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Close Area Suppression Weapon (was Company Area Suppression Weapon)

Royal,

The problem with your table is you are saying that 1 40mm HV round will do the same job as 1 60mm Mortar bomb.  For HE this is not the case, and if you get into Smk and Illum you are definitely going to need more than a 1:1 ratio.  Try around 3:1 for HE and 5-10:1 for Smk/Illum (if it's even available).  Also you are burdened with a full belt of 40mm HV, things start going wrong when you break them by hand.  You can distribute 60mm in a nice mix amongst troops, I don't think they would be too keen to carry a full belt of 32 40mm.
 
AmmoTech90 said:
The problem with your table is you are saying that 1 40mm HV round will do the same job as 1 60mm Mortar bomb. 
No he did not.  If you go back, he has 18 x  60 mm to 24 x 40 mm.

... and the 40 mm still comes out on top for weight.
 
MCG said:
No he did not.  If you go back, he has 18 x  60 mm to 24 x 40 mm.

... and the 40 mm still comes out on top for weight.
You are absolutely correct.  I was looking at his ammo weight.  Let me try another tack.

As an AT I am not advocating that you carry ammunition in an unpacked state but hey, it happens, especially with mortars.  Not a big deal for someone to carry three or four mortar bombs.  I know the Canadian packaging (the 4 packs of green tubes) is not the best but it can be done.  Now 40mm grenades come in 32 round belts.  These are a bitch to break, and once broken even harder to relink in such a manner that you dont get stoppages.  So you are looking at a minimum load of 32 rounds, and you probably want them in a box, right?  So you are looking an ammo can the size of 2 to 2.5 .50 cal cans end to end, all up weight in the 20 kg range.  So you minimum weight is not 8.16kg, but rather 20kg, 50% more rather than 300% more than the 60mm, and then you are only looking at one nature.  Well that's a given as the 40mm HV can't provide Smk or Illum.
Basically it's nice you can suppress an enemy (only sometimes as Arius said) with 24 rounds but you have to carry 32.  You can give pers 0 to however many mortar bombs to carry depending, you want them to hump GMG ammo, have 32.  Dismount the 60mm from it's bipod, sight, baseplate, you still have a weapon with a km+ range.  Dismount the 40mm from it's pintle/tripod what do you have?
BDA assessments aside (and they always give us a good chuckle when we read them), what is the reasoning behind giving up (in 2012 or so) the 60mm?

40mm GMG is a great weapon but having worked with a force that uses 40/51/60/81 all together I can see where giving up the light mortar leaves a capability gap.
 
The problem or the base of it is , that we keep thinking in a typical manner. I have seen both used in a combat zone and both are equally as good at suppressing/fixing the enemy. As we keep relating to other army's and how they use both weapons systems, the fact of the matter is that they use both. Replacing one with the other is only creating a problem in a different area. I know they are replacing one with the other when in actual fact the best viability is to have both.
 
seamus said:
The problem or the base of it is , that we keep thinking in a typical manner. I have seen both used in a combat zone and both are equally as good at suppressing/fixing the enemy. As we keep relating to other army's and how they use both weapons systems, the fact of the matter is that they use both. Replacing one with the other is only creating a problem in a different area. I know they are replacing one with the other when in actual fact the best viability is to have both.

+1.

At the Company level, we have more than one kind of anti-armour weapon, more than one kind of grenade and more than one kind of MG in recognition of the need for different capabilities. Why not more than one kind of indirect fire capability?
 
We have to remember how the CASW project emerged.  The 60mm was nearing the end of its service life no matter what.  It’s was not serviceable anymore just from the spare parts point of view.  The question then became what would replace it?  A newer 60mm might have been the obvious answer but it’s not how DLR works.  They need to ask:  What is the target? What is the distance? How is it protected? What is the effect?  They end up with a matrix and they put all the various weapons systems and munitions effects in there and it becomes a numbers affair.

The range might have been an issue but they found that the 2 km mark the max distance of engagements at coy level except for anecdotal evidence for the 25mm.  The 60mm was found to be firing more than 90% of the time at a max range of 800m and with a line of sight to the target - And that was a big blow.  Put it an error area of 90m X 200m at 2000m versus 100m for a 777 at 20km with some doctrine commitment that we won’t deploy without arty/cas support and you have an almost impossible sell.  The other thing was that 2/3 of ammo expenditure is smoke and illum.  A CG84 smoke round produces 3 times the volume and similar illum than a 60mm.  At this point we almost get no reasons not to just take out the 60mm and not replace it.

