Tactical Armoured Patrol Vehicle - RG-31, LAV Coyote, and (partial) G-Wagon Replacement

[Colin Parkinson]

What kind of counter-UAS systems did you have deployed with you?

Camouflage, radio and track discipline, which are now in vogue again.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

The design process from the outside looking in seemed to have been driven by the need to get a jump on the race between a vehicles protection and the corresponding increase in IED size and effectiveness .
One of the other factors seems to have driven by fear of what could happen to the political health of the government of the day by increasing casualties leading to decrease in popular support for the war this leading to a drop in popular support for the government.
One of the impressions that I got was that there was a.greart deal of pressure to design an utterly IED proofed vehicle . In the past that looked like the designers were shooting for a vehicle that withstand an IED in the megaton range.
The TAPV is very much a a one trick pony a niche vehicle if you will.

The design requirements had blast ratings, but there was no belief that the TAPV would result in an "utterly IED proofed vehicle." Everybody understood that that was impossible and there are always trade-offs.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

We have those, as long as the passengers don't mind walking

In war there are always adaptations, and each adaptation can in turn expose another vulnerability.

The Israelis and Hezbollah were locked in a counter-insurgency campaign in the late 90s in the south-Lebanon "security zone", a strip of Lebanon that remained occupied by the IDF. There was a technical fence but also a series of platoon strongpoints and of course patrols. The campaign featured raids, ambushes, airstrikes, missile attacks and increasingly (on the part of Hezbollah) IEDs. These IEDs became more sophisticated and effective, with RCIEDs being very common and Hezbollah using foam-forms to disguise their IEDs among other things. The IDF Brigade Commander was killed in one such IED attack.

An Israeli adaptation to the IED attacks on troop rotations at the outposts was to use aviation as opposed to ground convoys for their bi-weekly reliefs. In 1997, two S65 helicopters conducting an outpost relief collided shortly after takeoff, killing all 73 IDF soldiers and aviators that were onboard the helicopters. This incident is seen as one of the contributing factors to the withdrawal of the IDF from the security zone in 2000.

So nothing is risk-free, and one adaptation can open a new vulnerability.

 

[daftandbarmy]

In war there are always adaptations, and each adaptation can in turn expose another vulnerability.

The Israelis and Hezbollah were locked in a counter-insurgency campaign in the late 90s in the south-Lebanon "security zone", a strip of Lebanon that remained occupied by the IDF. There was a technical fence but also a series of platoon strongpoints and of course patrols. The campaign featured raids, ambushes, airstrikes, missile attacks and increasingly (on the part of Hezbollah) IEDs. These IEDs became more sophisticated and effective, with RCIEDs being very common and Hezbollah using foam-forms to disguise their IEDs among other things. The IDF Brigade Commander was killed in one such IED attack.

An Israeli adaptation to the IED attacks on troop rotations at the outposts was to use aviation as opposed to ground convoys for their bi-weekly reliefs. In 1997, two S65 helicopters conducting an outpost relief collided shortly after takeoff, killing all 73 IDF soldiers and aviators that were onboard the helicopters. This incident is seen as one of the contributing factors to the withdrawal of the IDF from the security zone in 2000.

So nothing is risk-free, and one adaptation can open a new vulnerability.

Hence the importance of not setting patterns, which can be impossible for alot of 'military minds' unfortunately

 

[Maxman1]

This is the biggest point that many haven’t grasped.

Frankly the only role I think they should be playing in Canada is given to the RCAF to provide a Base Security Vehicle.
For a Canadian Army vehicle they simply have too many negatives, to employ, while the RCAF has a need for something to ensure the F-35 Airfields can be secured and patrolled.

I wonder if it could be used as an artillery tractor.

 

[childs56]

I wonder if it could be used as an artillery tractor.

Tow a 81mm?

 

[childs56]

Textron Tactical-Armoured Patrol Vehicle (TAPV)

The Textron Tactical-Armoured Patrol Vehicle (TAPV) is a 4×4 wheeled combat vehicle, which is designed and currently being developed by…

www.army-technology.com

Below is taken from this link. Interesting role of the vehicle. The Canadian Forces have stated the TAPV can go places the Coyote could not go.
The vehicle can be deployed in surveillance, general utility, cargo, reconnaissance and armoured personnel transport, as well as command and control missions. It can be configured with interchangeable modules for different mission variants, including patrol, ambulance, convoy protection and mortar carrier.
The new vehicle will supplement the Canadian Army’s LAV 2 Coyote reconnaissance vehicle.
Below is Textrons link to the capabilities of the vehicle.

Commando® Family of Products

Enhanced combination of lethality, survivability, mobility and sustainability

www.textronsystems.com

My take is we bought a vehicle for peacekeeping, Which it might do pretty good as we rarely have a full section to carry, has some decent speed and good armour for what it is, it looks mean enough to say were the Army, but not mean enough to scare people. It can be configured for a few different variants. They should configure the entire fleet into the different variants and put them aside for our " were back peacekeeping missions"

 

[McG]

My take is we bought a vehicle for peacekeeping …

No. The Afghan theatre was front of everyone’s mind when this was bought. It is the leading edge of anti-Taliban technology. An ideal replacement for GWagon in that theatre, and probably an improvement on the RG-31 in many (though not all) of its role.

 

[FJAG]

I wonder if it could be used as an artillery tractor.

I would think not.

I have no idea how much it can tow but my guess is not an M777 (maybe an LG1).

It's weakness is its lack of ammo carrying ability as well as the det. A given detachment would need two vehicles the way we used HLTVs as gun tractors with an ability to carry roughly 100 rounds. Part of the crew travelled in the HLVW and the rest in either a Bison or TLAV depending on the year. The TAPV might fill that role but it has less personnel carrying capability, as configured, than either the Bison or TLAV.

It could fulfill other roles though.

 

[McG]

Part of the crew travelled in the HLVW and the rest in either a Bison or TLAV depending on the year. The TAPV might fill that role but it has less personnel carrying capability, as configured, than either the Bison or TLAV.

The Artillery will get ACSV APCs for gun crew.