Canada's tanks

[GR66]

All that advantage is countered by a few SS-29 on TELs.

No need to waste placing troops there then if they are so easily neutralized? Surely NATO could just as easily stop a Russian invasion with its own nukes.

Seriously though, I honestly don't see any possible positive result for Russia in attacking NATO. Like in Ukraine an attack might see some initial gains on the ground but in the long run NATO simply has the military, economic and demographic and geographic advantages to ensure an ultimate Russian defeat.

That being said, Putin & Co. are absolute nut jobs and we can't rule out them doing something stupid. That's why NATO needs to maintain a strong deterrent capability. As I said above I think the risk of a Russian attack is very low but the military capabilities to counter such an invasion aren't something that can just be thrown together at the last minute so we need to be prepared just in case.

This is why I think the idea of pre-positioning equipment in Europe with a small posted contingent and the rest of the personnel being flyover troops is the smart way to go. That way you don't have so many troops sitting on the border of Russia that they feel threatened (which would be very expensive to maintain) but the equipment is there and can be quickly brought into service when maximum deterrence is required.

Bringing it back to the tanks, this kind of forward deployment is ideal for our tanks as this is where they are most likely to be needed and they provide significant deterrent effect.

 

[Kirkhill]

All that advantage is countered by a few SS-29 on TELs.

Significant escalatory step though.

I dare you.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

Well, we have fifteen Leopard 2A4Ms forward deployed to eFP Latvia now. This was no mean feat - well done to those who did (and are still doing) the work to make that happen. The Canadian Army now has a world-class capability deployed to a theatre for which it was truly designed. We tend to denigrate our capabilities, but tanks is one area where we are actually doing really well. Now they are forward, with more going through Repair and Overhaul to steward the capability and the others being set for the generation of squadrons for eFP.

We'll see what the Armoured Cavalry concept brings for the Light Squadrons. I think it will be rather moot for a while, but conversion between Squadrons should be a little easier. I am curious about work on Medium, although I don't expect to see anything soon.

 

[DBNSG]

Well, we have fifteen Leopard 2A4Ms forward deployed to eFP Latvia now. This was no mean feat - well done to those who did (and are still doing) the work to make that happen. The Canadian Army now has a world-class capability deployed to a theatre for which it was truly designed. We tend to denigrate our capabilities, but tanks is one area where we are actually doing really well. Now they are forward, with more going through Repair and Overhaul to steward the capability and the others being set for the generation of squadrons for eFP.

We'll see what the Armoured Cavalry concept brings for the Light Squadrons. I think it will be rather moot for a while, but conversion between Squadrons should be a little easier. I am curious about work on Medium, although I don't expect to see anything soon.

So would a modest buy of say 64 CV-90's constitute a medium Cavalry capability? Four Squadrons of 16.

 

[FJAG]

Russian losses in Ukraine have wiped out its advantage in Baltics, report says

Russia’s battlefield losses in Ukraine have eliminated the military advantages it once held over NATO allies in the Baltic region, a new think tank report says.

www.stripes.com

The requirements have changed and continue to change.

That's exactly the point. No one seriously thinks that Russia won't learn from this and take corrective steps. Russia may not be a threat to the Baltics today but we need to be preparing for the future.

For a while there we'd been lulled into thinking that the Russian bear was happy and sleeping. We willingly sat back and ignored or made excuses for their little indiscretions even as they got more and more pronounced.

IMHO, the lesson is clear. NATO has to look strong and united in order to provide a credible deterrence. Russia has to clearly understand that if you poke the NATO bull, you get the horns.

On your prior post about Finland and Sweden. IMHO this is one of those places where you can have both things. We need two different segments in the army - one a heavy force oriented to Latvia another a light force oriented towards our own Arctic. There's no reason why that latter force can't participate from time to time on exercises in Finland or Sweden and have a planning staff that works with them. The only caution I have there is that we need to ensure that whatever we might make available to them is properly backed up in Canada so that we don't get caught short if our north gets threatened too. And just to be able to say I told you so at some point in the future - we are going to be challenged in the north if its resources are what we think they might be. Remember that this was once a shallow inland sea which should now be loaded with hydrocarbons at a minimum. It's simply a matter of when, and not if.

 

[Kirkhill]

That's exactly the point. No one seriously thinks that Russia won't learn from this and take corrective steps. Russia may not be a threat to the Baltics today but we need to be preparing for the future.

For a while there we'd been lulled into thinking that the Russian bear was happy and sleeping. We willingly sat back and ignored or made excuses for their little indiscretions even as they got more and more pronounced.

IMHO, the lesson is clear. NATO has to look strong and united in order to provide a credible deterrence. Russia has to clearly understand that if you poke the NATO bull, you get the horns.

