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Informing the Army’s Future Structure

Both within very strict repetitive traces.
Yup. I can still do a BLACK BEAR battle group battle run in my sleep. But that was for nine-month conscripts. It doesn't have to be that restrictive.

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I haven’t been to Valcatraz other than a brief stop over - so I can’t really comment on that, but looking at a map I’d agree with your assessment.
I also haven't but everyone I have worked with has indicated that the area is not at all suitable to anything but dismounted operations. What usually happens is the LAVs act as battle taxis with the rest being left up to the troops as I'm told. Additionally, as much as everyone including myself rags on them it seems like they are the best run brigade these days or at least when it comes to retention and getting people trained.
 
We did have. In it's day Borden and Meaford were into tanks, but the tanks outgrew the facilities.

Gagetown played a role after that and even Shilo served the Germans well for many years.

It's really only Petawawa and Valcartier that are a bit anemic and that's mostly because so much of the ranges are unsuitable for wide ranging open manoeuvre.

I sometimes think that we're not doing enough with simulated munitions for our large calibre weapons or in using civilian terrain like we did in Germany. There's shooting and then there's realistic battalion level tactical manoeuvre. The two do not need to be combined in the same exercise. 4 CMBG shot on very restrictive ranges but manoeuvred in the most realistic terrain possible.

Don't get me wrong. I see the benefits of a facility like NTC that can run a BCT at a time ... and even CMTC ... but quite frankly restrained in both equipment and money and ranges as we are, I think that the biggest bang for the buck we get is at the battalion/battle group level for integrated live fire and manoeuvre while brigade level is best kept to simulated exercises. If we turn out good battle groups (heavy, medium and light) capable of working within a sim-trained brigade framework then we've done well.


You're probably right.


My thoughts, as expected, run more in the nature of more deployable brigade and battalion headquarters than we have but with (please don't yell at me) fewer RegF troops. Do that through more ResF integration in things like 30/70 brigades and battalions.

We are constantly deploying contingents with the equivalents of a battle group headquarters overseen by rump TF/NCE headquarters which are akin to a small brigade headquarters. We need to continue to have enough of those so that we can do the rotations to suit the deployment requirements set out in the SSE. In addition we need trained and knowledgeable headquarters if we are ever going to expand in an emergency.

My gut math tells me we can reduce the 5 div HQs to 2 and the 3+1+10 brigades to probably 6 manoeuvre and 4 support using existing manning levels. We convert the around 30 major RegF units and the 130+ ResF units into around 50 hybrid units plus a half dozen training units. All done without any equipment changes other than what's already on the books.

I've put this diagram up before and I'm in the process of revising it but it's shows one way to do that. (Note that the Readiness FL 4 category is for a prepositioned armoured brigade's equipment in Latvia with minimal full time manning, and in large measure concurrently replacing the functions of CMTC as a training and certification venue.

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My issue with your plan (looking forward to your revision) is that you seem to be assuming equipment expansion (3 x Tank Regiments vs our current 1 and 10 x Mech Battalions vs our current 6) and also the basic issue of Reserve participation in Tank Regiments/Mechanized Battalions.

It would be hard to convince me with the major spending already pending for the CAF (NORAD upgrades, the shipbuilding program, F-35's, and new AD & AT capabilities that a major expansion of our AFV fleet is also a real possibility.

The general consensus on the site seems to suggest that achieving 30% properly trained and ready to deploy Reserve augmentation for Mechanized Infantry and Armoured units is not realistic and that 70% manning for those units is likely pure fantasy. Can we get to the point where that is actually a possibility? Maybe, but there seems to be no effort being made at present to even move toward that goal so wishing it into existence is maybe not realistic.

I had considered that possibly "Reservists" (as opposed to part-time Militia members) ...fully trained Reg Force members shifting to Reserve units on release with a core of Reg Force leadership and located close to existing CAF bases for technical support might be a way to expand Total Force units for mobilization, but realistically how many Reg Force members leaving full-time service are choosing to remain close to existing CFB's? Or are they moving back to places like Metro Toronto and Metro Montreal, etc. where they grew up?

There are MANY steps that need to be taken to revive the CA to become a more effective and efficient force. What you're suggesting might be a possible end goal, but I fear we are far from being able to even consider that as the next step.
 