The need for fast and precise suppression out to 2000m and effects in complex terrain is what it came down to.  With a +600% suppression rate over the 60mm, the AGL came on top (6 offensive platoon being taken out in the time it take the light mortar to suppress 1).  More number crunching and studies by our brainiacs in our Research Facilities and the 40mm  with airburst capability came on top.

Hard certified data trumps personal anecdotes all the time when you spend the tax payers money and with nothing to challenge its data, the CASW plodded forward.

Operational research just doesn’t support other options than the CASW right now.  How to long-term sustain it is through National Procurement and there is a cap on this.  You cannot spend more NP money when you bring something into service.  Between the CG84 ammo and the CASW there was little use left for the 60 and its NP funding was set aside for them.

That being said…  If we find that we absolutely need a light mortar in theatre after the intro of the CASW and CG84 ammo we can draft an unforeseen operational requirement, bypass the process, and get a top of the line light mortar sent into theatre in no-time and have the separate ops budget to finance it.  A bit underhanded but feasible.  I can see a few tactical scenarios where I would like to have a light mortar section at my disposal but they are very specific.  We would need to consistently start to operate outside the big guns indirect umbrella to justify the return of the mortar in infantry units.  By then we could try to get some NP offset from the torpedoes of the navy.  I wish we could have the “Arms Room” concept like the SOF people but we can’t atm.
 
Arius said:
We have to remember how the CASW project emerged.  The 60mm was nearing the end of its service life no matter what.  It’s was not serviceable anymore just from the spare parts point of view.  The question then became what would replace it?  A newer 60mm might have been the obvious answer but it’s not how DLR works....ma

Remainder deleted in the interest of brevity

It's already quite obvious that common sense and simplicity is not that common at DLR.

Did you even consider HOW that thing is to be carried around?  Why use it when you have a 25mm that can INDEED engage infantry targets out to 2000+ metres?  (Please look at an SOR *somewhere* out there on the DWAN: I won't get more specific than that). 
Also please review the expenditure ratios for HE/SMK/Illum for mortars.  It is definately NOT 1/3-1/3-1/3.  Instead of crunching numbers, I suggest that you get the tape off of your horn-rimmed glasses, take off your pocket protector, put on a Tac Vest (according to instructions, its entirely adequate), go to the field (and I don't mean that grassy pitch across the street from you), and actually see what infantrymen in a MODERN company have at their disposal.  You may be surprised to note that ANOTHER low trajectory anti-pers weapon system is not what they need or want. 
Having said that, have a look over at a TLAV some day.  You may note a RWS on it.  Perhaps the CASW would be outstanding for that.  I have no idea if it fits on that thing or not, but have a look.  It might be worth it.
 
Noted.  However, I stand by my post.  In my opinion, decisions are being made that could have the potential to cost lives (in the worst case).  I have had personal discussions with person(s) from DLR on this very issue, and I was holding back.  The decisions being made are, in my opinion, short-sighted and faulty in logic.  I have many qualifications and experiences to back up my opinions, as well as the many battlefield experiences of others. 


I fully accept the DS position; however, I refuse to alter my post and I will gladly accept any consequences for my actions in this regard.

Thank you.
 
Mortarman Rockpainter said:
It's already quite obvious that common sense and simplicity is not that common at DLR.

Did you even consider HOW that thing is to be carried around?  Why use it when you have a 25mm that can INDEED engage infantry targets out to 2000+ metres?  (Please look at an SOR *somewhere* out there on the DWAN: I won't get more specific than that).   
Also please review the expenditure ratios for HE/SMK/Illum for mortars.  It is definately NOT 1/3-1/3-1/3.  Instead of crunching numbers, I suggest that you get the tape off of your horn-rimmed glasses, take off your pocket protector, put on a Tac Vest (according to instructions, its entirely adequate), go to the field (and I don't mean that grassy pitch across the street from you), and actually see what infantrymen in a MODERN company have at their disposal.  You may be surprised to note that ANOTHER low trajectory anti-pers weapon system is not what they need or want. 
Having said that, have a look over at a TLAV some day.  You may note a RWS on it.  Perhaps the CASW would be outstanding for that.  I have no idea if it fits on that thing or not, but have a look.  It might be worth it.

