• Thanks for stopping by. Logging in to a registered account will remove all generic ads. Please reach out with any questions or concerns.

Informing the Army’s Future Structure

It was type of unit where, in theory, there was 10% Regular Force and 90% Reserve Force. I am going back in my hazy memories as a young B(A) Capt, but 3 RCR had a Battalion HQ in Borden and several affiliated Reserve units in the area. The Regular Force Cadre was augmented in these units, especially the critical NCO rank and I believe that these units then each provided a company to the 10/90 battalion.

My impression was that the troops were happy since they had well-planned and executed exercises/courses, but that senior Reserve leadership was a little worried. Seeing as how Reserve units are having a very hard time generating their own COs I think it is something worth looking at.

I think its beyond Force 2025, but even as a young Reserve officer I saw the value in amalgamation, which could be seen in a 10/90 light. Turn each CBG into 10/90 unit. Perhaps each geographical area gets one armour and artillery 10/90.

It was a short term attempt to hide Reg F PYs from the chopping block, which seemed to work for them.

Unlike what we expected, a partnership between the Reg F and Reserves kind of like the TA operates in the UK, they landed on us like a large rock, announced that they were in charge of all the training (except for the recruits) and squished out all the other leadership and inserted their own people to lead our troops while we did all the admin. A high level of condescension and disrespect permeated most of their interactions with us. When it ended, the Reg F took all of our well trained and experienced soldiers with them, which destroyed our succession for few years.

Also, some of the people they sent us were simply awful. I was a rifle company OC who had to deal with the worst MWO/CSMs I've ever encountered in my career. He was clearly sent to us to get rid of him, and pretty quickly had a wide range of complaints lodged against him. Some called him a 'Militia-hater' but it was pretty clear he hated every type of human, including himself. On the upside, his son joined our unit and became an excellent MCpl, so I guess you could score a win there.

A Reg F Major , a pretty good guy who I knew from Phase training, took over from me as I had to move out of town with work and wound up returning him to the mother ship pretty quickly. We thought he would be dealt with, as we were assured he would be by the then CO, but he wasn't of course.

So, yeah, it worked out pretty well for the Reg F based on what I saw ;)
 
10/90: as long as the true reasons aren't along the lines of "to keep the 3rd bns and their leaders around", and the rug isn't pulled out again suddenly. I heard a few who were there, then, grouse about what happened when everything ended; I didn't hear any praise for the way in which it was done.
 
I like the concept of hybrid units very much. I think, however, that the 10/90 battalion has an inherent weakness that makes it unattractive to the Reg F.

If you look at a 10/90 infantry battalion with a full-up strength of 6-700 it means the Reg F component is approximately 60-70 personnel who the Reg F in general, look at as being heavily underutilized on a day-to-day basis and potentially unavailable for deployments. With a Res F as small as 20,000 that still adds up to 2,000 Reg F personnel (add another 3-500 for brigade headquarters) who are "lost" to the day-to-day operations of the Army with their only perceived benefit being the eventual creation of a useable battalion for a major emergency. It will always be a target for syphoning off personnel (and equipment if its ever given any) as "more important" missions come up.

I would think that what might perhaps be more palatable to the Reg F side would be a hybrid battalion of say 25 to 30% where much of the battalion headquarters and one full company, squadron or battery would be Reg F. The reason for the full sub-unit is that when not conducting reserve training, it would have a sufficient mass to train itself and provide continuous career development for it's personnel. It would also be sufficient numbers so that during the very busy summer training periods for the Res F elements, there would be sufficient people to allow for a reasonable summer leave and APS program.

More importantly, as a complete sub-unit, it would be available for deployments (assuming it could raise sufficient augmentees from the Res F component of the battalion to leave a large enough core behind to continue on with the rest of the battalion's training). The same would be true for the battalion headquarters. It could do occasional rotations so long as a sufficient core remains behind to lead the entire battalion. In fact a properly constructed system could create more deployable unit and even brigade headquarters and thereby create not only more deployable "chunks" out of which task forces could be formed during peacetime but also create a viable framework of a force which, in an emergency, could form a larger force then we now are able to generate.

