Future Canadian Airborne Capability and Organisation! Or, is it Redundant? (a merged thread)

[McG]

How come on paper we're like, 1000+ over the limit in the infantry but when I talk to guys in the battalion they say they are short manned.  I remember augmented reservists (reserves LOL) acting as section 2ICs or even section commanders for a while during work up training and on tour.

The infantry are overmanned at the Pte/Cpl level.  I suspect there is simultaneously a deficiency at the Sgt/WO level.

The "limit" does not account for 100% manning of units, and the additional manning of other positions for which Infantryman may be detailed (HQ's, Schools, other non trade specific taskings etc).

Not so.  PML does account for all the permanent positions that a given occupation is expected to fill.  What is not accounted for is the hundereds of temporary positions in Afghanistan and on many other international operations.

 

[KevinB]

Theory or Practice?

I would say the only time I have ever seen a unit manned to strength if for deployment.

In Calgary in 1PPCLI we had a M/Cpl as a PL WO, two other jacks as Sec Cdr's and a Cpl as a sect commander, with a 2LT as a PL Comd.

 

[Jarnhamar]

I'm inclined to agree with KevinB.

Any time I've worked in a battalion they seemed to be understrength.

With reserve augmentation I've heard comments like "Cool this is the first time we've had a full platoon in a long time" but then again it may vary.

 

[McG]

Theory or Practice?

Practice.  For every establishment position of a given rank/MOS (and also every position of rank/Occ Gp that is managed by said MOS), the CF is authorized to have a person of that rank and occupation.

I'm inclined to agree with KevinB.

Any time I've worked in a battalion they seemed to be understrength.

With reserve augmentation I've heard comments like "Cool this is the first time we've had a full platoon in a long time" but then again it may vary.

You have identified a symptom and blamed the wrong cause.  It is not that the CF is not authorized to hire/promote the personnel, it is that typically we have not recruited & retained enough personnel to fill all of our positions.  As a result, authorized positions go vacant somewhere.  Units will see these vacancies as (unless on road to high readiness) they are lower in the manning priority list.

Right now, we are overborne as a result of significant recruiting.  However, extra infantry privates (even to the tune of triple digits) cannot fill sergeant positions or EGS corporal positions - and these people cannot be converted overnight to fill such positions.  So, vacant positions still exist.  Other vacancies appear to exist (but do not in reality) because all of the personnel deployed on operations still fill a permanent establishment position somewhere in Canada.

In summary - people missing from an organization was incorrectly blamed on the CF not being authorized to have people for all of its positions.  The real problem is that many occupations and various rank levels are undermanned, the CF has soooo many extra infantry Cpls & Ptes that we are overmanned at the aggregate level, and NCOs and experienced officers cannot be produced overnight through the doors of the CFRCs.

 

[dapaterson]

Right now, we are overborne as a result of significant recruiting.  However, extra infantry privates (even to the tune of triple quadruple digits) cannot fill sergeant positions or EGS corporal positions - and these people cannot be converted overnight to fill such positions.  So, vacant positions still exist. 

Fixed that for you.

 

[vonGarvin]

A force-employment infantry battalion for force 2013 will be in excess of 900, all ranks.  A force-generation infantry battalion for force 2013 will be 599, all ranks.  There are holes in the ORBAT starting at the rifle-section level and on up, all left as "no fill authorised".  Those holes are designated to be filled by reservists.

So, having said that, and keeping in mind the philosophy of collective training at level 2 (section), and also remembering the philosophy to "train as you fight", how can an eight soldier infantry section properly train up to level 2?

So, in short, there are holes in our TO and E, and they are deliberate.

 

[McG]

A force-employment infantry battalion for force 2013 will be in excess of 900, all ranks.  A force-generation infantry battalion for force 2013 will be 599, all ranks.  There are holes in the ORBAT starting at the rifle-section level and on up, all left as "no fill authorised".  Those holes are designated to be filled by reservists.

FE Bn or FE BG?
Either way, the holes intended for reservists on operations do not exist as positions (in fact the FE BG itself is only a theoretical model and does not exist unitl created for a mission).  The previous suggestion that "the limit" does not allow for 100% manning is still un-true.  The CF would need to be authorized for 110 % + manning in order to start filling vacancies where positions do not exist.

So, having said that, and keeping in mind the philosophy of collective training at level 2 (section), and also remembering the philosophy to "train as you fight", how can an eight soldier infantry section properly train up to level 2?