Maybe you should write a proposal for it.
 
NFLD Sapper said:
Maybe you should write a proposal for it.

Maybe I should.  I think that a CASW type weapon, on a stablised mount on a T-LAV (or whatever) with an RWS would be a nice addition to a non-LAV subunit.
 
Mortarman Rockpainter said:
Maybe I should.  I think that a CASW type weapon, on a stablised mount on a T-LAV (or whatever) with an RWS would be a nice addition to a non-LAV subunit.

You do that and I will come drive the T-LAV for you ;)
 
AmmoTech90 said:
Not a big deal for someone to carry three or four mortar bombs.  ...  Now 40mm grenades come in 32 round belts.  ...  So you are looking at a minimum load of 32 rounds, and you probably want them in a box, right?  So you are looking an ammo can the size of 2 to 2.5 .50 cal cans end to end, all up weight in the 20 kg range. 
If we can tactically carry mortar bombs out of the box, then why not have a tactical way of carrying 40 mm for dismounted ops (maybe something along the lines of the cloth ammo bags for MGs?).  If we get the weapon, you can expect that we'll also nationalize the ammunition production at GDOTS in Montreal.  Given that, we could also have belts built to our preferred lengths.

Mortarman Rockpainter said:
Perhaps a comparison of the CASW vs. ... the M 242 would be more relevant? 
The Bushmaster is not dismountable, so there is a clear problem in that comparison.  You'd do better to compare against the XM307 & XM312.  The project has stalled in the US, but that does not mean Canada could not buy in.

Mortarman Rockpainter said:
You may be surprised to note that ANOTHER low trajectory anti-pers weapon system is not what they need or want. 
The CASW crowed tells us that CASW will be high & low trajectory.

Arius said:
What doesn’t help is that we don’t kill anything with the 60mm.  0 kill for the 60mm since we are in Afghanistan.  Suppressed a few guys here and there?  Maybe, but no BDA to backup the claims that it’s the bane of the Taliban.  Battle proven?  It throws illum and smoke in battle.  That’s proven and that’s all.
By doctrine, firepower is used to destroy, neutralize or suppress the enemy.  I'd suggest disrupt is another useful function.  If light mortars are achieving all the effects less destroy, then it would certainly seem they have proven themselves.  Sometimes, all it takes is a few rounds of illum to silence enemy guns & send him hiding (because he knows what else comes from the tubes which fired the illum).

Arius said:
The people in DLR didn’t try to kill the 60mm btw.  It killed itself by underperforming against a lowly Mk19 during trials.
Was this an LFTEU trial or a METC test?  I've read the stuff from DLSE, but that is only a computer sim.  I'm assuming there must have been a real world shoot-off to compare effects of the real world weapon systems.

In any case, reviewing some information presented so far, it seems the man portability of either 60 mm or 40 mm is debatable.  But, I do have a few questions on what we've seen.

|
M19 60mm
|
Mk 47 40mm
|
L9A1 51 mm
|
Wt Weapon
| 20.5 kg | 41 kg | 6.275 kg |
HE Proj
| M720 | M383 | ?? |
Wt HE Proj
| 1.7 kg | 0.340 kg | 0.920 kg |
Shot per fire msn
| 18 | 24 | 20-22? |
Wt Ammo per fire msn
| 30.6 kg | 8.16 kg | 18.4 kg - 20.24 kg ? |
Total Wt, 1 x fire msn
| 51.1 kg | 49.16 kg | 24.675 kg - 26.515 kg ? |
Total Wt, 2 x fire msn
| 81.7 kg | 57.32 kg | 33.075 kg - 46.755 kg ? |

  • Do the mortar weights include bi-pod & base plate?
  • Does the Mk 19 weight include FCS & batteries of the CASW?
  • Does the 40 mm weight include the link?
  • How many mortars are required to achieve a suppressive rate of fire?
  • How many soldiers currently share the load of carrying mortar & ammo?  If ammo is spread over the whole Pl/Coy is it going to be available to the weapon when it is needed?
  • How many fire missions need to be carried at the Pl & Coy level?

Infidel-6 said:
MCG -- well -- if I wanted to work a wall that ol' mohammed was hiding behind the Mk19 with the HV HEDP would be ideal.
I'd rather hit it with a Carl firing a HESH type round (or better a thermoberic).
 
