Divining the right role, capabilities, structure, and Regimental System for Canada's Army Reserves

[FJAG]

The Regimental system in effective action yet again  :facepalm:


The Reserves need to be gutted and filleted like a fish to make combat effective entities like the Guard is down here.
(and that took a lot of gnashing of teeth and pains over the last 14 years too).

If Canada wishes to retain the Regimental system for the Reserves - the regimental senates need to take a long walk off a short pier - and then the units HQ's and command staffs need to be decimated until they reflect the realities of their effective strength -- which may end up being a Capt as the 'unit' 'CO'.  And due to the truncated command availabilities - an up or out method may need to be adopted to the Reserve Officer structure.

I have for a long time been a fan of the National Guard system so I'll do a friendly pre-empt of the negative comments that others will undoubtedly throw in.

Firstly the Guard's effectiveness does not come from its level of training which is not much better than that of our own reserves.  The Guard's effectiveness (especially over the last ten years) comes from:

1. legislation and an administrative system that allows Guards to be relatively easily mobilized for operations (ours allows for mobilization but it is cumbersome at best and we have very poor job protection legislation).

2. A willingness on behalf of senior leadership to compulsorily mobilize the Guard (units and/or individuals). (Our leadership is highly reluctant to use compulsory activation and looks to volunteer individual augmentation)

3. A willingness of senior leadership to accept the risk of fielding soldiers that have not had the equivalent of full-time training and experience (ours leaders are highly risk adverse. The fact is that a six year reserve infantryman is not, and never will be, the equivalent of a six year regular force one - the real issue is does he have to be? There are arguments pro and con but the bottom line is how much risk should we be prepared to accept and how can we structure things to minimize that risk to an acceptable level-rather than eliminate it entirely)

4. A willingness of senior leadership to assign the Guard both a role in the overall defence scheme and to pay for the basic equipment required to fulfil that role. The best example is the fact that much of the heavy armour, artillery and mech infantry (all of which are only needed for major operations occasionally) to be located in the Guard. (Our senior leadership, and many of those who post here, have a belief that sophisticated equipment needs to be with the regular force. In reality you can build a system to cater for this and the Guard is but one example of how to do that)

Reserve forces, if properly structured and used, can be a major cost multiplier for a government. Simply put the "stand-by" costs to train and maintain a single reservist is a small fraction compared to that of a regular soldier over the length of a career. The best place for reserves is in those trades and skills that are not required either for day to day operations or administration or for immediate reaction forces. Armour, artillery, heavy infantry and many specialty trades lend themselves to this.

Sadly it's my opinion that our senior military leadership has its head up its a** on this issue. It is not a "political" government issue unless and until the military present a viable course of options for them to consider. In my opinion that will never happen because we have now had several generations of generals, colonels and CWOs who know nothing but a system where the reservists are considered the poor and incompetent cousins who must be stroked from time to time but never taken seriously. They have no motivation to look outside the box and any hint that we need to break the two sacred cows of the existing limiting legislation and the fiction that operationally deployed reservists must be volunteers causes their eyes to glaze over in a heartbeat. The last half century has limped along with the current inadequate and misunderstood system and it will take a major external push to get any action to even study the issue. Won't happen in any of our lifetimes.  :2c:

:cheers:

 

[Eye In The Sky]

I think you've got it. Taking the earlier example of the Maritimes, with its 3 x Armd regiments...because of sheer #'s, PEIR and Hal R work together on TBG exercises. We simply don't separately have the qual'd ppl to flush out a full 8-car tp. Yet when we work together, as we have since the Rifles were raised, we can make it work, with the odd unqual'd MCpl in a CComd seat, or MCpl in a Ptrl Comd seat (or Sgt in Tp WO, etc.).

That was the way back in '89 when I joined.  Nothing new really...

Speaking solely to what I know (even in its own limited way), to have all 3 x Armd regiments lose their respective cap badges, if such is what is proposed, is a dangerous proposition.

