Should Armour crew the TUA? Which type of unit should it be in?

[Lance Wiebe]

Like I mentioned before, TOW was originally issued to the Armoured.  After training about 100 people, firing dozens of missiles, the decision was made to give them to the infantry.  Why?  Who knows?  All I know is that we taught the Infantry for about one year, before they finally started running their own courses.  Now the wheel turns......

So, where does the TOW really belong?  Should the Infanteer concentrate on closing with the enemy, as is traditional?  TOW has no place there.  The Armour, which preaches flexibility, mobility and firepower as its mantra?  TOW doesn't belong there either.  I just wish that instead o highly payed staff weenies losing and winning turf wars, that we would concentrate on a doctrine for the army, then deciding how to man it.  This is pathetic........

 

[Scoobie Newbie]

TOW allows the Infantry a defense against armour without having to rely on our own armour.  TOW also serves as a quasi recce element as well.  To close with and destroy the enemy also includes armored vehicles.  Just my opinion.

 

[Lance Wiebe]

TOW is strictly a defensive weapon.

I wrote the above tongue in cheek, BTW.  In my opinion, the TOW should belong to the Infantry, so they can employ it to suit their defense plan, and on the offense, the TOW can be used for flank security and, using the sights, it can also be used for overwatch.  TOW can be used by armour, of course, but why have two weapon systems that do much the same thing attached together?  If our few tanks are employed in a blocking force, or preparing a counter-attack, or whatever, at least the Infantry aren't left with nothing but the almost useless (because of range) Eryx as their only anti-armour weapon.

 

[Scoobie Newbie]

Thanks for setting me straight.  Seriously.

 

[Brad Sallows]

Which branch should man the anti-armour units at the brigade (coy/sqn), division (bn/regt), and corps (bde/group) level?

Answer that question, and you will correctly identify the colour of the beret at the unit level.

 

[Infanteer]

This is what I dislike about the regimental/branch system in general.  I could care less on who mans a TOW, whether he be from the Infantry or the Armour; he could be a Refrigeration Tech for all I care.  The crux of the matter is that the Mechanized Infantry Battalion has been deprived of a crucial defensive asset for the sake of some bureaucratic juggling, and no replacement seems to be readily available.  All the talk about person years seems irrelevent when you acknowledge the fact that you have reduced the fighting power of one of our key formations.  I understand that the asset has been sent up to Brigade level.  That seems to be the wrong directing; historical trends show the neccessity of forcing combined arms down rather than up.

Unfortunatly, as CFL alluded to, at some point some guy in Ottawa is going to have the blood of Canadian soldiers on his hands when a pack of T-72s decide to come rumbling over the flanks.

 

[Scoobie Newbie]

If that happens and I survive it, I'll be taking a little trip to the glass palace and go medievel on that sum bitch.   Then I check into the rubber room for some much needed head space and timing.

 

[Brad Sallows]

"Blood on the hands"will only occur if no one - infantry, armour, refrigeration techs - provides an integral or attached (eg. from a brigade anti-armour squadron) platoon to a battalion which faces a risk of massed armoured attacks.

 

[Scoobie Newbie]

I'd rather have the assets as an integral part vs relying on another unit to provide security because when the shit hits the fan who knows what will happen.  Why not have a cohesive force with all the basic elements, anti armour elements, immediate fire support, immediate engineering support, immediate recce elements all in one harmonious unit.  Have redundant elements for the bigger picture.  What are these officers using to formulate the future of our army?  Military for Dummies?  Time to clean house.

 

[Fishbone Jones]

Why not have a cohesive force with all the basic elements, anti armour elements, immediate fire support, immediate engineering support, immediate recce elements all in one harmonious unit. 

You mean like we already had with the now defunct Armoured Assault Troop or the Infantry Pioneers?

 

[Scoobie Newbie]

Well I'm not familiar with the armoured assault troop (educate me please)?   As far as mortars and pioneers go then yes.

 

[Infanteer]

"Blood on the hands"will only occur if no one - infantry, armour, refrigeration techs - provides an integral or attached (eg. from a brigade anti-armour squadron) platoon to a battalion which faces a risk of massed armoured attacks.

Obviously, the topic of TOW's refers specifically to Armoured threats, which may or may not be low on the threat horizon right now.   However, I figure it is the core of the issue that I am opposing; that being that when we remove the greatest percentage of firepower from a maneuver unit (Infantry Battalion, Armoured Regiment) we are depriving it of fighting power.   Saying it will have the abilities augmented is potentially making promises you can't keep.   I remember hearing that the C-6 provides 80% of the firepower to the platoon.   Would we have a platoon depend on 80% of its firepower to come from another source, one that has its own problems during battle?   I remember reading that one of the reason for German tactical successes in both WWI and WWII was that they built their small units around the heavier supporting arms (ie, an MG) rather then simply building a unit around the rifles with a few heavier weapons to spice things up.