MCG said:
The Bushmaster is not dismountable, so there is a clear problem in that comparison.  You'd do better to compare against the XM307 & XM312.  The project has stalled in the US, but that does not mean Canada could not buy in.

Actually, I was thinking in terms of weapon's effect vice portability.  From what I've read, the CASW is not that portable.  Dismountable, yes, but not portable (think .50 cal with tripod and ammo.  Can't get too far with that too quickly).  Though firing the M 242 is not really practicable NLOS, I think to the old methods of indirect shoots (semi-indirect?) with tan[/pre]
 
Mortarman Rockpainter said:
It's already quite obvious that common sense and simplicity is not that common at DLR.

Did you even consider HOW that thing is to be carried around?  Why use it when you have a 25mm that can INDEED engage infantry targets out to 2000+ metres?  (Please look at an SOR *somewhere* out there on the DWAN: I won't get more specific than that).   
Also please review the expenditure ratios for HE/SMK/Illum for mortars.  It is definately NOT 1/3-1/3-1/3.  Instead of crunching numbers, I suggest that you get the tape off of your horn-rimmed glasses, take off your pocket protector, put on a Tac Vest (according to instructions, its entirely adequate), go to the field (and I don't mean that grassy pitch across the street from you), and actually see what infantrymen in a MODERN company have at their disposal.  You may be surprised to note that ANOTHER low trajectory anti-pers weapon system is not what they need or want. 
Having said that, have a look over at a TLAV some day.  You may note a RWS on it.  Perhaps the CASW would be outstanding for that.  I have no idea if it fits on that thing or not, but have a look.  It might be worth it.


Can't really let you get away with this...


It's already quite obvious that common sense and simplicity is not that common at DLR.

Probably more common than you would like to assume.  They invite guys back from ops all the time so they can debrief them and orient the future projects.  They will even pay TD and hotel if you are really good and have decent tactical insight.  Stop by the St-Laurent building in Hull and tell them how they suck when you get a chance.  After they are done chuckling they will buy you a coffee and explain things to you.  Maybe you will have something to contribute that they don’t know yet.

Did you even consider HOW that thing is to be carried around?

I would say in an already packed vehicle in a soft tactical container and then carried for a short distance to the firing position.  I don’t expect it to be strapped on somebody’s back for long periods of time.  Nobody does.

Why use it when you have a 25mm that can INDEED engage infantry targets out to 2000+ metres?

I fully expect the 25mm to be used if it’s the best way to go about it.  The AGL would probably be used in situation or location where it is the best option.  Maybe FOBs or overwatch in built up areas and such.  I see it mainly as static defensive weapon with great observation capabilities for any unit that may need it.  Defense of gun positions and airfields are valid options I think.

(Please look at an SOR *somewhere* out there on the DWAN: I won't get more specific than that).

Please be specific if you think you know what you are talking about.  There it is:
http://otg-vcd-webs018.ottawa-hull.mil.ca/CID/Project-Home_e.asp
CASW project number is 00000562.  Look into uploaded documents for the SOR.

Also please review the expenditure ratios for HE/SMK/Illum for mortars.

I did, its on TITAN.  All the way back to Op Medusa.

It is definately NOT 1/3-1/3-1/3.

Never said it was 1/3-1/3-1/3.  But smoke and illum still make roughly 2/3 of overall 60mm consumption.

Instead of crunching numbers, I suggest that you get the tape off of your horn-rimmed glasses, take off your pocket protector, put on a Tac Vest (according to instructions, its entirely adequate), go to the field (and I don't mean that grassy pitch across the street from you), and actually see what infantrymen in a MODERN company have at their disposal.

I’m fairly confident of my looks and “operational” credentials so personal attacks like that don’t bother me.  Being in Petawawa, a posting in Darfur or being in exchange with the Brits doesn’t make you a tactical God whose words are beyond questioning – Far from it.  Punching your ticket in Ottawa is not shameful as it makes you understand how real influence and money flows in the CF and how you can bring about real changes.  I try to explain some of it at times so we can have a bit of an educated discussion.  Sorry you don’t fucking get but trying to pass yourself as the only true defender of the Infantry is laughable.

You may be surprised to note that ANOTHER low trajectory anti-pers weapon system is not what they need or want.

