Divining the right role, capabilities, structure, and Regimental System for Canada's Army Reserves

[Rick Goebel]

For all those who advocate basing the reserve force structure on what is currently in existing units, I would suggest that you are going about it backwards.

The first thing to do is to decide what reserve forces are needed.

After you determine that, you decide how to get there from the current structure.   You may need to change recruiting procedures, compensation packages, job protection legislation, individual training, collective training, and other things in addition to structure, but at least you will have a goal to gear these changes to.

 

[bgreen]

Sir...,

The thing is I don't think we will ever get the argument sorted out as to what the reserves will become in the future.  We have been having the "role of the reserve" discussion for years.  I think if we can get what we have in our units reflecting the organizations and doctrine that currently the CF is using we will at least be ready and current.  My thoughts on the Bde Recce Sqn are based on what our manning list should be to reflect upon the BTS we are trg to.

Also in small communities like those in Sk the unit I was in had the opportunity to recruit  veh techs, gun mechs, medics and storesman from our small city and neighbouring towns that would have been unavailable to the CF because these individuals weren't prepared to travel to a unit that focused on their trade or skill in a location 100 to 200 km away.  I should add I could also have recruited a DR. a chaplain and a lawyer that wanted to train with their hometown unit.  Unfortunately I had no positions to offer these individuals.  As a result they are not avail to the CF now.  And likely you will only find these individuals in cities with units like SVC Bns or HQ.

BG

 

[pbi]

Also in small communities like those in Sk the unit I was in had the opportunity to recruit veh techs, gun mechs, medics and storesman from our small city and neighbouring towns that would have been unavailable to the CF because these individuals weren't prepared to travel to a unit that focused on their trade or skill in a location 100 to 200 km away. I should add I could also have recruited a DR. a chaplain and a lawyer that wanted to train with their hometown unit. Unfortunately I had no positions to offer these individuals. As a result they are not avail to the CF now. And likely you will only find these individuals in cities with units like SVC Bns or HQ.

BG

Bgreen: IMHO herein lies one of the failures of our current system to spread the "footprint" beyond the cities: the failure to develop rural units or outlying sub-units of urban units, beyond a very limited scope. This was, I thought, the "hub-and-spoke" concept articulated for LFRR Ph II but in the end I think it came to almost nothing outside Southern Ontario. Compare the current presence to the pre-Unification web of outlying coys/sqns/btys and (as you are well aware...) you will see a lot of empty areas on the map. One of the obstacles to expanding a unit's presence by broadenig its catchment area (as opposed to establishing outlying subunits) is also inherent in the current nature of the Res which focuses on "parade nights". These work well for units whose soldiers have a reasonable commute to the Armoury; they do not work well, or at all, for units whose soldiers must drive two or three hours to get to the Armoury.  As you know 116 Bty went to weekend parading years ago, as I believe 26 Fd also has. There are some drawbacks (more weekend time is taken up per month) but it does allow a much broader catchment area, until such time as we are able to convince the Army that Canadians who don't live in big cities should have the opportunity to serve in the Army Res too.

 

[mdh]

I should add I could also have recruited a DR. a chaplain and a lawyer that wanted to train with their hometown unit.   Unfortunately I had no positions to offer these individuals.   As a result they are not avail to the CF now.   And likely you will only find these individuals in cities with units like SVC Bns or HQ.

This is an interesting comment which raises another point - albeit somewhat off topic - about recruiting "specialists" like professionals who want to serve with the reserve force.   We just don't have the same "specialist stream" designed to recruit and encourage such people to join.   I believe both the Territorial Army in the UK and reserve forces in the US actively recruits them and have created programs aimed a taking advantage of those skills.   In my case I am public affairs specialist in civilian llife but there appears to be a fairly limited scope to develop those skills in the Militia world (beyond being the UIO of course which is really an appointment not an MOC).  

Any thoughts or observations on this PBI or BGreen?  

 

[pbi]

We just don't have the same "specialist stream" designed to recruit and encourage such people to join. 

You mighty want to talk with your local Res Bde HQ or Area HQ. In our Bde (38 CBG) and in LFWA I know that we have Medical Officers, Legal Officers, Public Affairs Branch Officers, Chaplains, Finance Branch Officers, etc. While not all of these positions exist on the establishment of an Army Res unit, both Bde and Area HQs, as well as Army, have positions to hold and to employ people with these qualifications.

