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Best Air Support ?

Using strat bombers in the CAS role is actually not a bad idea.  USAF B52 & B1s can carry an enourmous load of JDAMs, as well USN have been using their P3 Orions for this task.  These platforms are big, carry allot and have a long loiter time, which means they do not require as many supporting tankers as fighter bombers.  The air war is complex, troops on ground need CAS, CAS jets need fuel, tankers must refuel them constantly to keep them in the area.  Fighter bombers like F18, F16, A10 have limited onboard fuel, they need gas to RTB, therefore their time on station is shorter.  Even with
 
Arthur, good comments.  I suppose I think of CAS as just that...support.  I consider armed aviation to be an integral manoeuvre element, and integrated into the battlespace differently than CAS.  It is much more of a intimate supporting "shooter" that is expected to understand more of the Comd's ground tac plan than the more target-centric view of a CAS provider delivering ordnance where a JTAC is telling him/her to.

G2G
 
peaches said:
Using strat bombers in the CAS role is actually not a bad idea.  USAF B52 & B1s can carry an enourmous load of JDAMs, as well USN have been using their P3 Orions for this task.  These platforms are big, carry allot and have a long loiter time, which means they do not require as many supporting tankers as fighter bombers.  The air war is complex, troops on ground need CAS, CAS jets need fuel, tankers must refuel them constantly to keep them in the area.  Fighter bombers like F18, F16, A10 have limited onboard fuel, they need gas to RTB, therefore their time on station is shorter.  Even with
Who knows, maybe Dan DALE Brown had it right, proposing modified B52s.  Creating aerial battleships as a platform for all the gee whiz munitions now available to the Airforce.
 
Didn't Dale Brown write a book emphasizing just that?
 
Yup,  Like Geo noted, many thought he was just ranting about keeping an old girl flying....who'd a thunk?
 
My next question then is: if the effect is what is required and the launch platform is immaterial what is wrong with using good, solid ground as a launch platform?

Aircraft deliver effects over very long distances.  That is their competitive advantage over artillery.  They are faster than the Navy and they can approach the target more closely.

However they are very expensive and hard to maintain.  They are better off operated from bases distant to the enemy otherwise they are put at risk, require a lot of resources dedicated to defence and don't get the best of maintenance.  If they are operated from distant bases then they waste mechanical hours, crew hours and fuel getting to and from the job-site. As well there is a time delay in getting from the base to the target - an unacceptable delay to engaged troops on the ground.  To keep the reaction time down the aircraft needs to loiter in the area - burning more gas, crew-hours, airframe and engine time.  All too often to zero effect.  How many sorties are returning with full or partial bomb loads?  Patrick Stewart on CBC last night was talking about how this past year there had been 2000 air sorties this year against those poor, defenceless Taliban and they had dropped the shocking total of 1000 missiles and bombs.

It seems to me that aircraft are a great means to surge "effects" forward over long distances and in early entry scenarios but once you get to the stage where you are doing more flying than delivering then there needs to be another look given to the use of aircraft as bomb-trucks.  This is different to arming reconnaissance aircraft (similar to arming LAVs doing reconnaissance to take advantage of fleeting targets).

I think that once a secure land base has been established in an area of operations, it has been determined that there is more time spent waiting for fire-missions than actually conducting fire missions and that the missions generally are not calling for massive expenditures of ammunition, then ground based artillery makes more sense than air-delivered artillery.

It used to be that the difference between artillery and air support was that artillery delivered support in small packages over extended periods, while the air force delivered support in large packages, over a short period of time.  In addition the artillery was more timely in delivering support but its range was more limited.

Now it appears that the weapons of choice for the Air Force are Hellfires (fired from Predators, Apaches and Harriers) with 20lb warheads, as well as 250lb Small Diameter Bombs and 500lb JDAMs.  Their precision means that they can land within 1-3 meters of the aim point.  This is possible because of electronics.  The electronics, which are fragile, are possible because the aircraft, built to carry pilots gently, treated the electronics equally gently.  The guns of the artillery and electronics, until very recently, were not as compatible.   Excalibur still demonstrates the difficulty.

If the requirement is for the delivery of 2 or 3 20lb warheads and a couple of SDBs on a daily basis, likely even less frequently than that, with the occasional need for a timely 500 lb load then there are other ways of doing that.  

The NETFires PAM, launched from a vertical silo or 15 missiles, carries much the same warhead as a Hellfire.  With its 40 km range and a speed similar to TOW then it would be on target in about 2.5 mins of the fire call.  And there would be 14 more immediately ready to launch or available to salvo.

