Divining the right role, capabilities, structure, and Regimental System for Canada's Army Reserves

[bossi]

We also need to avoid undoing the very good healing process of the last few years by further separating the Res from the Regular Army in any significant way.

Yup.  Inspired by the "Emma Gee's", a number of problems and possile solutions have been presented ...
http://www.ducimus.com/Archive/cafa.html

 

[Edward Campbell]

I have been retired for so long that you must take all this with a whole bag of salt, but:

o It seems to me that the Canadian Navy Reserve is riding a winning horse with their reserve crewed minesweepers.   There are, I am told by reliable sources, problems, including too few qualified reservists for 12 ships, each needing a crew of 30+ but I am also told that some officer positions, especially CO and XO, and some PO slots may go to regulars (and no, I don't know where they will find them in an already undermanned navy, but ...).   The top of the navy is pleased with the ships and their crews and their entire reserve establishment; more than one senior serving naval officer has told me that he is now happy with the navy's 'total force' project;

o The British Army used to have many 'specialist' units in the Territorial Army.   A special favourite of mine (about 40 years ago) were the Mercians â “ various reserve battalions and companies of the Cheshire, Staffordshire, Sherwood Foresters, and Worcestershire regiments who, as I discovered late on dark and stormy night, were assigned to defend the 1 (BR) Corps communications system and Rear Corps HQ.   The units were specially organized, equipped and trained for these tasks â “ their organizations were 'tailored' to the organization of the (fairly vast) Signals establishment, the small, undermanned and essentially defenceless (without the Mercians) units of which occupied damned near every hilltop on the North German Plain; and

o Another favourite was a RAOC unit â “ I can't remember its designation - which I 'met' during Crusader/Spearpoint 80 â “ it was the army level NAAFI distribution unit, full of logistical specialists from the British consumer/retail sector.   Good bunch of fellows who gave me a very good lunch while my vehicle was being repaired and convinced me that, once again, the Brits really were planning for war â “ the sports and social programmes being designed only to lull enemies and allies alike into the false sense that the Brits are all fun and games ...

I say let's have as many different kinds of reserves as the reserves themselves can muster â “ provided, only, that they make some military sense.   I remain committed to the idea that about 75% of our current policies, plans and programmes will not stand the test of a major war; I am equally certain that neither I nor any of our serving generals know which are in that doomed to fail 75%.   So: Let's try 'em all ... our reserves, it seems to me, are filled with boundless enthusiasm, incredible resilience and bags of initiative â “ we should exploit that.

 

[Bill Smy]

It's been a long time since I've read the Minister's statement of the roles of the Rerserve Forces, but I believe the first and primary role was to provide a base for mobilization. Notwithstanding all the efforts of the serving members of the Reserves and their supporters, the PRes has failling marks here, with no fault of itsr own.

To be an effective mobilization base, the PRes needs to be three to four times the size of the regular force it supports. History has proven that over and over again. But the numbers are just not there today. In fact, Reserves 2000 pointed out a year or so ago that with the numbers of Militia personnel on full time duty today we are past Stage 1 of mobization.

Instead of talking about a Militia of 15-18,000 strength, we really should be aiming at 45-60,000. It's not impossible, but rather a matter of political will and funding.

I believe that large civilian communities can support reserve units with strengths of 600 to 1,000 man units. They have in the past with smaller populations bases. And cities such as Toronto, Montreal, Vancouver, etc, should be able to field a number of these units. Put all the naysayers aside, if the monies were there, the units could achieve these numbers.

Another of the Minister's roles for the Reserves is to be a footprint in the community. A good footprint helps both the regulars and reserves, but there are mixed marks here.