The ratio of Reg F to Res F ought to be somewhat flexible so that units with a high peace-time day-to-day utilization or deployment rate could have a second Reg F subunit while those which have virtually no peace-time day-to-day utilization could have a smaller Reg F component.

As T2B points out, it's weakness within the Res F perception is the fact that it does negate the need for senior Res F leadership. Essentially there is no need beyond company level majors and MWOs and, perhaps, a very limited number of LCols and CWOs. Quite frankly, and notwithstanding D&Bs experience, the system could and should be developed so that all admin functions devolve onto the Reg F cadre and that the only responsibility for the Res F leadership is the training within their own companies (with opportunities to voluntarily rise into battalion or brigade staff positions if they accept the required training)

I must admit, that the regimental system with its tiers of leadership and special buttons and bows creates a problem with this as Reg F and Res F are all bound to their cap badges. I'm somewhat envious of the flexibility of the US uniform system which is fairly standard and battalion identity is portrayed by a single enameled badge worn on the chest with brigade or divisional affiliation by a shoulder patch. It makes cross-posting dead simple. That said, I'm sure that we have enough CWOs in the Army who can sit down and work out this particular conundrum and do we really care if on a battalion parade one company parades in a highland uniform and another in rifle green? I guess the QM might but that's why he gets paid those sweet, sweet Reg F bucks.

🍻
 
Last edited:
10/90: as long as the true reasons aren't along the lines of "to keep the 3rd bns and their leaders around", and the rug isn't pulled out again suddenly. I heard a few who were there, then, grouse about what happened when everything ended; I didn't hear any praise for the way in which it was done.

Despite all my whining the training and resources provided to the Pioneer platoon, which was our 'mission tasking', were excellent.

We got a Pioneer SNCO and small team of instructors, LSVW pioneer vehicles with chainsaws and all the other toys, explosives, courses, exercises etc etc.

Did I mention explosives?

The effort was was lavishly supported in comparison with anything else I've ever seen outside of a Reg F unit. Certainly better than anything I've seen being provided to Reserve Units for the current iteration of mission taskings.

If this approach could be used for the 'forces of good', as opposed to the actual Machiavellian reality that played out, we'd have to station provost staff at the armoury door with billy clubs to keep people away, I'm sure.
 
In fairness to the Army side of things, the Militia, with memories still fresh in the senior leadership of the Civil Defence efforts of buckets and ladders, were not thrilled about being tasked to the defence of domestic Vital Points. There was a lot of moaning about having to practice standing guard at the local Post Office.

From my standpoint learning how to create a defended locality anywhere, post office, power station or hydro-electric site, would have provided a great focus for training a reserve company. If that skill could be learned, and practiced, on the weekend, then it would have been a portable skill for the unit. Something the unit could be called to do, defence and duties, domestically and on expedition. And it would have been a useful platform for working out the kinks in cohesion and management.

Whoever was advising Beatty in 1987, wasn't all wrong, despite his fleet of 12 nuclear subs (even that wasn't militarily wrong so much as it was politically wrong).
 
If this approach could be used for the 'forces of good', as opposed to the actual Machiavellian reality that played out, we'd have to station provost staff at the armoury door with billy clubs to keep people away, I'm sure.
Instead of to encourage the less-than-fully-housed along? You might also have to find a bit more classroom space.

Sidebar: Bay Street's peculiarities (messes, messes, and more messes, etc.) have some period justifications. Harder to parse is why the Nanaimo armoury's so constricted, especially as the sole significant CAF facility in the area.
 
Instead of to encourage the less-than-fully-housed along? You might also have to find a bit more classroom space.

Sidebar: Bay Street's peculiarities (messes, messes, and more messes, etc.) have some period justifications. Harder to parse is why the Nanaimo armoury's so constricted, especially as the sole significant CAF facility in the area.

I'm a big fan of the Nanaimo Armoury.

It has more than one training room, has a rifle range a short drive up the road, and won't fall down in an earthquake (or a heavy truck driving by) :)
 
Re: HQs and brigades. Would there be any benefit to making a sharp split between a given number of deployable brigade HQs, maybe sitting under CJOC along with that Division HQ, and a purely non-deployable training/FG/domestic defence and emergency response structure?
 
I'm a big fan of the Nanaimo Armoury.