The GMRLS fired either from the MRLS or HIMARs, or conceivably a permanent ground mount, is roughly equivalent in effect to the 250 lb SDB and as accurate.   It is fired from a silo/cell of 6 missiles and can reach any target within 70 km of its launch point.

The Big Brother of the GMRLS is the ATACMS-QRU - equivalent to the 500 lb JDAM.  It has a range of 270 km.

Because of their relatively soft launch then the electronics compatible with air delivered bombs are compatible with these missiles.  That results in the same accuracy.  The fact that they lack pilots means that they can accelerate more quickly and cover ground faster than an aircraft. They aren't bothered by weather at the launch site.  They don't burn gas, crew and parts while they are waiting to be launched.  They can be housed within the defensive perimeters of existing bases.

This article presents a good summary of these arguments.
http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/summary_0199-5606016_ITM

The point I am making is the one G2G alluded to.  It seems to me that launch platform has got very little to do with support.  It has got everything to do with what you want the delivered package to accomplish and how quickly you can get the package to its destination.

PS Dale Brown's B52 generally seemed be travelling long distances to strike a particular target with massive precision fire power and then rapidly retire.  I don't recall them stooging around the skies for an indeterminate period of time.





 
Kirkhill,

In Dale Brown's yarn, his EB52 Megafortresses do linger, flying cover - frequently staging out of places like Diego Garcia with 1 on the ground and 1 in the air 24/7 with midair refueling.
 
Thanks Geo - I must have missed that one ;D
 
you gotta catch up on your holliday reading.... several books have been written with that theme

Have a Happy NY

CHIMO!
 
Good2Golf said:
Arthur, good comments.  I suppose I think of CAS as just that...support.  I consider armed aviation to be an integral manoeuvre element, and integrated into the battlespace differently than CAS.  It is much more of a intimate supporting "shooter" that is expected to understand more of the Comd's ground tac plan than the more target-centric view of a CAS provider delivering ordnance where a JTAC is telling him/her to.

G2G

Well as much as I love to take credit for things, I'm fairly old fashioned at heart, and still see CAS in terms of having a platform right on station (similar to a LAV III one bound behind supporting with a 25mm chain gun) rather than a bomb truck at some indeterminate altitude releasing goodness on call. I really think the Americans were in the right direction with the "Air Cavalry", where the aircraft were integral and integrated as part of the unit.

Kirkhill shows that effects don't have to come from an aircraft, and perhaps the best way to provide tactical "effects" is with advanced artillery techniques. Aircraft come in for surge, long range shaping of the battlespace and perhaps when a breakthrough brings line of sight energy weapons to the battlefield. (Of course your CAS will be in the form of a modified 747.......)
 
So CAS is to Arty as Armed Aviation is to Cavalry?  The helicopter as a lightly armoured (unarmoured) high speed, all-terrain LAV?  CAS and Arty remove obstacles?  Armed Aviation and Cavalry manoeuver around obstacles?
 
Rhodesia's Fire Force is a good example of how well integrated and coordinated air/ground units can be very effective in counter-insurgency operations, even with relatively antiquated equipment.

http://members.tripod.com/selousscouts/fireforce_operations.htm
 
daft&barmy
your link provides pictures that are particularly "all white" which leads me to believe that these are snapshots that go back some 30 years... so the equipment was prolly not all that antiquated at that time.
 
Yes, this stuff is from the mid-70s (God, is it already 30 years ago already? Sheesh, I AM OLD)

Talking to guys I know who had 'been there, done that' I think the RLI was always pretty well racially integrated. It was always a tradition in the Rhodesian Army, dating back the the time of WW2 and before. The C47s and the Alouette helicopters they used were pretty old even in the mid-70s. They even used 25 pounders for artillery I believe.

For me, it's a good lesson in how, with the right leadership, communications networks and support, you can do a great job in an air/ land cooperation during COIN ops even with humble gear.
 
a_majoor said:
...
Kirkhill shows that effects don't have to come from an aircraft, and perhaps the best way to provide tactical "effects" is with advanced artillery techniques. Aircraft come in for surge, long range shaping of the battlespace and perhaps when a breakthrough brings line of sight energy weapons to the battlefield. (Of course your CAS will be in the form of a modified 747.......)

Arthur, I can't find the link right now, but I read that future generations of the AC-130 could have a directed energy weapon system on board...

