Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[FJAG]

I think you are grossly underestimating the missing equipment costs.

I figured you'd say that.

We have a wonderful way of actuarially piling on the life cycle costs of a Cadillac system rather than looking at the bare bones costs of a Chevy-class equipment itself. I agree that there are significant additional costs which fall under O&M. Many of those are already sunk into existing infrastructure and personnel costs. There are others, such as ammunition, for essential training and war stocks which would be enormous but which is a can that has been continuously kicked down the road. That's a big risk factor that needs addressing but isn't the issue about forming the force itself.

There are tremendous cost savings to be had if you look around. Remember we bought our current fleet of Leos at roughly 100,000 apiece (and remember that there are more Leo II A4s in service than there are A7s or A6s). - I budgeted full up costs for an A7 equivalent. The same for SP arty and AD and CLUs.

I'm of the view that one can cobble together a credible organization with Canada's existing equipment in hand and the new ones suggested. There is enough equipment to put a relatively decently equipped 2 bdes in the field and to have another bde with older equipment to be a training base - if required. From a pure training perspective the equipment is adequate across the board.

 

[FJAG]

The one point of disagreement is over the "rocket artillery". I think technology is pushing "rockets" further down the food chain. I'm starting to lean towards the "Long Range Precision Fires" nomenclature.

I'm not so much against rockets, but I was leaving the establishment to a division which (at least in the US model) leaves the rockets as an above division enabler. My view was to restrict the divisional "indirect fire support" to SPs and armed UAVs.

I must admit I am keeping my eye on the UK's Strike brigade which I see as perhaps a sign of the way future divisions should look when they are not part of a larger corps structure as the US. There are complications when you "download" certain enablers to lower level units (and yes, the division in some cases is a lower level unit.)

As to not needing a 155 for static defence....why not? If you have the ammunition in stock and the gun can be emplaced with the gun crew in a deep bunker and deeper magazine then what can it hurt? Besides the enemy.

Static defence - think Maginot line. Except in this case you are trying to hold the line with a lot less guns and a lot less people than the French had. At least if that turret is on a dug-in truck, then you can move it to where its needed. Trucks are cheap.

 

[KevinB]

I figured you'd say that.

We have a wonderful way of actuarially piling on the life cycle costs of a Cadillac system rather than looking at the bare bones costs of a Chevy-class equipment itself. I agree that there are significant additional costs which fall under O&M. Many of those are already sunk into existing infrastructure and personnel costs. There are others, such as ammunition, for essential training and war stocks which would be enormous but which is a can that has been continuously kicked down the road. That's a big risk factor that needs addressing but isn't the issue about forming the force itself.

I don't disagree, I just think you were skimping on needed items, from a strict capital expenditure part.

There are tremendous cost savings to be had if you look around. Remember we bought our current fleet of Leos at roughly 100,000 apiece (and remember that there are more Leo II A4s in service than there are A7s or A6s). - I budgeted full up costs for an A7 equivalent. The same for SP arty and AD and CLUs.

I'm not sure there will be a great deal of cost saving at this point for the lacking systems, as many other countries have been realizing exactly how screwed they are as well.

I'm of the view that one can cobble together a credible organization with Canada's existing equipment in hand and the new ones suggested. There is enough equipment to put a relatively decently equipped 2 bdes in the field and to have another bde with older equipment to be a training base - if required. From a pure training perspective the equipment is adequate across the board.

Individual solder systems for the troops are so outdated, it isn't funny at this point.
Canada is effectively blind at night, and those who do have NV systems are on the older range of reaching obsolecense, not to mention comms.

For years Canada only bought equipment for a BG or Bde, and kept robbing Peter to pay Paul when deployments came up and units rotated.

 

[FJAG]

I don't disagree, I just think you were skimping on needed items, from a strict capital expenditure part.

Individual solder systems for the troops are so outdated, it isn't funny at this point.
Canada is effectively blind at night, and those who do have NV systems are on the older range of reaching obsolecense, not to mention comms.

For years Canada only bought equipment for a BG or Bde, and kept robbing Peter to pay Paul when deployments came up and units rotated.

I must admit the key item that worries me is comms. Unfortunately I do not know enough about the current state of the Army's comms systems to know just how far behind we are. We may be adequate but I'm not sure if adequate is good enough anymore. Since I'm going Chevy option I've kicked that can down the road.

Same issue on NV.

