Divining the right role, capabilities, structure, and Regimental System for Canada's Army Reserves

[GR66]

I think my (poorly presented) thought was actually very much in line with what Kirkhill suggested.  The key element that I was getting at was that the Reg Force has to be reformed FIRST and come to the realization that it's not going to ever magically expand to deploy Division-sized field units.  We simply don't have the equipment or trained people to be able to do that.  It should be a much smaller, but well equipped and fully manned force able to deploy on its own.  The Reserves could then be reorganized to properly support such an structure (Kirkhill's "rifles" to fill out losses). 

The idea of a "Militia" structure different than the "Reserves" is more of an idea that there may be at some point a requirement to have a trained and organized force that is able to deploy within Canada at a time when the Reg Force may already be deployed overseas.  For example if we were to go to war there would still be a need for a "Home Guard" to protect our key infrastructure, etc.  A Militia organization could be well suited for this but would not necessarily have to be trained or equipped or organized in that same way as our Reg Force.  The "Reserves" in this model would simply be Part-Time soldiers...the same training, etc as their Reg Force Full-Time peers, which could be called to Full-Time service when required.  The "Militia" on the other hand would be more like units of trained citizens that can be used for specific tasks within Canada. 

However you slice it I think that Reg Force re-organization needs to come first.  Re-organization of the Reserves to support the resulting structure would then come next.

 

[daftandbarmy]

However you slice it I think that Reg Force re-organization needs to come first.  Re-organization of the Reserves to support the resulting structure would then come next.

And even before that, we need a 'Mission Statement' that drives everything else. Right now we're adrift in a sea of strategic indecision, and it shows throughout....

 

[dapaterson]

And the thread title has always baffled me... what is divine about the role of the reserves ??

It's a verb, not a noun, in this instance: "to discover or declare (something obscure or in the future) by divination; prophesy."

 

[Kirkhill]

It's a verb, not a noun, in this instance: "to discover or declare (something obscure or in the future) by divination; prophesy."

As in "divining rods", also known as "witching".

 

[Eye In The Sky]

  The "Reserves" in this model would simply be Part-Time soldiers...the same training, etc as their Reg Force Full-Time peers, which could be called to Full-Time service when required. 

I think the yellow part is next to impossible, IMO.  PRES Inf types can't train up on LAVs and PRES Armour types can't train up on Coyote and Leo.  Just 2 examples off the top of my head.

/rant on

When I was  new Trooper in the Reserve Armd Recce world, we trained Mon and Thurs nights and 2 x weekend exercises a month.  That equated to 6 recce ex's before Christmas break, prep for winter warfare stuff, a winter indoc and winter warfare/dismtd recce ex, then back to mounted recce ex X 2/month in Apr, May and June.  Something like that.  But, I recall doing 12 or so Recce type ex's at the home unit. 

Anyways, we had the time and money to have fairly well trained recce troops.  We trained enough, and did a fair amount of variety of trg (of avail tasks from the Recce Sqn in Battle and Troop Ldr's Manual PAMs) that people were really interested in what was going on; morale was high then, despite this being before all the big pay raises of the last decade and a half - no 'miltiaman' did it for the money IMO.

The sqn weekend ex's, we would be going pretty much non-stop from 1800 Friday night until supper on Sunday; go into Tp Hides/Attack posn's on Friday night, confirmatory orders the Troopie would go to while the A c/s sorted out the Hide, BP was happening...H-hour Saturday morning (early), adv all day, into a running resupp then OP screen at night, withdrawl in contact with passage of lines, etc etc on Sunday, finishing up with Stables, a hot-wash and usually, a few pints in the Mess after.

Those are the days I remember that 'we' as a Sqn had a 'mandate' - train from the Recce Sqn in Battle, and Tp Leaders manual.  Train in AFV/AC rec.  Train in basic fieldcraft.  Wpns.  Heck, we'd go in on trg nights sometimes, and get a Wng O, kit out the troop and go to the RV, just to see how long it would take us and what part of our Tp SOPs needed some smoothing out. 