Perhapse the solution is that we need to create all the positions that don't really exist as war-time-only, and then seek a steady-state authorization of 100% manning + 30% wartime (effectively, each bde would have the ability to form 1 x FE model BG + the remainder as FG model, and the Army would then have the capacity to run the first three rotations of any new mission before tapping into the PRes for the longer haul).  Most field units would live at the 100%+30% level, but CMs Inf Bns could vary from 100%+0% to 100%+100% or 100%+30% depending on if the Bde was currently force generating or not, and if the Bn itself was next on the R2HR or not.

 

[Kirkhill]

It sounds like you're starting to get close to Infanteer's suggestion of a Platoon Command being a huggle-muggle assemblage of fire teams (7 to 10 Fire Teams per Platoon) with command being conducted by whatever number of MCpls and Sgts that the CF can spare.

Note I didn't include WOs.  I figure if you can't find MCpls for sections your probably not going to be able to find a WO to hold a 2Lt's hand.  Pl 2ics, I'm guessing, are going to be Sgts once again.

 

[vonGarvin]

I have an even more radical idea:
Man our sections, platoons and companies up to 100% strength, so that they can train up to level 4 (sub-unit) irrespective of where they fit within the Managed Readiness Plan.

Yes, I realise that this would mean only 18 rifle companies in the army; however, we don't send that many out the door, and anyone who is foolish enough to even suggest that we have 27 rifle companies now is kidding themselves.


"Train as you fight", so, "equip as you fight" as well. 

So, assume we have 6 companies deployed at any given time.  There are six "over there", six ramping up into high readiness, and six more in "reconstitution".  But what does that mean?
The six "over there" are on operations, doing what they get paid to do.
The six "ramping up" are conducting "road to high readiness" training, which means collective training at level 5 and up. 
The six "reconstituting" are preparing to hit that road to high readiness, after they do reorganisation, etc.  So this means career courses for progression, postings in and out, and more importantly, towards the end of that cycle, doing levels 1-4 training according to the BTS.

For this to work, you will need to have tours of nine-ish months.

And don't  think that you go for nine, return for eighteen, go for nine, ad nauseum.  For some, it may be like that for a cycle or so, but let us not forget that there are postings outside of the field force.  (Schools, training centres, area HQs, ASG HQs, etc).

If thought and effort went into the planning of the army collective training, then this would work.

As for no WOs, etc, that is a pers management problem that has to be solved,but not by reorganising.  Because if Sgts are going to be Pl 2ICs by design, then we have to train them as such.

 

[KevinB]

Realistically for a Pl - at least 1 of the SGT's needs to be 6B (whatever) to fill the WO jobs while he is either A/PL Comd, or on HTLA himself, and several of the Cpl's need to be ISCC (whatever) to fill both combat loss, and HLTA positions.

 

[ArmyRick]

My opinion, as an infantry WO. Having a 3B (new 6B) qualified SGT would be nice in addition to the WO but not likely to happen.

For what a PL 2IC does, I personally feel most Section commanders with at least a years expirience in the job would have little difficulty adjusting to filling in as PL 2IC. There would/most likely be learning on the fly but most infantry SGT I know could adapt quickly.

Now stepping up as PL Comd is a different story especially if you start talking deliberate ops that require more thought put inot the estimate.

 

[vonGarvin]

Though that is true in practice, I feel that any HLTA be scrapped.  It is an unnecessary drain on our resources, personnel and in essence, our entire logistical strain.  And we ought to designate a Replacement Holding Unit for combat losses, as is our doctrine.


In other words, we ought to practice what we preach.

 

[vonGarvin]

My opinion, as an infantry WO. Having a 3B (new 6B) qualified SGT would be nice in addition to the WO but not likely to happen.

For what a PL 2IC does, I personally feel most Section commanders with at least a years expirience in the job would have little difficulty adjusting to filling in as PL 2IC. There would/most likely be learning on the fly but most infantry SGT I know could adapt quickly.

Now stepping up as PL Comd is a different story especially if you start talking deliberate ops that require more thought put inot the estimate.

Given that there are four sgts in a platoon, and given that one of those sergeants (LAV Sgt/Wpns Sect Comd) is a former Sect Comd, and therefore senior, etc, that's the dude who could step up in the immediate short term (eg: during the battle after the Pl Comd inspires his troops by dying gloriously ;D).  Having said that, one of my most effective Pl 2ICs (when I was a rifle platoon commander) was a MCpl.  I have great faith in our troops at all levels to "step up" as required; however, we owe it to them to give them the proper training for the proper job.