It has more than one training room, has a rifle range a short drive up the road, and won't fall down in an earthquake (or a heavy truck driving by) :)
Absolutely. Just seems a bit cosy for something purpose-built for its current occupants; no room for growth; where Bay Street's had a century or so to become host to museums, cadet corps and squadrons, etc.
 
Absolutely. Just seems a bit cosy for something purpose-built for its current occupants; no room for growth; where Bay Street's had a century or so to become host to museums, cadet corps and squadrons, etc. as opposed to what is really required to train a military for the 21st Century.

There, FTFY.
 
In fairness to the Army side of things, the Militia, with memories still fresh in the senior leadership of the Civil Defence efforts of buckets and ladders, were not thrilled about being tasked to the defence of domestic Vital Points. There was a lot of moaning about having to practice standing guard at the local Post Office.

From my standpoint learning how to create a defended locality anywhere, post office, power station or hydro-electric site, would have provided a great focus for training a reserve company. If that skill could be learned, and practiced, on the weekend, then it would have been a portable skill for the unit. Something the unit could be called to do, defence and duties, domestically and on expedition. And it would have been a useful platform for working out the kinks in cohesion and management.

Whoever was advising Beatty in 1987, wasn't all wrong, despite his fleet of 12 nuclear subs (even that wasn't militarily wrong so much as it was politically wrong).
My first operational deployment as a Reg F officer was to take my troop to Montreal where we stood guard on hydro towers and one MP. It's what we do when we have to. The problem for the young keen soldier is if he is being told that standing guard or digging in rubble is to be his prime objective in life. They'll vote with their feet if that's the case.

🍻
 
Better doing something and grumbling than doing nothing at all, FJAG. You can always improve the situation by making sure the next detail is not a shit detail.

As to voting with feet... that seems to be happening anyway judging by the recruits that aren't showing up and the Reg releases that aren't transferring to the Reserves.

I'm aware of one Regiment that was not invited to stand guard at Buckingham Palace because it was feared they would site their mgs, layout the sandbags and concertina and organize a brew up.

I saw local home guards in Sweden doing much the same thing around their docks.
 
Re: HQs and brigades. Would there be any benefit to making a sharp split between a given number of deployable brigade HQs, maybe sitting under CJOC along with that Division HQ, and a purely non-deployable training/FG/domestic defence and emergency response structure?
No.
CJOC does not need more force generation responsibilities to distract from its force employment reason to exist. This would create more new HQs but may not remove any existing HQs.
 
If this approach could be used for the 'forces of good'

Matches what I heard. The number of CTs when the experiment ended I took to be evidence that the units were well-run during that period. I heard grousing that the Res F units were drained, but part of the value of the Res F is providing CTs by people who have decided Forces life is for them after all. The allegations that some of the Res F units had kit deficiencies afterward, I thought less well of. But given the way Res F units treat each others' holdings of vehicles and other stores, a sort of justice.
 
Hey, it's got six (Five? Can't remember if junior ranks is combined) messes. What more do you want?

AFAIK there are:

  • 2 x Offrs Messes
  • 2 x SNCOS Messes
  • 2 x JRs Messes
  • 2 x Association offices (unsure of the alcohol content but based on the results... )
  • 1 x Band Room (a.k.a, the unofficial Shebeen)

Plus what ever the Cadet Officers have to drink to get them through a session of looking after kids like I was :)

And then there are:

  • 2 x Museums
  • 2 x BOR Offices
  • 2 x Recruiting Offices
  • 2 x RSS Adjt's Offices
  • 2 x Coy/Bty Offices
  • 2 x Adm Coy/ HQ Coy Offices
  • 2 x CO's Offices
  • 2 x Padre's Offices
  • 2 x Ops Offices (where the RSS hang out talking about the Reg F 'back in my day' :) )
  • 2 x Cadet Offices
  • 1 x (broken) SAT range
  • 1 x 12 person conference room with a screen capable of hosting video meetings when it's not broken (I've never seen it working)
  • A half dozen Office spaces 'in the roof' that are unusable due to lack of DIN connections, and the fact that they were designed and built in 1915 before anyone cared about whether or not you had to egress successfully during a fire, so are usually filled with junk from the museums and BORs etc.
And then there is, all on its lonesome:
  • 1 x 20/25 person lecture/training theatre with the latest high tech training addition: a whiteboard.

