Below is an OpEd that I got into the "Calgary Herald" today (14 March). The reality is that Afghanistan can be lost on the battlefields of Kandahar but it can only be won in Kabul.
Beyond the Afghan debate: Need for better leadership
Col. Mike Capstick (Ret.)
For The Calgary Herald
Friday, March 14, 2008
Now that a Parliamentary consensus was reached Thursday on extending the Canadian mission in Afghanistan until 2011, it is time for the government to take the essential steps that will ensure strategic success.
Although there appears to be an international consensus on the need to establish Afghan-International strategic coherence, there does not appear to be any shared view of how to do this. While the recent nomination of the former Norwegian foreign minister Kai Eide as UN special representative offers the promise of coherence, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) remains marginal to the dynamic in Kabul.
Despite Eide's nomination, a few powerful states and some of the most important development agencies continue to weaken the possibility of UN leadership by their insistence on following national and organizational agendas and priorities instead of those laid out in the compact.
Clearly this lack of cohesion is untenable and if UNAMA is to be effective, the appointment of a special envoy must be accompanied by expressions of full political level support and genuine behavioural change "on the ground." Canada can, and must, play a leadership role in making this happen.
It is also evident that Canada's "whole of government" approach has matured greatly in the past two years and that the recent striking of a cabinet committee, supported by a task force located in the PCO, promises to strengthen the cohesion of the Canadian effort. The motion that passed provides for a special parliamentary committee on Afghanistan that will be able to exercise oversight over the mission and ensure ministerial accountability.
These positive steps must now be supported by the development of a comprehensive public strategy that defines Canadian objectives in Afghanistan (the "ends"), the organizations, methods, priorities and benchmarks to accomplish these (the "ways") and committed resources - human and financial (the "means"). This strategy must accord with the compact and serve as the authoritative guidance for Canada's "whole of government" effort. It would permit parliamentarians to monitor progress and, at the same time, fully inform Canadians as to our national objectives in Afghanistan and how the government intends to achieve them.
These steps would mitigate the challenges in Ottawa, but they must be supported by structural changes on the ground. Not only does Canada's Afghan strategy need to be coherent in Ottawa, it must be seamlessly co-ordinated in Kabul and Kandahar.
Despite the strong diplomatic skills of our Foreign Service officers, the leadership and management of a complex, multi-dimensional operation such as the Afghan mission is simply not a core-competency of Canada's ambassadors, nor is it an appropriate role for senior military commanders.
To overcome this, the prime minister should appoint a prominent and experienced Canadian as a special envoy with the authority to act as the head of Canada's "country team" and a specific mandate to ensure that Canada's Afghan strategy is co-ordinated.
This envoy should report to the PM and he or she should be supported by a strategic co-ordination team of approximately four people with experience in Afghanistan, expertise in security, governance and development as well as proven planning and co-ordination skills at the strategic level. The members of this team must not be serving soldiers or public servants to ensure their independence. It would advise the PM's envoy, review all activities to ensure strategic coherence and support his or her efforts to bring cohesion to the Afghan-International effort in Kabul.
Every single Canadian action in support of the Afghanistan compact must be designed to strengthen the legitimacy of the Afghan government. In the simplest terms most Afghans want the same things that Canadians wanted in 1867 -- peace, order and good government. Canada's entire effort must focus on helping them achieve this.
Opponents of the mission often recite the litany of failures and issues as proof that stabilizing Afghanistan and ameliorating its grinding poverty is "mission impossible," and that abandoning the country is the only option. This is simply wrong-headed and would consign Afghans to decades of predation and violence. At the same time, it would be folly to adopt a simplistic "stay the course" approach, which would only result in the repetition of the strategic failures that have had such an adverse impact on the Afghan mission.
Canada must, therefore capitalize on the new political consensus and develop a coherent strategy and provide the kind of political leadership so essential to the future of the Afghan mission.
Mike Capstick is a retired colonel and an associate at the University of Calgary's Centre for Military and Strategic Studies.
He spent 12 months between August 2005-2006 as commander of Canada's Strategic Advisory Team, Afghanistan stationed in Kabul.