Why?  Be creative; let each unit keeps its name, cap badge history and Guidon.  But structure and fund it as what PEIR is - an understrength Sqn (unless things have changed drastically recently).  They all become Sqns of the "3X Bde Armd Regiment" [ the first thing that needs to happen is putting all 5 Div Res units into a single CBG with one CBGHQ]. 

PEIR the only Army regiment on PEI (Sigs have a Sqn here), and will kick and scream. Rifles were just reactivated in 2009, and will also kick and scream. 8CH...well...

Despite it's name, PEIR is far from a Regiment, let's be honest.  It should have an OC, SHQ and the rest of stuff a PRES Armd Sqn gets.  Your own statement above underlines the fact that the Hfx Rifles and PEIR have to combine to get an 8 car troop.  That's not even half a Sqn. 

You mention the Sigs; the Comm Res transformation was something sensible; got rid of the Comm Res mafia and HQs.  Now, all NS and PEI PRES Sig's unit are part of 36 Signals Reg't.  Did it kill them?  No.  Did if ruffle feathers.  Yup.  Does that matter?  Shouldn't. 

The Conservative government is much in love with Canada's mil history. To tell the PRes units we're collapsing you under 1 x Inf badge, 1 x Armd badge...units will immediately throw everything they can to destroy that, JUST to protect their lineage - non-obstant the fact many are already perpetuating long-lost units as it is.

Last I remembered, CAF Officers and NCMs are required to follow lawful orders from their superiors.  Res COs are just like me or anyone else; I can bitch, moan and whine but at the end of the day when my SUNRAY says "get on with it", I either get on with it or face the music.

 

[daftandbarmy]

This year, at the unit level, we have approximately 37 'mandays' to train our troops up to participate in a culminating exercise in May 15.

Of those, approximately 10 or 12 get chewed up with 'mandatory' requirements imposed from above, like Domops, IBTS and various other PC/ ceremonial/ social fluff.

How much training can you get done with your troops in about 27 days (that includes one weekend per month and one night per week) between September and May? As for our Officers and SNCOs, they have little or no time assigned to their own professional development because that's way too costly.

I would say that 80% of our people are excellent material and want to participate in well planned and executed, tough, training. We are letting them down by not challenging them enough, and not allocating enough time and resources to training them properly.

Double the time we currently have available and I'd say you'll have yourself a pretty good 'reserve' to draw on as required.

 

[dapaterson]

This year, at the unit level, we have approximately 37 'mandays' to train our troops up to participate in a culminating exercise in May 15.

Of those, approximately 10 or 12 get chewed up with 'mandatory' requirements imposed from above, like Domops, IBTS and various other PC/ ceremonial/ social fluff.

How much training can you get done with your troops in about 27 days (that includes one weekend per month and one night per week) between September and May? As for our Officers and SNCOs, they have little or no time assigned to their own professional development because that's way too costly.

I would say that 80% of our people are excellent material and want to participate in well planned and executed, tough, training. We are letting them down by not challenging them enough, and not allocating enough time and resources to training them properly.

Double the time we currently have available and I'd say you'll have yourself a pretty good 'reserve' to draw on as required.

If we want senior Reserve personnel to also be engaged in the community, where will they find this additional time?  Time is finite.  Between work, family, community engagement and the Reserves where does this elusive additional time come from?  Or do we want the Reserves to be inhabited (inhibited?) by chronically unemployed single folks with nothing to do?

Leadership needs to be engaged and ensure that appropriate, effective training is scheduled.  There are still some, however, who think that the 49th anniversary of this or the protection of the mess are more important; there needs to be a cull of those.


(And the less said about those who put their efforts into buttons and bows and pips and crowns while ignoring the other issues, the better...)

 

[Rifleman62]

Eye In The Sky

But structure and fund it as what PEIR is - an understrength Sqn (unless things have changed drastically recently).  They all become Sqns of the "3X Bde Armd Regiment"

First of all, why does the Canadian Forces need all these Recce units?

 

[Eye In The Sky]

I don't know that they do, or don't.  I've always been a tactical level type, so won't guess on if they are/aren't needed.

