Future Canadian Airborne Capability and Organisation! Or, is it Redundant? (a merged thread)
McG
Army.ca Legend
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In the capability that comes of being airmobile or light, is the limiting factor the infantry or should we really be discussing everything else around the infantry? Are service battalions organized and equiped to support airmobile, jungle, or mountain operations? What about the Artillery Regiments? Engineers? Sigs? If a conscious decision is made to forgo the establishment of a light capability in other arms & services: how does that impact on the infantry's light capability, endurance, sustainability, etc?Infanteer said:
Haligonian said:
FM Slim's perspective is that it is better to convert whole units to commando or light roles, rather than to solicit volunteers, which tends to take the highly motivated away from their units.
Where this theory fails is in the realm of the SOF units, which are designed to operate in small numbers in hostile territory. When the SAS was reformed to serve in Malaya after the Second World War, part of the expansion was done by converting a company of the Parachute Regiment. This proved to be a failure, as the Paras who were as fine soldiers as were available in the Brit Army at the time, were unable to make the tranisition from fighting in sections and platoons to the SAS small party concept.
There is a book titled "Re-Enter the SAS" which covers this era. I have a copy somewhere and will try to find it so I can post a more complete reference.
MCG said:
I can comment on the light artillery question, in part because I commanded an airmobile/air portable battery. When the original SSF was created circa 1964, 4 RCHA - the field regiment in Petawawa - was converted to a two battery light regiment equipped with 4.2-inch mortars. The means to transport the mortars was the venerable Dodge M37 3/4 ton truck and trailer. By 1968 the mortars had been replaced by 105mm pack howitzers.
While the batteries were fairly light, and the regiment's main role was providing the battery for the AMF(L) Battalion Group, RHQ et al stayed mounted in heavier vehicles. It should also be appreciated that artillery ammunition is anything but light. A staggering amount of the airlift bill for the battalion group was taken up by 105mm ammunition, even on the AMF(L) light scales.
The CAST* Combat Group (think a mini brigade) came along about 1970. It really was a more or less conventional grouping made up of "normal battalions/batteries" from 5 Combat Group and the AMF(L) Battalion Group from 2 Combat Group. It was not really a light formation, and from my point of view, did little to prepare for mountain operations in North Norway, especially in later years when command shifted from 2 to 5 Combat Group.
The airborne battery, which was part of the Airborne Regiment in Edmonton, operated on even lighter scales. In my opinion, and this is second hand info, is that the ammunition challenge was never really solved.
Where much of the difficulty arises is in the mass of specialized vehicles required in HQ, CS and CSS units. Equally daunting is the requirement to feed, re-suppy and medically look after the formation. Once again, one cannot shrink or dehydrate combat supplies. Now add some tac or med hel resources and the CSS task gets really ugly.
* CAST = Canadian Air-Sea Transportable
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Currently the regular army is structured along these lines
This see's the light infantry battalions incorporated into mech brigades. Essentially our light infantry units are mech units on the cheap as the army has the money to fund 3 extra infantry battalions but not enough to fund the purchase of additional vehicles.
Now what if we disconnected those light battalions from the mech brigades and had them form their own brigade along these lines
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We would still have three mechanized brigades with a reduced Infantry footprint of 2 mech battalions
This would also give us a light infantry brigade as well which in theory would make operating as a true light force easier. As you may notice the size of the support elements would be reduced from a Btn/Regiment sized formation to a Coy level formation. The Artillery would employ 81mm mortars while a light engineer capability would also need to be developed. The biggest problem that would arise from this is the fact that all the battalions would not be co-located geographically together. How we would get past this would be splitting the Support Coys up and providing each Infantry Battalion with a platoon of engineers/loggies/and artillery which would essentially become CSC/CSS assets to the Battalions but could be formed together if the need arose.
This would take care of the problems that would occur with the geographical separation that exists between the units, but if we were to do this what would be the point of even having a separate brigade? The point is that; as Technoviking pointed out, what is needed to train Infantry soldiers is the bridging of Gap's between Individual/and Collective Training. A mech force can act as light infantry no question; however, re-rolling from mech infantry to light infantry takes time and effort and vice-versa. Having a Brigade formation that trains day-to-day as a light force would give Canada an extra tool at its disposal.
So I will summarize what I think are the advantages and disadvantages of this and then we can pick this bad boy apart.