The only thing that would surprise me at this point is you stopping to use caps aimlessly like a 12 year old.  “They” are the troops I guess.  “They” have to say what they need or want and their leadership needs to articulate it so that it can be acted upon.  So far, the XIAB is the forum through which “They” express themselves and they endorsed the CASW over the 60mm on the 14 Nov 07.

I was not convinced either the first time I heard about the CASW.  There is some tactical value from the programmable airburst and the AGL overall is not a bad concept.  I don’t think it is a miracle weapon but I would bet that we won’t bother with the C6 SF and the .50 cal once we get it and it will at least fill these roles plus 80% of the 60mm.  I may be wrong but I think it’s worth a try.

Having said that, have a look over at a TLAV some day.  You may note a RWS on it.    Perhaps the CASW would be outstanding for that.  I have no idea if it fits on that thing or not, but have a look.  It might be worth it.

Baseless condescending comments don’t add to your dismal credibility.  The RWS project is a few cubicles down and I talk with them on a regular basis as with Rheinmetall and Bofors reps among others.  The requirements of the RWS haven’t specified the type of weapon that will eventually go on it.  Big factors like the weight of the turret, the commonality, the feeding and stowage of ammunition are still being debated and will influence the weapon type.  It could be a twin AGL/C6 or a med velocity 25mm airburst or anything around that.


There you go.  Hope we're even.





 
Now that everyone has had a chance to vent, lets bring the conduct, tone and content and  back to an acceptable level. The freebies are over.

Cheers,
The Staff
 
15 Love.  As MCG said, let's get back to the issues and not personality.

Arius, as you are obviously in a position to know, my original questions still stand.

Infanteer said:
I've humped the 60 before; used it in both the Platoon dismounted role (Platoon commander's hip-pocket indirect fire) and the Company dismounted role (Coy "Mortar Group" of 3-4 tubes) - granted, not on a two-way range.  I'm also a former machine-gunner, and since the 40mm-AGL is essentially a large machine gun with specialized ammo, I think this comes into play.

1.  Doctrinally, where does the 40mm AGL sit in our organization?  I ask because I really cannot see a place for it in either the mounted or dismounted roles.

     a.  If our Infantry Companies are mounted in the LAVIII, they have an exceptional 25mm stabilized turret.  I can't see a AGL being mounted on the pintle due to its size and due to the fact that it will compete with (and lose to) the 25mm for ammo storage.  So are we going to have this big AGL in the back of a LAV to pull out if we need to lob a few rounds high angle to hit a target that the 25mm cannot punch?  Considering this is a tripod mounted weapon with a sophisticated fire control system, due you think that a mechanized platoon or company rolling along is going to have the time to employ this?  Manpower, along with space, also becomes an issue; two men can easily employ a mortar and pack it up and revert to riflemen by slinging the 60 onto their back in minimal time - an AGL takes three guys out of the picture.

     b.  Okay, how about a dismounted platoon or company?  An AGL is huge; looking at the pictures, the .50 cal was very unpleasant to hump in the dismounted role (thankfully, something I never had to do).  If we got a patrol moving through the mountains or jungle, you want them to hump this thing?  And the ammo?  Ever played with a can of 25mm rounds or a bandoleer of 40mm grenades?  Very awkward and very heavy.  Mortar bombs are fairly light and easy to break down within the company.  Conversely, a broken down 40mm belt is awkward and heavy (the link is the real killer in the heavier rounds) and, as with any machine-gun, continually breaking and relinking is liable to cause damage to the link and increase your rate of stoppages and misfeeds.  Having fumbled around with 25mm link, I can only imagine how un-fun 40mm link must be.  To be honest, I don't really see a dismounted role for this thing.

2.  The most likely method of employment will be on the LPV (RG-31), attached to the remote weapon station.  This is similar to how the Americans employ their AGLs - in a mix with .50 cal M2's on Humvees and other light vehicles.  This is great, and is a "nice to have" that I'd like to see.  However, as others have said, this is apples and oranges.  An AGL mounted on a remote weapon station does not seem to be a replacement for a lightweight mortar tube.  Is this relatively narrow method of employment really a good justification to do away with a weapon system like a 60mm mortar which is quite versatile?

