Canada Command boss: More equipment than needed?!?

[brihard]

Fixed it for you

Two points to consider:
1. police forces of the day were less robust and had fewer tactical and operational capablilites; and
2. P Res units were not deployed on Op GINGER and ESSAY as conventional wisdom held that neither the units or individual soldiers were suitable to the task, nor were they required given the number of soldiers in the Regular Force at that time.  Contrast that with recent experience (PODIUM, CADENCE etc.)

Our experiences on CADENCE along with the thrust of the recent TBG exercise suggests to me that 'ability to engage with Canadian civilians without screwing everything up' is one of the unstated training goals of the TBG construct, which of course would be the force generation mechanism for such a security-oriented DOMOP. I'd also throw in that the institutionalization of the IA capability and the very heavy reserve presence therein has built up a modest but critical core of reservists in most of our regiments with experience in CIMIC and somewhat fuzzier let's-deal-with-civilians tasks.

If a bit of hubris could be permitted, I'd be inclined to think that reservists across the board would probably be at least as good if not better at dealing with our civilian population in the manner desired by higher during a DOMOP, simply for the reasont hat there's much tighter integration between reservists and the civilian community. Most of us are 'in and of' the population in question for most of our time most days.

 

[Old Sweat]

Some very good points, indeed. Remember that Ops Ginger and Essay were no notice operations and things happened very quickly. Recent domestic operations had the advantage of time to plan and prepare, which would not necessarily be the case in the event of a natural disaster and perhaps not in case of civil striff such as a series of attacks. However, I agree that overall the CF is in much better shape than in 1970, and a large part of that is because our reserves are of much higher quality than way back then.

 

[dapaterson]

If a bit of hubris could be permitted, I'd be inclined to think that reservists across the board would probably be at least as good if not better at dealing with our civilian population in the manner desired by higher during a DOMOP, simply for the reasont hat there's much tighter integration between reservists and the civilian community. Most of us are 'in and of' the population in question for most of our time most days.

Challenges:

(1)  Many Reservists are first responders in their communities and thus would be unavailable in a time of crisis;

(2)  In the event of a natural disaster, Reservists and their families may be among the affected and be engaged in self recovery, vice being available  to assist; and

(3)  Risk of poisoning the well - in the event of any incident of violence, the future relations between the Reserves and the community could be impacted, regardless of who is responsible.


And, finally, the devil's advocate: Remember, the Chinese had to bring in soldiers from far, far away to clear Tianamen Square of protesters.


(Old Sweat:  Back in '98 we didn't have much time to prepare.  (And, by sayng "Back in '98" I realize that I am now, officially, on the road to old coot-dom.))

 

[Fishbone Jones]

I still haven't got my Territorial Battalion ATVs yet ullhair: Two years and counting :dunno:

 

[kratz]

Here's my take on the challenges mentioned:

(1)  Many Reservists are first responders in their communities and thus would be unavailable in a time of crisis;

Agreed, to a point. Most units I have been in those first repsonders only represent a fraction of the 100% that could be called up. Looking at other reserve units in the community and local area, this challenge is not an issue IMO.

(2)  In the event of a natural disaster, Reservists and their families may be among the affected and be engaged in self recovery, vice being available  to assist; and

I agree again, but use the plans and organization for Y2K as an example. These issues can be pre-planned to be dealt with in most scenrarios through CanCom can be greatly mitigated by accounting for this very issue.

(3)  Risk of poisoning the well - in the event of any incident of violence, the future relations between the Reserves and the community could be impacted, regardless of who is responsible.

Three for three, I agree with noticing this challenge, but again there are ways to mitigate it. With the current CanCom (ROEs - ie: Op CADENCE), the concern is as low as can reasonably be.

 

[GnyHwy]

From the vantage point of NDHQ, how many Leopards and CF18s would it take to evict squatters from their tentage in downtown Toronto?

1 Leopard with 1 canister round should do it.  If they don't leave for good, they'll at least  have to go home to change their pants.

 

[gun runner]

Kratz...have you seen some of the territory that some units have to deal with? Take the Reserve battery in my hometown, the next unit available is in either ThunderBay( five hours away), or Winnipeg( two and a half hours away). The 116 would be the first responder for a district that is the entire size of Southern Ontario, or Labrador! Northern Manitoba is no better, same for Saskatchewan.... !

 

[Haggis]

Challenges:

(1)  Many Reservists are first responders in their communities and thus would be unavailable in a time of crisis;

The number of first responders in Reserve units is surprisingly small, with the largest percentage being in Health Services units.

(2)  In the event of a natural disaster, Reservists and their families may be among the affected and be engaged in self recovery, vice being available  to assist;

As was the case with the 1998 Ice Storm (I was one - a victim, along with my extended family - but also CSM of a QRF Company for our AOR).  The advantage is that the Reservist is also uniquely capable of providing a link to the community when the external IRU and follow-on forces arrive, as was the case in 1998

(3)  Risk of poisoning the well - in the event of any incident of violence, the future relations between the Reserves and the community could be impacted, regardless of who is responsible.

