Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[WestIsle]

 

[GR66]

Currently our Reg Force Brigades are (relatively) symmetrical but our basing arrangements are not symmetrical.

Base	Tanks	Cavalry	LAV Infantry	Light Infantry	Artillery	Engineers	Service
CFB Edmonton	1 x Regiment (-)		1 x Battalion	1 x Battalion		1 x Regiment	1 x Battalion
CFB Shilo			1 x Battalion		1 x Regiment
CFB Petawawa		1 x Regiment (-)	1 x Battalion	1 x Battalion	1 x Regiment	1 x Regiment	1 x Battalion
BFC Quebec			1 x Battalion
BFC Valcartier		1 x Regiment (-)	1 x Battalion	1 x Battalion	1 x Regiment	1 x Regiment	1 x Battalion
CFB Gagetown	1 x Squadron		1 x Battalion
eFP Latvia	1 x Squadron (-)		1 x Company (+)

Which would provide a greater advantages for the CA?
1) The greatest possible mix of unit types in a single location so they can regularly practice combined arms operations
2) Concentrating the same unit types together to focus their training/support (and limit the need to move personnel) and conduct annual exercises with the other unit types at training centres to practice combined arms operations.

Would there be advantages to a geographic distribution something more like this?

Base	Tanks	Cavalry	LAV Infantry	Light Infantry	Artillery	Engineers	Service
CFB Edmonton	1 x Regiment*		3 x Battalions				1 x Battalion
CFB Shilo					3 x Regiments
CFB Petawawa		1 x Light Sqn*		3 x Battalions			1 x Battalion
BFC Quebec				1 x Battalion*
BFC Valcartier		2 x Regiments*					1 x Battalion
CFB Gagetown						3 x Regiments
eFP Latvia	1 x Squadron (-)		1 x Company (+)

* The only structural changes I'd make from our current force structure at this point would be:

• The single Tank Regiment (LdSH) would be separated from the RCAC's proposed Cavalry structure and focus as the force generator for the eFP Latvia Tank Squadron with a traditional anti-armour focus rather than the recently proposed "heavy cavalry" focus.
• The 2 x Cavalry regiments at BFC Valcartier would be slightly modified from their recently proposed LAV/TAPV structure to have 3 x Cavalry Squadrons and 1 x LAV Infantry Company.
• There would be a single Light Vehicle-based Cavalry Squadron in Petawawa to support the Light Infantry Brigade
• The only "isolated" unit would be a single Light Infantry Battalion at BFC Quebec to provide a French-Language Light Infantry unit as well as providing a 4th Light Infantry Battalion so that if/when one Battalion serves as fly-over reinforcement for Multi-National Brigade Latvia there is still 3 x Battalions remaining to force generate an additional deployable Battalion if required.

 

[WestIsle]

Currently our Reg Force Brigades are (relatively) symmetrical but our basing arrangements are not symmetrical.

Base	Tanks	Cavalry	LAV Infantry	Light Infantry	Artillery	Engineers	Service
CFB Edmonton	1 x Regiment (-)		1 x Battalion	1 x Battalion		1 x Regiment	1 x Battalion
CFB Shilo			1 x Battalion		1 x Regiment
CFB Petawawa		1 x Regiment (-)	1 x Battalion	1 x Battalion	1 x Regiment	1 x Regiment	1 x Battalion
BFC Quebec			1 x Battalion
BFC Valcartier		1 x Regiment (-)	1 x Battalion	1 x Battalion	1 x Regiment	1 x Regiment	1 x Battalion
CFB Gagetown	1 x Squadron		1 x Battalion
eFP Latvia	1 x Squadron (-)		1 x Company (+)

Which would provide a greater advantages for the CA?
1) The greatest possible mix of unit types in a single location so they can regularly practice combined arms operations
2) Concentrating the same unit types together to focus their training/support (and limit the need to move personnel) and conduct annual exercises with the other unit types at training centres to practice combined arms operations.

Would there be advantages to a geographic distribution something more like this?