Kit and equipment - we had enough Iltis, radios, etc to kit out 3 x 7 car Recce Tps, plus SHQ with 2 CPs, and a small A1 ech.  Tp Ldrs had 46 sets usually, and ea C/S had a manpack for Dbl-banked comms.  We had $ for all the stuff we needed to train.  What we DID lack, compared to today's standard, was decent pay and somewhat substandard kit; there was nothing high speed/low drag issued like bivy bags, fleece this and that and CADPAT Gortex-like jackets.  Regardless, we still did sentry in the freezing rain in late fall, night OPs in the spring in the cold mud, and winter warfare.  All of us survived, and IMO the high morale back then overcame the lower standard kit.

Then, things changed.  The PRes went from 2 trg nights a week and 2 weekends ex's to 1 trg night a week and maybe 1 or 2 weekend ex's between Sept and Christmas.  Winter warfare was dropped and winter indoc was the only "ex" done until the spring.  People starting loosing interest in the 'same ol same ol'.  The old 49 and 46 sets were removed from the callsigns and replaced with TCCCs gear, but, sorry you don't have enough for a veh mount for all the troop veh's.  Changes were made, sometimes only taking 5 car troops on ex.  I remember a few times when people who wanted to go could NOT go on a Sqn ex, because "there wasn't enough seats".  Then the Iltis was replaced and sorry, you aren't getting a 1 for 1 replacement.  Now, there was less money = way less actual training events, less radios to kit out less vehicles...less motivation, less morale and less GAFF.

Before I jumped back to the Reg Force, I left my PRES unit (as one of the Tp WOs) for the Bde HQ for a Cl B/A.  I went back a few years later as an Obs/Cntlr for the Bde Spring EX.  Wow.  The "Regiment" was barely able to put together 1 (one) 7 car recce troop.  The troop was a shambles compared to the troops I had grown up in.  No SOPs.  No direction.  No real ability.  A "we don't do stuff like hide procedure anymore" attitude.  WTF?  It was above the Tp level too - this low sense of GAFF. 

When I joined my former PRES unit, there was an actual 21 callsign recce sqn, with SHQ (with CPs provided by the local Comm Res Sqn), that had a fairly clear (and simple) training objective as D Sqn Recce or 61 Tp.  We made less money, had less 'high speed' kit, but we were 400% more capable of doing the job than the mob of confusion I witnessed on the last time I saw my old unit 'in action'. 

From what I can gather, not much has changed with that "Regiment" as of late - interest is down, morale is down, numbers are down.  But there is still a RHQ for what equates to maybe a recce tp and an very understrength A1 Ech component. 

I am betting there are many similar stories across the various Res Bdes.  Those who are fixated on living in the past will be left in the past. 

I could go on and on about the reasons why things are like the way they are, and what improvements could be made as well as the thinking at the Bde HQ levels in the PRES (I worked in one for 5ish years), but in the end it is still just an exercise in  :brickwall:

/rant off

 

[GR66]

Seen and understood.  The vast, vast majority on here seem to be saying basically the same thing.  I think (don't want to speak for Kirkhill) however that a fundamental change in the Reg Force structure along the lines Kirkhill is suggesting would make it possible to make some fundamental changes to the Reserves which may give them the opportunity to be effective in their new role. 

As suggested the Reg Force would become a much leaner organization with more focus on the advanced weapons and enablers that would compensate for the fewer numbers of overall troops.  The "new" Reserves wouldn't be designed to take over those roles...the Reg Force would ideally build in enough redundancy in these specialty trades that they could maintain those capabilities in the field...at least as long as these advanced weapons/tools are still available.  The Reserves would instead focus on providing replacements for the proverbial "Guys in Back".  I think it would be within the capability of fewer but larger Reserve units to fulfill this role.  The smaller overall number, the reduced overhead and hopefully closer working/training relationships with their affiliated Reg Force units should provide (hopefully) useful and interesting training opportunities for these Reservists.  Take those 10% turned on guys from a dozen units and put them together in a single unit with good leadership, purpose and tools.  Perhaps these few units will attract more turned on troops when they see that it's worthwhile.  You may even retain more releasing Reg Force members if they see the Reserve units are a worthwhile place to be.