3.  Has any consideration been given to the fact that we are putting our Infantry "indirect fire" eggs into a very sophisticated basket.  To achieve the results that the studies of your program lays out, the AGL requires a sophisticated fire-control system and programmable ammunition.  Having worked with all things sophisticated in the infantry (radios, sat phones, MNVGs, WES-gear, etc, etc) I can tell you that a safe maxim is "the more complicated a thing is, the more chances there are for it to break down when you really need it" or, more simply, Murphy's Law.  As another person mentioned, the idea of tube, pin and trigger with simple bomb is pretty foolproof.  The 60mm mortar has been much improved over the years - it's a bit unfair to compare it to the one we use today.  That's like comparing a modern assault rifle to an Enfield - not even, as the 60mm is a mortar tube and the 40mm AGL is essentially a machine-gun.  Why don't we consider a new 60mm mortar?

     All in all, I remain unconvinced that "a modern AGL will serve us better in the long run" - I've looked at the presentations and the studies and there are big holes that lead to questions - questions that have been asked here.  This whole thing reminds me of the Mobile Gun System/Main Battle Tank debate that plagued the Armoured Corps a few years back.  The MGS had some value (The Americans employ them today), but was not a tank.  We wasted time and money and did a nice pirouette and ended up with an MBT.  Until I see these questions answered, I remain unconvinced that a jacked-up machine gun, while nice to have, can take over an indirect suppressive role from a mortar.  Something else is at play here....

As I said, this seems to be like the MBT/MGS debate.  Why has the AGL/Mortar debate become an "either/or" argument?  I think a 40mm AGL is a "nice to have", but not at the expense of a light mortar - the questions above highlight why I hold this conclusion.
 
Arius said:
Please be specific if you think you know what you are talking about.  There it is:
http://otg-vcd-webs018.ottawa-hull.mil.ca/CID/Project-Home_e.asp
CASW project number is 00000562.  Look into uploaded documents for the SOR.

I'm not sure if that is available on the internet vice DIN.  Hence my vagueness in referring to it.  From the URL, it appears as though it is DIN only, so I shan't get more specific.
 
"The soldier cannot be a fighter and a pack animal at one and the same time, any more than a field piece can be a gun and a supply vehicle combined." -- (J.F.C. Fuller to S.L.A. Marshall, 1948)

The weight issue is always a significant one for the infantry. As it's so unwieldy, it's clear that the CASW is meant for mechanized/ mounted operations, which seems to support the current doctrine for most of our forces.  The light mortar, as seen with British Forces, supports a doctrine which supports the orbat and vehicle/ weapon systems to support dismounted unit operations. As we've seen, this includes a light mortar.

As Canada seems to be destined to stick with tanks and (increasingly) heavily armoured infantry, that will stay close to the road networks and associated indirect fire and combat service support channels, a 40mm AGL might be the right way to go for at least 2/3rds of our infantry units.

Regardless, this does not, as mentioned earlier by Arius, preclude us from pushing through a UOR for a new light mortar that will better meet the needs of our infantry during the various dismounted operations undertaken now, and into the future. We should have a weapon like this for use by the one light battalion in each of our regiments (the other 1/3 of our infantry), CSOR and any other similar dismounted units who are unlikely to be able to man pack a 50 cal or AGL.
 
Infanteer said:
15 Love.  As MCG said, let's get back to the issues and not personality.

Arius, as you are obviously in a position to know, my original questions still stand.

As I said, this seems to be like the MBT/MGS debate.  Why has the AGL/Mortar debate become an "either/or" argument?  I think a 40mm AGL is a "nice to have", but not at the expense of a light mortar - the questions above highlight why I hold this conclusion.

Doctrinally, where does the 40mm AGL sit in our organization?  I ask because I really cannot see a place for it in either the mounted or dismounted roles.

Doctrine has a hard time in the CF and in the Army in particular.  It should get directions from strategic thinkers and drive equipment acquisition but it doesn’t happen that way.  Without the strategists – political or military – painting us a decent picture of the battlefield where they will commit us 10 years down the road it is impossible for the doctrine people to come up with the requirements for the hardware.  We then have the equipment people trying to meet needs or replace stuff without a clear long term vision.  That’s why we have 3 types of RWS in service, unsustainable vehicles in theatre and fast-tracking of tanks and airplanes.  Over-simplified a bit but not far from the truth.  There is no hard doctrine for the AGL but there is enough of a consensus in favour of its potential to keep moving it forward.  Your post and the discussion we have here are probably the seeds of that doctrinal employment.

If our Infantry Companies are mounted in the LAVIII, they have an exceptional 25mm stabilized turret.  I can't see a AGL being mounted on the pintle due to its size and due to the fact that it will compete with (and lose to) the 25mm for ammo storage.