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My issue with your play (looking forward to your revision) is that you seem to be assuming equipment expansion (3 x Tank Regiments vs our current 1 and 10 x Mech Battalions vs our current 6) and also the basic issue of Reserve participation in Tank Regiments/Mechanized Battalions.
Actually not. The details is in the fine print. In a 30/70 battalion for example, only the RFL 1 100/0 RegF company is fully equipped (mech or otherwise). The two 10/90 RFL 3 ResF companies are not but take their training on the equipment and do annual summer concentrations on the prepositioned flyover equipment in Europe. The numbers are generally within the current equipment holdings although there are a few unequipped placeholder units such as the GBAD and HIMARS.

The general consensus on the site seems to suggest that achieving 30% properly trained and ready to deploy Reserve augmentation for Mechanized Infantry and Armoured units is not realistic and that 70% manning for those units is likely pure fantasy. Can we get to the point where that is actually a possibility? Maybe, but there seems to be no effort being made at present to even move toward that goal so wishing it into existence is maybe not realistic.
I agree with you that there is currently no effort being made in that direction but you are only skimming the surface of the idea. The concept is significantly more complex. I've discussed in many past posts the preconditions necessary to put such a system in place.

I had considered that possibly "Reservists" (as opposed to part-time Militia members) ...fully trained Reg Force members shifting to Reserve units on release with a core of Reg Force leadership and located close to existing CAF bases for technical support might be a way to expand Total Force units for mobilization, but realistically how many Reg Force members leaving full-time service are choosing to remain close to existing CFB's? Or are they moving back to places like Metro Toronto and Metro Montreal, etc. where they grew up?
We do have a supplementary reserve on the books but it has zero training requirement. It's merely a pool that can be placed on active service by the GiC. We also have a number of releasing members who choose to join reserve units (probably less now with the education benefit). IWhile lots of former soldiers settle down near bases, I don't think that you'd ever get a large pool but they would be valuable.

There are MANY steps that need to be taken to revive the CA to become a more effective and efficient force. What you're suggesting might be a possible end goal, but I fear we are far from being able to even consider that as the next step.
I'm quite aware that there are MANY steps needed to do this. I've set many of them out in a short book called "Unsustainable at any Price: The Canadian Armed Forces in Crisis." (Note that I wrote this a few years ago and I'm in the process of doing a major revision - especially to include the 30/70 concept and several other things that have popped up in the last few years.)

I should point out though that what I've put forward isn't a next step. It is an end goal vision. I hate to be catty (well maybe not) but one of the key problems within DND is that people are so wrapped up in day to day issues that grand visions are neither developed nor worked on. DND putters along by increments going from one crisis to another.

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DND putters along by increments going from one crisis to another.

@FJAG
Would you accept a change to: DND gradually sinker deeper into a hole, by going from one crisis of their own creation to another…
 
DND putters along by increments going from one crisis to another.

@FJAG
Would you accept a change to: DND gradually sinker deeper into a hole, by going from one crisis of their own creation to another…
I think so. I've held for years that the current model of DND isn't sustainable due to the ever rising cost of full-time personnel which, coupled with dropping or stagnant or moderately rising budgets, guarantees a reduction in force size or capabilities over time. This progresses to a point where the force might have some residual capability but is essentially irrelevant.

One might reasonably argue as to whether we've already reached that point or not, and one might reasonably argue as to whether or not the crises being dealt with are self inflicted or generated by outside forces. IMHO, while government action and inaction has a lot to do with that, there is also a systemic failure within DND's civilian and military leadership in properly charting a sustainable path to regaining combat capabilities and credibility.

There's always a lot of 20/20 hindsight in these things but who hasn't been aware for decades of the fact that our recruiting and training system, for example, has been dysfunctional? Or, if you read Leslie's 2011 report on transformation, that our personnel priorities are skewed? Or the last several audits and CRS reviews that our materiel support and procurement system is dysfunctional? And don't get me started on reserves.

It's always a hard thing to lay the blame on individuals because we all know that there are a lot of capable and dedicated people there but the system as a whole has difficulty coping and, at the end of the day, the system is nothing more than the sum of its individuals and processes.

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I tend to see the PRes as a poor value for the money at this time, due to equipment issues and lack of structure (both in terms of legislation and actual units).