Base	Tanks	Cavalry	LAV Infantry	Light Infantry	Artillery	Engineers	Service
CFB Edmonton	1 x Regiment*		3 x Battalions				1 x Battalion
CFB Shilo					3 x Regiments
CFB Petawawa		1 x Light Sqn*		3 x Battalions			1 x Battalion
BFC Quebec				1 x Battalion*
BFC Valcartier		2 x Regiments*					1 x Battalion
CFB Gagetown						3 x Regiments
eFP Latvia	1 x Squadron (-)		1 x Company (+)

* The only structural changes I'd make from our current force structure at this point would be:

• The single Tank Regiment (LdSH) would be separated from the RCAC's proposed Cavalry structure and focus as the force generator for the eFP Latvia Tank Squadron with a traditional anti-armour focus rather than the recently proposed "heavy cavalry" focus.
• The 2 x Cavalry regiments at BFC Valcartier would be slightly modified from their recently proposed LAV/TAPV structure to have 3 x Cavalry Squadrons and 1 x LAV Infantry Company.
• There would be a single Light Vehicle-based Cavalry Squadron in Petawawa to support the Light Infantry Brigade
• The only "isolated" unit would be a single Light Infantry Battalion at BFC Quebec to provide a French-Language Light Infantry unit as well as providing a 4th Light Infantry Battalion so that if/when one Battalion serves as fly-over reinforcement for Multi-National Brigade Latvia there is still 3 x Battalions remaining to force generate an additional deployable Battalion if required.

I think you gotta play the language/population game a bit. It blows having to be shoe horned into it but due to the weak representation in the Navy and less so the RCAF you army needs to carry the difference of having units and bases in which Francophones can serve. Arguably you also need to adhere to a third of the Canadian based forces being in both the West, Ontario, and the East. How that works with NDHQ and CANSOFCOM being largely Ontario based IDK.

 

[Kirkhill]

Thoughts -


9x Rifle Platoons with 2x Javelin + 1x Anti-Armor Platoon with 8x Javelin = 26x Javelin?
27x Rifle Squads with 1x CG84 + 9x Weapons Squads with 1x CG84 + 1x Anti-Armor Platoon with 4x CG84 = 40x CG84?

A battalion with 26 Javelins and 40 CG-84s feels to me as if it is well equipped to handle an armour threat.
Especially if operating as part of a division with a brigade of howitzers, and potentially HIMARs, and a battalion of assault guns in support.
And the CG-84, in US service, has access to the full range of ammunition manufactured by SAAB.

...

Separating infantry from vehicles?
The narrator speaks as if the vehicle is a pre-requisite for the infantry. The re-org suggests to me that the infantry battalion is going to focus on the infanteer on the ground and what can be carried on the back.

Vehicles will be somebody else's job, just like arty, engineering and service support. They will be supplied when and if.

...

1x Booker Battalion per Light Div supplying 1x Booker Company per Brigade which in turn can supply 1x Booker Platoon per Battalion, when and if.

...

1x Robotics and Autonomous Systems Platoon per Battalion with Remote Combat Vehicles (Light), Small Multipurpose Equipment Transport and Ghost-X UAV.

RCV-L is armed and tracked. S-MET is a wheeled logistics ATV and the Ghost-X is an IRS helicopter. All of which can be transported by air in the same aircraft that transport the new light infantry structure.

Comment about the RCV-Ls being employed in place of the Weapons Company Hummvees. It was mentioned that the Hummvees were often detached to conduct cavalry duties escorting convoys. The weapons on the Hummvees were lost to the Battalion, a problem if you were fighting a positional battle and needed that heavy firepower to thicken your lines. Having the heavy weapons mounted on crawlers that can move with the legs and at the pace of the legs means that they will stay with the legs and be available to support the legs when the legs run into heavier targets.

There was also comment about the crawlers being used for first contact. I don't think that is likely. I think first contact is likely to be via the UAVs, currently thought to be the Ghost-X mini-helicopter.

The armed crawlers I am going to guess are likely to be a rapidly redeployable reaction force that will allow for fewer gunners, the guns to relocate and run in and out of battery, and keep the gunners remote from the guns, saving the gunners.

...

I wonder how long before this RAS Platoon becomes a Company with separate Support and Logistics Platoons with the Support Platoon crewing the armed crawlers and the Logistics Platoons crewing the SMET mule. And further, how long it takes before each Squad gets its own SMET.

 

[KevinB]

Thoughts -


9x Rifle Platoons with 2x Javelin + 1x Anti-Armor Platoon with 8x Javelin = 26x Javelin?
27x Rifle Squads with 1x CG84 + 9x Weapons Squads with 1x CG84 + 1x Anti-Armor Platoon with 4x CG84 = 40x CG84?

Depends on the type of unit. Some Div’s allocate 1 Javelin/ Squad, while others have 1/Platoon. Mainly as the theory is the Bradley units have a TOW on the vehicle, and if they aren’t forward deployed don’t need as many Javelins.