G2G
 
Actually Daft, while the Rhodesian security forces (Army, Police and other elements) were only about 20% White with the balance being Black, Mixed Race and Asian IRRC, the Rhodesian Light Infantry were an all “European” (to use the official term) Unit, as were the Grey Scouts, The SAS, and The Rhodesian Armoured Car Regiment. The 3 Bns  Rhodesian African Rifles were all Black as were several independent company groups ( railway security companies etc) and only the various combat support units and of course the Selous Scouts were really integrated if memory serves me and yeah it’s coming up on 30 years.

You are right about  their equipment though. It was pretty antiquated by then NATO standards due to the UN Embargoes and shortages of hard currency (the embargo worked both ways and it was hard to ship resources out of the country too). Alouette IIIs were the mainstay of their troop delivery force (with some WW2 vintage C-47s/DC-3s) including a CAS and C&C Alouette with a 20mm.cannon.

For close air support they also had a limited supply of some 12 Hawker Hunter fighter-bombers, and a few older de Haviland Vampire fighter-bombers and, English Electric Canberra bombers as well as some converted civy light aircraft

Although 30 years old the campaign is worth studying as a it was militarily ( if not politically) successful and rather innovative.

More info here

http://www.rhodesia.nl/
 
I think in this thread we are primarily talking about fire support when we are taking about "air support."  I see fire support as all systems that deliver firepower in support of troops in contact.  I include mortars, artillery, naval gunfire, attack helicopters and aircraft.  I also see these various systems as complementary and they all bring different things to the table.  I would not advise replacing artillery with B1s, but that being said B1s can sometimes provide support to troops that artillery cannot at that time (perhaps a platoon is out of range of the guns).  I would never willingly give up M777 support, but having that 2,000lb hammer up there makes a great finishing move.

The counter-insurgency battle will usually place different demands on aircraft than "symetrical" operations and this can lead to some platforms conducting missions that the designers did not anticipate.  It can also be a bit more permissive in terms of what aircraft can operate.  Turning to technology, with the right people and equipment on the ground, JDAMs seem to have changed the rules somewhat with regards to what platforms constitute "close air support."  A B1 can deliver a munition on a specific target in support of a platoon commander's battle.  A-10s, Harriers and AH-64s bring other things to the table.  All have pluses and minuses.

For Canada, its a difficult proposition in terms of priorities.  The airforce has other concerns such as the defence of Canada.  I think we should focus on getting the assets that see the most use and are the hardest to "transfer" in theatre.  At the risk of joing the ranks of some rather infamous posters here, I figure we should focus on getting some AH-64s for a variety of reasons, not the least of which is to enable transport and casevac capabilties.  We are currently beholden to allies for many enablers, and it would be good to have a little more ownership of the stuff you need day to day.  If you are in a TIC then you may well become the priority for the whole theatre and will get the high-speed stuff like B1s coming to help.  Assumption, however, is the mother of disaster...After that, I'd try and get some armed UAVs. 

You can't always get want you want, but if you try sometimes you get what you need.

 
Danjanou said:
Actually Daft, while the Rhodesian security forces (Army, Police and other elements) were only about 20% White with the balance being Black, Mixed Race and Asian IRRC, the Rhodesian Light Infantry were an all “European” (to use the official term) Unit, as were the Grey Scouts, The SAS, and The Rhodesian Armoured Car Regiment. The 3 Bns  Rhodesian African Rifles were all Black as were several independent company groups ( railway security companies etc) and only the various combat support units and of course the Selous Scouts were really integrated if memory serves me and yeah it’s coming up on 30 years.

You are right about  their equipment though. It was pretty antiquated by then NATO standards due to the UN Embargoes and shortages of hard currency (the embargo worked both ways and it was hard to ship resources out of the country too). Alouette IIIs were the mainstay of their troop delivery force (with some WW2 vintage C-47s/DC-3s) including a CAS and C&C Alouette with a 20mm.cannon.

For close air support they also had a limited supply of some 12 Hawker Hunter fighter-bombers, and a few older de Haviland Vampire fighter-bombers and, English Electric Canberra bombers as well as some converted civy light aircraft

Although 30 years old the campaign is worth studying as a it was militarily ( if not politically) successful and rather innovative.

More info here

http://www.rhodesia.nl/

You're right! I checked with my ex-RLI sources. It was the Rhodesian African Rifles I was thinking of. They were 'mixed units' with a long tradition of being so.

As for air support for the CF, I'm in agreement with Red Five. It would make sense to focus on the 'cheaper' option first - heli-gunship support - as opposed to hoping we can get another Sqn of F/A 18s on station in the FGA role. At least that would help us interoperate with our allies at some level on the battlefield and support our own airmobile operations while providing some measure of integral air support to the PBI.
 
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