The Army Regular Force probably needs a drastic change in structure and equipment as well.
I think for the budget the Army is incredibly wasteful, again the 1 million LAV army rears it head, as with Tanks and 777’s it’s really not Medium, but a Poorly structured mess of Heavy, Medium and Light, with no sound basis for its genesis.

I think starting from scratch might be the only way forward.

If one could fix the Res issues - 30/70 and 70/30 units would be created as below.

1 CABG in an expanded base in Shilo with railhead and airfield for C17. (30/70)
1/3rd Equipment Predeployed to Europe

2 CLBG (Airborne/Airmobile) in Petawawa 70/30
3 CLBG (Airborne/Mountain) Edmonton 70/30
Reactivating airfield
4 CMBG (LAV ) Gagetown 30/70
5 CMBG (LAV) Valcartier 70/30
6 CLBG (Amphibious) new base Vancouver Island or coastal mainland. 30/70

1 CND Mechanized DIV - Shilo (1, 4,5 Bde)
2 CND Light Div - somewhere in BC. With 2,3,6 Bde
Each Div would also have a CSSB

Each base would be setup for OST (One station training).

Yes it requires new kit (about 15B, of which around 11B is required anyway) but is fairly PY neutral (large decrease in PRes senior leaders and some HQ positions)
 
I'll keep this in mind for my own rewrite.

Off the top of my head:

1) Southern Ontario is left out as a bde and is a major ResF manpower pool (and has little role in 2 CLBG whose 30% could probably come from Ottawa and vicinity alone)

2) The two div HQs are in the west but the bulk of the Army is in the east

3) no amphib capability on east coast

Just as a quick adjustment I'd consider:

1) moving 4 CMBG and 1 Div HQ to Toronto or London with 4 CMBG staying under 1 Cdn Div

2) adding an arty bde to 1 Cdn Div headquartered in Shilo;

3) moving 5 CBG to be under 2 Div

4) putting the BC Coastal Amphib contingent (which will probably be just battle group size) under 3 CLBG and canning 6 CLBG

5) creating a light Coastal Amphib battle group in the Maritimes and putting it under 5 CMBG

That leaves 1 Div (with 2 manoeuvre and 2 support bdes total) generally western with a med to heavy mix and NATO focus and 2 Div (with 3 manoeuvre and 1 support bde [I'd consider leaving their artillery as part of the manoeuvre bde gps]) generally eastern and coastal with a light to medium mix and multipurpose QRF focus.

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Also while I hate to sound all doom and gloom, if one cannot fix the PRes issue
I'll keep this in mind for my own rewrite.

Off the top of my head:

1) Southern Ontario is left out as a bde and is a major ResF manpower pool (and has little role in 2 CLBG whose 30% could probably come from Ottawa and vicinity alone)
Agreed -- I was just doing a terrain assessment - and while Souther Ontario offers some good Mech terrain - there doesn't appear to be anywhere to stick a Bde with a training area (I'm pretty much dead set those are a requirement).
2) The two div HQs are in the west but the bulk of the Army is in the east
Realistically Manitoba is pretty much central Canada - (albeit Shilo is on the western side) because I opted for an expanded Shilo base - I figured it was worth it to stick the Div HQ there, as one could conduct larger than Bde training there (granted the GoC would need to buy up the land) -
Suffield would have been my ideal location for 1 CABG and 1 Div, as its decently close to Medicine Hat, and the training area is great already -- but since the Brits still have use of it, I crossed it off.

3) no amphib capability on east coast
I see the Pacific as the major Amphib AO, and the Pacific Fleet being the POC on that - so left the Eastern side without.

Just as a quick adjustment I'd consider:

1) moving 4 CMBG and 1 Div HQ to Toronto or London with 4 CMBG staying under 1 Cdn Div
Again, without a real training area, I don't see the viability of those bases.
One basically need to push towards the Bruce Peninsula to find open land - without significant expropriation costs) The population density is significant though - and I see potential for a 30/70 Bn to be based at Meaford - and have that area with offshoot Platoons
2) adding an arty bde to 1 Cdn Div headquartered in Shilo;
Yes I meant to write Div with enablers - I should have been clearer.

