The State of Army Doctrine

[Haligonian]

Interesting.  I'll put some thought on you philosophy on the main effort and I'll read that article.

EBO is not popular here.  We watched a great video of General Mattis tearing it apart. Like I said, I'm going to need to see some concrete data before I start jettisoning the concept of synchronization!

 

[Haligonian]

And thanks for the military symbols Pam.  I'll try and track it down.

 

[Infanteer]

Interesting.  I'll put some thought on you philosophy on the main effort and I'll read that article.

EBO is not popular here.  We watched a great video of General Mattis tearing it apart. Like I said, I'm going to need to see some concrete data before I start jettisoning the concept of synchronization!

Sorry, mixed up my crazy buzzwords (although you are right on EBO as dumb).  The Marine swarming concept was Distributed Operations (DO).  It spawned a follow on concept of Enchanced Company Operations (ECO).  DO is dead, and I am unsure of the status of ECO.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

I expressed my own doubts about "swarming" in this thread: http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/98149.0.html

I remain extremely skeptical, although I am all for initiative and subordinates finding a way to muddle through when comms fail and its gets messy.

I hope that we get away from incorporating fads and buzzwords in our doctrine. I am leery of doctrine cooked up "out of contact." Theory not grounded in practice or reality is a big risk to adopt as doctrine.

I would be careful about turning the Combat Team publication into a full blown doctrine manual. I think its fine to focus on simple TTPs and leave the Doctrine to the higher level publications.

 

[Old Sweat]

Surely the doctrine - in the terms of how we fight at the battle group and below - depends upon whom we are fighting. For example, there are different ways to defend a position. The Second World War Germans held a position with a few troops to define how the attack was developing and force the attackers into fighting onto the objective, but then launched a quick local counterattack to drive tired, short on ammunition back off the objective before they could organize. Other armies denied the objective to the attackers by holding it tenaciously with lots of supporting fire. A third option, that of the weaker, less formally organized force, was to abandon the position before the attackers could close with it and live to fight another day. It seems to me that an one size fits all doctrine is suspect, and it behooves us to think before we cast anything in stone for a generic threat.

 

[Humphrey Bogart]

I expressed my own doubts about "swarming" in this thread: http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/98149.0.html

I remain extremely skeptical, although I am all for initiative and subordinates finding a way to muddle through when comms fail and its gets messy.

I hope that we get away from incorporating fads and buzzwords in our doctrine. I am leery of doctrine cooked up "out of contact." Theory not grounded in practice or reality is a big risk to adopt as doctrine.

I would be careful about turning the Combat Team publication into a full blown doctrine manual. I think its fine to focus on simple TTPs and leave the Doctrine to the higher level publications.

I agree with this and I don't personally think their is a problem with our doctrine.  What I do feel we have a problem with is a lack of understanding of TTPs, especially in the infantry.  This is mostly due to a lack of education amongst the officer corps and a failure to actually open up "The Infantry Section and Platoon in Battle" and take on what is written in that book, which for an infantry-centric army should be our holy bible.

Let's face it, not very many guys are like Infanteer and take the time to actually open up the books and educate themselves (Although if they want to call themselves professional soldiers they should really start).  If guys don't take the time to learn the basics and apply them properly when they are first starting out how do we expect them to apply thingsw properly at a higher level.

Coming from a LIB I have seen our poor grasp of the basics first-hand and with no vehicles to tie us down we should be the masters of this stuff but it's not so.  This is through no fault of the NCO's as they are merely following orders but is 100% on the officer corps for not knowing and understanding basic TTPs.  company commanders that think marching a dismounted company single file across open terrain is a good idea, platoon commanders that don't know the steps to occupying a patrol base, guys not knowing or using basic hand signals, not using proper formations.... the list goes on and on.

While we have had a revolution in communications and weapons are generally more precise and destructive, the principles of warfare and how war is fought since the Second World War remains the same.  Thus, I see no need to change the way we do business, what i do see a need for is greater emphasis on education in the officer corps so they are able to grasp the basics while they are young.  This will set them us up for success in the long-term.

 

[dangerboy]

This is through no fault of the NCO's as they are merely following orders but is 100% on the officer corps for not knowing and understanding basic TTPs.  company commanders that think marching a dismounted company single file across open terrain is a good idea, platoon commanders that don't know the steps to occupying a patrol base, guys not knowing or using basic hand signals, not using proper formations.... the list goes on and on.

One point it is the job of the Pl 2IC and Sect Comd to advise the Pl Comd and that of the CSM to advise the OC.  If the Pl or Coy are not following basic field craft then the NCOs should be advising the Pl Comd, now if the officer chooses to ignore the advice that is another issue.  So not only officers should be reading  "Section and Platoon in Operation" (it was updated this year) but all pers in Comd positions.

 

[Humphrey Bogart]

One point it is the job of the Pl 2IC and Sect Comd to advise the Pl Comd and that of the CSM to advise the OC.  If the Pl or Coy are not following basic field craft then the NCOs should be advising the Pl Comd, now if the officer chooses to ignore the advice that is another issue.  So not only officers should be reading  "Section and Platoon in Operation" (it was updated this year) but all pers in Comd positions.

Agree 100%, wasn't even tracking the name change, I still refer to the old one which I hold in my PAM's library on my personal computer (yep I am that much of a nerd).  Will update accordingly 

 

[Bruce Monkhouse]

what i do see a need for is greater emphasis on education in the officer corps

From what I see [very much on the outside mind you] the 'machine' thinks that involves more tax-payer paid university courses.

 

[Bird_Gunner45]

From what I see [very much on the outside mind you] the 'machine' thinks that involves more tax-payer paid university courses.

