commander of detail" or "controlling resources" requires that staff officers are equal to or higher in rank than subordinate commanders.

As to the function of deputies. It has always seemed to me that deputies were provided when:

    1. The likelihood was high of commanders (of platoons, companies, battalions .. whatever) were in some danger of being killed or, intentionally, left out of battle; or

    2. The command had a geographic or function duality - think about admin echelons or, even, the MG group in a section; or

    3. Both.

We did lose a couple of brigade commanders in battle 70 or so years ago, is that a valid reason to provide brigades with a deputy commander now?

 

[Kirkhill]

I learned that the duties of the staff are to:

    1. Assist commanders in the function of command by relieving them of detail; and

    2. Assist subordinate commanders in the execution of their tasks.

You are all keenly aware of the many things I don't know but ...  ;D

During my brief time in that strikes me as a succinct description of the duties of a 2iC at any level of command.

Is it fair to say that the first staff officer positions are Coy 2ic and DCO?

My understanding of my duties as 2iC were to make sure the Boss's troops had what they needed to get the job done and to fill in the details.

My secondary duties were to make sure I understood the Boss's plans well enough to continue implementing them when he did an H Jones.

I'm getting the sense these days that the 2iC, Deputy, Asst whatever, is divorced from the staff effort rather than leading the staff effort. 

Or am I all wet as usual?