On your prior post about Finland and Sweden. IMHO this is one of those places where you can have both things. We need two different segments in the army - one a heavy force oriented to Latvia another a light force oriented towards our own Arctic. There's no reason why that latter force can't participate from time to time on exercises in Finland or Sweden and have a planning staff that works with them. The only caution I have there is that we need to ensure that whatever we might make available to them is properly backed up in Canada so that we don't get caught short if our north gets threatened too. And just to be able to say I told you so at some point in the future - we are going to be challenged in the north if its resources are what we think they might be. Remember that this was once a shallow inland sea which should now be loaded with hydrocarbons at a minimum. It's simply a matter of when, and not if.

I rather suspect that we would have taken opposite positions on the CAST Brigade / Germany debate.

 

[RangerRay]

IMHO, we should have learned our lesson after the Russian invasion of Georgia. And we at least should have raised an eyebrow after Putin flattened Grozny.

 

[FJAG]

We'll see what the Armoured Cavalry concept brings for the Light Squadrons. I think it will be rather moot for a while, but conversion between Squadrons should be a little easier. I am curious about work on Medium, although I don't expect to see anything soon.

I really wonder what, if any distinction should exist between light and medium.

If I look at the American IBCT cav squadron I see two mounted troops in HMWWVs and one dismounted. The SBCT on the other hand, has Strykers with a weapons company of MGS.

Considering our CMBG structure is two LAV and one light battalion maybe we really have the need for only two types of cav unit - tank and other. Based on the LAV component in the brigade, "other" cav should probably be LRSS based with possibly some TAPVs. I really don't see a "light" cav organization unless and until you form a light brigade.

I think the army might be getting wrapped around the axle with the SSE emphasis on battle groups. It's possible that Canada might send out a true light battalion. But does that really need a cav component or just a beefed up recce platoon? Would the LRSS squadron do? Or should we just dismount or remount an LRSS squadron in light vehicles with whatever lightweight equipment exists?

To me the cav concept is really a force that has only a minimal role below the brigade. When we used cav in Afghanistan it was basically in the medium Coyote role.

So to get down to brass tacks. I see Canada really only having two cav models - the tank in its own regiment, and the LRSS/TAPV-equipped regiment for brigade level usage but with an ability to detach a squadron to work with a deployed battle group-sized task force. Essentially that is "medium". To me, the distinction between the terms "light" and "medium" cav appear mostly moot.

 

[markppcli]

View attachment 81399

NATO/JEF in the Arctic - RM Cdo in Norway at their new permanent base.

A Land Force contribution to NATO.

They just base out of Camp Viking for their annual winter ex. Not “their permanent base” to imply they have a constant presence.

 

[Maxman1]

If I look at the American IBCT cav squadron I see two mounted troops in HMWWVs and one dismounted. The SBCT on the other hand, has Strykers with a weapons company of MGS.

The Stryker MGS was retired last year and is being replaced by the M10 Booker.

 

[FJAG]

I rather suspect that we would have taken opposite positions on the CAST Brigade / Germany debate.

I'm not so sure. I was part of the AMF(L) (with the dubious distinction that every time it went over to Norway I was off on a course - very frustrating) I thought AMF(L) was a good concept. The trouble with CAST was it wasn't prepositioned equipment. The ST part of CAST was not practical. BRAVE LION in 1986 proved that and the logistics of supporting a brigade in Germany and one in Norway was basically undoable.

I never knew if the plan was to preposition equipment for 5 Bde in Germany - it never came to that but I thought that an air -sea transportable role to Germany as impractical as for Norway even though the logistics situation would have been mitigated with the bde in Germany alongside 4 CMBG.

By that time I'd gone to the legal branch and wasn't really tracking this type of issue very much. I think we kept a battalion role in Norway and I thought that a good and feasible idea.

The Stryker MGS was retired last year and is being replaced by the M10 Booker.

If I recall the decision to retire the MGS was made in late 2021 and to be complete by the end of 2022. What I haven't seen yet is confirmation that the divestiture has been completed seeing as the MPF won't start its roll out its LRIP models until mid 2024 for testing with the first battalion to be equipped with them in late 2025; four battalions by 2030; and the program completely rolled out in 2035.

I've yet to see what the plan for the SBCT cav squadron's weapons company is in the interim.

Interestingly I see no SBCTs where the MPF will exist. Some SBCTs are part of the basic armoured divisions (which do not have any MPF) and two separate cavalry regiments which are organized as SBCTs, and again have no MPF. The MPF battalions are basically part of only the light divisions' establishment. It makes me wonder, but I don't know, if the plan is to give SBCT cav squadrons a company of tanks to support their Strykers. tanks for the weapons company like they do for an ABCT cavalry squadron.

 

[ueo]

If I was Canada and looking at the tank situation realistically.