Advantages:
1. 80% of Canada's territory is inaccessible to Mechanized Forces; having a dedicated light infantry force would allow Canada to rapidly react to unforeseen events over its entire border. It would give Canadian Forces the ability to project power anywhere in Canada. This goes hand in hand with the Canada First Defence Strategy and its first Core-Mission "Conduct daily domestic and continental operations, including in the Arctic and through NORAD" http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/pri/first-premier/missions-eng.asp
2. Going hand in hand with some comments made about Arctic Sovereignty earlier; the light infantry force could become the SME's and primary responders to a crisis in the Arctic, the Para Capability could be maintained within the 3 light battalions to give us added punch and additional arctic capability. Within the CSS and CSC branch we could attach Troop of Sig/Eng/Log etc to the Para Coy to give them that necessary support capability and enablers.
3. I will use OP Halo as an example for this; 2 RCR deployed for this op and it was a light operation with some air mobile assets. I am not speaking from experience here but my OC was with 2 RCR at the time and he said 2 RCR was very lucky the way it worked out because they had by chance done collective training with helicopters and as a light infantry force prior to this deployment. Without this it may not have been as successful. Would it not be more prudent to have a light force that is continuously operating in an airmobile/light role that if these sorts of deployments arise they can be deployed rapidly. Other armies maintain this capability why can't we. This would also support the 6th Core missions "Deploy forces in response to crises elsewhere in the world for shorter periods" http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/pri/first-premier/missions-eng.asp
4. Finally; this would give us FLEXIBILITY, As some have mentioned earlier, the current force generation cycle is heavily reliant on providing soldiers with ample time to conduct collective training prior to deployment. Having a Light Force as well as a Mechanized Force would allow us to rapidly deploy and provide follow on forces to conduct collective training; be it in a Mech or Light Role.
Disadvantages:
1. Logistics - Working out how these units would be supported from the army is something I will leave to people with bigger brains to me. I personally envision certain assets such as Mortars/Engineers/Logistics being integrated into the Battalions themselves, higher level logistics could be provided by respective ASU's. The issue with this whole thing is with the vast distances between the light battalions how do you provide this light organization with cohesion and logistical support. This would need to be worked out by some highly qualified senior NCO's and Officers with far more knowledge then I possess.
2. Procurement - A big problem with the whole light concept is a lot of the enablers have been taken away that would make this functional. We are getting the Choppers back which is awesome, however the light battalions right now currently are very lacking in terms of vehicles/other key resources. I have heard a variety of rumours that the army wants to get rid of the G-Wagon. I have no idea why but for me these would be the perfect platform for light infantry, they are small and nimble enough to be easily transported rapidly but they also would provide light infantry units with mobility and flexibility. One thing that Canadian Army also lacks is the necessary winter equipment to operate in the Arctic. We have gotten rid of the Bv206's and their aren't exactly a wealth of skidoos and other equipment sitting around at the battalions (atleast not at 3 RCR).
So procurement of specialized equipment would definitely need to be done if we wanted a true light infantry capability especially if we wanted to be able to operate in the Arctic or Northern Canada, which would be one of the main reasons behind a airmobile/light infantry brigades raison d'etre.
3. Cost - Operating this sort of niche capability may in the end cost the army more; so money would need to be pulled from other areas to make this work. Where this would come from I don't exactly know, maybe nice to haves like the CCV project need to be canned, the army has already identified the LAV III as its primary vehicle fleet anyways so why we need a handful of CCVs is beyond me.
4. Additional Overhead - Do we really need to create another Brigade for this? A lot of people complain about how much overhead the army already has do we really need another Brigade to pull something like this off? I would argue we do so that Collective Training as a light infantry force can be achieved, and clear direction can be given; however, I am sure some would disagree with me.
Well I have dragged this post on for long enough thats what happens when I have too much time on my hands on a Sunday afternoon but really if we are going to bring back light infantry, and develop an air-mobile capability this may be a way to move forward. It would allow the Army to satisfy the core-missions highlighted in the Canada First Defense Strategy while providing us with an increased ability to project power abroad.
This see's the light infantry battalions incorporated into mech brigades. Essentially our light infantry units are mech units on the cheap as the army has the money to fund 3 extra infantry battalions but not enough to fund the purchase of additional vehicles.
Now what if we disconnected those light battalions from the mech brigades and had them form their own brigade along these lines
Uploaded with ImageShack.us
We would still have three mechanized brigades with a reduced Infantry footprint of 2 mech battalions
This would also give us a light infantry brigade as well which in theory would make operating as a true light force easier. As you may notice the size of the support elements would be reduced from a Btn/Regiment sized formation to a Coy level formation. The Artillery would employ 81mm mortars while a light engineer capability would also need to be developed. The biggest problem that would arise from this is the fact that all the battalions would not be co-located geographically together. How we would get past this would be splitting the Support Coys up and providing each Infantry Battalion with a platoon of engineers/loggies/and artillery which would essentially become CSC/CSS assets to the Battalions but could be formed together if the need arose.