 

[pbi]

I have been retired for so long that you must take all this with a whole bag of salt, but:

o It seems to me that the Canadian Navy Reserve is riding a winning horse with their reserve crewed minesweepers.  There are, I am told by reliable sources, problems, including too few qualified reservists for 12 ships, each needing a crew of 30+ but I am also told that some officer positions, especially CO and XO, and some PO slots may go to regulars (and no, I don't know where they will find them in an already undermanned navy, but ...).  The top of the navy is pleased with the ships and their crews and their entire reserve establishment; more than one senior serving naval officer has told me that he is now happy with the navy's 'total force' project;

The Canadian Army Reserve is also riding a winning horse with its Reserve-crewed platoons and companies and CIMIC teams for overseas operations, as well as OP BRONZE in Bosnia which is mostly Reserve (incl the Commander), with  Reservists in all (or almost all..) of the key positions. The CLS is very pleased with the Reservists' contribution and hopes to see more of the same;

The British Army.... into the false sense that the Brits are all fun and games

We really can't afford to assign standing "specific missions" to any of our Army Reserve units, (or most of our Regular Army, either...) because we are a very small army reacting to events in a very big world(and a huge country...). Instead we are slowly building their capability to respond to as many situations as possible, which means general purpose combat training and equipment. We are too small to afford "niche" units;

I say let's have as many different kinds of reserves as the reserves themselves can muster â “ provided, only, that they make some military sense.  I remain committed to the idea that about 75% of our current policies, plans and programmes will not stand the test of a major war; I am equally certain that neither I nor any of our serving generals know which are in that doomed to fail 75%.  So: Let's try 'em all ...

I agree that most plans do not survive contact with the enemy, which is one of the main reason we need a capable, flexble Army Reserve in the first place. The problem we face is that if we don't keep our Army Reserve efforts focused and related to operational needs (as well as within our likely resources...) we will end up with a box of little bits, each of them "one-shot", and no meaningful ability to reinforce or sustain deployed forces.

our reserves, it seems to me, are filled with boundless enthusiasm, incredible resilience and bags of initiative â “ we should exploit that

Believe me...we do: every day of every week. We couldn't do it without the Army Reserve, and they are constantly getting better. The Army Reserve today is NOTHING like the Militia I joined in 1974, nor do I want to see us slip back to those days. Cheers.

 

[48Highlander]

Our main problem seems to be retention.  Unlike in the USNG, Canadian reservists can clear out any time they want.  If I remember right, reserve units lose on average 14% of their personnel every year.  That means a regiment of 300 would have to recruit 42 new soldiers every year just to break even.

 

[foerestedwarrior]

My unit HAD a big recruiting problem for the last few years, and the only peopel that came really wanted to be there, thats not a bad thing, but alot of people didnt know much about the military. We now have two new recruiters, and they are doing very good, I think in OS, we had just over 100 applicants at one point. Unfortuantly, we only actually have like 130 people on paper.

 

[dutchie]

First of all Major, you are right - the average Cdn Res unit is understrength.
First off, to clarify.....

The CF actually doesn't want all Res units to be full Battalions (infantry). That only happened during WW1 & 2. Technically for instance, the Seaforth Highlanders are a Battalion, however, the CF has us at 1 coy, although some regiments have several Coys in several towns (the Canadian Scottish come to mind - Victoria, Nanaimo, etc). Even at this reduced strength, most units don't meet the numbers to fully staff what the CF wants. We have, off the top of my head, 200 on strength, with maybe 3 Platoons + HQ on parade for a parade night, and 2 Platoons + HQ on an ex (plus Op For) - this is pretty much best case scenario. We get less on some exs.

Interest is a problem. A lot of those interested in the Forces go to the Reg Force, and there isn't enough left over to fully staff all of the Res units.

Processing of applications is hideously long (just check out the recruiting forum on this site). I've heard of people waiting 1-2 years to get in.

Retention.The Res attracts a lot of University students (here at least) as it is a part time job that fits nicely into their schedule. Unfortunately, most University students don't aspire to a career of soldiering, so they quit after a year or two (or a week or two in some cases). I would guess that 50% of the troops cominig off BMQ over the summer don't see their 2nd year in.

There are other problems facing recruiters and senior staff, and I'll let them answer for themselves, but that's how I see it.