Two Tank Regiments of tanks would be permanently in Latvia. One HQ, and 3 Tank Squadrons being 100% filled with personnel, and the other Reg’t being a 10% skeleton crew (and 100% of the Maintenance Squadron) with the rest on fly over tasking.

The same for Two LAV Battalions, a CER, and a 4 Bty 8 gun Arty Regiment.

If Latvia isn’t idea for all the Forces, make a deal with another country like Poland, or Finland.

I fully agree with @FJAG as 6 months is just ridiculous, best to go back to a CFE type situation where it’s a 4year posting.

Maybe a deal to be had in Lahr?

 

[KevinB]

Maybe a deal to be had in Lahr?

Germany isn’t a good position these days IMHO. They don’t have the same mentality towards the Russians they used to do before the wall fell.

 

[GR66]

Germany isn’t a good position these days IMHO. They don’t have the same mentality towards the Russians they used to do before the wall fell.

It's almost 2,000km from Lahr to Riga, Latvia by road. Not exactly an "in your face" deterrence.

 

[Kirkhill]

I'm not so sure. I was part of the AMF(L) (with the dubious distinction that every time it went over to Norway I was off on a course - very frustrating) I thought AMF(L) was a good concept. The trouble with CAST was it wasn't prepositioned equipment. The ST part of CAST was not practical. BRAVE LION in 1986 proved that and the logistics of supporting a brigade in Germany and one in Norway was basically undoable.

I never knew if the plan was to preposition equipment for 5 Bde in Germany - it never came to that but I thought that an air -sea transportable role to Germany as impractical as for Norway even though the logistics situation would have been mitigated with the bde in Germany alongside 4 CMBG.

I take issue with the Sea Transport part not being practical. Technically there were capabilities available that could address the movement issues. IMO nobody was willing to spend the money - and that applied to politicians both in and out of uniform.

I do agree that prepositioning would have resolved a lot of issues, just as they would in Latvia and elsewhere in the world. But, again, money and will. And closing off of options so that decisions don't have to be made. Rapid Response Forces would require big decisions to be made rapidly... and nobody wants that.

By that time I'd gone to the legal branch and wasn't really tracking this type of issue very much. I think we kept a battalion role in Norway and I thought that a good and feasible idea.

If I recall the decision to retire the MGS was made in late 2021 and to be complete by the end of 2022. What I haven't seen yet is confirmation that the divestiture has been completed seeing as the MPF won't start its roll out its LRIP models until mid 2024 for testing with the first battalion to be equipped with them in late 2025; four battalions by 2030; and the program completely rolled out in 2035.

I've yet to see what the plan for the SBCT cav squadron's weapons company is in the interim.

Interestingly I see no SBCTs where the MPF will exist. Some SBCTs are part of the basic armoured divisions (which do not have any MPF) and two separate cavalry regiments which are organized as SBCTs, and again have no MPF. The MPF battalions are basically part of only the light divisions' establishment. It makes me wonder, but I don't know, if the plan is to give SBCT cav squadrons a company of tanks to support their Strykers. tanks for the weapons company like they do for an ABCT cavalry squadron.

The MGS had this advantage over the M10 - it moved at the same pace as the rest of the Brigade Combat Team. Now somebody is going to have to supply Tank Transporters and C17/C5 lift to get them into position with the "Light" forces.

The same thing applies to the towed artillery. Wheeled artillery for the SBCTs and Heliportable artillery for the IBCTs

For the Stryker Brigade Combat Team concept, or for that matter, the Infantry Brigade Combat Team concept, to have any meaning then all facets of the brigades should be able to move together.

And wrt the SBCT as a "medium" force, as I recall the early discussions the concept was of supplying protective transport to light infantry so that both the infantry and its transport could be airlifted anywhere in a C130. One might have thought that that would have set a pretty hard target as to the limits of the equipment available. But somebody somewhere had to stretch the envelope to the point that, instead of accepting the 80% solution, they ended up trying to squeeze 21 tonnes of stuff into a 20 tonne bag.

Keep in mind that the backdrop for the discussion was the 7th Light Infantry Division and its Dune Buggies (Fast Attack Vehicles).

.

 

[Fabius]

In terms of Raid Response Forces, what does Canada and the GoC actually foresee needing Rapid Response Forces for, what tasks?

Canada does not have the same tradition of force projection in a rapid manner as say the US, UK, or France. Nor do we really have specific national interests that require it.
Our domestic context requires that we have some strategic capabilities as does our tendency to have forces spread across the globe doing tasks but none of them are what I would state are rapid response.

Our rapid responses have typically been small, sub unit scale non combat missions and tasks integrated into a larger allied context.

Strategical our forces have been follow on forces in a crisis situation. How does that reality affect our army’s weight and the shipping or airlift capacity and capability needed?