What about the rest of the units/troops?  Maybe disband them.  Get rid of deadwood.  Or maybe that's where the concept of "Militia" units can come in to play.  You don't expect these units to have the time and resources available to train to the standard of your Reg Force troops.  So find something useful that these 90% can do.  Don't ignore their willingness to serve the CF..just give them roles to match the level of commitment they are able to give.  Different but useful training.  Civ pattern vehicles that suit what your asking them to do. 

 

[Eye In The Sky]

First thing I would suggest is to cut out the fat - reduce the HQs.  Example:  NS-PEI has it's own "Bde".  So does NB and Nfld.  Why?  Is there REALLY enough troops in each to justify a Bde, and a Bde HQ?  Knock it back to 1 Bde &  HQ.  Where...who cares, just do it but shut down either the Hfx or Moncton Bde HQ.  1 CBG HQ in the Maritimes, 1 in Qc, 1 in On and 1 for the West.

Most Cl B types on the Bde HQ payroll are at least SNCOs; from a $ perspective, every Cl B/Cl B(a) Sgt position eliminated in these unnecessary HQ position would pay for 11 Cl A Sgt positions (based on Cl A being funded @ 32 days/year).  11!  That is for 1 Sgt position. 

Carry that on - if a unit is a "Regiment" on paper but a Coy in strength...why do they have a CO, RSM, RHQ...etc.  I might be a former PRES type and , back in the Regs, but I am also a taxpayer.  I don't think we ( as in taxpayers) should pay a CO salary for a unit, when it doesn't really even have the numbers for a Sqn. 

If people want to keep living in la-la land, that is where they will continue to see their (limited) budget money going...

 

[Jungle]

It's a verb, not a noun, in this instance: "to discover or declare (something obscure or in the future) by divination; prophesy."

Ah... ok. I found this which clears things up:

http://runescape.wikia.com/wiki/Divination

Divination is a gathering and manufacturing skill that was developed by humans shortly after the beginning of the Sixth Age. It involves gathering Guthix's residual life-force, which is leaking throughout Gielinor. To do this, the players gather divine energy from wisps and then use this energy to make items such as portents, signs, and divine locations.

And I thought this thread was about defining the role of the Reserves... I feel like an idiot.

Now... who's Guthix ??

 

[Kirkhill]

Seen and understood.  The vast, vast majority on here seem to be saying basically the same thing.  I think (don't want to speak for Kirkhill) however that a fundamental change in the Reg Force structure along the lines Kirkhill is suggesting would make it possible to make some fundamental changes to the Reserves which may give them the opportunity to be effective in their new role. 

As suggested the Reg Force would become a much leaner organization with more focus on the advanced weapons and enablers that would compensate for the fewer numbers of overall troops.  The "new" Reserves wouldn't be designed to take over those roles...the Reg Force would ideally build in enough redundancy in these specialty trades that they could maintain those capabilities in the field...at least as long as these advanced weapons/tools are still available.  The Reserves would instead focus on providing replacements for the proverbial "Guys in Back".  I think it would be within the capability of fewer but larger Reserve units to fulfill this role.  The smaller overall number, the reduced overhead and hopefully closer working/training relationships with their affiliated Reg Force units should provide (hopefully) useful and interesting training opportunities for these Reservists.  Take those 10% turned on guys from a dozen units and put them together in a single unit with good leadership, purpose and tools.  Perhaps these few units will attract more turned on troops when they see that it's worthwhile.  You may even retain more releasing Reg Force members if they see the Reserve units are a worthwhile place to be.

What about the rest of the units/troops?  Maybe disband them.  Get rid of deadwood.  Or maybe that's where the concept of "Militia" units can come in to play.  You don't expect these units to have the time and resources available to train to the standard of your Reg Force troops.  So find something useful that these 90% can do.  Don't ignore their willingness to serve the CF..just give them roles to match the level of commitment they are able to give.  Different but useful training.  Civ pattern vehicles that suit what your asking them to do.

You're doing a fine job GR66.  Carry on.  ;D

 

[Kirkhill]

Here's a model for the "Militia" as opposed to the "Reserves".