This would take care of the problems that would occur with the geographical separation that exists between the units, but if we were to do this what would be the point of even having a separate brigade? The point is that; as Technoviking pointed out, what is needed to train Infantry soldiers is the bridging of Gap's between Individual/and Collective Training. A mech force can act as light infantry no question; however, re-rolling from mech infantry to light infantry takes time and effort and vice-versa. Having a Brigade formation that trains day-to-day as a light force would give Canada an extra tool at its disposal.
So I will summarize what I think are the advantages and disadvantages of this and then we can pick this bad boy apart.
Advantages:
1. 80% of Canada's territory is inaccessible to Mechanized Forces; having a dedicated light infantry force would allow Canada to rapidly react to unforeseen events over its entire border. It would give Canadian Forces the ability to project power anywhere in Canada. This goes hand in hand with the Canada First Defence Strategy and its first Core-Mission "Conduct daily domestic and continental operations, including in the Arctic and through NORAD" http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/pri/first-premier/missions-eng.asp
2. Going hand in hand with some comments made about Arctic Sovereignty earlier; the light infantry force could become the SME's and primary responders to a crisis in the Arctic, the Para Capability could be maintained within the 3 light battalions to give us added punch and additional arctic capability. Within the CSS and CSC branch we could attach Troop of Sig/Eng/Log etc to the Para Coy to give them that necessary support capability and enablers.
3. I will use OP Halo as an example for this; 2 RCR deployed for this op and it was a light operation with some air mobile assets. I am not speaking from experience here but my OC was with 2 RCR at the time and he said 2 RCR was very lucky the way it worked out because they had by chance done collective training with helicopters and as a light infantry force prior to this deployment. Without this it may not have been as successful. Would it not be more prudent to have a light force that is continuously operating in an airmobile/light role that if these sorts of deployments arise they can be deployed rapidly. Other armies maintain this capability why can't we. This would also support the 6th Core missions "Deploy forces in response to crises elsewhere in the world for shorter periods" http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/pri/first-premier/missions-eng.asp
4. Finally; this would give us FLEXIBILITY, As some have mentioned earlier, the current force generation cycle is heavily reliant on providing soldiers with ample time to conduct collective training prior to deployment. Having a Light Force as well as a Mechanized Force would allow us to rapidly deploy and provide follow on forces to conduct collective training; be it in a Mech or Light Role.
Disadvantages:
1. Logistics - Working out how these units would be supported from the army is something I will leave to people with bigger brains to me. I personally envision certain assets such as Mortars/Engineers/Logistics being integrated into the Battalions themselves, higher level logistics could be provided by respective ASU's. The issue with this whole thing is with the vast distances between the light battalions how do you provide this light organization with cohesion and logistical support. This would need to be worked out by some highly qualified senior NCO's and Officers with far more knowledge then I possess.
2. Procurement - A big problem with the whole light concept is a lot of the enablers have been taken away that would make this functional. We are getting the Choppers back which is awesome, however the light battalions right now currently are very lacking in terms of vehicles/other key resources. I have heard a variety of rumours that the army wants to get rid of the G-Wagon. I have no idea why but for me these would be the perfect platform for light infantry, they are small and nimble enough to be easily transported rapidly but they also would provide light infantry units with mobility and flexibility. One thing that Canadian Army also lacks is the necessary winter equipment to operate in the Arctic. We have gotten rid of the Bv206's and their aren't exactly a wealth of skidoos and other equipment sitting around at the battalions (atleast not at 3 RCR).
So procurement of specialized equipment would definitely need to be done if we wanted a true light infantry capability especially if we wanted to be able to operate in the Arctic or Northern Canada, which would be one of the main reasons behind a airmobile/light infantry brigades raison d'etre.
3. Cost - Operating this sort of niche capability may in the end cost the army more; so money would need to be pulled from other areas to make this work. Where this would come from I don't exactly know, maybe nice to haves like the CCV project need to be canned, the army has already identified the LAV III as its primary vehicle fleet anyways so why we need a handful of CCVs is beyond me.
4. Additional Overhead - Do we really need to create another Brigade for this? A lot of people complain about how much overhead the army already has do we really need another Brigade to pull something like this off? I would argue we do so that Collective Training as a light infantry force can be achieved, and clear direction can be given; however, I am sure some would disagree with me.
