Strategic vs. Tactical Airlift - What balance do we need? (from: Military wins no matter what after election)

[AoD71]

C17's are friggin cool. But what I would like to know is what's the difference between Strategic/Tactical airlifts?

 

[McG]

C17's are friggin cool. But what I would like to know is what's the difference between Strategic/Tactical airlifts?

Have you done a search?   Try these:

Strategic Airlift - We need more than the Herc!

Tactical Airlift - Replace the Herc!  

 

[AoD71]

lol, no. I haven't done a search. I was just looking for the answer in a "nutshell" is all, because I didn't understand those terms. But thanks anyways.

 

[Sf2]

Strategic airlift is moving huge amounts of equipment over long distances to support long term operations.

Tactical airlift is moving less amount of stuff, over shorter distances.

 

[AoD71]

Thanks mate! Thats exactly what I needed. Short and easy to remember  :blotto: . Just to be sure, a C17 would be a Strategic lift, while something smaller, like a C-27J, would be tactical? Right on!

 

[Bert]

The C-17 is perceived as strategic and the C-27J as tactical.  However, in many continental taskings
requiring rapid movement of personnel or cargo, the C-27J may be too small for the job.  The C-130 type
aircraft may be better suited.  Its all about have the right tool for the job.

 

[MdB]

AoD71,

Try Wikipedia, salt mine.

Strategic airlift

Tactical airlift

 

[AoD71]

That was a good read! It is easy to tell the difference between the two, seeing all the pictures of the planes. Thanks, MdB, I never thought of going to Wikipedia >_<. It should have came to mind, since I always go there to make fun (by editing the pages) of the hate groups that are on it.  :threat:

 

[McG]

2010 too late for new planes, DND contends
Contract to be awarded in 2007, file says
By MICHAEL DEN TANDT
Tuesday, December 20, 2005 Posted at 4:05 AM EST
From Tuesday's Globe and Mail


Ottawa â ” The first of 16 new military transport planes is not scheduled for delivery until 2010, two years after the Department of National Defence says its aging Hercules fleet will be inoperable, an internal government document obtained by The Globe and Mail shows.

The document, which the Defence Department submitted to the Treasury Board last month, raises fresh questions about the federal government's approval in the last days of its mandate of the $4.6-billion aircraft purchase.

DND officials for weeks have insisted that the procurement had to be completed urgently because the Hercules fleet must be replaced in about 36 months, or the lives of pilots and crew will be at undue risk.

"We know that three years and a little bit more than that, the fleet starts to become almost completely inoperational," General Rick Hillier, Chief of Defence Staff, said last month.

He added that Canadian troops need new planes "not another 15 years from now, not 10 years from now and actually not even five years from now."

Gen. Hillier reiterated the statement in a private briefing several weeks ago with the Bloc Québécois and New Democratic Party defence critics.

"They're trying to explain to us that if nothing is done today, the whole fleet will fall apart in three years," Bloc MP Claude Bachand said at the time.

The Treasury Board document thus raises new questions about DND's bidding process, which until now has effectively shut out competitors other than Lockheed Martin.

Asked about the document, the Defence Department said it has no comment. Defence Minister Bill Graham also declined to comment.

The accelerated process and in particular the contract specifications have been widely understood in the defence industry to favour Lockheed Martin over other potential contenders such as Airbus and Boeing.

Gen. Hillier and Mr. Graham have insisted that DND's conditions for the contract do not make the process uncompetitive, because the necessity for speedy delivery is incontrovertible.

They say any company is free to satisfy those conditions, if it can.

But according to a secret DND timetable and cost projection to the Treasury Board, dated Nov. 21 and signed by Mr. Graham, the timing of the delivery of the first aircraft is not three years out, but nearly five, in May, 2010. A copy of the document was obtained by The Globe and Mail.

A detailed table in the document sets out a schedule that would deliver four aircraft a year in each of 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013, for a total of 16.

A table, entitled Project Milestones, says that, given "preliminary project approval" in November of this year, the contract will be awarded in May, 2007.

The apparent two-year delay is significant. The Defence Department has been told by Airbus that the company can deliver two A400M transports by 2010, and the balance by 2014, as well as provide refurbished Hercules transports in the interim, should that be necessary.

"That is guaranteed," said Martin Sefzig, director of programs at EADS-Casa, Airbus's major shareholder.