Danish Home Guard - Unpaid Volunteers for home service with a small cadre of regular force instructors.

Reserves, on the other hand, could/should/might be, trained regular force personnel liable to recall for a period of years with a commitment to periodic refresher training. 

To take civilians off the street and expect to turn them into EO Techs, or even competent military clerks, on the basis of 9 months of Wednesday nights and Saturdays, together with a couple of summer courses, is unrealistic.

On the other hand, all those guys that came back from Afghanistan and wanted out, due to the lack of excitement, should have been released to the civvy world on a tether with a really strong return spring attached.  Form them into actual Reserve sub-units attached directly to their parent battalion or regiment.

Plan on engaging them with well planned, well resourced, paid, refresher exercises once every three years with annual bonuses for demonstrating current fitness.

 

[Bird_Gunner45]

The reality of the Canadian militia was indeed quite different from the myth. One needs look no further than the Fenian invasion of the Niagara Peninsula for an example of what happened when untrained and poorly equipped volunteers came up against a properly organized force of Civil War veterans at Ridgeway on 2 June 1866. See www.fenians.org for the details. The North West Rebellion also had the potential to go bad very quickly; the only thing that saved the reputation of the Canadian Militia was that the Metis were even more poorly organized, trained and equipped and their campaign plan was a disaster.

I am fond of saying we were very fortunate we did not come up against the Comanches or the Zulus.

So what is the solution. It has been suggested, with lots of evidence to back up the thesis, that the regular force can not sustain a prolonged campaign. Unfortunately the reserves, in my opinion, are not in any position to take over the battle except after a mobilization and training period of 18 months to two years at a minimum. Look at Korea and the Special Force: it took eight months to field a battalion built around a cadre of veterans and some regulars and a couple of months after that to deploy the rest of the brigade group. At that time we still had lots of modern equipment in our stores and tactics were dismounted and operated at 3.5 miles per hour. That is not the case today.

If the truth be known, we generated something pretty close to the Special Force in concept based on a combination of experienced regulars, reserves and people off the streets - without designating it as such - over the duration of the Afghanistan mission. Maybe we should start by asking how could we have done it better using the quasi Special Force model.

OS- this thread really took off in my day of travelling to Borden, but I'll respond.

IMHO, the future of warfare is more akin to what we would have expected in 1650 than 1913. I believe that, based on the expense in keeping a well equipped and trained regular army and employing said army, that wars of the future will be more, "fight with what you have" in "limited wars" than the traditional shoulder to shoulder advance to contact seen in unlimited warfare in the 20th century. Forces will fight close to their supply depots (certainly an extended distance than seen in armies under Louis XIV) for limited objectives. Evidence of this can be seen in the Falklands and even Afghanistan.

So what role does the reserve play? I would see the reserve being more of a territorial army with a mission for defence of Canada and INDIVIDUAL AUGMENTATION and the regular force being placed on an expeditionary footing. Changes in organization, equipment, and training would be required for the reserves, to be sure. I personally see no role for formed reserve bodies in expeditionary operations.

Feel free to critique!

 

[GR66]

And even before that, we need a 'Mission Statement' that drives everything else. Right now we're adrift in a sea of strategic indecision, and it shows throughout....

A big BINGO on that comment.  As I think I stated in both the HQ Bloat and F-35 threads the real problems won't be fixed until we have new (and realistic) Foreign Policy and Defence White Papers.  If we don't know what we're expected to do then EVERY capability and EVERY organization is defensible.  If we don't know what we're expected to do then every piece of kit we order can have an infinite number of possible requirements. 

 

[Colin Parkinson]

If you are waiting for a white paper that is worth the paper it is written on, then I have a bridge to sell you. It will always be the politics of the moment and who is in power for that moment.

 

[OldSolduer]

If you are waiting for a white paper that is worth the paper it is written on, then I have a bridge to sell you. It will always be the politics of the moment and who is in power for that moment.

I have been saying for some time that the CAF has lost its focus. The focus should be on war fighting...just my opinion....

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Perish the thoughts, parades, fancy camo patterns, paperwork, power point and promotions are what this army is about, war fighting and training for it gets in the way of real soldiering!