 

[dapaterson]

Of course, 18 companies pre-supposes 9 Bns.  Would 8 Bns of 2 coys, each with a mortar pl, come out to around the same PY bill, but give the Bns some much-needed integral indirect fire support?  Eight Bns provides two lines of six-month taskings over two years.


(The cap-badge issue could be resolved by rebadging two Reg F Bns to Black Watch)

 

[ArmyRick]

battalions with 2 x Coys for Ops is insufficient IMO. It doesn't give the CO any depth at all. It may suffice for a low intensity dom op or a humanitarian op but not one with combat or potential for combat.  If you have one coy back in rear reconsituting, that leaves one maneuver unit out in the AOR. Not to mention with 2 x coy, you really spread the troops thin over the AOR.

It not just indirect fire support that we need to operate (81mm and 155mm) but we also need engineers and armour (tanks and recce).

Depending on future threats (armed UAV purchased by the enemy?) we may find assets like air defence more in demand again.

If we had to reduce our infantry, IMO, I would go with 6 x battalions with 4 x rifle coys each (less command staff but more boots on the ground). the 4th rifle coy could be stood down except as need for ops (manned by reservist).

 

[dapaterson]

If we had to reduce our infantry, IMO, I would go with 6 x battalions with 4 x rifle coys each (less command staff but more boots on the ground). the 4th rifle coy could be stood down except as need for ops (manned by reservist).

Question:  Would it be better to have 4 coys of 3 pls, or three coys of four pls?  Twelve platoons either way, just with a different foot print  (and, if the TechnoViking doesn't become CDS, you can pull a platoon complete from the line for HLTA and still have a viable company).

 

[ArmyRick]

4 x platoons gives OC more platoons to fight with but it also increases coy supply requirements (Rats, water, ammo, POL) by 20-25%. 3 x Platoons is very manageable and it still leaves some depth to operations.

I would lean more towards 3 x platoons. Another option is having that fourth platoon but they man all the LAVs for the Coy (LAV SGTs would then be Sect comd within that LAV platoon and the LAV Captain would be the commander). But at that point we are re-inventing a wheel.

IMO, 3 x platoons (properly manned) is good to go as a standing ORBAT. Specific mission requirements in the future may dictate we need a fourth platoon but we will cross that bridge at that time.

 

[vonGarvin]

battalions with 2 x Coys for Ops is insufficient IMO. It doesn't give the CO any depth at all. It may suffice for a low intensity dom op or a humanitarian op but not one with combat or potential for combat.  If you have one coy back in rear reconsituting, that leaves one maneuver unit out in the AOR. Not to mention with 2 x coy, you really spread the troops thin over the AOR.

It not just indirect fire support that we need to operate (81mm and 155mm) but we also need engineers and armour (tanks and recce).

Depending on future threats (armed UAV purchased by the enemy?) we may find assets like air defence more in demand again.

If we had to reduce our infantry, IMO, I would go with 6 x battalions with 4 x rifle coys each (less command staff but more boots on the ground). the 4th rifle coy could be stood down except as need for ops (manned by reservist).

You're thinking of a force generation battalion, not a deployed battlegroup.
With the assumption of six companies, they could be in two battle groups, a battle group and an OMLT, PRT, whatever.  With 6 rifle coys per brigade, that's still 3 x Bn HQs, 3 x Sp Coys, 3 x Admin Coys, etc.

(Naturally the Armd Regiments can also stand up BG HQs, etc)

This is based on the force employment concept, in which BGs are stood up, and sub units are attached to them for operations.  If we stick to tasking Brigades to take rotations, then this is manageable.

 

[vonGarvin]

Of course, 18 companies pre-supposes 9 Bns.  Would 8 Bns of 2 coys, each with a mortar pl, come out to around the same PY bill, but give the Bns some much-needed integral indirect fire support?  Eight Bns provides two lines of six-month taskings over two years.


(The cap-badge issue could be resolved by rebadging two Reg F Bns to Black Watch)

Actually, we could stand up a smallish mortar and pioneer platoon in each of the 9 support platoons with the same PY bill.  THis is from the savings in going from 27 companies at 80-ish% to 18 companies at 100%

 

[Kirkhill]

Wouldn't the 4th platoon be the support platoon?  Mors, Pnrs, DFS (CASW, AT) and Vehicles?