• Thanks for stopping by. Logging in to a registered account will remove all generic ads. Please reach out with any questions or concerns.

On the Toxicity of the ‘Warrior’ Ethos

Everyone wearing a uniform has (or should have) regardless of trade or element accepted the risk they will be potentially placed in harms way.
I could be wrong here, but my read of @Navy_Pete 's comment is that the risk acceptance for HMCS X for various things isn't the crew but rather folks that aren't physically affected if things happen to HMCS X.
 
I could be wrong here, but my read of @Navy_Pete 's comment is that the risk acceptance for HMCS X for various things isn't the crew but rather folks that aren't physically affected if things happen to HMCS X.
That's exactly how I read it as well.

As an extreme example, Cmdre Bloggins in Halifax can "assume the risk" of putting a ship to sea with only one fire pump working. The 250 souls abord that ship actully face the risk, while the person "accepting the risk" sits comfortable ashore.
 
The most toxic leaders I've worked with and worked for in the CAF have been those who spoke the loudest about being warriors.

Same. Especially within the HQ Support and CSS side of the house. Chips on the shoulder and what not.

I personally molded my troops into the mindset that we (Sigs folk) are crucial to the fight because we allow Commanders to take that force and make it precise. All well and good to furiously and blindly swing a hammer at a nail; much better to have that hammer make contact every single time because you can see what you're doing.

We may not be kicking in doors and taking the trench, but we sure as hell ensure that it's the right door/trench, and that we can get any and all effects on that trench when things go south.

If I were to call folks "Cyber Warriors" like a previous CO of mine, I'd get the same eye rolls and sarcasm.
 
If I were to call folks "Cyber Warriors" like a previous CO of mine, I'd get the same eye rolls and sarcasm.
"But Cyber is a warfare domain!"

- Those guys, probably.

In all seriousness, that domain is crucial and offensive Cyber could presumably be considered hostile acts. It's also very hard to show and very unsexy, so I wouldn't expect the next Top Gun or Band of Brothers about a Cyber unit :ROFLMAO:
 
In all seriousness, that domain is crucial and offensive Cyber could presumably be considered hostile acts. It's also very hard to show and very unsexy, so I wouldn't expect the next Top Gun or Band of Brothers about a Cyber unit :ROFLMAO:
People would be pastier in colour than Elon Musk...not a good look on film, as everyone, including spectators, would need sunglasses...or it would have to be filmed like a Kari Lake campaign ad...
 
"But Cyber is a warfare domain!"

- Those guys, probably.

In all seriousness, that domain is crucial and offensive Cyber could presumably be considered hostile acts. It's also very hard to show and very unsexy, so I wouldn't expect the next Top Gun or Band of Brothers about a Cyber unit :ROFLMAO:
They made a movie about the boffins at Bletchley Park…just sayin’!
 
I could be wrong here, but my read of @Navy_Pete 's comment is that the risk acceptance for HMCS X for various things isn't the crew but rather folks that aren't physically affected if things happen to HMCS X.
Yes, and I meant specifically outside the normal 'risk management' thing we do (which is pretty crude at best anyway, with 1500+ defects per ship, with other big ones not even being tracked, and no 'big picture' roll ups of compounding risks).

HR risk has been a huge one for over a decade, with projects not getting done, obsolescence items not getting figured out (or even aware of due to lack of HR), spares not getting bought etc. Now lots of 10+ year old projects, obsolete items that are broken, no spare parts for repairs (etc etc) that end up with real issues on the ship side.

Similarly not enough people to do maintenance/repairs, or time in the schedule to do maintenance/repairs, so ships go to sea with things broken/not maintained.

And schools have been significantly underfunded/undermanned for a long time so lot of out of date training material, lack of experienced instructors, and general facility shortages, which has all been 'at risk' for a long time. (not that it matters, as we've only been getting our 20% of our strategic intake for a long time)

Basically a lot of non-ship risks being 'realized' that directly impact ships ability to do stuff. During Afghanistan, no big deal, but the Navy just drove harder since while it continues to bleed people, wear out gear and shave the overall icecube so we have no spare capacity left.

The number of people retiring/leaving/taking sick leave due to watching this coming for a decade with no changes and having enough of the sleepless nights is crazy. We're losing centuries of experience in support lines that isn't being passed onto the next generation.

But no big deal, supporting the fleet is a no fail mission so we'll just pick ourselves up by our bootstraps, brace the mainsail, and misuse whatever other stupid cliche is required to try and motivate people while trying not to pretend things have hit critical mass for a luge run downhill. If that fails, blame middle leadership (and hope no one ATIs all the memos, BNs, reports etc raising all the risks and pointing out things we just can't do).