"The production line has been designed to accommodate extra orders."

Although it remains unclear which aircraft bests suits DND's needs, this casts into doubt the most compelling argument against the Airbus craft, which is that it could not be available in time to meet DND's schedule.

Last month, after a plan to buy $12.2-billion worth of 50 military aircraft was criticized by industry insiders and opposition politicians for perceived unfairness of the bidding process, the Defence Minister announced an abridged plan, for transport planes only. Of the total $4.6-billion cost, $3-billion is directly related to procuring the aircraft, with $1.6-billion for servicing costs over 20 years.

At a news conference on Nov. 22, Mr. Graham and Gen. Hillier dismissed allegations that contract requirements were tailored so that only one plane, Lockheed Martin's Hercules C-130J, could fulfill them.

"The procurement process will be competitive, fair and transparent," Mr. Graham said. A spokesman for Mr. Graham reiterated this recently.

Interviews with industry and government insiders -- all of whom insisted on anonymity for fear of missing out on future government work or suffering other reprisals -- confirm that the transport contract, whatever it may evolve into in future, has not been designed to produce a competition.

Defence Department officials have acknowledged that a requirement that the new transport fleet number at least 16 effectively rules out the C-17, an aircraft that carries four times the payload of a Hercules and costs twice as much, about $260-million apiece.

Buying 16 would far exceed the military's needs, and its limited budget.

DND officials have also privately conceded that a requirement that the new aircraft be "certified to aviation certification standards" by the expected contract award date effectively rules out Airbus's A400M transport.

Although far closer to DND's price range than the C17, the A400M remains in development and won't make its first flight until early 2008.

This condition on certification is a first in Canadian military procurements. In the past, the department has required certification by the delivery date.

The upshot is that Lockheed Martin's C130J is the only known aircraft in the world that meets the Defence Department's current requirements for so-called tactical, short-haul transports.

DND officials have privately offered various explanations for this, including that the Hercules C130J would be easier to integrate than other types of aircraft because the military operates 31 Hercules craft now.

Another explanation is that Gen. Hillier and his senior staff, by virtue of their combat experience in places such as Afghanistan and the former Yugoslavia, simply know which equipment is best for the forces, and have decided what they need.

"Indecision only benefits lobbyists, vested interests and ex-generals," a senior Defence Department official, who supports the Hercules option, said last month.

But the C130J has neither the same engine nor avionics as the Canadian military's 31 C130H and E models, which negates many of the mechanical synergies, industry sources contend.

The C130J is not big enough to transport some versions of the military's new Stryker mobile gun system. Nor can it carry the new Multi-Mission Effects armoured anti-tank vehicle, unless it's partly disassembled. Industry sources unrelated to any of the potential bidders confirm this.

In addition, a report last year by the Pentagon's Office of the Inspector General found that the C130J "is not operationally effective or suitable," as a replacement for older Hercules transport.

Moreover, the C130J lacks the range for strategic or long-haul lift. That necessitates a continuing reliance on rented Antonov transports, which are sometimes in short supply, and cannot land on the short, rough runways typical of Afghanistan.

"The two other aircraft are dual-role," said a source familiar with the process, and unconnected to either Airbus or Boeing.

"They can do both strategic and tactical. They should be allowed to compete."

An internal air force report circulated within DND this year but never made public said there was "no rationale for CF [Canadian Forces] fixation" on replacing the old Hercules craft with a newer Hercules model.

The report, a copy of which has been obtained by The Globe, raises concerns about the availability of leased Antonovs in a crisis.

It then recommends buying six Boeing C17s, keeping the military's nine newer H model C130s, and buying a fleet of dedicated search and rescue aircraft, rather than getting new C130Js.

That report fell on deaf ears, a source familiar with the situation said, because "months ago they had already decided on Hercs."

Neither Boeing nor Airbus is complaining publicly, sources say, because both companies hope to secure future Canadian government contracts.

Boeing makes the CH-47 Chinook helicopter, of which DND hopes to buy 15 -- total cost, $4.2-billion -- should the Liberals be re-elected. Airbus is 80-per-cent owned by Netherlands-based EADS NV, which continues to hold out hope of landing a $3-billion-dollar-plus Canadian purchase of its C-295 search-and-rescue plane.