Eventually I understand the plan of every squad will have a NLOS Javelin and an acquisition system for that (recon drone)

A battalion with 26 Javelins and 40 CG-84s feels to me as if it is well equipped to handle an armour threat.
Especially if operating as part of a division with a brigade of howitzers, and potentially HIMARs, and a battalion of assault guns in support.
And the CG-84, in US service, has access to the full range of ammunition manufactured by SAAB.

...

Separating infantry from vehicles?
The narrator speaks as if the vehicle is a pre-requisite for the infantry. The re-org suggests to me that the infantry battalion is going to focus on the infanteer on the ground and what can be carried on the back.

Vehicles will be somebody else's job, just like arty, engineering and service support. They will be supplied when and if.

When they killed the Mech Inf MOS down here, it really did a number on the trade - with a very different mindset going into how to approach the mission.

Light Infantry should never equate to Mech Inf, as Light Infantry aren’t just Infantry without vehicles, and Mech Inf isn’t just Light Infantry with vehicles.

...

1x Booker Battalion per Light Div supplying 1x Booker Company per Brigade which in turn can supply 1x Booker Platoon per Battalion, when and if.

Again the entire Booker concept fails to address the doctrine use of a Light entity.

It’s like some folks in the Army are falling for the whole 80’s concern of too light to Fight on the Light Div’s that gave rise to the Medium Stryker idea - that quickly got too heavy to be moved quickly.

...

1x Robotics and Autonomous Systems Platoon per Battalion with Remote Combat Vehicles (Light), Small Multipurpose Equipment Transport and Ghost-X UAV.

RCV-L is armed and tracked. S-MET is a wheeled logistics ATV and the Ghost-X is an IRS helicopter. All of which can be transported by air in the same aircraft that transport the new light infantry structure.

Comment about the RCV-Ls being employed in place of the Weapons Company Hummvees. It was mentioned that the Hummvees were often detached to conduct cavalry duties escorting convoys. The weapons on the Hummvees were lost to the Battalion, a problem if you were fighting a positional battle and needed that heavy firepower to thicken your lines.

That’s a bad take away the US Army has made from GWOT. The Weapons Coy was detached to do Convoy as they generally were not needed for the urban patrolling. In areas where the BN’s where conducting offensive operations, the Wpns Coy’s where not detached (unless the Bde Commander was an assclown).

Having the heavy weapons mounted on crawlers that can move with the legs and at the pace of the legs means that they will stay with the legs and be available to support the legs when the legs run into heavier targets.

Except when the legs go places the crawlers can go…

There was also comment about the crawlers being used for first contact. I don't think that is likely. I think first contact is likely to be via the UAVs, currently thought to be the Ghost-X mini-helicopter.

Agreed.

The armed crawlers I am going to guess are likely to be a rapidly redeployable reaction force that will allow for fewer gunners, the guns to relocate and run in and out of battery, and keep the gunners remote from the guns, saving the gunners.

I think you need to define Gunners and Guns better.

...

I wonder how long before this RAS Platoon becomes a Company with separate Support and Logistics Platoons with the Support Platoon crewing the armed crawlers and the Logistics Platoons crewing the SMET mule. And further, how long it takes before each Squad gets its own SMET.

I think it’s less of a when in terms of time, and more of a when for situations.



Some of the ideas down here just make me shake my head.

 

[FJAG]

Which would provide a greater advantages for the CA?
1) The greatest possible mix of unit types in a single location so they can regularly practice combined arms operations
2) Concentrating the same unit types together to focus their training/support (and limit the need to move personnel) and conduct annual exercises with the other unit types at training centres to practice combined arms operations.

I'm not much of an advocate for forcing the colocation of units for either one or the other. Units are too complex to easily categorize.

As an example one rarely needs to train artillery and infantry together other than the artillery's tactical gps (BC, FSCC, FOOS, JTACs) should train with their respective battalions at their Level 5 events. Guns not so much because our current safety regulations make live fire support almost meaningless.

IMHO, recce regiments do not need to train with bns but should occasionally train with their bde HQ. Since the two are generally out of sight of each other in battle, such an exercise could conceivably be done in two separate locations as a split FTX.

Tanks and their supporting mech infantry need to train together as a battle group at Level 5 and above. However, a HET or rail move to get them to come together is also a valuable training exercise.

Engineer dets should also train with their supported arms at level 5 and above but much of this is at single engineer detachments which can easily be moved. (Incidentally are we equipped and trained for mine and defensive fortification tasks to the extent that we should be in light of Ukraine?)

Artillery regiments do not need to be collocated to practice massed div fire control.

And so on. There are places where small teams from one unit need to interact with other units but we only need to bring all of the elements of a brigade together on infrequent (maybe annually) occasions. IMHO that's best accomplished by having a forward deployed CMTC structure collocated with a brigade's worth of equipment in Latvia, and flying battlegroups and brigades over for a major exercise once per year.