 

[DOOG]

Greetings..
One of the most serious problems in this end of the country is the recruiting system is a mess. The recruiters ( I mean the CFRC guys, not the unit people) have convinced themselves that they are doing a great job administering the applications and no amount of proof to the contrary will shake their beliefs. They have also managed to convince the upper echelon of the army that all is well. Bull!
The system is crap and most people who ahave been around a while know it. I recently had a conversation with a young unit recruiting officer who told me that the local CFRC went three months without testing anyone because all the pers in that det were newly posted in and weren't ready to undertake testing yet. Gee, I wish I had three months to get my shit together every time I changed jobs. Then the ere is the medical thing. Something like two (2) doctors in Borden check all the file in the country. If they have a pile of Reg Force files on their desks, the res Force files wait until they get around to them. The wait time is ridiculous. I have seen potential recruits wait 6, 8 and up to 12 months fto get in.
Another problem is inappropriate tests for MOCs. For example we had a soldier who was an infanteer and wanted to re-muster to supply. Before the OT was done the unit nominated her for a Supply Tech course. The nom went through (by mistake) and she went on the course, even though she was still an infantry soldier. She topped the course. When she finally got tested, the results indicated that she wasn't of the appropriate type (score/mindset/whatever) to transfer to supply. She only came first on the course. Makes me wonder what goofy civilian over-educated doctorate of whatever designed. the testing.

But I am not bitter.

 

[Echo9]

Doog,

Obviously, you haven't read the SCONDVA report last year (by John Fraser- former speaker of the house and HCol of the Seaforths(?) ).

It was pretty scathing about the recruiting system as being the single biggest problem with regards to reserve restructure.  Unfortunately, little has come of it to this point (aside from the concept of conditional enrollments).

 

[enfield]

Doog,

Obviously, you haven't read the SCONDVA report last year (by John Fraser- former speaker of the house and HCol of the Seaforths(?) ).

It was pretty scathing about the recruiting system as being the single biggest problem with regards to reserve restructure.   Unfortunately, little has come of it to this point (aside from the concept of conditional enrollments).

Col. Fraser is an amazing man, a great asset to our regiment and the Army as a whole. He came out on Cougar Salvo a few years back, but insisted in joining one of the rifle sections and did the whole 3 day final ex, FIBUA in Ft Lewis, including the Chinook assault, just like a trooper. He's heavily involved in the unit, and uses his connections and influence in Ottawa to draw attention the Reserves and the Army. 

 

[dglad]

Excerating the retention and training problems already mentioned, there are too many units in the Res F, and the number of units expressed per capita in many cities is way out of whack.  A city of roughly 100,000 in Canada often has 4-6 Res F units.  While it is probably possible for a city of that size to provide an adequate recruiting base to support 1-2 units at a reasonable strength, 4-6 units will end up diffusing the available person-pool across too wide a target.  We talk about typical units actually being at coy strength, but I would venture that, except in specific parts of the country, it's more likely platoon+ strength.  The trouble is that we're dealing with a Res F model that was designed in a different era, intended to support large-scale mobilization of many battalion-regiment-sized elements.  While there is still some value to that model, it just doesn't fit well with the current environment.

 

[pbi]

I think dglad has (as usual) hit the nail on the head in identifying one of the major problems we face. 38 CBG (which dglad and I belong to) is a prime example of the poor distribution of Res units in Canada (and the strength of resistance to change). Thunder Bay, a city whose urban population is about 100,000 with a limited regional population, contains two Army Res units, one Med Res unit, one Comm Res unit and one NavRes unit. All of these units compete for that very small slice of the Canadian population in TBay that is willing (and suitable) to give its time to be citizen-soldiers.

In Regina, a city of about 200,000 including the regional population, there are three Army Res units, a Comm Res unit and a Nav Res unit. Again the same problem arises: too many units for the population base and thus only a very limited chance of ever recruiting these units even to their full Res est, never mind increasing unit size.