Critics of the process continue to believe it is deeply unfair, and will remain so unless DND's specifications for new transport aircraft are rewritten. Only a true competition based on new specifications, they say, will deliver the best product to the Canadian military.

"The A400 costs 15 per cent more [than the C130J], but has twice the payload and twice the range," said a source familiar with the situation, but unconnected with the Airbus bid. "So why wouldn't they allow it to compete?"

Likewise, defence experts say, there is no compelling reason a smaller number of Boeing C-17s couldn't meet all of Canada's airlift needs, were the specifications written to allow it. The stipulation for 16 aircraft, they say, is artificial, for the simple reason that one big aircraft can do the work of several small ones. A single C-17, a source familiar with Canadian military procurements said, could have airlifted all the Canadian aid that was shipped to victims of Hurricane Katrina earlier this year.

"Performance-based is you get yourself from home to work in X time," said one critic of the current process. "You're not out there deciding whether you want to drive in a Lamborghini or a Toyota Corolla."

Public Works Minister Scott Brison has promised to appoint a "fairness monitor" to examine both DND's written requirements for new transport planes and the selection process.

Officials in the Defence Department are strongly resisting an independent review of their specifications, according to sources, saying that there is no time to delay.

Shopping for planes

Canada's Defence Department is preparing to spend $4.6-billion on new military transport planes. Here are a few of the options being considered.

Lockheed Martin Hercules C130J

Payload: 19,500 kg

Range: 5,100 km

with 18,155 kg

Cost: $135-million

Boeing C-17

Payload: 76,644 kg

Range: 9,630 km with 58,967 kg,

can be refuelled

in flight

Cost: $260-million

Airbus A400M

Payload: 37,194 kg

Range: 6,950 km

with 20,000 kg,

can be refuelled in flight

Cost: $155-million

This begs the question: What mix of Tactical & Stratigic lift does Canada need?  Can we go all one way or the other?  Would a "middle of the road" aircraft best meet our needs?

 

[Kirkhill]

Actually the very words Tactical or Strategic airlift might be imposing too much of a constraint on thinking.

As stated earlier - Tactical usually means short ranges, small loads while strategic means long ranges, large loads.   However tactical also means being able to influence the battle by delivering close to, if not on the FEBA.   By that definition both large and small aircraft are capable of being operated tactically.   The C-17, A-400, C130, Il-76, C-27, C-295 and CC-115 are all capable of conducting airdrops, dropping paratroopers and landing on short rough strips which can be close to FEBA.   I am not clear but I believe that the AN-124 can be operated in a similar environment although the "rough strips" probably can't be short.

At the other end of the spectrum - civvy freighters, like the CC-150, various other passenger conversions and aircraft like the 747 all need airports with hard, long runways and cargo unloading facilities. They can only be operated in a strategic role. On the other hand there are lots of them available and can be chartered at relatively reasonable rates. For establishing a supply conveyor to a secure terminus, or even for surging forces forward is this such a bad option?   It is no different than chartering civvies to carry supplies in semi-trailers in Canada.   Delivery to the secure terminus could also be by sea.

The real challenge occurs not in getting supplies into the general vicinity but in getting them to FEBA.

The military lifters can be operated both strategically and tactically.   They are most valuable when operated tactically it seems to me, operating as the final link between the secure terminus and FEBA.   Effectively they would form a shuttle service from the terminus to FEBA.   The distance between the two, the size of the deployed force and the size of the components shipped will all impact on the numbers and sizes of aircraft.  

I think it might be more beneficial to state the issue as what type of heavy and light lift is needed (AN-124/C-17 vs C27/C295), how much of each and what benefits the middle weights like the IL-76/A-400/C130J/C130J-30 bring?

If there are any professional logisticians out there please feel free to jump in and correct errors here - but just to give a sense of scale

A common pallet used in a civilian warehouse and handled by a bog standard forklift is designed to handle roughly one tonne of material and occupies roughly one square meter of floor and one cubic meter of volume.   Depending on the material loaded   one or more of those parameters will change.

1 tonne of water - enough to supply 4l per man per day for a platoon of 30 for more than a week = 1 pallet
1 tonne of diesel - enough to supply 4 Bv206s with fuel   to carry a   platoon of 30 for about 500 km = 1 pallet
A one tonne pallet can deliver 48 crates of 5.56 mm ammunition for C7s and C9s or about 80,000 rounds.   By my reckoning that is enough to resupply 270 riflemen or 135 C9 gunners with small arms ammunition.
A pallet of rations, weighing about half a tonne, will keep a platoon fed for about a week.  