Agree on the scale of equipment purchases. Again going by what I've been learning about our force in Afghanistan its quite clear that we were buying too much of our equipment on a deployed operational force (i.e a BG) scale rather than a force-wide equipping basis. I can't even blame SSE's myopic view of the scale of deployable force because Afghanistan preceded SSE by a lot. I tend to blame managed readiness and whole fleet management as it took the unique turn of the century state of the Army and turned a reactive solution into a blueprint for the future. That, IMHO, shows a system of crisis management rather than vision.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Individual solder systems for the troops are so outdated, it isn't funny at this point.

That's OK. It's nothing that splashing out a few hundred bucks on your own gear can't fix.

But think of the money we'll save on shaving products

Operation UNIFIER: This year's training mission for Ukrainian military ends in UK

This year's last stage of training, which the instructors of the Canadian Armed Forces conducted for the Ukrainian military in the United Kingdom in coordination with the British Army as part of Operation UNIFIER, has come to an end. â Ukrinform.

www.ukrinform.net

 

[KevinB]

I’d honestly have 2 Cadillac Bde’s (one heavy and 1 light) that routinely replace equipment and put it into storage. That way if Canada ever needed more, there would be available equipment even if not the latest and greatest.

 

[KevinB]

That's OK. It's nothing that splashing out a few hundred bucks on your own gear can't fix.

But think of the money we'll save on shaving products

Operation UNIFIER: This year's training mission for Ukrainian military ends in UK

This year's last stage of training, which the instructors of the Canadian Armed Forces conducted for the Ukrainian military in the United Kingdom in coordination with the British Army as part of Operation UNIFIER, has come to an end. â Ukrinform.

www.ukrinform.net

Personally I thought the better picture was this one.
"not really sure how this works, we don't have any and I just picked this up..."

 

[daftandbarmy]

Personally I thought the better picture was this one.
"not really sure how this works, we don't have any and I just picked this up..."
View attachment 77489

The deep, and ignored, irony of training people from another army to use a highly effective weapon system in which your own military has not yet invested.

 

[Kirkhill]

I'm not so much against rockets, but I was leaving the establishment to a division which (at least in the US model) leaves the rockets as an above division enabler. My view was to restrict the divisional "indirect fire support" to SPs and armed UAVs.

I must admit I am keeping my eye on the UK's Strike brigade which I see as perhaps a sign of the way future divisions should look when they are not part of a larger corps structure as the US. There are complications when you "download" certain enablers to lower level units (and yes, the division in some cases is a lower level unit.)

Static defence - think Maginot line. Except in this case you are trying to hold the line with a lot less guns and a lot less people than the French had. At least if that turret is on a dug-in truck, then you can move it to where its needed. Trucks are cheap.

Trucks are cheap. But cities and their inhabitants aren't.

And they can't get out of the way.

 

[markppcli]

I must admit the key item that worries me is comms. Unfortunately I do not know enough about the current state of the Army's comms systems to know just how far behind we are. We may be adequate but I'm not sure if adequate is good enough anymore. Since I'm going Chevy option I've kicked that can down the road.

Same issue on NV.

Agree on the scale of equipment purchases. Again going by what I've been learning about our force in Afghanistan its quite clear that we were buying too much of our equipment on a deployed operational force (i.e a BG) scale rather than a force-wide equipping basis. I can't even blame SSE's myopic view of the scale of deployable force because Afghanistan preceded SSE by a lot. I tend to blame managed readiness and whole fleet management as it took the unique turn of the century state of the Army and turned a reactive solution into a blueprint for the future. That, IMHO, shows a system of crisis management rather than vision.

Comms wise we’re pretty good. The army is invest a lot into Harris 163s as part of the next phase of ISSP. The reserves suffer, unfortunately and no by design, because of the storage requirements required for them (Crypto vaults / custodians etc) which is probably effecting the issue of new systems like 152s and 117Gs.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Comms wise we’re pretty good. The army is invest a lot into Harris 163s as part of the next phase of ISSP. The reserves suffer, unfortunately and no by design, because of the storage requirements required for them (Crypto vaults / custodians etc) which is probably effecting the issue of new systems like 152s and 117Gs.

No sweat. The Reserves are used to it...

 

[OldSolduer]

The deep, and ignored, irony of training people from another army to use a highly effective weapon system in which your own military has not yet invested.

And so fucking sad its ridiculous. I weep for this country.