I believe both the Territorial Army in the UK and reserve forces in the US actively recruits them and have created programs aimed a taking advantage of those skills.

I can't speak about the TA, but last year I had a very interesting conversation with the G1 (Recruiting) of 34 Inf Div, the USARNG Div that is the parent HQ for the ARNG units located in the states south of our Bde. I specifically asked him about "targeted recruiting" for the ARNG. The answer he gave me was that, except for medical personnel, the ARNG did not target any specific civ trade in order to recruit for any specific MOC: people serve in whatever interests them. He commented that a person who drives a truck all week at their civvy job may not want to drive a truck on weekends for the ARNG for less money. He may, however, want to jump out of a helo or fire a 155mm howitzer instead.

In my case I am public affairs specialist in civilian llife but there appears to be a fairly limited scope to develop those skills in the Militia world (beyond being the UIO of course which is really an appointment not an MOC). 

Again, check out your local Res Bde HQ. In our Bde we have a Bde PAO, a PA Sgt, and an Image Tech. We have a second Bde Image Tech and two regional PAOs out in our Garrisons. These positions are in addition to our UIOs. "Connecting With Canadians" is a major role for the Army Res, and PAOs play a vital role in this. As well, any Comd worth his pay understands the value of good PA work. Our "B" Class PAO is usually busy with something all the time, ranging from supporting Unit PIOs to coverage of communty events to helping the Cmd deal with the latest "nasty" out of a unit (yes...that happens in the Res too, more often than you might think!!). Your Area HQ may have positions available, and I know that Director Land Communications (the Army PAO staff) have Res PAOs that they employ across the country, living and working in their own comunities but employed on Army-level PA projects. We have one of these officers co-loc in our Bde HQ.  Check out what is out there. Cheers and good luck!

 

[bgreen]

I almost hate to get into this as it can really choke an individual.  Let me say that this week I met two professional men a lawyer and a medical worker who both expressed an interest in the Reserves.  Let me qualify that because really they were interested in one particular unit that resides in their hometown.

I don't want to put these men on a pedestal because they didn't ask for any special treatment even though they possess specialist skills needed by the CF.  Their straight forward request was to become a part of a local unit for all the same reasons high school students want to join... challenge, camaraderie, and being part of something that has historical and current relevance.

And doesn't it seem somewhat strange that we allow civilian equivalences for law, medical, social workers, chaplains and the like but a weapons, veh, or sigs techie we can't get any recognition of civilian equivalences?

I think if we want to get a pool of specialists for the CF we had better be prepared to get the ones that have expressed interest in joining a local unit wherever that unit may be located and sort out the manning issue later.  Let them parade with the unit and build bonds with the unit so they will be encouraged to stay in and perhaps take tours.

Why do we let our huge geography which is a great blessing get in the way of smart recruiting and soldering?

Like pbi I had great faith that LFRR was on the cusp of doing some great initiatives.  They seem to focussing on pieces of the issue without addressing the one issue that puts everything in perspective....What role and equipment to support that role do you want the CF Army Reserve to train to.  Without answers to this question we have the units doing what they have always done and appearing like they are resistant to change.  When in fact they are working very hard without much guidance.

BG

 

[pbi]

bgreen: there are ways we can deal with enrolling folks like that (not the solution in every case, but...). Every Res CBG and each LFA has a limited number of "Military Manning Overhead" (MMO) positions that can be used to hold unique cases. As well, people can be enrolled against vacancies in other units, but "attach posted " in order to parade in their community. Finally, the CFMS in particular uses the Primary Reserve List (PRL) to hold qualified individuals who may not have a suitable Res Med unit in their location.

Part of the problem in LFWA until fairly recently was that Area HQ kept a very tight grip on the MMO positions and was reluctant to permit their use. I believe that in the last year or so the approach has been liberalized somewhat. Cheers.

 

[mdh]

Thanks PBI and bgreen for your input.