Four pallets - 3.5 tonnes would keep one platoon supplied, and then some, for a week.   One C27/C295 with a 10 tonne payload could lift that with room to spare, even at maximum range.   2 or 3 flying daily missions could keep 25 to 50 platoons supplied - by my reckoning that would be about 750 to 1500 troops.   Those types of flights are the norm.  

Flying in vehicles in large numbers happens infrequently as is the case for troops - once the force is established there will be a smaller, steady flow of individual vehicles flying in and out.

Large carriers are needed for these bulky items but a small number can be well employed if they only have to shuttle a short distance from the terminus to FEBA,   making up in frequency of flights what they lack in numbers.    Once the rush is over then they frequency of flights can be scaled back.

Setting aside the FWSAR project a Squadron of 8 C27s backed up by one or two C17s could likely keep a Task Force supplied.   Two such groupings could sustain two Task Forces.   A similar grouping could be on hand in Canada for domestic ops - including FWSAR (large aircraft can carry helicopters into the arctic).   The C-17s could be held centrally at Trenton and tasked out to support the forward deployed squadrons.

Given that scenario the need for middle weight lifters would be greatly reduced.   Possibly eliminated?

 

[FSTO]

Kirkhill, there is quite the debate going on Norman Spector website regarding military procurement. Could I transfer your post to his blog because it is the best reply I have seen.

Link to Norman Spector

http://www.members.shaw.ca/nspector4/

Look under Fed Follies

 

[MdB]

As stated on Norman's Spector's website, under the Fed Follies blog, if the C-17 would be a better deal and in fact reducing the cost of airlift, now I feel that there's a big great damn powerful lobby drive behind the Grits choice of buying C-130J. Yeah, our pilot can only pilot C-130 and that'd be too costly to train them on C-17... go figure what's the logic!


Kirkhill, repost from A-400 thread, which more relevent here.

Here's a Wikipedia article on the C-17 casting a light on the issue comparable to your commment:

The 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and resultant tsunamis placed a strain on the global strategic airlifter pool. The impressive performance of the C-17 in USAF and RAF service have persuaded Germany to consider acquiring 2-4 C-17s for the Luftwaffe in a dry lease arrangement, at least until the A400M is available in 2009. German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer stated in the German news magazine Der Spiegel that the government needed its own organic strategic transport capability to be able to respond to disasters in a better manner than it was able to for this incident. During the tsunami relief effort, Germany tried to acquire transport through its usual method of wet leasing Antonov airlifters via private companies, but found to its dismay that there were no available aircraft. While the stated goal of a C-17 lease would be to last until the A400M's arrival, it is always possible that the Luftwaffe may undergo an experience similar to that of the RAF, and elect to retain them.

It seems Canada would do good by looking what others do. And it seems Canada has been lucky too. Note that Minister Joschka Fischer is from the Green Party, not really a right-winger.

 

[Kirkhill]

FSTO - feel free.

Glad to be of service.

 

[Bert]

Kirkhill>
Given that scenario the need for middle weight lifters would be greatly reduced.  Possibly eliminated?

From limited perspective, the need for medium lift is more necessary for domestic ops where C-17s would
be overkill or several C-27s may be impractical.  Using CFS Alert, Boxtops, Eureka, OP Hurricane, deployment to
FOLs, regular or rapid transport of smaller units or detachments as an example, the C-130 type is much more
suited.  Alot of unsung OPS don't require larger aircraft or support paved runways of sufficient length.  A
balance of light lift/SAR/SPECOPS, medium for more involved load-outs, and heavy lift or major transport may be
a better approach.

 

[Kirkhill]

Seen Bert.

 

[FoverF]

The biggest issue with splitting the transport requirement into a strategic and tactical type is that we would be (at least transitionally) operating at least FOUR types, the Polaris, the newer  Hercs, and the two new kids. However our lack of strategic transport is one of the reasons we're in this situation right now (flying the crap out of Hercs trying to support far flung overseas missions), and I think it needs to be adressed. So while our newer Hercs are still very viable, I think it might be a good idea to sell them while they still have some hours left, and a relatively modern equipment fit. They could be retained, but that would definitely limit us to buying only one type. I think having three outsized transports, plus Twotters, Challengers, and the Polaris would be out of the question, and a major waste of money. So I'm going to stick to two-type combinations.