But, looking at numbers "if" 36 and 37 Armd Recce units went to the field as a formed unit, it sounds like they might have enough to field 1 actual Recce Sqn of G Wags. 

So despite 3 capbadges and various locations...1 actual Sqn.

Not sure what the state is now, but there used to be 11 or so "Recce Sqn's" on the PRES side.  That was when the Boat folks had Cougars.  AFAIK, all the boat Sqn's re-rolled to Recce.  At least one Armd Recce unit was re-rolled out of the blackhat world (Elgins), so not sure what the current # of PRES Armd Recce...units...is these days. 

 

[dapaterson]

Sadly it's my opinion that our senior military leadership has its head up its a** on this issue. It is not a "political" government issue unless and until the military present a viable course of options for them to consider. In my opinion that will never happen because we have now had several generations of generals, colonels and CWOs who know nothing but a system where the reservists are considered the poor and incompetent cousins who must be stroked from time to time but never taken seriously. They have no motivation to look outside the box and any hint that we need to break the two sacred cows of the existing limiting legislation and the fiction that operationally deployed reservists must be volunteers causes their eyes to glaze over in a heartbeat. The last half century has limped along with the current inadequate and misunderstood system and it will take a major external push to get any action to even study the issue. Won't happen in any of our lifetimes.  :2c:

:cheers:

There is a camp in the current Regular Force that will admin (in private at least) that the Reserve Force kept the army going through Afghanistan - not only with augmentees for deployment, but by filling in the holes back in Canada in record numbers.  That goodwill still remains in some circles.

The challenge is that when push comes to shove, and budgets are being cut, people instinctively protect their own.  Add to that the odd accounting systems of DND where pay for Reservists is a local expense looked at with envy as something that could be saved, and pay for Regulars is hidden away and rarely considered as a cost to day to day business, and many perverse incentives arise.

 

[MilEME09]

Eye In The Sky
First of all, why does the Canadian Forces need all these Recce units?

Because there was no other role armour related to role them into, since the idea of reserve heavy armour went out the window with the sherman tank. Personally I would of kept the leopard 1, gave it to the reserves (but kept them at major bases like Wainwright) and role about half of those recce units back to armour

 

[Remius]

Which begs the question as to why have certain trades in the PRES.  Many trades in the PRES are undeployable in their actual trades and cannot even CT as a semi-skilled/skilled applicant so why have them?  The exception would be those trades that fill a niche for the reserves.  Armoured Recce, med tech, MP are just a few that I can think of. 

 

[McG]

... why does the Canadian Forces need all these Recce units?

Because there was no other role armour related to role them into, since the idea of reserve heavy armour went out the window with the sherman tank.

That does not describe a need.  Reserve armour units could be transformed into infantry or a support function.  Not having tanks in the reserve does not lead to a requirement that we have more recce.

 

[Remius]

Many units could be re-rolled as infantry but have specialised functions that some non infantry units currently do.  Heck, more reserve MSEOP/drivers would be great.

 

[Fishbone Jones]

ROPU Units and Balloon Regiments.

 

[Nfld Sapper]

Just look at the History of 31 CER....

Year Change
1812 31 CER perpetuates the Royal Corps of Artificers and Craftsmen
1866 25th Elgin Battalion of Infantry
1900 25th Elgin Regiment
1903 (disbanded)
1904 25th Elgin Regiment (re-formed)
1915 Canadian Expeditionary Force:
18th, 33rd, and 91st Battalions raised
1920 The Elgin Regiment
1921 Canadian Expeditionary Force:
1st Battalion (perpetuating 91st Battalion CEF)
2nd (Reserve) Battalion
1942 25th Armoured Regiment (The Elgin Regiment)
1943 1st Canadian Tank Delivery Regiment
1943–45 25th Armoured Delivery Regiment (The Elgin Regiment)
"A" & "B" Squadrons attached to 1st Canadian Armoured Brigade
"C" Squadron attached to 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade
"D" Squadron attached to 4th Canadian Armoured Division
"E" Squadron attached to II Canadian Corps
"F" Squadron attached to First Canadian Army
"G" Squadron attached to 5th Canadian Armoured Division
"H" Squadron attached to I Canadian Corps
1946 The Elgin Regiment (Infantry)
1954 The Elgin Regiment (27th Armoured Regiment)
1958 The Elgin Regiment (Royal Canadian Armoured Corps)
1997 31 Combat Engineer Regiment (The Elgins)
2004 48 Field Squadron is re-established in Waterloo, Ontario
2006 Both Field Squadrons renamed Engineer Squadrons as part of Land Force Reserve Restructure Phase 2.
2013 31 CER(The Elgins) perpetuates 1 Armoured Personnel Carrier Regiment (The Kangaroos