 

[FJAG]

Again the entire Booker concept fails to address the doctrine use of a Light entity.

It’s like some folks in the Army are falling for the whole 80’s concern of too light to Fight on the Light Div’s that gave rise to the Medium Stryker idea - that quickly got too heavy to be moved quickly.

The direct fire support vehicle concept has been around for many decades (look back at the Sheridan and its predecessors) and probably reached its zenith with the MGS platoon in the Stryker rifle company.

Unfortunately the MGS didn't work out - either through technical difficulties or tactical ones. They all ended up being pulled out of the companies and a few were reallocated to the SBCT cavalry squadrons.

IMHO, the Booker is a solution looking for a problem to solve. Grouping them into a battalion may help give some flexibility to their employment but my guess is that there will be numerous NTC rotations going through where bde comds are at a loss with what to do with their attached company other than parcel out a platoon here and there hoping it meets the DS pinks.

I'm not an opponent of the SBCT. I agree that the idea of a rapid deployment Stryker force is a pipe dream. More rapid than an ABCT - sure; but not all that rapid to deploy or easy sustain by any stretch of the imagination.

That said, I like the idea of an armored division being two ABCTs and one SBCT. It provides a heavy punch and a flexible, mechanized infantry brigade that complements the armor heavy ABCTs. Giving the div arty bde two M109 battalions and one M777 battalion is plain silly and just a reallocation of existing resources from the three existing BCTs. That needs fixing.

I think you need to define Gunners and Guns better.

Amen. IMHO, the issue is "what are the desired effects that you want your indirect fire capabilities to bring to the party?" Once you figure that out you work backward through the problem. To try to structure artillery on the basis of keeping gunners out of harms way is wrong. That is one factor to consider but the overriding initial question turns on the delivered effects and not the presupposed delivery methodology.

 

[Kirkhill]

Currently our Reg Force Brigades are (relatively) symmetrical but our basing arrangements are not symmetrical.

Base	Tanks	Cavalry	LAV Infantry	Light Infantry	Artillery	Engineers	Service
CFB Edmonton	1 x Regiment (-)		1 x Battalion	1 x Battalion		1 x Regiment	1 x Battalion
CFB Shilo			1 x Battalion		1 x Regiment
CFB Petawawa		1 x Regiment (-)	1 x Battalion	1 x Battalion	1 x Regiment	1 x Regiment	1 x Battalion
BFC Quebec			1 x Battalion
BFC Valcartier		1 x Regiment (-)	1 x Battalion	1 x Battalion	1 x Regiment	1 x Regiment	1 x Battalion
CFB Gagetown	1 x Squadron		1 x Battalion
eFP Latvia	1 x Squadron (-)		1 x Company (+)

Which would provide a greater advantages for the CA?
1) The greatest possible mix of unit types in a single location so they can regularly practice combined arms operations
2) Concentrating the same unit types together to focus their training/support (and limit the need to move personnel) and conduct annual exercises with the other unit types at training centres to practice combined arms operations.

Would there be advantages to a geographic distribution something more like this?

Base	Tanks	Cavalry	LAV Infantry	Light Infantry	Artillery	Engineers	Service
CFB Edmonton	1 x Regiment*		3 x Battalions				1 x Battalion
CFB Shilo					3 x Regiments
CFB Petawawa		1 x Light Sqn*		3 x Battalions			1 x Battalion
BFC Quebec				1 x Battalion*
BFC Valcartier		2 x Regiments*					1 x Battalion
CFB Gagetown						3 x Regiments
eFP Latvia	1 x Squadron (-)		1 x Company (+)

* The only structural changes I'd make from our current force structure at this point would be:

• The single Tank Regiment (LdSH) would be separated from the RCAC's proposed Cavalry structure and focus as the force generator for the eFP Latvia Tank Squadron with a traditional anti-armour focus rather than the recently proposed "heavy cavalry" focus.
• The 2 x Cavalry regiments at BFC Valcartier would be slightly modified from their recently proposed LAV/TAPV structure to have 3 x Cavalry Squadrons and 1 x LAV Infantry Company.
• There would be a single Light Vehicle-based Cavalry Squadron in Petawawa to support the Light Infantry Brigade
• The only "isolated" unit would be a single Light Infantry Battalion at BFC Quebec to provide a French-Language Light Infantry unit as well as providing a 4th Light Infantry Battalion so that if/when one Battalion serves as fly-over reinforcement for Multi-National Brigade Latvia there is still 3 x Battalions remaining to force generate an additional deployable Battalion if required.