A C-130H/C-27J mix is basically just trading-down our Hercs for smaller birds. We get a slight decrease in operating costs, but probably an equal drop in capability. Not a good thing.

A C-130J/C-27J mix has the upshot that they have a lot of commonality. The C-27J actually has a lot more commonality with the C-130J than the older Hercs do. This would be the cheapest option to operate by far. A lot of missions don't require a Herc (dropping SAR techs for example), and can be done just fine by a C-27J. We *MIGHT* be able to afford enough airframes with this option (since we ARE also talking about 20 years support contracts) to make it viable, and get a good increase in capabiltiy. Provided we can get a lot of birds, this might be a viable option, but probably not the best.

But it leaves us with the same lack of strategic airlift we have today. And I'm not convinced of the cost savings involved in trying to support operations in places like Afghanistan with lots of sorties of C-130s, rather than far fewer sorties with a real heavy lifter. Not to mention the fact that the whole doctrine of having a light, highly mobile force, bereft of tanks and other heavy equipment, is a a complete and total farce if you have absolutely no means of deploying that force except by sea. Or waiting for the USAF to move our stuff for us, by which time we're pretty much superfluous anyways.

Keeping our newer Hercs, and trading our old ones up for C-130Js would probably be our cheapest option in terms of purchase price, but would cost more than replacing the whole old Herc fleet in terms of operating costs. The C-130J will be a bit cheaper in the long run than the -H model, since we're talking about 20 years of maintenance and fuel. It wouldn't boost our capabilties by much, and we would still have to adress the same problem in 10-20 years as the -H models start hitting the wall. But it's also the most likely to happen, since it involves the least political risk. Doesn't involve spending much money up front, and doesn't have a whole lot of controversay.


The C-17/C-27J mix is not a bad option, but as has been pointed out, there is a very large gap between the two. It would be like giving your infantry only pistols and high-end ATGMs, when a rifle is really what's needed most of the time. The C-130 is so popular exactly because MOST of the time, it's exactly what you need.

A C-130J/C-17 mix is the most expensive option, and maybe the most capable, but I can't see us having a large enough fleet of C-17s to make it really work. An option here might be to lease the C-17s from the US, while owning the C-130Js. You would have to do some major numbers crunching to see if that would work out in dollar terms though.

The A400 is just too far away for my tastes. It hasn't flown yet, and we have no guarantees it will be delivered on time (and every expectation that it won't be). It's a good middle-of-the-road option, is on the small side of strategic, and the large side of tactical, and will probably see a fairly large production run. One option that could make the A400 option work would be leasing some C-17s until the A400 comes. This is a very popular option right now, with the RAF already doing it, and Germany looking closely at it.

However, my personal favorite option would be to use aircraft like the Twin Otter to replace most of the Buffalo's roles. Maybe buy some C-27Js, but I prefer something much smaller and cheaper.  keep the -H models hercs, and lease some Il-76s until a Canadian model can be produced. The Il-76 is still in full-swing production, with a wide variety of avionics and engine fits. There are a lot of customers who want fully westernized Candids, but I'm not so convinced that this would result in much real benefit. The engines do have shorter TBOs, but they are also essentially sealed units. Virtually no maintenance in between overhauls, and extremely easy to replace. So long as we had a reasonably large stock of spare engines, I really can't see any reason to use western ones. We just send them back to the factory a few dozen at a time, and get a few dozen back in exchange, and we're good to go. The avionics, on the other hand, aren't quite as good as their western counterparts, so upgrading some of them might be worth looking into, but a pre-production avionics upgrade is not  big deal. Just lift out 90% of the avionics from the Polaris (only changing the proprietary airbus stuff, that they wouldn't want on their competition's aircraft), and build one prototype. The avionics would be fitted to the aircraft before they're produced, which is easy as pie. Even if we insisted on a western engine, and all western avionics, the Candids would still be cheaper than A400s, or C-17s, the only really heavy-lift competitors.