 

[Kirkhill]

In terms of Raid Response Forces, what does Canada and the GoC actually foresee needing Rapid Response Forces for, what tasks?

Canada does not have the same tradition of force projection in a rapid manner as say the US, UK, or France. Nor do we really have specific national interests that require it.
Our domestic context requires that we have some strategic capabilities as does our tendency to have forces spread across the globe doing tasks but none of them are what I would state are rapid response.

Our rapid responses have typically been small, sub unit scale non combat missions and tasks integrated into a larger allied context.

Strategical our forces have been follow on forces in a crisis situation. How does that reality affect our army’s weight and the shipping or airlift capacity and capability needed?

What role does Canada see itself playing internationally? I mean beyond convening meetings and holding doors.

 

[Oldgateboatdriver]

Didn't we pledge a rapid response force (not yet created or staffed) for UN peacekeeping ops?

 

[Fabius]

What role does Canada see itself playing internationally? I mean beyond convening meetings and holding doors.

That’s the question, and it needs to be answered by Canada and the GoC before the Army can design its forces. The army trying to design forces with out the country’s intent will largely fail which is likely to some degree responsible for the light Bns being adrift and not tied into a formation and joint force responsible for rapid force projection.

 

[FJAG]

I take issue with the Sea Transport part not being practical. Technically there were capabilities available that could address the movement issues. IMO nobody was willing to spend the money - and that applied to politicians both in and out of uniform.

I actually agree with what you say. The problem that Sea Lion showed was that the CAF had great problems in executing the actual process. Eventually they did get there but it was pretty much a boondoggle. There was a similar situation with the "Bungle in the Jungle" or "Great Lakes Fiasco" in 1997 when General Baril was sent off to the Congo to plan having 1 Cdn Div become the lead element for the humanitarian UN Op ASSURANCE. The op fell apart for many reasons but one of the major ones was that Baril concluded that Canada did not have the requisite command, control or logistics capability to do such a leadership mission.

Sometimes there is a big delta between what we should be able to do and what we actually can do. IMHO we're quite capable of sending heavy forces as an administrative move in peacetime but would have troubles with doing so where time is a factor.

I do agree that prepositioning would have resolved a lot of issues, just as they would in Latvia and elsewhere in the world. But, again, money and will. And closing off of options so that decisions don't have to be made. Rapid Response Forces would require big decisions to be made rapidly... and nobody wants that.

I don't see money as a problem. In fact I see a prepositioned force as one that can actually save money if you convert much of our higher end collective training to a single installation in Europe. The creation of the Selonia training area and the acquisition of the CC-330 makes flyover training quite practical. Think GATES and BATUS in reverse.

... But somebody somewhere had to stretch the envelope to the point that, instead of accepting the 80% solution, they ended up trying to squeeze 41 tonnes of stuff into a 20 tonne bag.

FTFY

Yeah. I basically agree. There are doctrinal limitations here and only time will tell how those will be addressed. In short, it provides light divisions with an additional resource to use. How they use it; how they manage the logistics involved with using it, waits to be seen.

It's kind of funny. I was looking back at some of the American MBTs over the years and came up with this - M41 Walker Bulldog - 76mm, 24 tonnes; M47 Patton - 90mm, 49 tonnes; M48 Patton - 45 tonnes, 90 and 105mm; M60 - 105mm, 46 tonnes.

The M10, weight wise, has crept into the area of what used to pass as an MBT. It's role is not to be an MBT but protected direct firepower for dismounted infantry.

IMHO, the turret causes it the most weight problem. The German concept of the Sturmgeschütz was to take an existing tank chassis, rip off the turret and replace it with a significantly larger gun to provide direct fire support for the dismounted infantry. Of course there is no existing tank chassis to build off - the M1 is much too heavy to be a contender. But if the M10 had been built without a turret one might be able to strip it of around 5-10 tonnes of weight.

We've gone quite far in beefing up the armour side of the speed v weight v firepower triangle in general. If you do not reduce one of the three then as armour creeps up the total mass is just bound to get heavier. The same problem for BAE's AMPV which is destined to replace the M113 in ABCTs. It clocks in at around 35 tonnes, depending on the variant, and the M113 which it will replace in ABCTs comes in at around 11 tonnes. GDLS Ajax comes in at 38 (I haven't been able to find an actual weight for the turretless Atlas but presume its a bit lighter) Between BAE and GDLS there isn't much difference in their armoured vehicles base weights. Interestingly, your favourite country, Sweden's, Stridsvagen 103 (the closest thing to a Sturmgeschütz) also came in at around 43 tonnes back in the 1960s.

Just for a giggle, the MGS came in at just over 20.

Edit: I had an afterthought. Maybe the problem is the "P" in MPF. Maybe what light infantry needs is just a better version of a 106mm recoilless rifle on a jeep.