There is also a phenomenon I have noticed in the two units I have worked with which I might describe as the unofficial "specialist" second lieutenant - very often people who are highly skilled (perhaps a Fin-O or a LogO or UIOs) who cannot complete full qualifications because of their professional careers, and are content to continue on as 2LTs at that level. Unfortunately they can't get too many additional assignments or oversees deployments because they aren't fully qualified in their "official" MOCs.

At any rate for those who are interested here a link to the British TA specialist site.  http://www.ta.mod.uk/specialist/index.html

 

[bgreen]

pbi and mdh...,

Last night I watched Gen Lewis Mackenzie's presentation to the senate committee on defence.  From my perspective it was one of the most succinct and credible presentations I have ever heard free of jargon and flavour of the day NDHQ phrases.

Tired of waiting for a white paper on def he did two of his own.  One a 50 page tome back in 93 and yesterdays 700 word plan for the CF.  While acknowledging he was an infanteer first and foremost he also outlined a structure for the air and navy.  He based his plan on BGs one airborne and two in either training or reconstitution.

To summarize the navy should immediately lease Antonio class ships capable of carrying a BG worth of equipment and some men  as well as stop immediately the decommissioning of Shearwater so we have an assembly area in the east and make one on the west coast.  As well they should get 3 new major ships and coastal frigates.  The air should immediately upgrade CF 18 and smart bomb packages as well as invest in airborne troop aircraft as well as sign lease agreements with civvy airlines to move large numbers of men.

For the army he suggested raising all reg units to 110% strength.  No more plug and play send the unit and its log support folks at a BG level.  He was scathing in Canada's current posture of sending NGOs and other peace support teams before sending troops to get a grip on the militants and also provide some security for Canadian civvys overseas.  He reckons Afghanistan is ripe for some warlord having Canadian peace support workers as hostages and no plan or resources outside the US to get our people rescued.  He also stated the reserves in two provinces BC and SK should be brought up to full strength as there is no ready reg army in these provinces.  He further stated that we need a robust force capable of moving into our North on very short notice.  He gave an example of an airliner going down over the North as this area is increasingly used and the CF's only response would be to recover bodies as they currently have no way of launching any unit to provide ssoverignty or assistance to the North on an emergency basis.

He was also critical of how our current leaders are more concerned about living within ever decreasing budgets then about costing out what an operation will cost and then allowing the gov't to decide if they wish to participate or not.

I didn't get to see his whole presentation but hopefully it will be aired again.

On a side note he also stated that if all mandated bilingualism, SHARP and Human Rights training was funded by the appropriate ministries then there would be a saving of approximately 3 billion dollars which would be added to the defence budget.  Like wise with pensions that should be funded out of a different source than DND which would free up even more money as currently nearly 1/2 of the CF budget goes into non army trg and pensions.

Finally he took issue with a previous speaker a Navy Admiral who said it would take Canada nearly 3 to 5 years to get the infrastructure in place to support 5000 more soldiers.  Gen Mackenzie figured there is more than enough unfilled barrack spaces in all units to easily accommodate 5000 soldiers and 3000 reservists.  He would also cut NDHQ by 50% separate army and civvy workers with no reduction in tasking putting more soldiers in the sharp end of our forces.

Anyway like I said totally refreshing.

PS L/Col Gerry Carline was invested as Honourary Colonel of the Sask D today at a trooping of the guidon.  Didn't see any 38 Bde staff in attendance.

BG

 

[mdh]

Hi bgreen,

Fascinating stuff - if only we had some real momentum to make it happen the way someone like Lew Mackenzie envisions.  I keep hoping that it does.  Who knows, with all the continued bad publicity the military seems to be getting about aging equipment, (i.e. the latest Snowbird SAR revelation in the National Post) there may be sufficient political pressure on the Liberals to make it happen.

 

[Rick Goebel]

bgreen wrote:

"Finally he took issue with a previous speaker a Navy Admiral who said it would take Canada nearly 3 to 5 years to get the infrastructure in place to support 5000 more soldiers.  Gen Mackenzie figured there is more than enough unfilled barrack spaces in all units to easily accommodate 5000 soldiers and 3000 reservists."

If the government is dead set on creating a new brigade for some arcane reason, the navy Admiral is probably correct.  If, however, the government simply wishes to increase the capability of the Canadian Forces to do what the government has shown it wishes the Canadian Forces to do, then MGen Mackenzie is certainly correct.