3) moving 5 CBG to be under 2 Div
In my ideal world - the 1 CABG would have an extra Bde worth of Pre-Deployed Equipment - and 5 CMBG or 4 CMBG would potentially move into the domestic equipment if there was a need for another Armored Bde -- given my 1 CABG has a tracked IFV (lets pencil in the CV90 MkIV for now) that leaves 2 Bde worth of LAV's - and Vacartier while not ideal for 25mm Bn Battle runs, has a decent enough training area for exercises, and PCF's on the LAV.
4) putting the BC Coastal Amphib contingent (which will probably be just battle group size) under 3 CLBG and canning 6 CLBG
I like 3 Bde Div's, mainly as it allows for 1 Bde to be entirely rotated out of the line as needed for R&R&R.
5) creating a light Coastal Amphib battle group in the Maritimes and putting it under 5 CMBG
Don't go symetrical on me ;) I don't see a real use for Amphib in the East - short of Hurricane support work, and so I would prefer to keep a Bde sized force out West to work with the Pacific Fleet and the USMC.

That leaves 1 Div (with 2 manoeuvre and 2 support bdes total) generally western with a med to heavy mix and NATO focus and 2 Div (with 3 manoeuvre and 1 support bde [I'd consider leaving their artillery as part of the manoeuvre bde gps]) generally eastern and coastal with a light to medium mix and multipurpose QRF focus.

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Roger.

I figured that if push comes to shove - the 2 Light Bde's can jump off to anywhere as needed, and can rotate readiness (not fake readiness - but actually a Bn on 6hrs NTM, and the Bde on 24) I don't see a major use for the Armor (tracks or LAV) in the Pacific (channelling my inner MacArthur as best I can with not wanting to get involved in a ground war in Asia) - but the Light and Amphib units can support that theatre as needed - and the heavier forces with a European focus.


If the Army was larger, I would have regionally specific Divisions - and support language and culture courses in their specific AOR's.
 
Agreed -- I was just doing a terrain assessment - and while Souther Ontario offers some good Mech terrain - there doesn't appear to be anywhere to stick a Bde with a training area (I'm pretty much dead set those are a requirement).
I worry less about training ranges in Canada because with 30/70 heavy units, I would move much of the major exercising off shore to the prepositioned equipment so as to 1) reduce the need for ranges in Canada and build familiarity with the likely AO; 2) exercise the air move capability/plans for the RCAF regularly; and 3) create interest and excitement for both the RegF and ResF members to entice recruitment and retention

Realistically Manitoba is pretty much central Canada - (albeit Shilo is on the western side) because I opted for an expanded Shilo base - I figured it was worth it to stick the Div HQ there, as one could conduct larger than Bde training there (granted the GoC would need to buy up the land) -
As above ranges for bde level exercises is a minor issue because of Europe. I have no real issues with 1 CABG in Shilo (albeit infrastructure is an issue) and could easily see 1 Div HQ in any of Shilo, Winnipeg, London or Toronto.

I see the Pacific as the major Amphib AO, and the Pacific Fleet being the POC on that - so left the Eastern side without.
I agree on the Pacific issue but see below

Again, without a real training area, I don't see the viability of those bases.
One basically need to push towards the Bruce Peninsula to find open land - without significant expropriation costs) The population density is significant though - and I see potential for a 30/70 Bn to be based at Meaford - and have that area with offshoot Platoons
I don't see land purchases for training anywhere - the Special Ops base in Trenton is a sad lesson that will forestall any GoC support for that.
In my ideal world - the 1 CABG would have an extra Bde worth of Pre-Deployed Equipment - and 5 CMBG or 4 CMBG would potentially move into the domestic equipment if there was a need for another Armored Bde -- given my 1 CABG has a tracked IFV (lets pencil in the CV90 MkIV for now) that leaves 2 Bde worth of LAV's - and Vacartier while not ideal for 25mm Bn Battle runs, has a decent enough training area for exercises, and PCF's on the LAV.
Working on my basis of using what we have I can only see one fully equipped brigade as the prepositioned one in Europe were all bde level exercises are conducted. Units in Canada will be equipped fully only to the extent of their RegF component and partially at training unit.
I like 3 Bde Div's, mainly as it allows for 1 Bde to be entirely rotated out of the line as needed for R&R&R.
That's generally my thought although I tend to think in the current LAV model and as such 2 Div's 5 CMBG can be used for that role as well. If anyone is ever prepared to address the CV 90 issue again then the structure may need to be revisited.
Don't go symetrical on me ;) I don't see a real use for Amphib in the East - short of Hurricane support work, and so I would prefer to keep a Bde sized force out West to work with the Pacific Fleet and the USMC.
Two coasts (more like three actually) require some symmetry. 2 Div USMC is on the east coast as is all of the UK's Marine force all with roles for the northern Atlantic of which we could and should be a part.