What if we removed all the support weapons (C-9s, C-6s, 60mm, and Carl G's) away from the Infantry Platoon and sent it up to company or battalion in order to pool the resources.   What would happen when 35 guys carrying rifles required suppressive fire in order to maneuver around the enemy?   They would be up shit creek if all those assets were away at another sector of the battlefield, or worse, not even present because they were all used on the last ROTO in order to patrol Bosnian coffeeshops.

Forcing combined arms doctrine down should enable a significant force multiplier for smaller units in the field.  The small unit commander simply has more at his disposal.   Removing these capabilities to higher echelons which will provide the support can only serve to curb the initiative and the ability to react to the ever changing situations on the battlefield for lower level commanders, ultimately serving to slow down actions and increase friendly casualties.

I hope it doesn't seem like I'm lecturing.   I'm just trying to give the reasoning behind my rational for thinking this is a bad choice.

 

[Coyote43D]

Well I'm not familiar with the armoured assault troop (educate me please)?   As far as mortars and pioneers go then yes.

CFL,
Assault Troop is the armoured version of an infantry Pioneer Platoon. They are part of Recce Sqn

 

[Scoobie Newbie]

Thanks.


I'm getting a bit tired of our military being bastardized for some smucks grand vision.  Anyone know where I can find the Offical Oppostion Parties defence critics name and email.  Also Peter Worthington's email while I'm at it.

 

[Armymedic]

Check under

www.parl.gc.ca

specifically:http://www.parl.gc.ca/common/senmemb/house/members/CurrentMemberList.asp?Language=E&Parl=38&Ses=1&Sect=hoccur&Order=PersonOfficialLastName

and look for the email of the Conservative Defence critic, Mr. O'Connor from Carletonâ ”Lanark.

email: OConnor.G@parl.gc.ca

Next time do your own darn homework and you won't be a CFL forever. ;D

 

[Scoobie Newbie]

Hey I like it where I am thank you very much.

 

[Brad Sallows]

If the capabilities removed as part of a redistribution of personnel to overcome current shortfalls are not returned if we mobilize formations (brigade+) with the intention of mid- to high-intensity warfighting against modern mechanized formations, then the change is likely to be a bad risk.  (Hedge: if the capability is revolutionized, it may not be necessary to vest it in a combat support element; an example would be a dismounted fire/forget LRAAW which could realistically be distributed one per section.)

However, as long as combat support platoons continue to be attached under full command of infantry battalions and recce squadrons when necessary, it is almost irrelevant that they are not part of the permanent unit establishment.  The caveat is that the platoons should train collectively with the supported unit types on a regular basis.  The critical risk with removing pioneer, mortar, anti-armour, assault, etc platoons from the battalions and squadrons is not that they will never be provided under some form of command arrangement, but that they will not train collectively often enough for the attached elements to retain the institutional knowledge of infantry battalion, recce squadron etc TTPs.

 

[Infanteer]

I fully agree with the assessment in your last statement, Brad.

Here is a potentially daunting question yet one that must be asked; I remember the issue was floating around prior to 9/11.

Perhaps, with current manning conditions, we may have to break up one Infantry battalion from each brigade.   The numbers would be used to fill up their remaining two sister battalions, bringing them up to strength (Should we bring them back to four companies, or is that part of doctrine completely antiquated by now?) and filling out the training establishments.   One Battalion can focus on Mech tactics and doctrine while the other performs the Light Infantry role.   Since I can't see a CMBG ever being used as a manuever formation in the next while, it shouldn't be necessary to stick to Brigade TO&E.

Does anyone think it would be better to have two full strength battalions then three emaciated ones?   I have my own opinion on the matter, I'm just throwing the bone out for discussion.

 

[Scoobie Newbie]

During the 90's wasn't that the case?  10/90

 

[McG]

If the capabilities removed as part of a redistribution of personnel to overcome current shortfalls are not returned if we mobilize formations (brigade+) with the intention of mid- to high-intensity warfighting against modern mechanized formations, then the change is likely to be a bad risk.  ...

However, as long as combat support platoons continue to be attached under full command of infantry battalions and recce squadrons when necessary, it is almost irrelevant that they are not part of the permanent unit establishment.  ...

The move to LAV III TUA will result in a reduced number of platforms (not all M113 TUA will be converted to LAV) so we will not have the option of returning the capability in the event of a high intensity war.

By concentrating all the TUA in the LdSH it will also mean that 2 and 5 brigade units will only train along side TUA once every three years.  Is this often enough to maintain interoperability with TUA and those formations?