I am morally certain that the regular infantry alone could absorb at least 2,000 of the proposed new troops not only with barracks space but also the existing LAVs, rifles and other infantry kit.  The other arms could absorb more still.  After all, it hasn't been a shortage of artillery pieces or mortars that has caused the move of the RCA into the mortar field but a shortage of people.

The reserve situation is the same.  It would require no new armouries or kit to increase the number of reservists by 3,000.  All that would be needed would be to increase the paid ceilings of existing units.

Sorry, that is not entirely true.  For both the regular and reserve forces, there would be a serious problem of where to find the trainers.  If, however, the shortage of sharp-end soldiers is not addressed now there will be a greater problem in the future.  Canada needs more people coming in the Canadian Forces front door now if there are to be MCpls available to train new soldiers years from now.

This is a clear case of short-term pain for long-term gain.

 

[Matt_Fisher]

What about going back and truly implementing and enforcing a 80/20 role for the infantry battalions where 3 line companies, Support and Headquarters companies were all regular and the 4th line company was reserve?

When a battalion was put into it's "deploy" status of the readiness cycle a company of reservists on Class B/C contracts would be the ones filling it.  While it's not the perfect solution, I think it's probably the most cost-effective which gives the deploying unit the extra boots it wants.

 

[a_majoor]

Having the entire fourth company as a CRIC might cause problems due to the different level of training and experience between "A" "B" "C" coy and the reserve "D" coy. As well, there will be specialist positions which cannot be filled in "D" coy (things like Rappel Master, Small Arms Instructor and so on). Having the three reserve rifle platoons added to the orbats of the other companies allows a closer working relationship to develop, especialy if the SNCO's and WO's are mentoring their reserve counterparts. Three full strength rifle companies will be better than four understrength companies.

It is my belief that the CRIC formed for ROTO 13 wouold have been more efficient (or become as efficient much faster) in pre training with the addition of Regular Force counterparts to do a bit of coaching and mentoring where needed. Since the company and the D&S platoon were separate entities, we were on our own a lot, and may have been learning bad habits as a result. "D" (Reserve) coy might fall into the same trap, depending on the climate and culture of the gaining unit.

 

[Infanteer]

I'm not to sure I'd support plunking reservists into each regular company - to what extent does integration simply become a regular unit with a different name.  It seems that you'd have a "short-service regular" as part of your company.  While I can see the value of having an extra source of manpower (the reserves) for regular units to "top up", I think the limitations are too much to make it of any value.

If it's a one year contract, what do you do if the company is deployed on operations near the end of the contract?

As well, is their any sense of career management?  As a company commander, you can't work towards developing leaders and building skill sets with your existing team, because after a year they are scattered in the wind.

I am a supporter of Reserve subunits being utilized in some form (I was a member of the trial version), however I don't think this is the way to go about it - if a soldier wants to be a regular force soldier, then let him sign his BE.

 

[McG]

I'm not to sure I'd support plunking reservists into each regular company - to what extent does integration simply become a regular unit with a different name.

This may be the only way to generate PYs that the government does not want to permanently mandate.

If it's a one year contract, what do you do if the company is deployed on operations near the end of the contract?

Contracts would be tied to high readiness and promise a year of work with an obligation to work up to an additional half year.   This would ensure that highreadiness units sit at 110% strength and deploy at 100% (with individual replacements on rear party).

As well, is their any sense of career management? As a company commander, you can't work towards developing leaders and building skill sets with your existing team, because after a year they are scattered in the wind.

This is an argument to look at augmentation at the sub-sub unit level (or lower).  The Engr transformation plan will call on one reserve section in every field troop that deploys.

 

[Matt_Fisher]

A_Majoor,

To counter, what about putting certain positions as reg, ie. Company 2ic and Ops. WO (if that position exists at Canadian Coy. level?) along with select other "cadre" staff positions necessary.

I am interested to see what other ways could minimize the financial impact of creating a 4th rifle company within the infantry battalions that are on their 'readiness' phase.

McG,

You have some very good points.

Infanteer,

As the official Armoured Corps court jester, you again raise some good points such as a loss of identity, career management, etc.