Well I have dragged this post on for long enough thats what happens when I have too much time on my hands on a Sunday afternoon but really if we are going to bring back light infantry, and develop an air-mobile capability this may be a way to move forward. It would allow the Army to satisfy the core-missions highlighted in the Canada First Defense Strategy while providing us with an increased ability to project power abroad.
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Interesting..... In essence, the airmobile brigade you propose is a very near match to the old Airborne Regiment when the commandos were battalion-sized, minus the full para capacity of course...
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Old Sweat said:
OS - with the greatest respect, that doesn't fully do justice to Slim's position. In my opinion it was not so much that line units should convert to specialist roles but that well led line units could be trained to handle any of the tasks that specialists were performing. Based on that reading, the failure of the Paras to become instant SAS troopers could be placed at the feet of the Para leadership (IIRC at that time there were a large number of Guards officers in the Paras - a 300 year old elite clinging to 300 year old man mangement tactics). I would note that ulitmately the Paras seem to have supplied a disproportionate portion of troopers to the SAS and that currently 1 Para has been completely reroled to take over some portion of the kinetic roles previously handled by the SAS themselves.
In a related thought I would note that Line Regiments adopted Ranger tactics which became formalized as Light Infantry companies, which then begat Light battalions, which begat Rifle battalions, which begat the Rifle Brigade, which begat the Light Division, which resulted in the whole army using light tactics, which begat the Commandos which begat the Paras, which begat the SAS which begat CSOR and JTF2 . Ulitmately modern armies are all using the dispersed tactics that characterised Ranger operations 300 years ago. And that includes conducting Mounted operations after the form of Moss Troopers, Hussars, Dragoons and Boer War era Mounted Infantry.
Yea verily ;D
The evolution of the army and military force in general is that command invests a small amount of resources to determine if new tactics can beat old problems. Successful practioners of innovation become elites. Unsuccessful ones die. The tactics of the elites become generalized (while at the same time the elites try to hold their postion in the pecking order for as long as they can).
Yes, Slim was against taking good NCOs out of line units just to create specialist Corps of Tree Climbers, with the union ticket to authorize them to do that work and deny others the right to climb trees. His position, IMO, was that if somebody knows a better way to climb trees, and there is a need to climb trees, then take your troops available and teach them to climb trees the new way.
And when they need to jump out of a plane give them a two day course and a parachute and throw them out the back. Once they hit the ground they are doing exactly what they were doing before they got into the plane.
Now they don't need the parachute, the helicopter can get them into 90% of the places a parachute can and, unlike the parachute, can extract them from 100% more places.
My 2 centavos. and your are probably over charged at that.
Edit: sorry for the divergence Stymiest.
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I'll give you credit for putting forward a proposal. I'll start with your advantages:
1.
The inaccessibility of domestic territory is a red herring. An Infantry Battalion can go anywhere regardless of its kit; it is not bound to take its vehicles. Canada already has this ability to react to unforeseen events over its entire border embedded in its 9 Infantry Battalions.
2.
This one is always paraded as a strength of Light Infantry. First off, what is your threat in Arctic Sovereignty? Are we expecting a Russian Division? A battalion of Danish parachutists? A few armed foreigner corporate goons? We need a credible threat before we can build a capability to defeat it. Secondly, what is your proposed employment of Light Forces in the Arctic - are you going to parachute 1000 guys into the high north with tobaggans? How will you sustain those guys? What do you expect them to do when their mobility is likely a few km a day?
3.
Again, helicopters are not a black art and it doesn't take "light forces" to develop competencies in them. There are numerous cases (some of which I was part of) of LAV-equipped companies leaving the vehicles behind to conduct effective air-mobile operations in Afghanistan.
4.
How so? I'd argue that it strips us of flexibility as it pigeon-holes your available forces for Force Employment. Should you require anything that needs infantry with its own protected mobility, you have stripped 1/3 of your forces available for this. Should you require guys to run around in the jungle/mountains, you're leaving 2/3 of your forces out of the equation.
I'd argue that instead of building divisions within our forces, we need to put the resources into all-around excellence. Having all parts of your forces provide you with the most options gives us true flexibility. I know Canadian soldiers and our Infantry are capable of this.
5.
So, you want motorized infantry in jeeps? It doesn't take long to train jeep drivers; infact a driver wheeled course is a prerequisite to most heavier platforms. So, again, the ability to deploy in small vehicles (if political conditions allow for it) already exists within all 9 Infantry battalions.
1.
Stymiest said:
The inaccessibility of domestic territory is a red herring. An Infantry Battalion can go anywhere regardless of its kit; it is not bound to take its vehicles. Canada already has this ability to react to unforeseen events over its entire border embedded in its 9 Infantry Battalions.
2.