True for the LAVIII as we know it now.  The AGL/CASW can be adapted to an M3 pintle if needed but we are most likely to have it mounted in a RWS in the next fleet of vehicles.  The RWS and the weapon(s) that will go on it are another ball game.  For discussion sake, the RWS come with their own FCS so if you only put the AGL part of the CASW into it, it’s not a CASW anymore.  I don’t see the RWS people buying the full CASW but only the AGL if they go for a 40mm solution..

So are we going to have this big AGL in the back of a LAV to pull out if we need to lob a few rounds high angle to hit a target that the 25mm cannot punch?  Considering this is a tripod mounted weapon with a sophisticated fire control system, due you think that a mechanized platoon or company rolling along is going to have the time to employ this?  Manpower, along with space, also becomes an issue; two men can easily employ a mortar and pack it up and revert to riflemen by slinging the 60 onto their back in minimal time - an AGL takes three guys out of the picture.

Are we rolling in through the objective or cordoning it off and destroying in place?  For the first scenario, I think the the CASW is a very deliberate weapon and that it will not compete with readily available direct fire weapons, be it 120mm or 25mm, unless you need that capability in a location a turreted vehicle cannot reach.  I would also expect that we will consider using the Carl Gustaf airburst ammo before we think about breaking out the CASW for its airburst capabilities.  Direct and airburst fire are faster to bring to bear effectively and more precise than indirect so for me indirect is a last option.  I would personally prefer using the artillery to reach a non-line-of-sight-target.  Full MET data allows a M777 to hit within 100m at 20km and correct within 50m on the subsequent shot.  That’s the weapon of choice imho.  If this is not available, I would like to have my dreamland 120mm mortars from battalion (Nevermind the CASW/60mm polemic – I believe in the need for integral, modern, fast-firing, high lethality, PGM-enabled, heavy mortars in infantry units).  No big indirect and no CAS available?  We should know in advance I hope.  We then break out the CASW within range and plug in the computer the likely grids from which we will correct fire – or fire and walk the rounds to the target.  I would deploy a CASW before rolling in if possible.  Would a CASW deploy as fast as a handheld light mortar?  Of course not but bringing the target under constant effective fire is the key here - Constant fire with a handheld is difficult.  Against a light mortar with bipod and baseplate that need one or two bedding shots?  The CASW will deploy and pepper the target effectively faster.  Second scenario is no contest I believe as I see it as a cut-off or support weapon on a known target.  The direct, airburst, high angle, IR observation combination almost nullifies the concept of cover and dead ground.  But it needs to be a deliberate well thought out deployment of the weapon.

Okay, how about a dismounted platoon or company?  An AGL is huge; looking at the pictures, the .50 cal was very unpleasant to hump in the dismounted role (thankfully, something I never had to do).  If we got a patrol moving through the mountains or jungle, you want them to hump this thing?

No.  In fact, I don’t want anybody to carry anything that deliver an effect on the target that can be achieved from another remote/long-range weapon system.  Be it close air support or long range artillery.  The current infantryman is grossly overloaded even with just his basic load.  I humped 105lbs of kit at 5000m altitude in 35 degree heat without carrying any crew served ammo – It is demented.  We lose guys from dehydration before getting to the start line these days.  I cringe whenever we talk about new personal kit with improved armor or that require batteries.

And the ammo?  Ever played with a can of 25mm rounds or a bandoleer of 40mm grenades?  Very awkward and very heavy.

Yes and yes.  No arguments there.

Mortar bombs are fairly light and easy to break down within the company.

Maybe but we now get back to the discussion about total weight per fire mission…

Conversely, a broken down 40mm belt is awkward and heavy (the link is the real killer in the heavier rounds) and, as with any machine-gun, continually breaking and relinking is liable to cause damage to the link and increase your rate of stoppages and misfeeds.  Having fumbled around with 25mm link, I can only imagine how un-fun 40mm link must be.

The coupling often gets sheared when you de-link and you need a special pliers-type tool to relink.  A soft pack can be easily designed to avoid the awkwardness of the box.  But you still look at a 30-40 pounder bag.

To be honest, I don't really see a dismounted role for this thing.

It’s not an easily man portable weapon that’s for sure.  The question is the type of dismounted operation, how far, what effect, etc.  Long-range patrol?  Forget it.  Urban ops?  I can see some use.  Overwatch/op day/night?  Definitely.