It's always been pretty clear to me, though, that based on what the two CO's can get into trouble for the space allocation is pretty much on target ...
 
Matches what I heard. The number of CTs when the experiment ended I took to be evidence that the units were well-run during that period. I heard grousing that the Res F units were drained, but part of the value of the Res F is providing CTs by people who have decided Forces life is for them after all. The allegations that some of the Res F units had kit deficiencies afterward, I thought less well of. But given the way Res F units treat each others' holdings of vehicles and other stores, a sort of justice.
I've always HATED that Reserve units have to borrow each other's vehicles and such, even just for exercises. One of the things that would bring morale down extremely quickly was knowing we had 2 or 3 working ML's, only to have another unit need to borrow 1 for an exercise. Usually it would come back just as we lent it out, no issues. Sometimes it would come back broken - not necessarily the fault of the unit that borrowed it, just that it wasn't the most reliable to begin with.

When you factor in the distances between some units, and borrowing a vehicle ends up into a 3hr to 6hr drive. And then again, after ex. And what happens if there is a domestic emergency, and both units need working vehicles? Miracles. Literally some folks who have some decent mechanical skills, and miracles.


I was under the impression that the MSVS was supposed to be bought in sufficient numbers that the reserve units who received them wouldn't have to beg/borrow/lend between themselves. Is this still the case? Please for the love of anything holy, let that RFP come out this summer 🙏
 
I never minded borrowing; I took it for granted that each unit alone would not have enough of some things. What I took exception to was the culture.

Example: send trucks to support summer training camps (Vernon, Nanaimo), with reminder from the HQ transport to include full EIS; receive trucks back at end of summer stripped.

Example: send box amb to support an RV ex; receive damaged (not broken) unit back, VOR for a couple of months during high demand period (autumn) - not because of motor vehicle accident, but because of abuse and neglect.

Example: ordered to send fully stocked panniers to support summer training and cadet camps; receive panniers back pillaged.

Example: loan canvas in good condition; receive back different (and deficient) canvas (not due to the kind of shuffling which must happen during large collective exercises, but deliberate exchange by a single borrowing unit).

Best part: sanctimonious regimental officers of prominent units who would brook no criticism, while their corporals are openly bragging about stripping EIS, swapping eqpt, etc.

All resolvable (and not a bit of it unique - I'd be surprised to meet anyone who spent at least a year in a Res F unit's supply/transport section and encountered none of it) but the supply system takes time and is (or was) capable of occasionally being snotty about it. Meanwhile, Sep and Oct are good months for training, so borrow what you're waiting for from someone else...
 
AFAIK there are:

  • 2 x Offrs Messes
  • 2 x SNCOS Messes
  • 2 x JRs Messes
  • 2 x Association offices (unsure of the alcohol content but based on the results... )
  • 1 x Band Room (a.k.a, the unofficial Shebeen)

Plus what ever the Cadet Officers have to drink to get them through a session of looking after kids like I was :)

And then there are:

  • 2 x Museums
  • 2 x BOR Offices
  • 2 x Recruiting Offices
  • 2 x RSS Adjt's Offices
  • 2 x Coy/Bty Offices
  • 2 x Adm Coy/ HQ Coy Offices
  • 2 x CO's Offices
  • 2 x Padre's Offices
  • 2 x Ops Offices (where the RSS hang out talking about the Reg F 'back in my day' :) )
  • 2 x Cadet Offices
  • 1 x (broken) SAT range
  • 1 x 12 person conference room with a screen capable of hosting video meetings when it's not broken (I've never seen it working)
  • A half dozen Office spaces 'in the roof' that are unusable due to lack of DIN connections, and the fact that they were designed and built in 1915 before anyone cared about whether or not you had to egress successfully during a fire, so are usually filled with junk from the museums and BORs etc.
And then there is, all on its lonesome:
  • 1 x 20/25 person lecture/training theatre with the latest high tech training addition: a whiteboard.

It's always been pretty clear to me, though, that based on what the two CO's can get into trouble for the space allocation is pretty much on target ...
The PRes summarized in one post.
 
Back
Top