 

[daftandbarmy]

Many units could be re-rolled as infantry but have specialised functions that some non infantry units currently do.  Heck, more reserve MSEOP/drivers would be great.

We have just had one of our guys finally get his MSEop qualification... after three years. I can give him his Pte hooks this week (and a bottle of champagne for hanging in there for so long!).

 

[Eye In The Sky]

That does not describe a need.  Reserve armour units could be transformed into infantry or a support function.  Not having tanks in the reserve does not lead to a requirement that we have more recce.

I don't think we have too much recce;  PEIR and Hfx Rifles combined can't do 2 x 8 car troops.  We have a lot of PRES G Wag units called Regiments that are (likely all) understrength Sqns / overstrength Troops.

 

[OldSolduer]

We do have a generic mission statement at least in the infantry. We are supposed to train to generate general purpose combat capable soldiers.

I personally think there are too many infantry regiments. Between the two orgs here we can barely maintain a company.

 

[dangerboy]

We do have a generic mission statement at least in the infantry. We are supposed to train to generate general purpose combat capable soldiers.

I personally think there are too many infantry regiments. Between the two orgs here we can barely maintain a company.

Just wondering if anyone has looked at how Winnipeg did it forming the Tac Inf Group and thought about applying to other cities with multiple Inf units, such as Toronto.  To me it seems like a good idea and I have not heard a lot of people bitching about loss of identity.

 

[OldSolduer]

Just wondering if anyone has looked at how Winnipeg did it forming the Tac Inf Group and thought about applying to other cities with multiple Inf units, such as Toronto.  To me it seems like a good idea and I have not heard a lot of people bitching about loss of identity.

I'm not sure of the strength of Toronto's infantry units. I would say for units that can parade around 200 or more regularly, leave them be. If they can't produce, then group them under 1 CO and RSM and go for it. There will be some pushback, but once its said and done it is workable.

 

[Dissident]

Which begs the question as to why have certain trades in the PRES.  Many trades in the PRES are undeployable in their actual trades and cannot even CT as a semi-skilled/skilled applicant so why have them?  The exception would be those trades that fill a niche for the reserves.  Armoured Recce, med tech, MP are just a few that I can think of.

While the trade has been somewhat Schitzo since I've enrolled, the fact remains that the RegF MPs would have been in a world of hurt without the PRes MPs in the last ten years. With the Dom Ops tasking, RegF MPs have a hard time generating troops for any sort of surge in op tempo.

We, PRes MPs, do not (with very few exceptions) get the full police training package. Nonetheless we have been able to fill in gaps as necessary. It's not great, but it has worked.

On a side note, I happen to have an acquaintance who just got posted to the Army MP Doctrine slot. I've met with Col LaFlamme this summer (along with CWO Raymond). The future of the PRes MPs has never looked brighter, IMHO. Let's see what happens with the PRes MPs in the next little while...

The main issue we are contending with right now is that the institution of the requirement to successfully complete MPAC, combined with the SIP limitation. Recruiting comes in dribbles. I warned higher of this 3 years ago and we will likely hit rock bottom before things changed. My platoon went from having our full establishment, 54 all rank on paper (~35 parading), to low 30s on paper (~18 parading).

How is everybody else doing recruiting wise?

 

[daftandbarmy]

How ius everybody else doing recruting wise?

We could recruit dozens more than we are allowed to, regularly. As a result we're kind of slowly drying up, especially when CT opportunities to the Regs come through.