There is an expected amount of risk, but shouldn't be because we don't have enough basic safety equipment, can't schedule time to fix things properly, or scale back the number of ships at sea to the crews we actually have. That's just a blatant and cavalier disregard for the sailors, and no reason we should sail below basic SOLAS for routine things. It just all builds up and means we don't ever get the ships combat capable for when they go into real threat areas, because we spend a lot of the time just trying to keep the basics going.
 
Yes, and I meant specifically outside the normal 'risk management' thing we do (which is pretty crude at best anyway, with 1500+ defects per ship, with other big ones not even being tracked, and no 'big picture' roll ups of compounding risks).

HR risk has been a huge one for over a decade, with projects not getting done, obsolescence items not getting figured out (or even aware of due to lack of HR), spares not getting bought etc. Now lots of 10+ year old projects, obsolete items that are broken, no spare parts for repairs (etc etc) that end up with real issues on the ship side.

Similarly not enough people to do maintenance/repairs, or time in the schedule to do maintenance/repairs, so ships go to sea with things broken/not maintained.

And schools have been significantly underfunded/undermanned for a long time so lot of out of date training material, lack of experienced instructors, and general facility shortages, which has all been 'at risk' for a long time. (not that it matters, as we've only been getting our 20% of our strategic intake for a long time)

Basically a lot of non-ship risks being 'realized' that directly impact ships ability to do stuff. During Afghanistan, no big deal, but the Navy just drove harder since while it continues to bleed people, wear out gear and shave the overall icecube so we have no spare capacity left.

The number of people retiring/leaving/taking sick leave due to watching this coming for a decade with no changes and having enough of the sleepless nights is crazy. We're losing centuries of experience in support lines that isn't being passed onto the next generation.

But no big deal, supporting the fleet is a no fail mission so we'll just pick ourselves up by our bootstraps, brace the mainsail, and misuse whatever other stupid cliche is required to try and motivate people while trying not to pretend things have hit critical mass for a luge run downhill. If that fails, blame middle leadership (and hope no one ATIs all the memos, BNs, reports etc raising all the risks and pointing out things we just can't do).

There is an expected amount of risk, but shouldn't be because we don't have enough basic safety equipment, can't schedule time to fix things properly, or scale back the number of ships at sea to the crews we actually have. That's just a blatant and cavalier disregard for the sailors, and no reason we should sail below basic SOLAS for routine things. It just all builds up and means we don't ever get the ships combat capable for when they go into real threat areas, because we spend a lot of the time just trying to keep the basics going.
It's disturbing that a near-miss with PRO has been ignored so effectively.
 
Is there a bookkeeper tracking “First CPF to crack its keel and sink?”
 
Western forces have had big "tails" for a long time now. No reason for the "head" not to inculcate a particular culture if it wants it. Are our forces just too small to allow this?
 
Perpetuating an institutionalized form of leadership Hubris won't help...

Rooting Out Hubris, Before a Fall​


Hubris, the sin of overweening pride or arrogance, may be the most misunderstood disorder an executive will ever be confronted with. It’s not just narcissism; it’s much more dangerous than that.

... narcissism is a character disorder, which means it starts in the teenage years and defines a person’s entire modus operandi. If, owing to a childhood that left you bereft of good feelings about yourself, you feel a need to preen and self-promote to merely stay afloat psychologically, that problem sticks with you forever. Psychotherapy can dampen a narcissist’s tendency to self-aggrandize, but under duress he’ll regress and become insufferably self-centered. A narcissist is pretty much a narcissist all the time.

Hubris, on the other hand, is a reactive disorder: Either the unfortunate consequence of endless laudatory press clippings leading to supreme over-confidence, or the culmination of a winning streak that causes a person to suffer the transient delusion that he is bullet-proof. Many good people will, under bad circumstances, suffer from hubris— but they tend to recover after toppling from their pedestals shrinks their egos back down to size.

Kenneth Lay, the former CEO of Enron, is a good example of executive hubris. Long before the company imploded, Lay lauded his company for being a “new economy” corporation “before it became cool to be one.” In an email sent to employees and the public only weeks before Enron’s coffers ran dry, Lay boasted, “Our performance has never been stronger, our business model has never been more robust. We have the finest organization in American business today.”

What is tragic about Lay’s self-destruction and the Enron collapse — apart from the number of lives ruined by it — is that Lay built the business, retired, and returned in a effort to save it, not to feather his own nest. Yet ultimately Lay could not throw himself on his shield and admit defeat, so he let his pride get in the way of reason, causing devastation as a result. Unable to watch his pride and joy fail, and unwilling to make the hard decisions that might have saved a diminished version of it, he decided to cook the books – and in so doing, his business’s goose.

 
Enron was McKinsey through and through. You can't understand Enron without understanding McKinsey.
 
Back
Top