Arius, thanks for taking the time to respond to my questions in detail. Some thoughts on the responses:
Arius said:
Without the strategists – political or military – painting us a decent picture of the battlefield where they will commit us 10 years down the road it is impossible for the doctrine people to come up with the requirements for the hardware. We then have the equipment people trying to meet needs or replace stuff without a clear long term vision. That’s why we have 3 types of RWS in service, unsustainable vehicles in theatre and fast-tracking of tanks and airplanes. Over-simplified a bit but not far from the truth. There is no hard doctrine for the AGL but there is enough of a consensus in favour of its potential to keep moving it forward. Your post and the discussion we have here are probably the seeds of that doctrinal employment.
Ack - agreed.
If this is not available, I would like to have my dreamland 120mm mortars from battalion (Nevermind the CASW/60mm polemic – I believe in the need for integral, modern, fast-firing, high lethality, PGM-enabled, heavy mortars in infantry units).
Ack - vehicle mounted like the AMOS? Perhaps - the Marine Corps "Triad of Fires" seems to be a solid artillery concept. However, this is above the level of discussion we are looking at; this stuff may not always be available to a company or platoon needing some suppressive "hip pocket" support.
Would a CASW deploy as fast as a handheld light mortar? Of course not but bringing the target under constant effective fire is the key here - Constant fire with a handheld is difficult. Against a light mortar with bipod and baseplate that need one or two bedding shots? The CASW will deploy and pepper the target effectively faster. Second scenario is no contest I believe as I see it as a cut-off or support weapon on a known target. The direct, airburst, high angle, IR observation combination almost nullifies the concept of cover and dead ground. But it needs to be a deliberate well thought out deployment of the weapon.
Ack - not a man-packed weapon system and one that requires deliberate well thought-out employment. Nothing wrong with this per se (you could give this definition to a M777) but do we want to lose a man-packable, platoon level system to get it when, as you said earlier, higher-level assets like arty could deliver the effects of deliberate, well thought-out employment? I am going out on a limb here in assuming that a CASW, like most other platoon/company weapons in the vault, should be something that can be employed quite quickly.
No. In fact, I don’t want anybody to carry anything that deliver an effect on the target that can be achieved from another remote/long-range weapon system. Be it close air support or long range artillery. The current infantryman is grossly overloaded even with just his basic load. I humped 105lbs of kit at 5000m altitude in 35 degree heat without carrying any crew served ammo – It is demented. We lose guys from dehydration before getting to the start line these days. I cringe whenever we talk about new personal kit with improved armor or that require batteries.
Agreed, especially with your last sentence. But would it not be prudent to maintain a suppressive capability that can be packed - preferably a lighter, modern one as Matt Fisher alluded to above? Stripping a small unit of something because we have remote/long-range weapon systems on hand seems awfully dangerous - reminds me of Anaconda and those American's pinned down for lack of their inorganic support.
For the last sentence we could flip it around a bit and ask ourselves: Is a 60mm as versatile as a CASW and CG84 with new AB/Smoke/Illum? Because that’s what the financial offset of the light mortar buys. Vesatility+effect on the target may not be in favour of the 60mm at the moment.
I guess a question of versatility is "where can I employ it?" We've acknowledged above that the 40mm AGL CASW is largely static and requires prep time and somewhat of a heavier logistics tail to support it (a vehicle to move the hard case and the 40-pound ammo bags around). What good is rate of fire and time onto target if you can't get the thing where it needs to be ASAP?
95% RAMD/14 days per weapon system is the minimum requirement. It is as reliable as it gets. Optics and computer have no moving parts. The actuator that keeps the sight on target is the only moving part outside the weapon. If all of those fail you can still go for reflex/iron sights. Murphy is most likely hiding in forgetting to change the batteries and its not a weapon issue.
That's what the guy who sold us the PLGR said....
Why don't we consider a new 60mm mortar?
Because a modern option was considered and lost out against the CASW/CG84 combo. Why not consider a new 120mm mortar instead and sort out the doctrine for the infantry?
Doctrine is another matter, but I guess this is a small attempt to "sort it out" by trying to figure out if this bugger is going to be versatile enough for a company to be more than a fancy "we use it sometimes" kind of thing. As for larger mortars, they are rather irrelevant, because I can't supply the manpower at the platoon/company level to hump those - they
are heavy.
As for the modern option that lost out - right now I'm looking at the Statement of Operational Requirement, the Confirmation of CDR Compliance, and the Limited Objective Experiment 0201 and, as far as I read it, all comparisons use the poor, tired old M19 as opposed to something snazzy like the M224 that Matt Fisher mentioned above. Am I missing something?
I would be less likely to support the CASW if we had solid data for the 60mm. Anecdotal evidence are ok as a starting point but they cannot be used to justify doctrine or spending. For each anecdote where we praise the 60mm you get the other one where a ranged 60mm failed to get that guy in the open and he ran away scratch free after 15 rounds around him. If we had smelted the little guy in the 70s I’m not sure we would miss it today. As for the very specific scenarios, where we would patrol the jungles of Burma 50km from a fire base and require mortar support, we can go and UOR something. I’m not crazy about the 60mm because I feel it’s underpowered. The very least I would lconsider would be a portable 81mm at company level with some PGM. I don’t think there is a anti-60 conspiracy. It just too hard to sell atm.
Roger. I'm still leery about this. Anecdotal evidence aside (we can find tons for both a 40mm AGL and a 60mm mortar) I really wish this "either/or" situation never came about. The CASW looks like something we should have had 10 years ago - it is a snazzy piece of kit that can provide excellent suppressive fire in
some situations - you highlighted the difficulties with portability and speed of employment above. I would be game for it if I also saw the PASW project, which replaced M19's with M224's and gave the platoon and company commanders that hip-pocket ability when the CASW was packed in it's expensive box in the CQ's truck or down because, of all things, that 95% RAMD/14 days decided to crap out when we needed it.
If this military can get C17's, I'm sure a PASW shouldn't be an problem....
Anyways, good info and discussion.
Cheers.
.