For some perhaps... The military also (at least the units I've been in) need to make better use of Professional Development for Junior Officers and more emphasis needs to be placed on intellectually challenging Jr Officers than on mindless administration. Things like CMXs are starting to come back now that we're out of A-Stan, and will help get the young officers more "up" on tactics, doctrine, and procedures prior to hitting the field.

IMHO, if leadership emphasizes education, not necessary formal education, through unit sponsored PD, CAX/CMX, and TEWTs than the CAF would achieve a better level of knowledge without the cost of sponsoring endless masters degrees.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Coming from a LIB I have seen our poor grasp of the basics first-hand and with no vehicles to tie us down we should be the masters of this stuff but it's not so.  This is through no fault of the NCO's as they are merely following orders but is 100% on the officer corps for not knowing and understanding basic TTPs.  company commanders that think marching a dismounted company single file across open terrain is a good idea, platoon commanders that don't know the steps to occupying a patrol base, guys not knowing or using basic hand signals, not using proper formations.... the list goes on and on.

While we have had a revolution in communications and weapons are generally more precise and destructive, the principles of warfare and how war is fought since the Second World War remains the same.  Thus, I see no need to change the way we do business, what i do see a need for is greater emphasis on education in the officer corps so they are able to grasp the basics while they are young.  This will set them us up for success in the long-term.

I agree.

Which is why each Division should probably set up it's own equivalent of 'Tiger Land' and rotate BGs through on a regular basis to brush up on basic skills before launching on larger formation level concentrations, where the emphasis is generally on everything but the basics.

 

[McG]

... each Division should probably set up it's own equivalent of 'Tiger Land' and ...

Is there really a requirement to create new organizations which will demand re-allocation of PYs from somewhere (precedent suggests that somewhere will be from the field force)?
Is there any reason the CMBGs cannot manage this level of training internally with existing force structures? 

 

[Infanteer]

Agreed.  If a CO cannot have his battalion "brush up on basics", he should be fired.

 

[Kirkhill]

Is "Tiger Land" an organization or just a venue?

Are trainers required or just a place to train?

 

[daftandbarmy]

Agreed.  If a CO cannot have his battalion "brush up on basics", he should be fired.

Well, if they 'don't know what they don't know', or never get a chance to hammer home the basics because they're dancing to someone else's tune, it might not be the right move.

 

[CombatDoc]

Is "Tiger Land" an organization or just a venue?

Are trainers required or just a place to train?

It's a movie about a training venue to prepare soldiers for war, starring Colin Farrell IIRC. 

 

[Kirkhill]

It's a movie about a training venue to prepare soldiers for war, starring Colin Farrell IIRC.

Oh.  :facepalm:  :-[

Never mind.

 

[Old Sweat]

Oh.  :facepalm:  :-[

Never mind.

I had no friggin' idea either, and my care factor is measured in microgiveash.ts about it.

 

[pbi]

Ahhh, doctrine mongering.. where is my old DS hat? Here it is, under these empty beer cans and pistachio bags...Oh, wait--that's a dunce cap...

I think  part of the problem is that we have a mix-up in terminology, or maybe in useage. "Doctrine", at least as I understand it, concerns itself with fairly broad things such as "Infantry and Armour Will Cooperate in Offensive Operations" or "The Force in Place Will Provide Fire Support for the Assault Force".

Fairly high level stuff that is based in common sense, doesn't really have to be changing every five minutes, and provides for a common start point for understanding. After all, if you're going to change the way you conduct a type of operation, its useful to know the start state you're changing from.

IMHO, doctrine allows people who don't always work together to have a shared idea of how to go about something. It's a guideline, not a set of handcuffs. Armies that treat it as the latter probably won't do well.

Also IMHO, what happens at unit level and below, is really much  more about TTPs. TTPs can and should evolve very quickly (even during an operation) and will always change with the type of equipment and weapons, the training level (Kitchener's New Army couldn't be relied on to do what the 1914 BEF could do...), nature of the enemy, etc. TTPs may vary from unit to unit, and to be honest I don't think it makes all that much difference if they do. So what if 2 RCR does a BG attack different from 1 PPCLI? As long as the actions of the unit conform to the higher commander's intent, and are coordinated with whoever cares, so what?

The "Main Effort" discussion is an interesting one. I always taught that ME (at least at the Op/Tac lvls) is best expressed as "Somebody" doing "Something".

IMHO, ME is about achieving the critical result (or effect, if you want..) that is necessary for the success of that particular part of the operation. If you can't achieve it, that bit will fail and, quite possibly, the entire op will fail.

So, by identifying "somebody", you do two things:

a) tell Bloggins that it's him and his force that will achieve that critical result; and
b) tell everybody else that Bloggins is "it", and in the failure of any further guidance tey will act to support Bloggins in his task.

By identifying "something", you tell Bloggins (and all the rest of them) what it is that must be achieved. This gives Bloggins a good idea of what his most essential task must be, as opposed to magically divining it, or inventing his own that doesn't support the bigger picture. It tells everybody else what the task is, so that a) they can take it over if Bloggins and Co. get waxed or b) they can understand best how to support it.

So, IMHO it's not "In Phase 1 Main Effort is the Bridge at XYZ"

It's not "In Phase 1 Main Effort is  2 PPCLI"

But it probably should be "In Phase 1 Main Effort is 2 PPCLI capturing the Bridge at XYZ"

 

[PanaEng]

:goodpost:

... a baseline for common understanding but not a ready-made structure for our templating by the enemy.

I would add, regarding the ME, It definitely makes sense to identify the task and unit/sub-unit; but at the very least the actual task for situations where you have a unit with a task of 'Follow and Assume/Support'