Yet, when we have attempted to propose significant changes this has been bitterly opposed by forces on both "sides of the fence". Reserve 2000 vigorously opposed our plans to regroup artillery and Service units, and the Army shot down our plan to formalize and expand an existing but "bukshi" troop of the SaskD. At the same time we see large Canadian centers such as Mississauga (over 750,000 people) and Burlington (somewhere in the 130,000 range) being very under-served, and very, very few units are   reaching out to tap hinterland comunities by establishing outlying elements. There have been a few changes under LFRR Ph II but it appears to me that most of   these problems remain.

As for the National Guard and Reserve, I have spoken with a few of these people currently serving over in Afgh. The job protection thing, while certainly an important factor in an operationally ready reserve, is not a panacea. I have been told that not all Reserve duty is protected, and employers in some states and in the case of the Army Res have the ability to ask the home unit why the person is being activated. Some employers (typically smaller operations) do not like to hire Res and if the Res employer presents them with enough problems, they   may seek other ways to get rid of them (since the Federal and State legislation usually prevents firing directly as a result of Res duty). Several mentioned that as the US places the highest peacetime demand ever on the ARNG and AR, some employers(and some soldiers) are beginning to feel the pinch. Res would also have to be prepared to accept the quid pro quo: we protect your job so we have the right to call you up any time we like for as long as we need.

Cheers.

 

[bgreen]

An interesting question as to why reserve units aren't larger than what they appear on paper.  I think you have to look at this as a problem with a series of issues that must be addressed.

First there is the issue of a "paid ceiling" whereby a unit is funded for only a certain number of soldiers which often has more to do with historical numbers then it has to do with recruiting to any particular size.  So while the CF may say it wants more reserve soldiers the units are hamstrung by being offered read as authorized to recruit only 2 to 6 soldiers per year.  If a CO were to say go over this directed limit then the only way he could pay for the training of these soldiers would be to cut the training days of the rest of his unit members.  This leads to a death spiral because as he attempts to recruit more, then the existing trained soldiers leave because there is not enough training days and training value to maintain interest.

I also think for the most part the recruiting system is not functioning for the reserves.  Not for the reasons others have listed because I believe with the "expedited" enrollment system you can get people into your unit in three weeks.  The issue goes much deeper.  Reserve soldier recruiting is about number 5 or 6 priority for CF recruiting centres.  First is Reg Force trades with critical requirements, next quotas for REG F officers then Reg Force MOCs, then Military College and then comes political national initiatives like BOLD EAGLE. Finally at the low end of the totem pole comes reserve recruitment for army, navy and air reserves.  Within that group you go to command size units such as medics, comms and then the rest of your combat arms units.  Of the above groups full time career seekers would more likely wait a reasonable time to get in whereas the part-time reservists are seeking immediate opportunities.  So historically we cause the longest wait time in the recruiting centres to those potential members who are most sensitive to wait times.  Also the reserve world only offers recruit training in two serials one in Jan and one in Jul.  So where you might think that all CFRC effort should go to meeting these two envelopes that are huge to the reserve world the result is that little effort is directed outside the above listed priorities.

Second issue in terms of recruiting is that we vacillate between unit directed recruiting and Bde directed recruiting.  The two directions in my experience are seldom complimentary.  Bde directed trg insures the recruiting effort goes to Bde issues like shoring up units that are hopelessly mired in recruiting, retention or training issues that are often beyond the control of the unit or Bde.  Issues like training craftsmen that requires 6 months of course for Service Bns.  Reserve Svc Bn members see huge obstacles to getting and keeping recruits when faced with training standards that are not in line with the two week block system the rest of the army has adopted for reservists.  So Bde Comds direct increasing recruit vacancies to units that are already in difficulty for issues outside their control in order to maintain these units viability.  The remaining units are then given 2 to 6 vacancies a year to replace soldiers lost to attrition which in many cases is a misnomer.