What about the possibility of having a reserve unit (brigade level) being tasked to deploy a company during its "deploy" portion of the readiness cycle?  Obviously you'd need things such as job protection for reservists in order to have this happen.  This system is more in line with what we do in the US with alot of our activations when an entire reserve unit gets activated to augment a regular counterpart, such as how my battalion's A & B Companies were attached to 1st and 3rd LAR Battalions, respectively during OIF.

 

[SHARP WO]

re: the 10/90 company,

A good example for this was Op Snowgoose (Cyprus) Roto 59 of which I was a part of.

Although the Roto was with 2 Horse, we had 3 Reg members in our platoon(Platoon Comd, Driver and Sect Comd). With a short work up of 45 days we all intergrated well. There were personality conflicts the big one was between the Platoon Comd and WO, but at the lower levels we all worked well together.

Rural Coy (Reserve Coy) was by far the best at working and when close out came(Roto 59 was the last tour) the BN had so many resources to draw on, (carpenters, welders, contractors, etc.) and all from the Cbt arms from across Ontario.

One more point is that members from the Reserves seem to adapt faster when minimal Reg members are integrated into the Coy.

SHARP WO

 

[KevinB]

Gee, being on Snowgoose 59 in City Bty - I had a whole different outlook on the Rural Bty...  ;D

 

[pbi]

Matt: this option is something that has been debated, tried and fiddled with for years in our Army, under various names and guises: "Op Task" back in the 1980s, then "10/90" in the 1990's, with other variations floated at other times. We also have considerable practical experience with composite Reserve sub-units deploying on operations with RegF units. The deployment of the CRC (not CRIC) with 2PP to Bosnia last year was considered to be a good example of how to do it right: the leadership of 2PP observed the issues that arose during the previous CRIC with 1PP, and adjusted their plan accordingly. The 2PP CRC was formed from across LFWA's three Res CBGs(as well as other LFAs), with only a very small RegF cadre (a handful of positions). The Res leadership of the coy was brought in to 2PP eary an underwent a training and integration program that served both to develop the skills and currency of the Res ldrs, while building a stronger relationship with the bn. The troops were brought in later, then trained largely by their own Res ldrs.

As a contributing CBG to both Rotos,(which were back to back) we compared the processes and the results from a force generator's perspective and found that from the points of view of both 2PP and the Res CRC the 2PP approach was better.

By contrast, when I had C/1PP in Croatia in 94 (whoah...that was a long time ago!..) we received our Res as indiv augmentees to each coy. We had some initial problems in the pre-deployment training work-ups (fitness and skill levels-the usual two bugbears with Res soldiers...) and we had to let a few go. But, once they were into the sections, my CSM and I assessed that they fit in well and after a while it was hard to tell the difference.

Anyway--a long winded comment on integration methods.

One problem (that I think you recognize...) in trying to draw a parallel between how the Corps uses the USMC (R) and how we use the Army Res is the huge difference in terms of service. The USMC(R) ,like the other US Res components, has fixed terms of service which include obligations and liabilities for active duty. Our Res, with a few exceptions, is composed overwhelmingly of volunteer soldiers who serve with no fixed engagement and no obligation to serve on full time duty short of an Act of the Governor in Council (ie: something that hasn't happened since 1939).

As well, we have no means of guaranteeing that the civilian job of a Res soldier will  be protected by his employer once he  goes on full time duty. The effect of these conditions, despite the excellent efforts of our Army Res to step up to the plate for Roto after Roto as indiv augmentees or as members of composite sub-units such as CRICs ad CRCs, means that the Army has to proceed cautiously with how far it integrates Res into the permanent TOE structures of Field Force units. Sadly, if we were to build an entire sub-unit out of Reservists, there is no guarantee as to how often its members would be available to train over the course of a year, and even less of a guarantee that if the subunit were needed for full time duty that it would turn out at full strength. As well, since I was a Res soldier in 1974 I have never seen a single Res unit that could generate a complete and deployable coy/sqn/bty. A platoon/troop has always been about the limit in terms of generating organizations made up of soldiers who are available, willing, fit and trained adequately for overseas duty (even with pre-depl trg which we normally mandate at 90 days of full time trg).