© The Calgary Herald 2008
Beyond the Afghan debate: Need for better leadership
Col. Mike Capstick (Ret.)
For The Calgary Herald
Friday, March 14, 2008
Now that a Parliamentary consensus was reached Thursday on extending the Canadian mission in Afghanistan until 2011, it is time for the government to take the essential steps that will ensure strategic success.
Although there appears to be an international consensus on the need to establish Afghan-International strategic coherence, there does not appear to be any shared view of how to do this. While the recent nomination of the former Norwegian foreign minister Kai Eide as UN special representative offers the promise of coherence, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) remains marginal to the dynamic in Kabul.
Despite Eide's nomination, a few powerful states and some of the most important development agencies continue to weaken the possibility of UN leadership by their insistence on following national and organizational agendas and priorities instead of those laid out in the compact.
Clearly this lack of cohesion is untenable and if UNAMA is to be effective, the appointment of a special envoy must be accompanied by expressions of full political level support and genuine behavioural change "on the ground." Canada can, and must, play a leadership role in making this happen.
It is also evident that Canada's "whole of government" approach has matured greatly in the past two years and that the recent striking of a cabinet committee, supported by a task force located in the PCO, promises to strengthen the cohesion of the Canadian effort. The motion that passed provides for a special parliamentary committee on Afghanistan that will be able to exercise oversight over the mission and ensure ministerial accountability.
These positive steps must now be supported by the development of a comprehensive public strategy that defines Canadian objectives in Afghanistan (the "ends"), the organizations, methods, priorities and benchmarks to accomplish these (the "ways") and committed resources - human and financial (the "means"). This strategy must accord with the compact and serve as the authoritative guidance for Canada's "whole of government" effort. It would permit parliamentarians to monitor progress and, at the same time, fully inform Canadians as to our national objectives in Afghanistan and how the government intends to achieve them.
These steps would mitigate the challenges in Ottawa, but they must be supported by structural changes on the ground. Not only does Canada's Afghan strategy need to be coherent in Ottawa, it must be seamlessly co-ordinated in Kabul and Kandahar.
Despite the strong diplomatic skills of our Foreign Service officers, the leadership and management of a complex, multi-dimensional operation such as the Afghan mission is simply not a core-competency of Canada's ambassadors, nor is it an appropriate role for senior military commanders.
To overcome this, the prime minister should appoint a prominent and experienced Canadian as a special envoy with the authority to act as the head of Canada's "country team" and a specific mandate to ensure that Canada's Afghan strategy is co-ordinated.
This envoy should report to the PM and he or she should be supported by a strategic co-ordination team of approximately four people with experience in Afghanistan, expertise in security, governance and development as well as proven planning and co-ordination skills at the strategic level. The members of this team must not be serving soldiers or public servants to ensure their independence. It would advise the PM's envoy, review all activities to ensure strategic coherence and support his or her efforts to bring cohesion to the Afghan-International effort in Kabul.
Every single Canadian action in support of the Afghanistan compact must be designed to strengthen the legitimacy of the Afghan government. In the simplest terms most Afghans want the same things that Canadians wanted in 1867 -- peace, order and good government. Canada's entire effort must focus on helping them achieve this.
Opponents of the mission often recite the litany of failures and issues as proof that stabilizing Afghanistan and ameliorating its grinding poverty is "mission impossible," and that abandoning the country is the only option. This is simply wrong-headed and would consign Afghans to decades of predation and violence. At the same time, it would be folly to adopt a simplistic "stay the course" approach, which would only result in the repetition of the strategic failures that have had such an adverse impact on the Afghan mission.
Canada must, therefore capitalize on the new political consensus and develop a coherent strategy and provide the kind of political leadership so essential to the future of the Afghan mission.
Mike Capstick is a retired colonel and an associate at the University of Calgary's Centre for Military and Strategic Studies.
He spent 12 months between August 2005-2006 as commander of Canada's Strategic Advisory Team, Afghanistan stationed in Kabul.
© The Calgary Herald 2008