 

[blackberet17]

So let me see if I've got this correct? What is being is suggested is taking all of the reserve infantry regiment in an area like 31 Brigade for example and reorganizing them under 1 unit badge? Let's say in this case all of the regiments become outlying companies of 4 RCR with one battalion head quarters based in London and each of the outlying companies maintains it's own company HQ and training facilities in its respective city or town?

Have I got this right or did I misunderstand something?

I think you've got it. Taking the earlier example of the Maritimes, with its 3 x Armd regiments...because of sheer #'s, PEIR and Hal R work together on TBG exercises. We simply don't separately have the qual'd ppl to flush out a full 8-car tp. Yet when we work together, as we have since the Rifles were raised, we can make it work, with the odd unqual'd MCpl in a CComd seat, or MCpl in a Ptrl Comd seat (or Sgt in Tp WO, etc.).

Speaking solely to what I know (even in its own limited way), to have all 3 x Armd regiments lose their respective cap badges, if such is what is proposed, is a dangerous proposition. PEIR is the only Army regiment on PEI (Sigs have a Sqn here), and will kick and scream. Rifles were just reactivated in 2009, and will also kick and scream. 8CH...well...

The Conservative government is much in love with Canada's mil history. To tell the PRes units we're collapsing you under 1 x Inf badge, 1 x Armd badge...units will immediately throw everything they can to destroy that, JUST to protect their lineage - non-obstant the fact many are already perpetuating long-lost units as it is.

 

[x_para76]

I think you've got it. Taking the earlier example of the Maritimes, with its 3 x Armd regiments...because of sheer #'s, PEIR and Hal R work together on TBG exercises. We simply don't separately have the qual'd ppl to flush out a full 8-car tp. Yet when we work together, as we have since the Rifles were raised, we can make it work, with the odd unqual'd MCpl in a CComd seat, or MCpl in a Ptrl Comd seat (or Sgt in Tp WO, etc.).

Speaking solely to what I know (even in its own limited way), to have all 3 x Armd regiments lose their respective cap badges, if such is what is proposed, is a dangerous proposition. PEIR is the only Army regiment on PEI (Sigs have a Sqn here), and will kick and scream. Rifles were just reactivated in 2009, and will also kick and scream. 8CH...well...

The Conservative government is much in love with Canada's mil history. To tell the PRes units we're collapsing you under 1 x Inf badge, 1 x Armd badge...units will immediately throw everything they can to destroy that, JUST to protect their lineage - non-obstant the fact many are already perpetuating long-lost units as it is.

Would a middle ground be something modelled on what the Brits did with Royal Regiment of Scotland, where each unit maintains it's identity but organizationally comes under one flag? That would at least stream line things somewhat as well as eliminating numerous senior leadership positions.

 

[OldSolduer]

We tactically grouped the Rifles and Camerons here in Winnipeg several years ago. There were some hurt feelings that Camerons or Rifles would be commanded by someone not from their Regiment.

It seems to work, but for whatever reasons Winnipeg and the population does not seem to support the military much, despite what they all say. It's an inch deep and a mile wide.

For a city of 750,000 or so you'd think we could have at least two full companies of infantry.

 

[KevinB]

The Regimental system in effective action yet again  :facepalm:


The Reserves need to be gutted and filleted like a fish to make combat effective entities like the Guard is down here.
(and that took a lot of gnashing of teeth and pains over the last 14 years too).

If Canada wishes to retain the Regimental system for the Reserves - the regimental senates need to take a long walk off a short pier - and then the units HQ's and command staffs need to be decimated until they reflect the realities of their effective strength -- which may end up being a Capt as the 'unit' 'CO'.  And due to the truncated command availabilities - an up or out method may need to be adopted to the Reserve Officer structure.

 

[dapaterson]

It's not only the Res F regiments that fight progress in the name of history.  Why are there nine infantry battalions in the Reg F - funny how we have three regiments of three Bns each - wonderful that the math works out so nicely.

It may be time to reexamine the Regimental system in its entirety - maybe do something heretical like posting the best Reg F infantry LCols into command positions regardless of cap badge.