IIRC, the US Army experiment with "Round-Out" ARNG Bdes as integral elements to Active Army divisions was cancelled because of issues over traning levels. I believe that a "Round-Up" process was substituted, in which the ARNG Bdes were attached as increments, over and above the normal TOE. I do not know how the ARNG does it now. Any of our US friends care to comment about direct integration of ARNG into Active Army unit TOEs?

If, on the other hand, we are willing to accept the risks I mentioned, then IMHO it could be made to work. We would want to be very careful not to repeat the mistakes made during 10/90, which in LFWA at least seemed to generate boundless hatred and suspicion on both sides as to what wicked purpose the integration process was actually serving.  Cheers.

 

[NMPeters]

To get back on topic here, the Army is currently undergoing regeneration. Obviously, not being able to copy and paste the entire 300 some-odd page regeneration document here, I'll attempt to pull out the parts that are pertinent to this discussion and the Army Reserve. Here it goes:

The Army has identified several operational capabilities that are suitable for development as â Å“Reserve-onlyâ ? functions.  In addition to individual augmentation of trained ARes personnel to operations, and provision of formations from traditional capabilities, the ARes will be the single provider of the Army's CIMIC, Psychological Operations (PSYOPS), and dedicated CBRN force generation capability.  These new capabilities will be remain manned on a part-time basis until such time as individual soldiers or formations are generated for a specific mission requirements.  The ARes will continue to support, when required, the generation of sub-units, and sub-sub-units, from within the traditional arms in each of the Land Force Areas. Close coordination with DLFR and DCDS staffs will be necessary to determine the degree to which ARes capabilities either replace or complement Regular Force and civilian agencies as first responders in a domestic crisis situation.

3Much work in the development of new capabilities remains to be done before these specialized units are fully emplaced in the institutional ARes.  Under the guidance of the LFRR project, the Director of Land Reserve Management (DLRM), in concert with DLSP and other LS Dirs will oversee the stand-up of new ARes capabilities, and implement such establishments and funding levels as to ensure their appropriate manning and training.  The goal will be capabilities of sufficient depth to ensure their continuing ability to support the Army's continuing operational commitments whenever required.

The successful deployments of Composite Reserve Companies (CRC) to Op PALLADIUM has proven the viability of re-grouping ARes individual augmentees into formed sub-units.  These re-groupings allow for greater ARes leadership exposure to operations, and increased operational tempo relief for the Regular Force.  While no Land Force Area is currently planning deployment of a composite ARes company overseas, the ARes will remain committed to having the ability to force generate at least two composite companies per year in order to augment high Readiness forces on an individual or sub-sub unit basis.

Augmentation - Land Force Areas will continue to force generate their deployment packages as required, utilizing formed ARes sub-units when necessary and appropriate.  In the longer term, the ARes envisions a more predicable pattern of operational commitment that would permit greater lead-time for work-up training and business planning. In due course, appropriate ARes capabilities will be incorporated into the Managed Readiness Plan and will be reported on in Level 2 HQ Operational Readiness Reports.

The raison d'etre of the ARes is it's ability to force generate individuals, sub-sub-units and sub-units for operations as required, and it will remain highly committed to augmenting the Regular Force whenever possible.  As such, the ARes will continue to provide individual augmentees when required as a priority.  Second to individual augmentation, the ARes will seek to develop deployable and employable new capabilities, either exclusively or with the Regular Force, as quickly as possible.  Thirdly, the ARes supports the re-grouping of ARes augmentees into formed sub-units for operations, and the force generation of ARes operational packages, as required by the Army's High Readiness Tasks.

ARes commitment to the CMTC at this point is still very much in development. However, it is envisaged that as that facility and trg cycle and methodology matures, the ARes will play increasingly significant roles. As a start point, the ARes will force generate up to five company/squadron group size elements each year starting in 2006 that will cycle through the CMTC workup and exercise sequence. It is currently planned that Reservists will participate in a CMTC serial in summer 06 (TF 5-06) and in summer 07 (TF 5-07).This trg cycle will culminate in the ARes company groups participation in a two-three week long trg exercise at CMTC, nominally scheduled for the later part of August in each trg year. These companies will be identified through the Managed Readiness Plan and will be force generated by the LFA in the high readiness cycle. There will also be scope for increased ARes participation in the OPFOR requirement for CMTC, details of which are still being resolved.