This one is always paraded as a strength of Light Infantry. First off, what is your threat in Arctic Sovereignty? Are we expecting a Russian Division? A battalion of Danish parachutists? A few armed foreigner corporate goons? We need a credible threat before we can build a capability to defeat it. Secondly, what is your proposed employment of Light Forces in the Arctic - are you going to parachute 1000 guys into the high north with tobaggans? How will you sustain those guys? What do you expect them to do when their mobility is likely a few km a day?
3.
Again, helicopters are not a black art and it doesn't take "light forces" to develop competencies in them. There are numerous cases (some of which I was part of) of LAV-equipped companies leaving the vehicles behind to conduct effective air-mobile operations in Afghanistan.
4.
How so? I'd argue that it strips us of flexibility as it pigeon-holes your available forces for Force Employment. Should you require anything that needs infantry with its own protected mobility, you have stripped 1/3 of your forces available for this. Should you require guys to run around in the jungle/mountains, you're leaving 2/3 of your forces out of the equation.
I'd argue that instead of building divisions within our forces, we need to put the resources into all-around excellence. Having all parts of your forces provide you with the most options gives us true flexibility. I know Canadian soldiers and our Infantry are capable of this.
5.
So, you want motorized infantry in jeeps? It doesn't take long to train jeep drivers; infact a driver wheeled course is a prerequisite to most heavier platforms. So, again, the ability to deploy in small vehicles (if political conditions allow for it) already exists within all 9 Infantry battalions.
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Further to OS comments about the need for specialist vehicles and the transport bill for artillery - as well as the comments by Stymiest.
Why not situate the estimation on the basis of light companies that are in communication with air support - both Combat and Service?
If that combination of effort can't get the job done then heavier forces can be rolled in (or flown in) to take over the main effort but in the mean time the light force got there "fustest with the mostest" that it was physically possible to supply, thereby engaging the enemy at the earliest possible opportunity and disrupting their planning cycle.
Better "a Battalion in time than a Division too late". The Light Force is a screen to deal with low level threats on their own and buy time to concentrate heavier elements against the threat.
1 Abn Div got chewed up on North Africa because - just as Slim would have predicted, and indeed saw, once they had fallen out of their aircraft they were kept on the ground as infantry. They didn't have the kit necessary to function as infantry until they started "finding" vehicles "lost" by other units.
There is nothing wrong, in my view, with deploying a light unit and then reinforcing it with heavier elements over time. Equally there is nothing wrong with ultimately replacing the light units with heavier units over time and withdrawing the light units to be reallocated to taskings more in keeping with their capabilities.
But does everybody always have to carry an axe all the time in case he has to knock down a door?
Why not situate the estimation on the basis of light companies that are in communication with air support - both Combat and Service?
If that combination of effort can't get the job done then heavier forces can be rolled in (or flown in) to take over the main effort but in the mean time the light force got there "fustest with the mostest" that it was physically possible to supply, thereby engaging the enemy at the earliest possible opportunity and disrupting their planning cycle.
Better "a Battalion in time than a Division too late". The Light Force is a screen to deal with low level threats on their own and buy time to concentrate heavier elements against the threat.
1 Abn Div got chewed up on North Africa because - just as Slim would have predicted, and indeed saw, once they had fallen out of their aircraft they were kept on the ground as infantry. They didn't have the kit necessary to function as infantry until they started "finding" vehicles "lost" by other units.
There is nothing wrong, in my view, with deploying a light unit and then reinforcing it with heavier elements over time. Equally there is nothing wrong with ultimately replacing the light units with heavier units over time and withdrawing the light units to be reallocated to taskings more in keeping with their capabilities.
But does everybody always have to carry an axe all the time in case he has to knock down a door?
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Kirkhill said:
Thank you Kirkhill - you got to the heart of what I was getting at. My takeaways from Slim:
1. Well trained forces will do almost anything you need of them provided you give them the right training;
2. Creating barriers within your forces only disadvantages the whole for the "benefit" of a few. Slim was sceptical of the value of such forces as the Chindits as they would dissapear into the jungle only to come back decimated, requiring a refit;
3. The loss of Lines of Communication is something that can be overcome by some ingenuity and frugality, we have a penchant to oversupply units when infact we can get by with much less;
4. Motorization/Mechanization - from a truck to a tank - can be used to advantage by a force almost anywhere in the world short of heavy swamps. Tanks were part of his fight in some of these heaviest tropical jungles in the world; and
5. Air mobility in the form of parachutes (and now helicopters) can and should be used to advantage by any force and should be taught to as many soldiers as possible.