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I worry less about training ranges in Canada because with 30/70 heavy units, I would move much of the major exercising off shore to the prepositioned equipment so as to 1) reduce the need for ranges in Canada and build familiarity with the likely AO; 2) exercise the air move capability/plans for the RCAF regularly; and 3) create interest and excitement for both the RegF and ResF members to entice recruitment and retention
My sole aspect to Trg Area = Bases is for OST, it makes it so much easier to train people in situ, at least to their initial trade qual.

As above ranges for bde level exercises is a minor issue because of Europe. I have no real issues with 1 CABG in Shilo (albeit infrastructure is an issue) and could easily see 1 Div HQ in any of Shilo, Winnipeg, London or Toronto.
While I like the idea of a Reforger/CAST/AMF(L) type activity - I do think there needs to be some local ability to conduct larger exercises.

I don't see land purchases for training anywhere - the Special Ops base in Trenton is a sad lesson that will forestall any GoC support for that.
The unfortunate aspect of that reality means that Canada is stuck with no real area to play effectively.

Working on my basis of using what we have I can only see one fully equipped brigade as the prepositioned one in Europe were all bde level exercises are conducted. Units in Canada will be equipped fully only to the extent of their RegF component and partially at training unit.
I think due to the small size of Canada Army a realistic and responsible Government would have a heir and a spare for equipment...

That's generally my thought although I tend to think in the current LAV model and as such 2 Div's 5 CMBG can be used for that role as well. If anyone is ever prepared to address the CV 90 issue again then the structure may need to be revisited.
Ack I just do not see Tank and LAV working as symbiotically as some folks in Canada do, so I keep preaching IFV-T ;)
Two coasts (more like three actually) require some symmetry. 2 Div USMC is on the east coast as is all of the UK's Marine force all with roles for the northern Atlantic of which we could and should be a part.

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I tend to think a Bde is the smallest entity one should look at deploying, hence my dislike of penny packing those as Btl Gps to each coast.
- again with a larger Military one could do a lot more.
 
A lot of crossover between this and the reserves thread. Going to try and walk the line between aspirational and incremental change, and avoid major capital purchases other than those already on the books (GBAD/ Arty/ ATGM)

1 CABG - current 1 CMBG + 38&39 CBG
Move all combat arms LAV's out west, adopt 14 tank squadron, shift LdSH to a LAV/LRSS based Cav regiment, go to combined arms mech battalions
5x combined arms battalions = 70/80 tanks, 10/18 Lav Coy sets. (Cav regiment eats another 3 (1.5 per, 2nd set in Europe))
3x PPCLI Bns
1x Bn set for 38 and 39 to split time on with Reg force leadership
1x Bn set pre-positioned in Europe
1x Reg set pre-positioned in Europe

With appropriate purchase of SP 155's and GBAD, pre-position of that and other CS/CSS equipment, NATO commitment of leading the flyover surge of eFP Latvia to a MN Bde.
Edit- could also drop a PPCLI Bn to free up PY's, and have 2 full Bn set's in Europe.

2 Canadian Light Division
2 CLBG - RCD ,1&2 RCR (100/0)+ 33CBG (10/90) -
4CLBG - 32, 33, 34, 41, 36/37 (all 10/90)
5 CLBG - 12 RBC, 1&2 R22R, (100/0) + 35CBG (10/90)


2&5 provide a pool of 4 100/0 Bn's for QRF, and each have a pool of ACSV Troop variants attached to provide protected mobility for UN/COIN taskings.

4CLBG is an administrative command tasked with ensuring that all 5 subordinate CBG's are capable of delivering self contained light battlegroups for Arctic Response, Domestic Defense etc.
 
I don't see land purchases for training anywhere - the Special Ops base in Trenton is a sad lesson that will forestall any GoC support for that.