And, finally, the devil's advocate: Remember, the Chinese had to bring in soldiers from far, far away to clear Tianamen Square of protesters.

The role of Armed Assistance to Law Enforcement (which is what I beleive you are alluding to here) has, in the past traditionally fallen to Category "A" forces - Regular Force manaouever units.  However, Op CADENCE and, to a lesser extent, Op PODUIM have shown that the Reserves (all of them) are up to the task of ALEA.  Regarding the second and third order effects, they have been considered.  If the scenario called for it, I wouldn't be surprised to see forces from 34 CBG, for example, deployed in 31 CBG's AOR and vice-versa.

 

[Haggis]

Our experiences on CADENCE along with the thrust of the recent TBG exercise suggests to me that 'ability to engage with Canadian civilians without screwing everything up' is one of the unstated training goals of the TBG construct, which of course would be the force generation mechanism for such a security-oriented DOMOP. ......

......If a bit of hubris could be permitted, I'd be inclined to think that reservists across the board would probably be at least as good if not better at dealing with our civilian population in the manner desired by higher during a DOMOP, simply for the reasont hat there's much tighter integration between reservists and the civilian community. Most of us are 'in and of' the population in question for most of our time most days.

I still chuckle when I think of the CADENCE prep training in Meaford where Reservists (and Regulars) went through stands to prepare them for "population encounters".  I know what the intent was, and I support it.  I just think there was a better way to accomplish the aim than to have soldiers playing civilians dealing with soldiers.

 

[Nfld Sapper]

And to think for OP LAMA all we did was walk out the door and mount up ,,,,,,

 

[aesop081]

And to think for OP LAMA all we did was walk out the door and mount up ,,,,,,

....and we've been hearing about it ever since  ;D

I still chuckle when I think of the CADENCE

I still chuckle when people use CADENCE as an example of how things should be done.

 

[OldSolduer]

I still chuckle when I think of the CADENCE prep training in Meaford where Reservists (and Regulars) went through stands to prepare them for "population encounters".  I know what the intent was, and I support it.  I just think there was a better way to accomplish the aim than to have soldiers playing civilians dealing with soldiers.

Agreed. Soldiers do not play civilians very well.

I think a presentation from the local constabulary on how to deal with civilians would be far more beneficial.

 

[Nfld Sapper]

....and we've been hearing about it ever since  ;D

:clubinhand:

;D

 

[chrisf]

And to think for OP LAMA all we did was walk out the door and mount up ,,,,,,

And brought *everyone*... including the band for some reason...

 

[Haggis]

I still chuckle when people use CADENCE as an example of how things should be done.

I NEVER said that.  In fact I have a well established history of ranting against using the CADENCE model as a template for future routine DOMOPS.

 

[aesop081]

I NEVER said that. 

I never said you did.

 

[Good2Golf]

Are all Canada Command operations in Canada ?

No.

I cant think of at least one case where more resources are indeed needed to (seriously) have the required effect.

Indeed.  :nod:

To quote the Canada Command website (ref: link) [Emphasis mine, to note the responsibility elements of Canada COM as noted by CDN Aviator above]

Canada Command stands on guard for Canada. It maintains a 24/7 watch over the country, ready to respond to threats and crisis in an area of operations that spans more than nine million square kilometres, 240,000 kilometres of coastline and almost 9,000 kilometres of borders. In addition to covering Canada and continental North America and the approaches, Canada Command pays close attention to other areas of the world where threats to Canada may exist, for example, it has also conducted operations off the coasts of Africa and South America.

Technically, as a "force employer" Canada Command presently has standing headquarters and attached under operational command, SAR assets including squadron, JRCC and CMCC personal and equipment. (ref: SAR in Canada)  All other capabilities are the responsibilities of the various "force generators (FG)" (RCN, CA, RCAF, other CF elements) to provide.  If the situations requiring the FG organizations' capabilities outstrips their ability to respond, then that would mean that at the moment, it is they that wouldn't have enough resources, not Canada Command.  I understand that LGen Semianiw seemed to be technically accurate in what he said, but the manner in which the statement was provided seemed not to help provide the additional context of the technicalities of the force employer/force generator relationship within which existing and future capability requirements is viewed. 


Regards
G2G

 

[Journeyman]

...example, it has also conducted operations off the coasts of Africa and South America.

Now that is completely news to me. What ops, and why weren't they CEFCOM?

 

[dapaterson]

Now that is completely news to me. What ops, and why weren't they CEFCOM?

I would assume that those operations would be related to air and martime surveillance of Canadian approaches - for example, watching for smugglers with a Canadian destination.




...or maybe an aircrew wanted to work on their tans...

 

[The Bread Guy]

Another bit from G2G's shared link:

.... to support the Government’s policy on Canada and the Americas, Canada Command guards against and deals with threats and hazards originating in Mexico and other parts of the Western hemisphere.