Again, of 5 books I think are important for all professionals to read, this is 1 of them. Slim has a way of turning observations of high level command into useful lessons on leadership in modern warfare.
I really do not want to get into a peeing contest, but I knew Slim felt it was preferable to retrain formed units for specialized roles. As for the canard about the Parachute Regiment supplying a large amount of the successful applicants for the SAS, not everybody in the Paras applies and not every Para that applies, makes it. I can't comment about the Guards influence in the Parachute Regiment, but I know the C-in-C in Malaya sent two Guards COs home. One had told "Mad Mike" Calvert that his battalion did not go thrashing around in the jungle looking for terrorists as it was not proper soldiering, or something of that nature. The other had instituted a policy that every platoon or larger would do thirty minutes drill on the parade square before leaving camp. This was enforced on the QRF responding to an ambush just down the road from the camp with obvious results.
Now, I have some problems getting my mind around forming another brigade, especially as it will be without supporting arms in the form of a field and a combat engineer regiment, along with the vital CSS tail. Moreover, this means forming another headquarters which means finding the manpower and kit for it. Admittedly forming headquarters seems to be the Canadian reaction to any issue, but the cost is too rich in resources for what the army achieves.
As for the gunners using 81mm mortars and nothing else, that is an expedient, not a tactically viable solution. There is a requirement for both guns and artillery STA along with (Air Force) TUAV in any deployed force that is intended to fight, which implies a proper structure that is not just a mortar platoon by any other name. When I wrote guns, I meant guns with lots of FOOS and FACS and a FSCC/ASCC function with all the bells and whistles to get the most from artillery, air and aviation.
Now, I have some problems getting my mind around forming another brigade, especially as it will be without supporting arms in the form of a field and a combat engineer regiment, along with the vital CSS tail. Moreover, this means forming another headquarters which means finding the manpower and kit for it. Admittedly forming headquarters seems to be the Canadian reaction to any issue, but the cost is too rich in resources for what the army achieves.
As for the gunners using 81mm mortars and nothing else, that is an expedient, not a tactically viable solution. There is a requirement for both guns and artillery STA along with (Air Force) TUAV in any deployed force that is intended to fight, which implies a proper structure that is not just a mortar platoon by any other name. When I wrote guns, I meant guns with lots of FOOS and FACS and a FSCC/ASCC function with all the bells and whistles to get the most from artillery, air and aviation.
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Infanteer:
Generally you and I are in agreement on the need for generalist forces. Mech can become Light can become Helo can become Para can become Marine. Stipulated.
But I don't agree with you that you can take a LAV unit and immediately drop it into another role and have it effectively fight.
From Vimy to your experiences with CH53s and 2VPs experiences with the USMC the keys are, in my opinion, time, training and support.
You have good troops that pick up the training quickly. Good stuff. But they were latching into systems that had been created and were supplied by others. Those folks had written the manuals after they had made their mistakes. They were surviving elites. Your troops got the benefit of their skills. And their service support.
With the greatest of respect all your guys had to do was get on the back of the bus and get off at the other end. But somebody had to supply and maintain the bus and determine if this was a suitable landing site and where the gas was going to come from.
Those skills need practice.
Now if you are arguing that LAV battalions should spend one third of their time operating without their LAVs, practicing operations in muskeg, desert and bush, heliborne and riverine, urban combat then we are on common ground. But if you are arguing that there is no conversion bill for LAV troopers to other roles then I am afraid that I am having difficulty with that proposition.
With respect to the Red Herring - forever is a very long time and just because we don't perceive an imminent threat today doesn't mean that a threat won't eventuate tomorrow. Additionally, if your enemy perceives that you don't pessess the ability to operate in an environment where he can operate where do you suppose he will expend effort?
In the meantime a ready Light Force (and that could be 1 VP or 3 VP, either permanently LAVless or LAVless for a 6 month to one year rotation, could find employment as an immediate reaction force, whether in Coppermine ACP or Beirut NEO or securing an airhead until the LAVs can arrive.
Light Forces have a role. Just because that role may only require them to be on the ground, in some circumstances for 72 hours doesn't negate their value. LAVs don't go everywhere. People live many places LAVs don't go and can't go and the critcal issue is to bring armed, disciplined agents of the government everywhere that people live and the government claims authority. If you can't do that, if you can't command the place AND the spaces, then you are not supplying the full range of services for which the government engages you.
I know you know that. I am just having a great deal of difficulty with what I perceive as the LAV battalion as being the key to the universe.
Canadian troops are good but are you really comfortable taking a position that they could immediately and effectively engage an enemy when it was necessary to conduct heliborne or waterborne operations to get to grips with them?