As a western unit we sometimes "lose" up to 6 soldiers a year who remuster to the reg force world.  Instead of celebrating this number of already trained soldiers the CF penalizes reserve units by listing this contribution as a retention issue where these individuals are statistically treated no different than quitters.  Even the Moose Jaw Warriors WHL team is given some renumeration when its members are called up into the NHL but I digress. Any reserve CO worth his salt knows where his recruiting base lies be it high school, small business, college etc.
If a CO can't or won't tap these pools then discipline the CO.  The CO knows who his best recruiters are and how best to employ them.  As an example three years ago  a small unit in the west did  some research on what recruiting was working for reserve units in other areas of Canada.  They found that in Ontario there was an initiative to give high school students both school credits and pay for entering into basic training.  Based on that knowledge the little unit that could went out and worked an agreement with local school boards that won provincial education recognition.  On their very first course they had 28 recruits; 26 who graduated.  The little unit not being greedy offered to give of its expertise freely to other units.  The little unit began to get bigger while the bigger units on paper began to get smaller.  So that after a time it became very apparent the little unit was about to get huge.  Outside the little unit other units said we want what they have.  But the other units and its HQs were not prepared to do the liaison necessary with the education systems both local and provincial and so an excellent recruiting initiative was cancelled for everyone.  As a post script the little unit still maintains itself as a big unit in a very small population area.  More a tribute to excellent training which is a cornerstone of retention.

Also I have waited for the LFRR initiative.  I know it is slowly coming together.  But the emphasis on specific tasks while good for individual members engaged in CIMIC, LO provincial emergency duties and Psyops, is not conducive to pulling the trigger on issuing op tasks or augmentation to reserve units.  Units need the op tasking and equipment that go hand in hand to augment deployment.  If we get this right I don't believe recruiting and retention will be a factor.

Lastly there is a huge funding difference even among the various reserve entities.  There are wide disparities among the number of recruits and trg days offered between reserve line units and medics and comms people.  Next comes an even bigger disparity between army and air reservists. The only comment I have on the navy reserve comes from  the published reports referred to in earlier posts where the naval reserve has been given an op tasking, equipment issued in line with that tasking ie coastal patrol vessels, and augmentation by reg navy pers in critical areas to maintain the equipment and assist in achieving the op tasking.

I would like to give one civilian parallel that may apply to our issue here.  I live in a community of under a 1000 permanent residents.  We have a volunteer fire department.  We have 18 members.  In any given year we lose about two as people move away.  We have a task to respond to fires and emergency care requests in a 200km2 area.  We have two fire trucks and an emergency vehicle plus the equipment we need to control fire and respond to health care emergencies.  We train on weekends to certification standards.  We receive no renumeration.  Our trg is challenging and interesting and the men and women feel we provide service to our community.  We are a happy Little lot and have one supper per year provided by our municipality.  We go crazy over new helmets, flashlights, scba and jaws of life.  Now have I put anything in this paragraph that you could not substitute soldier in for?  The solutions for the reserve world I believe are similar.

Let me conclude by saying I don't believe any of the issues we face are insurmountable.  For what its worth I believe we need CO's to recruit to fill the units manning vacancies that are a reflection of an op tasking.  We need CFRCs to step outside the walls of their buildings and meet the needs of reserve units in their locations.  We need new ways to partner with business and industry including govt departments like education. And we need great training opportunities that encourage reservists to continue to seek their challenges in the reserves.

 
Free and Fearless
BG

 

[pbi]

bgreen: good presentation of the issues. While I know (that you know...) that I wouldn't agree 100% on everything you have said, I think you have pointed out an important fact: problems with the Army Reserve are not amenable to cosmetic solutions: they are not cosmetic problems. The problems are deeply systemic and in some ways mirror what I experienced myself as a Res soldier 1974-1982. While I do believe we have made progress in some key areas (the level of professionalism is MUCH higher now, the level of op experience is considerably better, the Army Res gets used more often to do real things....) we still face the systemic problems you have identified.
Having served (briefly) as a volunteer firefighter myself, I like your parallel and I often draw similar parallels myself. It is interesting to consider that VFFs face lethal danger on a regular basis at a considerably lower level of pay than what Reservists generally receive: the last time I looked IIRC most FDs and most FFs in Canada were volunteers except for a few larger centres, so it is not unique to your VFD.