The most likely method of employment will be on the LPV (RG-31), attached to the remote weapon station.  This is similar to how the Americans employ their AGLs - in a mix with .50 cal M2's on Humvees and other light vehicles.  This is great, and is a "nice to have" that I'd like to see.  However, as others have said, this is apples and oranges.  An AGL mounted on a remote weapon station does not seem to be a replacement for a lightweight mortar tube.  Is this relatively narrow method of employment really a good justification to do away with a weapon system like a 60mm mortar which is quite versatile?

I understand the first part but RWS and CASW are two very different things right now and they shouldn’t mix.  For the last sentence we could flip it around a bit and ask ourselves:  Is a 60mm as versatile as a CASW and CG84 with new AB/Smoke/Illum?  Because that’s what the financial offset of the light mortar buys.  Vesatility+effect on the target may not be in favour of the 60mm at the moment.

Has any consideration been given to the fact that we are putting our Infantry "indirect fire" eggs into a very sophisticated basket.  To achieve the results that the studies of your program lays out, the AGL requires a sophisticated fire-control system and programmable ammunition.

Back up is the reflex sight or flipping up the iron sight for direct fire.  Airburst rounds are dependent on the laser and computer combo but will detonate as normal rounds if the computer fails.  Indirect is just going into super-elevation and watching the fall of shot - The computer is for first shot accuracy and registering of target.  I will mention that ballistic tables with fixed ranges/elevation should be included with the mount.

Having worked with all things sophisticated in the infantry (radios, sat phones, MNVGs, WES-gear, etc, etc) I can tell you that a safe maxim is "the more complicated a thing is, the more chances there are for it to break down when you really need it" or, more simply, Murphy's Law.

95% RAMD/14 days per weapon system is the minimum requirement.  It is as reliable as it gets.  Optics and computer have no moving parts.  The actuator that keeps the sight on target is the only moving part outside the weapon.  If all of those fail you can still go for reflex/iron sights.  Murphy is most likely hiding in forgetting to change the batteries and its not a weapon issue.

As another person mentioned, the idea of tube, pin and trigger with simple bomb is pretty foolproof.  The 60mm mortar has been much improved over the years - it's a bit unfair to compare it to the one we use today.  That's like comparing a modern assault rifle to an Enfield - not even, as the 60mm is a mortar tube and the 40mm AGL is essentially a machine-gun.
Yes, no, maybe.  The simplicity of the mortar tubes is beyond question.  The effectiveness of mortars are dependent on accurate data bringing the rounds on target.  The smaller the rounds, the more accuracy you need.  Even a modern Soltam or Viktor will have an error area of 90x200m at 2000m on the first few rounds.  Granted, things get better after bedding and  MAPAM-type  rounds would help but they would still lose out for the speed of suppression with line of sight under 2000m.

Why don't we consider a new 60mm mortar?

Because a modern option was considered and lost out against the CASW/CG84 combo.  Why not consider a new 120mm mortar instead and sort out the doctrine for the infantry?

All in all, I remain unconvinced that "a modern AGL will serve us better in the long run" - I've looked at the presentations and the studies and there are big holes that lead to questions - questions that have been asked here.  This whole thing reminds me of the Mobile Gun System/Main Battle Tank debate that plagued the Armoured Corps a few years back.  The MGS had some value (The Americans employ them today), but was not a tank.  We wasted time and money and did a nice pirouette and ended up with an MBT.  Until I see these questions answered, I remain unconvinced that a jacked-up machine gun, while nice to have, can take over an indirect suppressive role from a mortar.  Something else is at play here.

I would be less likely to support the CASW if we had solid data for the 60mm.  Anecdotal evidence are ok as a starting point but they cannot be used to justify doctrine or spending.  For each anecdote where we praise the 60mm you get the other one where a ranged 60mm failed to get that guy in the open and he ran away scratch free after 15 rounds around him.  If we had smelted the little guy in the 70s I’m not sure we would miss it today.  As for the very specific scenarios, where we would patrol the jungles of Burma 50km from a fire base and require mortar support, we can go and UOR something.  I’m not crazy about the 60mm because I feel it’s underpowered.  The very least I would lconsider would be a portable 81mm at company level with some PGM.  I don’t think there is a anti-60 conspiracy.  It just too hard to sell atm.
 
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