Or how am I misreading you?
Cheers, Chris.
And Old Sweat: not engaging. Apologies for the tone. Points taken.
Generally you and I are in agreement on the need for generalist forces. Mech can become Light can become Helo can become Para can become Marine. Stipulated.
But I don't agree with you that you can take a LAV unit and immediately drop it into another role and have it effectively fight.
From Vimy to your experiences with CH53s and 2VPs experiences with the USMC the keys are, in my opinion, time, training and support.
You have good troops that pick up the training quickly. Good stuff. But they were latching into systems that had been created and were supplied by others. Those folks had written the manuals after they had made their mistakes. They were surviving elites. Your troops got the benefit of their skills. And their service support.
With the greatest of respect all your guys had to do was get on the back of the bus and get off at the other end. But somebody had to supply and maintain the bus and determine if this was a suitable landing site and where the gas was going to come from.
Those skills need practice.
Now if you are arguing that LAV battalions should spend one third of their time operating without their LAVs, practicing operations in muskeg, desert and bush, heliborne and riverine, urban combat then we are on common ground. But if you are arguing that there is no conversion bill for LAV troopers to other roles then I am afraid that I am having difficulty with that proposition.
With respect to the Red Herring - forever is a very long time and just because we don't perceive an imminent threat today doesn't mean that a threat won't eventuate tomorrow. Additionally, if your enemy perceives that you don't pessess the ability to operate in an environment where he can operate where do you suppose he will expend effort?
In the meantime a ready Light Force (and that could be 1 VP or 3 VP, either permanently LAVless or LAVless for a 6 month to one year rotation, could find employment as an immediate reaction force, whether in Coppermine ACP or Beirut NEO or securing an airhead until the LAVs can arrive.
Light Forces have a role. Just because that role may only require them to be on the ground, in some circumstances for 72 hours doesn't negate their value. LAVs don't go everywhere. People live many places LAVs don't go and can't go and the critcal issue is to bring armed, disciplined agents of the government everywhere that people live and the government claims authority. If you can't do that, if you can't command the place AND the spaces, then you are not supplying the full range of services for which the government engages you.
I know you know that. I am just having a great deal of difficulty with what I perceive as the LAV battalion as being the key to the universe.
Canadian troops are good but are you really comfortable taking a position that they could immediately and effectively engage an enemy when it was necessary to conduct heliborne or waterborne operations to get to grips with them?
Or how am I misreading you?
Cheers, Chris.
And Old Sweat: not engaging. Apologies for the tone. Points taken.
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cavalryman said:
Yes, Each Battalion would maintain the Para Capability that they do now (You can jump from Chinooks so why not use them for that very role)
But in essence the Brigade would be based around the Helicopter and the use of small vehicles (G-Wagons(or equivalent) with Skidoos/Bv206s (Similar Vehicles) for use in the arctic) with some training from other Aviation assets.
Other then what exists in a few of our training books already there isn't really doctrine on air-mobile operations in the CF at least there isn't any that I am aware of. With the incorporation of Dillion Miniguns into our Griffon fleet/new ISTAR capabilities, the new Chinooks... we have an actual capability to put out an air-mobile force. Wasting this would be foolish IMO. This is going to require books to be written on how we employ helicopter force doctrinally and how we structure them.
It will also require a closer integration of Tac-Hel and the Army... better cooperation, and new courses. Much of the problem that exists in the army and the air force is neither organization really understands the others planning considerations. As well on the army side atleast their are a hodge podge of courses out there detailing helicopter ops (Hel ops, LZ/DZ controller, pathfinder, etc)... perhaps it would be prudent for the army to combine these much like the Americans do with their Air Assault Crse, this would be the helicopter equivalent of our jump course and would teach skills such as LZ/DZ marking, slingload operations, rappelling, and planning considerations for helicopter ops.
On the air force side of the house
they currently have (initial pilot training (2 Choppers per op); Category Upgrade Program (Planning with 2 to 4 Helos); ATAC (Advanced Tactical Aviation Course which is Helo pilot equivalent of ATOC (Cbt team planning)); beyond this they have Mountain Flying Course; SOA Crse; NVG Formation; ISTAR Qual Crse (In development based on the MX-15 Eo/IR Ball)
What we don't have is a course dedicated to understanding joint ops between aviation and the army, this course could go hand in hand with an Air Assault type course, and could be used to bridge the gap between air force aviation and army planning considerations. This is important because any effort to create an Air Mobile brigade would undoubtedly require cooperation between the air force and the army.
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This is true; however, if you are going to get someone to do something who will you send in first a force trained specifically in the light infantry role or a force whose primary role and what they practice the most is the conduct of mechanized operations.