Depends on the type of unit. Some Div’s allocate 1 Javelin/ Squad, while others have 1/Platoon. Mainly as the theory is the Bradley units have a TOW on the vehicle, and if they aren’t forward deployed don’t need as many Javelins.

Eventually I understand the plan of every squad will have a NLOS Javelin and an acquisition system for that (recon drone)


When they killed the Mech Inf MOS down here, it really did a number on the trade - with a very different mindset going into how to approach the mission.

Light Infantry should never equate to Mech Inf, as Light Infantry aren’t just Infantry without vehicles, and Mech Inf isn’t just Light Infantry with vehicles.


Again the entire Booker concept fails to address the doctrine use of a Light entity.

It’s like some folks in the Army are falling for the whole 80’s concern of too light to Fight on the Light Div’s that gave rise to the Medium Stryker idea - that quickly got too heavy to be moved quickly.


That’s a bad take away the US Army has made from GWOT. The Weapons Coy was detached to do Convoy as they generally were not needed for the urban patrolling. In areas where the BN’s where conducting offensive operations, the Wpns Coy’s where not detached (unless the Bde Commander was an assclown).



Except when the legs go places the crawlers can go…


Agreed.


I think you need to define Gunners and Guns better.


I think it’s less of a when in terms of time, and more of a when for situations.



Some of the ideas down here just make me shake my head.

I'm not much of an advocate for forcing the colocation of units for either one or the other. Units are too complex to easily categorize.

As an example one rarely needs to train artillery and infantry together other than the artillery's tactical gps (BC, FSCC, FOOS, JTACs) should train with their respective battalions at their Level 5 events. Guns not so much because our current safety regulations make live fire support almost meaningless.

IMHO, recce regiments do not need to train with bns but should occasionally train with their bde HQ. Since the two are generally out of sight of each other in battle, such an exercise could conceivably be done in two separate locations as a split FTX.

Tanks and their supporting mech infantry need to train together as a battle group at Level 5 and above. However, a HET or rail move to get them to come together is also a valuable training exercise.

Engineer dets should also train with their supported arms at level 5 and above but much of this is at single engineer detachments which can easily be moved. (Incidentally are we equipped and trained for mine and defensive fortification tasks to the extent that we should be in light of Ukraine?)

Artillery regiments do not need to be collocated to practice massed div fire control.

And so on. There are places where small teams from one unit need to interact with other units but we only need to bring all of the elements of a brigade together on infrequent (maybe annually) occasions. IMHO that's best accomplished by having a forward deployed CMTC structure collocated with a brigade's worth of equipment in Latvia, and flying battlegroups and brigades over for a major exercise once per year.

One common thread that I am seeing throughout these US discussions is the return to technological amalgamations rather than functional amalgamations.

All the experts are being grouped in garrison. The Arty. The Armo(u)r. The Wings. The Robots. The Engineers. The Transport.....

They are then being called out into ad hoc formations that meet the needs of the situation. It is the Unified Command concept being dragged downwards to the platoon level. Everybody gets the best of what is available to meet the needs of their situation and task. And they get assigned the appropriate expert to work with them.

The BCT was a unified structure designed for a specific situation and task but that situation and task dragged on for 20 years.... and is now in the rearview mirror. The situation may recur but the resources available the next time are going to be different. As will the enemy.

So...

To answer the question about Brigades or Brigade Groups?

Single skill Brigades built around Schools.
More frequent exercises with ad hoc groupings in multiple environments.


And train one or two specific "unified" ad hoc units or formations to meet the needs of a specific current situation.

....

PS @KevinB

WRT legs and crawlers:

Would you rather leg it for 100 km from the LZ with an overloaded ruck and a shortage of ammunition and water?
Or would you rather have a crawler drag your rucks, water and extra ammo for 90 km while you moved in Fighting Order and only had to hump your ruck the last 10 km?
Not to mention the advantages of having a significant cache and retransmission point within 10 km.

 

[FJAG]

Would you rather leg it for 100 km from the LZ with an overloaded ruck and a shortage of ammunition and water?
Or would you rather have a crawler drag your rucks, water and extra ammo for 90 km while you moved in Fighting Order and only had to hump your ruck the last 10 km?

Basicaly this brings us back to the M274 Mule.



They built over 11,000 of these things between 1956 to 1970 in numerous configurations until too old and were replaced by HMWWVs and the M-Gators



The question we need to ask is how complex we make them - stay with a 4 cycle gas engine or something "electric"; and driven or remotely controlled, autonomous etc. Personally I'm a guy who believes in the KISS principle and an M-Gator suits me just fine.