 

[quadrapiper]

Comms wise we’re pretty good. The army is invest a lot into Harris 163s as part of the next phase of ISSP. The reserves suffer, unfortunately and no by design, because of the storage requirements required for them (Crypto vaults / custodians etc) which is probably effecting the issue of new systems like 152s and 117Gs.

Would that specific use be a good argument for a "training" device? Ideally the same radio and range, but not encrypted to the point that it can't be kept in a locker by the QM?

 

[dapaterson]

Would that specific use be a good argument for a "training" device? Ideally the same radio and range, but not encrypted to the point that it can't be kept in a locker by the QM?

Any crypto that's compatible would require such restrictions.

 

[rmc_wannabe]

Comms wise we’re pretty good. The army is invest a lot into Harris 163s as part of the next phase of ISSP.

Dismounted and static comms, yes.
Mounted comms.... Not really.

Without getting too far into things, I wish I could have shaken some sense into DLR to pair up the vehicle platform buys with the TacC2IS/TCM design so that it does look like a cable abortion in the back of an ACSV or Lav6.

 

[quadrapiper]

Any crypto that's compatible would require such restrictions.

Not compatible, just same box, buttons, and user-level behaviour. Bonus points if it's just encrypted enough to keep comms vaguely secure from hobbyists with scanners during DOMOPS and exercises. Paint it blue and use it for anything except situations where full encryption is required.

 

[dapaterson]

So, buy the IP from a company, create a crippled version, and maintain compatibility between our new crippled version and the real version?

Cheaper to buy more of the same, invest in the necessary security (vaults etc) and create central holdings that can be properly controlled and issued as needed to Res F units.

 

[Fabius]

Dismounted and static comms, yes.
Mounted comms.... Not really.

Without getting too far into things, I wish I could have shaken some sense into DLR to pair up the vehicle platform buys with the TacC2IS/TCM design so that it does look like a cable abortion in the back of an ACSV or Lav6.

I know some know this, but Comms is larger than just the radios. C5ISR for the CA is not keeping up period. There have been some very blunt conversations with our allies specifically the US Army on this, and I think it’s shocked some of the higher echelons in the CA.

Interestingly the US Army with their focus on Divisions, has moved and is planning to move most of their integration points to Division and Corps level meaning that at Bde and below if your not operating the exact same system and software as the US Army you can’t integrate to the level we were formally used to.

The CA is seeing this play out in real time on exercise I think.

 

[quadrapiper]

So, buy the IP from a company, create a crippled version, and maintain compatibility between our new crippled version and the real version?

Cheaper to buy more of the same, invest in the necessary security (vaults etc) and create central holdings that can be properly controlled and issued as needed to Res F units.

Would the latter course be manageable for DOMOPS comms? Or are you still using a second set of radios for flood/snow/fire/etc.?

 

[rmc_wannabe]

I know some know this, but Comms is larger than just the radios.

Uh...yeah. I can definitely agree with that ; .

C5ISR for the CA is not keeping up period. There have been some very blunt conversations with our allies specifically the US Army on this, and I think it’s shocked some of the higher echelons in the CA.

So here is the issue at hand:

TacC2IS is a CA responsibility, C5ISR is a CAF-wide, JIMP problem, as we rely heavily on other L1s for sensor input. The interconnection between all is a nightmare on the best of days.

Our Allies' armies ,however, are moving into that realm faster than our entire force is.... Its a problem and we are our own worst enemy for that.

Interestingly the US Army with their focus on Divisions, has moved and is planning to move most of their integration points to Division and Corps level meaning that at Bde and below if your not operating the exact same system and software as the US Army you can’t integrate to the level we were formally used to.

The issue I see is that we as the CA have all gotten used to there being integral RCCS support down to the Coy level. This is a uniquely Canadian approach, even in the ABCANZ construct; where Sig Regts are Bde and Div assets that are consolidated and eqpt is then portioned out as needed and then the pers are returned to carry on follow on tasks.

With the degree that C5ISR is advancing, and the amount of baseline technical knowledge non specialized troops have, I can see us consolidating Sig Support much higher in the food chain like our allies.

The CA is seeing this play out in real time on exercise I think.

This is true. The problem is that Comms is never brought up in planning until it becomes a limiting factor. And that usually after the plan has been made in isolation without including the Comms advisors.

It is a massive headache to have to explain to Commanders that compatibility issues aren't "opportunities for us to overcome..." No amount of positive thinking will make an outdated system bleep bloop with a newer system bleeping newer bloops.

It will get people killed eventually.