This is a good point and one that is difficult to answer. For this the threat isn't so much what exists today but what could exist in the near future. I know that the Danes/Norwegians take Arctic sovereignty very seriously, so why with our huge land mass and potential for immense monetary gain in the Arctic not take sovereignty and Arctic patrolling seriously. When the fight in the international community comes over Arctic Sovereignty we are going to have to show that we can actually control the territory up there, having a Brigade group with this as one of its core functions will do this.
Again I will say yes you are right in the sense that anybody can be taken and probably carry out an air assault operation but would it not be more effective to have a force specifically dedicated to conducting air-mobile operations. What happens if we take the lead in a mission in lets say the Congo where Air-Mobile ops will undoubtedly play an important role. Who would you want inserting initially, a force who works with choppers day in day out? Or one who doesn't?
This would be true if we had enough vehicles and equipment to outfit all units universally but the fact is we don't. The light Battalions have no vehicles and no ability to train on them. When they were inserted into Afghanistan they required many months of pre-deployment training and build up before being inserted into theatre. This is fine; however, would it not make more sense to give them their own delivery platform to the battlefield. One that they could train on and become so called SME's on. Also this goes back to my who point on Collective training. Maybe at some point we won't be given the opportunity to have months of pre-deployment training. At this point the ability to interchange between mech and light would add a lot of flexibility and it would give subsequent units time to re-roll themselves.
Well the purpose behind motorized vehicles in the light infantry would again be because it is air portable. You can sling load a G-Wagon so it would definitely have its uses.
I think Infanteer, our differences in opinion are merely a product of our interpretations of certains ideas and definitions. I view the divisions within the army as a good thing, you view it as wasteful and it would be more prudent to have everyone be proficient at everything. My argument against this is we may not always have the time to do collective training necessary prior to a deployment; however, by having niche forces we can provide that force specifically trained in a certain area to conduct the initial insertion and afterwards allowing follow on forces time to conduct follow-on training IOT bridge the gap in skill so to speak.
I would also argue that a division between light infantry and mechanized infantry would provide a much needed morale boost for the fellows in the light battalions who often view themselves as the ugly step-children of the mech battalions. It would provide a certain amount of esprit de corps that is lacking in the infantry.
I think the last point about giving the light battalions a much-needed "boost" to their morale is bunk. I've seen plenty of guys from both mechanized and light units walking around as though their crap doesn't stink, and the same number that whine and moan about how terrible life is and how everyone overlooks them in favour of someone else. 1VP and 3VP live in each others' shadows, and 2VP sulks in the corner and complains about how awful Shilo is.
As for the light battalions/brigades, I think that in an army as small as ours we can afford to play the generalist role "well enough." For example, with the current shortage of LAVs, 2VP cannot afford to outfit the companies in their traditional mechanized role. In fact, the LAVs are being consolidated within Cbt Sp and used as a Zulu LAV "Squadron," presumably as mobile fire support. Does this mean that training stops in the companies?
I'm not going to dispute the fact that a specialized unit will perform its given function better than a unit assigned to that role in an "ad hoc" fashion, but I also believe that in the majority of cases, "good enough" really is good enough and that a force of well-trained generalists will adapt better than an assortment of specialists.
As for the light battalions/brigades, I think that in an army as small as ours we can afford to play the generalist role "well enough." For example, with the current shortage of LAVs, 2VP cannot afford to outfit the companies in their traditional mechanized role. In fact, the LAVs are being consolidated within Cbt Sp and used as a Zulu LAV "Squadron," presumably as mobile fire support. Does this mean that training stops in the companies?
I'm not going to dispute the fact that a specialized unit will perform its given function better than a unit assigned to that role in an "ad hoc" fashion, but I also believe that in the majority of cases, "good enough" really is good enough and that a force of well-trained generalists will adapt better than an assortment of specialists.
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Technoviking said:
CO says so...leaving room for this sort of flexibility is a good thing; you know, that whole mission command thing.
Doctrine is "what is taught", not necessarily "what is practiced", while manning authorization and TO&E are administrative tools for the adjutant, quartermaster and comptroller branches, not tactical straightjackets on the commanders. Since doctrine and manning authorisation are usually right outta'er, I can't blame commanders for doing what they can with what they got.
daftandbarmy
Army.ca Dinosaur
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Old Sweat said:
In his book, Slim also said that there was little need for special forces as any unit in the 14th Army could be called upon to successfully complete tasks formerly thought the preserve of 'special units'. We shouldn't underestimate the capabilities of a 'normal', well led Canadian infantry battalion.
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