 

[Kirkhill]

Basicaly this brings us back to the M274 Mule.

View attachment 83782

They built over 11,000 of these things between 1956 to 1970 in numerous configurations until too old and were replaced by HMWWVs and the M-Gators

View attachment 83783

The question we need to ask is how complex we make them - stay with a 4 cycle gas engine or something "electric"; and driven or remotely controlled, autonomous etc. Personally I'm a guy who believes in the KISS principle and an M-Gator suits me just fine.

I'm more inclined to the Hybrid than the fully electric models. And if it is cheap and easy to get rid of the driver and save the space and weight taken up by him, his rations and kit then so much the better.

 

[ArmyRick]

Sergeants, Staff Sergeants and Sergeants Major.

Two of those are ranks and

Depends on the type of unit. Some Div’s allocate 1 Javelin/ Squad, while others have 1/Platoon. Mainly as the theory is the Bradley units have a TOW on the vehicle, and if they aren’t forward deployed don’t need as many Javelins.

Eventually I understand the plan of every squad will have a NLOS Javelin and an acquisition system for that (recon drone)


When they killed the Mech Inf MOS down here, it really did a number on the trade - with a very different mindset going into how to approach the mission.

Light Infantry should never equate to Mech Inf, as Light Infantry aren’t just Infantry without vehicles, and Mech Inf isn’t just Light Infantry with vehicles.


Again the entire Booker concept fails to address the doctrine use of a Light entity.

It’s like some folks in the Army are falling for the whole 80’s concern of too light to Fight on the Light Div’s that gave rise to the Medium Stryker idea - that quickly got too heavy to be moved quickly.


That’s a bad take away the US Army has made from GWOT. The Weapons Coy was detached to do Convoy as they generally were not needed for the urban patrolling. In areas where the BN’s where conducting offensive operations, the Wpns Coy’s where not detached (unless the Bde Commander was an assclown).



Except when the legs go places the crawlers can go…


Agreed.


I think you need to define Gunners and Guns better.


I think it’s less of a when in terms of time, and more of a when for situations.



Some of the ideas down here just make me shake my head.

NLOS Javelin? Tell me more.

 

[KevinB]

NLOS Javelin? Tell me more.

The LWCLU for the Javelin has the ability to accept NLOS targeting data from other “acquirer’s”. So the user doesn’t even need to see the target initially. It’s akin to the Longbow Hellfire - in that any element can lock a target and the launcher can stay hidden.

So for this purpose a squad or platoon UAS can fly around and find targets while the Javelin is out of sight. The Javelin can be fired in some fairly tight spots- so a trench with OHP and a small exit window for instance. Or even setup as a remote station on a tripod.

 

[FJAG]

The LWCLU for the Javelin has the ability to accept NLOS targeting data from other “acquirer’s”. So the user doesn’t even need to see the target initially. It’s akin to the Longbow Hellfire - in that any element can lock a target and the launcher can stay hidden.

So for this purpose a squad or platoon UAS can fly around and find targets while the Javelin is out of sight. The Javelin can be fired in some fairly tight spots- so a trench with OHP and a small exit window for instance. Or even setup as a remote station on a tripod.

It's exactly this type of capability that makes me think that these types of systems are better held at a dedicated weapons or AA platoon/company where people are skilled in making maximum use of them.

While I can understand why one wants to distribute these down to the individual rifle section, one will never be able to maximize the use of some of these more advanced capabilities if that's what is done.

At the very least, one need to integrate these valuable systems into a comprehensive AA plan that is an overlay to the basic defense plan. That requires a dedicated AA agency to coordinate it. I think that the range capabilities of the various systems will dictate that this takes place at both the brigade or battalion level.

 

[Kirkhill]

It's exactly this type of capability that makes me think that these types of systems are better held at a dedicated weapons or AA platoon/company where people are skilled in making maximum use of them.

While I can understand why one wants to distribute these down to the individual rifle section, one will never be able to maximize the use of some of these more advanced capabilities if that's what is done.

At the very least, one need to integrate these valuable systems into a comprehensive AA plan that is an overlay to the basic defense plan. That requires a dedicated AA agency to coordinate it. I think that the range capabilities of the various systems will dictate that this takes place at both the brigade or battalion level.

Distributing the capability makes the entire system less fragile. You have multiple points of observation and multiple firing points dispersed over a wide field.

If you apply Ukraine's Uber Taxi software to the situation then every body knows where everything is and can call on any launcher in range. And it doesn't matter if the system functions with optimum efficiency. It only matters that the enemy is attrited. And that the supply of Javelins, or compatible missiles, continues unabated.