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If you're looking at a travel-to-train model anyway, would that open up a much more transitory approach to e.g. using Crown/Indigenous land in the less populous reaches of the country? Don't need anything like the footprint, especially if the dynamic changed to bringing everything you needed for each ex (I think I saw someone posting recently about the value of giving the support elements a full airing).

Bet a brigade could happily occupy itself on the northern end of Vancouver Island, let alone further north in the province.
 
If you're looking at a travel-to-train model anyway, would that open up a much more transitory approach to e.g. using Crown/Indigenous land in the less populous reaches of the country? Don't need anything like the footprint, especially if the dynamic changed to bringing everything you needed for each ex (I think I saw someone posting recently about the value of giving the support elements a full airing).

Bet a brigade could happily occupy itself on the northern end of Vancouver Island, let alone further north in the province.

If the Brigade didn't get booted out by the loggers who own all the private land (IIRC that most of the North Island is private land) and access roads, or the first nations, or hounded by the insane environmentalists chainingthemsleves to the vehicles.

Oh, and then there's the inaccessible rain forest covering most of the area that might just drown/ kill people because of the prevailing geography and weather ;)
 
If the Brigade didn't get booted out by the loggers who own all the private land (IIRC that most of the North Island is private land) and access roads, or the first nations, or hounded by the insane environmentalists chaining themsleves to the vehicles.

Oh, and then there's the inaccessible rain forest covering most of the area that might just drown/ kill people because of the prevailing geography and weather ;)
Couldn't remember how much of the north island was properly private, and how much was leased/licensed/etc., and using the island for training anyone not already based here is probably a logistical nonstarter regardless. Just thinking of how much Not Really Lived In landscape is kicking around, not too far from nominal civilization.

DND/CAF need to start selling their actually really good current environmental custodial practices more enthusiastically: see if the purely green crowd can be convinced that Defence land is often quite environmentally friendly.

Mentioned first nations land initially, as I could see the right nation being quite amenable to some sort of rental/lease agreement.

As for your last line, aren't there a number of countries who have to leave their borders to train in terrain like that (granted, I think those are all much warmer iterations of rain forest...), or who've identified a patch of The Worst Land in the Country for training trades who walk to work? (Did ground SAR for a number of years: yeah, lots of good ways to mess yourself up in the cold and wet around here)

On an island note, I wonder what the Strathcona charter has to say about military use?
 
1 CABG in an expanded base in Shilo with railhead and airfield for C17. (30/70)
1/3rd Equipment Predeployed to Europe
If some sort of agreement with the UK to share Suffield could be made would it make sense to keep 1 CABG in Edmonton? Continue to use Wainwright as the regular training base but annually provide a Battle Group to act as the BATUS OPFOR for at least a portion of the UK's summer training cycle. It would give both nations the opportunity to exercise against someone other than their own troops.
 
I've read documents and reports that indicate two is easier to control, and actually more effective. A Division doesn't need an entire brigade for reserve, it needs a Bn max, if not a Cbt Tm.
Any OS info you're able to share on this?

If you were to have a 2 Brigade Division with a single Battalion for reserve where would the reserve Battalion fall in the ORBAT? As part of the Support Brigade? Directly under the Division HQ?
 
I also haven't but everyone I have worked with has indicated that the area is not at all suitable to anything but dismounted operations. What usually happens is the LAVs act as battle taxis with the rest being left up to the troops as I'm told. Additionally, as much as everyone including myself rags on them it seems like they are the best run brigade these days or at least when it comes to retention and getting people trained.
Their retention has for a long time been an economic factor less than a Bde leadership thing. Also consider that a Vandoo or 12 RBC soldier will likely complete his career with at most 1 ere posting, and when they go back to the regiment it’s in Valcartier which is conveniently 30 minutes from Quebec City, infact they have shacks and a JRs in Quebec City.

I don’t know what you mean by “getting people trained”?
 
If you're looking at a travel-to-train model anyway, would that open up a much more transitory approach to e.g. using Crown/Indigenous land in the less populous reaches of the country? Don't need anything like the footprint, especially if the dynamic changed to bringing everything you needed for each ex (I think I saw someone posting recently about the value of giving the support elements a full airing).

Bet a brigade could happily occupy itself on the northern end of Vancouver Island, let alone further north in the province.
There’s a training area in the Chilcotin just sayin
 
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