Finally (since I am a loyal staff wienie...) I want to offer a different perspective on your comments on the role of Bde HQ. Bde HQ, like any HQ, cannot satisfy all of its subordinates given the resources we have. If that were the case we wouldn't need to go through the Operations Plan process every year to try to divvy out what we are given in order to achieve the tasks we are assigned. We could just open the till and say to all the Res COs: "Come on down!" We get assigned so many growth positions (and, as you pointed out...) so much money to pay people. We can't recruit people whom we know we cannot pay: that is both a recipe for attrition and a morally questionable thing IMHO bordering on fraud. As you know our Bde consistently meets (or comes very close to...) the CLS-mandated 37.5 days/soldier on Class A. If and when we don't it is explained in black and white to COs and anybody else who cares why we don't. There are no "secret slush funds" anymore. In fact as long as I have been COS the Bde Comd's Res account has operated in the red as a way of sucking up our deficiencies in $$$. Class B employment is also pretty tightly controlled for the same reason.

I agree that we have not pleased people with Bde driven recruiting plan (despite endless tweaking), but I am not sure how, given our limited resources, the very conflicted recruiting ponds we face in our major centres, the sclerotic state of Indiv Trg, the shortage of instructors and the need to see that ALL of our units are kept functional and meet the tasks assigned by the CLS (an almost impossible task in some cases, I'll readily agree...).   Your unit has done very well (thanks to a great extent to your work and leadership) and it is a beacon of how well a small centre/rural unit can do. (An example that seems to be lost on some people...). If all of our units did as well as the SaskD we would be laughing. But, they don't, and we can't just abandon them to let the good units survive: remember we represent Army Reservists in three provinces who face differing problems.   I know that all of this may not mean a lot the trooper on the armoury floor but it is the reality we face. Cheers.

 

[bgreen]

You know I debated about putting in the Firefighting as equivalent to our profession of arms.  I think it has little direct comparison other than if you can get 18 folks out of a thousand then we should be able to recruit as a unit from a 50 000 pers trading area about 18 x 50 or 900 pers.

Soldiering is so much more than volunteer firefighting.  Yes you get to work on real emergencies but there the comparison stops.  When doing a tour you can't come home after a difficult day and have a shower and receive the support of caring family members.  Also firefighters are revered across nearly all cultures whereas the soldier is often called upon to do some nasty business by shear feat of arms and willpower in cultures that are openly hostile.  I also know there are lots of civil servants that like to compare themselves in terms of job equivalencies to soldiers.  Simply it is all BS.  There is no equivalent to a soldier period.

My only issue with Bde HQ is that often the size they task a unit to recruit to has little to do with the organizations we are supposed to be fielding.  You want a Bde Recce Sqn then let me recruit the 160+ pers I need to do the job including support trades like gun plumbers sigs and veh techs, medics and storesmen..  Give me a 10% overage which allows for attrition.  You want me to field an Infantry Regiment than give me the manning slate to get a Bn's worth of soldiers that can combine with another units Bn so we can have the pers to do the task assigned to that unit.

BG

 

[McG]

My only issue with Bde HQ is that often the size they task a unit to recruit to has little to do with the organizations we are supposed to be fielding. You want a Bde Recce Sqn then let me recruit the 160+ pers I need to do the job including support trades like gun plumbers sigs and veh techs, medics and storesmen ...

Are technical trades sustainable in supporting roles within a reserve combat arms unit?  Who would look after the unit level PD of the one or two Pte/Cpl Wpn Techs?  What is offered for advancement and retention?

 

[pbi]

You want a Bde Recce Sqn then let me recruit the 160+ pers I need to do the job including support trades like gun plumbers sigs and veh techs, medics and storesmen..  Give me a 10% overage which allows for attrition.  You want me to field an Infantry Regiment than give me the manning slate to get a Bn's worth of soldiers that can combine with another units Bn so we can have the pers to do the task assigned to that unit.

bg: you wouldn't get an argument from me, if we had the resources.