I think we are approaching this from two different perspectives. You use the word valuable and suggest scarcity. I see them as valuable yes, but not something that should be husbanded. I see the problem as one of supply and the need to rework the production lines to keep producing the Javelins, a high speed one way UAV, as fast as possible as cheaply as possible.

And I believe that the production lines for missiles and CLUs can be more easily automated than the lines for guns, barrels and shells.

As I said, the Javelin is an UAV and while people are struggling to find shells and barrels they are manufacturing UAVs by the 10s of thousands a month.

Scatter guns and not rifles.

 

[Kirkhill]

This is why I think that you can build Javelins and Javelin-Analogs faster than you can build guns and shells.

 

[FJAG]

Distributing the capability makes the entire system less fragile. You have multiple points of observation and multiple firing points dispersed over a wide field.

If you apply Ukraine's Uber Taxi software to the situation then every body knows where everything is and can call on any launcher in range. And it doesn't matter if the system functions with optimum efficiency. It only matters that the enemy is attrited. And that the supply of Javelins, or compatible missiles, continues unabated.

I think we are approaching this from two different perspectives. You use the word valuable and suggest scarcity. I see them as valuable yes, but not something that should be husbanded. I see the problem as one of supply and the need to rework the production lines to keep producing the Javelins, a high speed one way UAV, as fast as possible as cheaply as possible.

And I believe that the production lines for missiles and CLUs can be more easily automated than the lines for guns, barrels and shells.

As I said, the Javelin is an UAV and while people are struggling to find shells and barrels they are manufacturing UAVs by the 10s of thousands a month.

Scatter guns and not rifles.

You've utterly missed my point. "Valuable" was a throw-away term here. The key is the capability to link disparate sensors and weapon launchers which calls for a coordination capability beyond that of the average Pte Bloggins in a rifle section or his platoon commander.

If anything this is an analogy to the misuse of machine guns which has gone from an integrated weapon system with coordinated defensive fire controlled by skilled NCOs to "let's give one to everyone" where coordination is rudimentary at best. ATGMs work at significantly longer ranges than MGs and therefore ought to be coordinated at a commensurately higher level.

My point has nothing to do with guns or manufacturing capability. Supply, however, is an issue and, again, a proper higher level coordination system will optimize resupply at critical sectors rather than leaving the issue to serendipity.

 

[markppcli]

You've utterly missed my point. "Valuable" was a throw-away term here. The key is the capability to link disparate sensors and weapon launchers which calls for a coordination capability beyond that of the average Pte Bloggins in a rifle section or his platoon commander.

If anything this is an analogy to the misuse of machine guns which has gone from an integrated weapon system with coordinated defensive fire controlled by skilled NCOs to "let's give one to everyone" where coordination is rudimentary at best. ATGMs work at significantly longer ranges than MGs and therefore ought to be coordinated at a commensurately higher level.

My point has nothing to do with guns or manufacturing capability. Supply, however, is an issue and, again, a proper higher level coordination system will optimize resupply at critical sectors rather than leaving the issue to serendipity.

Precisely this. Networking sensors to systems means some one is head down, linking data, plugging in solutions, sorting out the relevant feeds, ect. It means some one else is handling comms to a node, be that AI or a CP, and relaying the Tgt list and priority. The. There’s a weapons operator. That’s probably not an ideal task list for a rifle section. It’s an evolution of how we used to run support platoons though. And that construct would work well.

I don’t understand your guns and shells production vs UAVs frankly @Kirkhill. I think we’re missing the point that if you’re using UAVs as munitions, you still need to produce the shell / charge to have that effect.

 

[Kirkhill]

The key may be in the linking of sensors and shooters but the Ukrainians seem to have democratized that to the extent that they can through their battlefield management software.

With respect to the Javelin at the section level:

Boys Rifle, PIAT, M72, CG84, Dragon, Eryx.... all anti-tank weapons issued to the section with the underlying assumption of See it, Kill it.

Why is the Javelin different beyond its longer range, accompanied by longer ranged sights?

And as for the NLOS capability - that just means that your loader is located 2 km away. The person with the sights, the CLU, is not limited to the rounds they can carry on their back. They can draw from all available rounds in the area. In fact, they may not need to carry any rounds at all. The launcher could be on a boat, a LAV, a crawler or emplaced.