In addition, unlike any of the other contenders (except the KC-130J) it also comes in a proper strategic tanker version, something Canada, and a lot of our allies, is desperately short of. The Candid is extremely viable as both a strategic AND tactical airlifter, and was designed specifically to operate in arctic conditions, something that we are going to be needing to do a lot more of, if current trends are anything to go by. It is also far cheaper to purchase (even with western engines) than any other strategic lifter.

Eventually, as the -H model Hercs run out of life, we could replace them with C-27Js, or maybe get more Candids and whatever we replace the Twotter and Beaver with.  Shorts Sherpas maybe? 

The real black-sheep contender, westernized An-124s, is economically viable, but not likely. The key to that deal being that WE would then be leasing the highly demanded, and highly profitable aircraft to other militaries, and would not have to wait on them when WE need to lease them. That's a much more controversial option though, since we would be de-facto supporting any mission than used them, something liable to put politicians in hot water. I don't really see it happening, and that's probably for the better.

But I'm still behind the Il-76 option. It a proven serious heavy lifter, that was designed to operate in our climate, and can fulfill any tactical or strategic mission we need. Forget not being able to lift an MGS, the thing will haul Leopards. It's also cheap. The only thing it DOESN'T have going for it is a large political lobby. Now, if we made sure that it had an avionics suite designed and manufactured by Bombardier... Or if P&WC started licence producing an engine large enough to fit an Il-76...
Barring that, I think keeping the C-130Hs, and leasing C-17s until we can get some A400s would be the way to go.

 

[Bert]

Interesting post.  However, one can compare the specs of light, medium, and heavy lift aircraft.
Knowing the type of airfields light and medium lift aircraft may face, the requirement to support
smaller operations especially in remote regions is still a day to day requirement in Canada and abroad. 
Acquiring light lift, like the C-27, significantly reduces the ability to transport supplies and heavier
machinery where C-17s are impractical to go (assuming medium lift is phased out).  I've looked
into the cargo area of the C-27 and be hardpressed to believe light lift could replace medium lift in
the circumstances I'm referring.

Just speculating the scenario of the acquisition of  light and heavy lift with limited or no medium lift,
the number of heavy lift aircraft would not be significant.  The heavy aircraft would be rotated from
active duty to maintenance leaving the light lift to do most of the shorter domestic or in-threatre distribution
runs. Without medium lift, the CF may have to contract other militaries to move cargo light lift is
not able to.  I'm referring to tactical supply of helicopters, BVs, vehicles, beer, food, FOL and rapid
deployments, boxtops, mixed runs, and supply of smaller taskings that keeps locations operating day to
day.

The light, medium, and heavy lift all have their own characteristics of flight, maintenance, capacity, and
scope.  The need for strategic lift is important but what the C-130 and its type are doing now to maintain
CF operations can't be ignored.

 

[FSTO]

FSTO - feel free.

Glad to be of service.

Thanks

 

[FoverF]

I don't really see a big issue with phasing out medium lift, so long as your heavy lift replacement isn't ridiculously large. We're still going to have Hercs for many years to come. And when they are replaced, we'll have to look at what kind of tasking they're getting to determine a proper replacement. In my opinion (which in not set in stone), a smaller machine should be fine for most work (obviously not all). And whie the Il-76 is a pretty large machine, anything  too big for a C-27 or CN-235 (or whatever you want to call it) should be able to justify it. We'd be looking at moving vehicles, or tens of tons of freight, in which case the Ilyushin (or A400M) is not really overkill anyways. And it's low purchase price means we can afford enough airframes to do the dirty work.

Basically, anything a Herc can do, an Il-76 or A400M can do too (albeit for a bit more money in fuel burned). But having these heavier birds around means that we have a while range of capabilties the CF has never had before. Like moving several Griffons at a time without having to disassemble except to stow the blades. Or being able to airflift whole mech companies overseas in a matter of days.

 

[Hawker]

Now I know that this is a bit of a swerve out of the current discussion, but what about the idea of adding to our current Polaris fleet?
With the conversion of two the air to air refueling and one as a VIP plane, there is only two for the 'airport to airport' strategic lift.
Now in no way would this eliminate the need for a C-17/A-400 for bulky equipment etc, but could it perhaps reduce the need by having more of these planes for passenger/relatively light cargo duties?  As compared to other aircraft, A 310's are readily available (I believe there are even a couple of former Canada 3000 planes available, hearkening back to how we got the Polaris in the first place), they would be relatively inexpensive and are already in our fleet.