Are technical trades sustainable in supporting roles within a reserve combat arms unit?  Who would look after the unit level PD of the one or two Pte/Cpl Wpn Techs?  What is offered for advancement and retention?

McG: I agree that CSS soldiers need PD and tech supervision, but that doesn't mean we can't have CSS in Res Cbt A units. There are a couple of ways it might be done:

a) attach the CSS soldiers from the local Svc Bn to the Cbt A unit (as we now do for some Res MAs at outlying units. The employing CO is responsible for day-to-day empl and admin, the parent SvcB n CO is resopnsible for tech trg, PD and tech standards. Where this would tend to fall down would be in Cbt A units that are not  located within an easy drive of a Svc Bn: providing tech supervision could be difficult. A possible solution to that problem (which a couple of our units have applied for other reasons) is to change from weekly parade nights to parade weekends, with troops commuting in on Fri and out on Sun PM; and

b) get rid of the Res Svc bn unit level command structure (ie the CO/DCO/RSM) and reconstitute the Svc Bn as an Admin Coy of a Cbt A unit. The size, equiment, rank structures and MOC distr could remain pretty much the same as they are now  (with a probable reduction in MSE Op since Cbt A units do not normally use them...). A problem with this would be deciding which Cbt A unit would get the sub-unit, as typically most CBGs have only one or two Svc Bns for several Cbt A units. This might lead us to discussing the "A"-word, such that we have fewer, stronger Res Cbt A units with a single unit-level HQ and several sub-units instead of several units that obly appoximate a sub-unit in strength.

On top of that, the CSS world (esp the EME world) needs to keep on with its efforts to make CSS training more realistic and achievable for Res CSS soldiers by modularization and acceptance of a trg delta, the way the Army has. Of course, if the Army owned these trades we might be able to direct these changes ourselves. Cheers.

Cheers.

 

[Pikache]

b) get rid of the Res Svc bn unit level command structure (ie the CO/DCO/RSM) and reconstitute the Svc Bn as an Admin Coy of a Cbt A unit. The size, equiment, rank structures and MOC distr could remain pretty much the same as they are now (with a probable reduction in MSE Op since Cbt A units do not normally use them...). A problem with this would be deciding which Cbt A unit would get the sub-unit, as typically most CBGs have only one or two Svc Bns for several Cbt A units. This might lead us to discussing the "A"-word, such that we have fewer, stronger Res Cbt A units with a single unit-level HQ and several sub-units instead of several units that obly appoximate a sub-unit in strength.

On top of that, the CSS world (esp the EME world) needs to keep on with its efforts to make CSS training more realistic and achievable for Res CSS soldiers by modularization and acceptance of a trg delta, the way the Army has. Of course, if the Army owned these trades we might be able to direct these changes ourselves. Cheers.

Cheers.

Or have this 'Adm Coy' part of the brigade admin function. Every unit would have a CSS attachment, which reports to unit CO for day to day admin, but reports to brigade CSS coy for all training purposes. (Slight modification of your idea, and I like your BN idea better)

It's not like this reserve BN idea with several 'regiments' forming a battalion. The brits do it.

 

[McG]

a) attach the CSS soldiers from the local Svc Bn to the Cbt A unit (as we now do for some Res MAs at outlying units. The employing CO is responsible for day-to-day empl and admin, the parent SvcB n CO is resopnsible for tech trg, PD and tech standards. Where this would tend to fall down would be in Cbt A units that are not located within an easy drive of a Svc Bn: providing tech supervision could be difficult. A possible solution to that problem (which a couple of our units have applied for other reasons) is to change from weekly parade nights to parade weekends, with troops commuting in on Fri and out on Sun PM;

I see consolidation in the service battalions as the route to take.  However, I would ammalgamate all the Svc Bns within any given CBG (turning each one into a Coy of the new amalgamated Bn).  I would also specialize the Coys (S&T, Maint) so that there would be greater depth of technical supervision.

 

[McG]

. . . at the same time, if multiple Cbt A regiments were grouped into single battalions, I agree that each Bn should have its own Admin Coy seperate from the Svc Bn.