WRT the UAV,

The UAV or Uncrewed Aerial Vehicle is a flying body, with or without an engine on board, that can be used to transport a package from point A to point B. It may or may not return to the point of origin. The package transported can be an RRB, or an ISR package, or a Designator, or a Claymore-like package of shrapnel, or an AT round or anything else that can be packaged in an artillery shell.

The UAV does not need a gun with a 10 man crew to launch it. It does not need a foundry to make the material for the gun or the round.

The production line, IMO, is likely to be shorter, simpler and faster. That will drive the cost of the round downwards.

Ultimately everything becomes a matter of delivering a packet of destructive energy on to a target at least cost.

Although not all UAVs are munitions, many UAVs are. Loitering Attack Munitions, FPV UAVs, and One Way Attack Drones all blur the lines between what we were thinking of as UAVs (eg Reapers) and what we currently think of as UAVs. And as that line blurs, and as all aerial vehicles, regardless of their motive power, get smarter the differences between a Tandem HEAT warhead delivered by rocket, pusher prop, jet or 155mm howitzer becomes, IMO, meaningless.

They are all means of delivering a packet of destruction to eliminate that thing that is in the rifleman's sights.



Slainte.

PS - linking sensors and shooters

Delta (situational awareness system) - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

https://www.technology.org/2023/02/04/ukrainian-army-making-full-transition-to-locally-developed-battlefield-management-system-delta-what-will-be-different/

 

[markppcli]

The key may be in the linking of sensors and shooters but the Ukrainians seem to have democratized that to the extent that they can through their battlefield management software.

And yet they employ javelin in Bn and above AT platoons….

With respect to the Javelin at the section level:

Boys Rifle, PIAT, M72, CG84, Dragon, Eryx.... all anti-tank weapons issued to the section with the underlying assumption of See it, Kill it.

Why is the Javelin different beyond its longer range, accompanied by longer ranged sights?

Please read the above post. It’s about totality of the system and data synchronization.

And as for the NLOS capability - that just means that your loader is located 2 km away. The person with the sights, the CLU, is not limited to the rounds they can carry on their back. They can draw from all available rounds in the area. In fact, they may not need to carry any rounds at all. The launcher could be on a boat, a LAV, a crawler or emplaced.

Yes it can, that’s what we are talking about. X number of sensors identify y number of targets and they are prioritized and disseminated. Who engages what gets sorted out via some kind of targeting node / cell. The job of picking that target and engaging it ought not be the job of a rifle section. It’s not “see it kill it” it’s “see 47 different vehicle, cross reference HPTL and unmask requirements, assign target to asset, assign engaging element.”

WRT the UAV,

The UAV or Uncrewed Aerial Vehicle is a flying body, with or without an engine on board, that can be used to transport a package from point A to point B. It may or may not return to the point of origin. The package transported can be an RRB, or an ISR package, or a Designator, or a Claymore-like package of shrapnel, or an AT round or anything else that can be packaged in an artillery shell.

The UAV does not need a gun with a 10 man crew to launch it. It does not need a foundry to make the material for the gun or the round.

The production line, IMO, is likely to be shorter, simpler and faster. That will drive the cost of the round downwards.

Ultimately everything becomes a matter of delivering a packet of destructive energy on to a target at least cost.

Although not all UAVs are munitions, many UAVs are. Loitering Attack Munitions, FPV UAVs, and One Way Attack Drones all blur the lines between what we were thinking of as UAVs (eg Reapers) and what we currently think of as UAVs. And as that line blurs, and as all aerial vehicles, regardless of their motive power, get smarter the differences between a Tandem HEAT warhead delivered by rocket, pusher prop, jet or 155mm howitzer becomes, IMO, meaningless.

They are all means of delivering a packet of destruction to eliminate that thing that is in the rifleman's sights.

That was a lot of words to not answer a question. My point was that it is infact not quicker and easier to produce a drone than a shell. Because what you’re making when you build a shell or bomb is that effect on the target. The drone still requires a means of producing that effect. It’s merely the delivery system.

Slainte.

PS - linking sensors and shooters

Delta (situational awareness system) - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

https://www.technology.org/2023/02/04/ukrainian-army-making-full-transition-to-locally-developed-battlefield-management-system-delta-what-will-be-different/

They’ve essentially built a DATA synchronizing app like ATAK. That doesn’t mean it’s a flat control system, it’s simply allowing better sharing of information.

 

[KevinB]

So keep in mind the US Army has TOW at the Squad Level for the Bradley units. The Anti Armor plan doesn’t need as much detailed work as a Canadian one, as you have a great deal of Anti Armor weapons at the Coy level for a Bradley Company.

Heck even the 25mm with the APDSFS-DU rounds can take on a Russian tank if the need arises.