Who should own CAS & why it can't be trusted to an Air Force (from A-10 retirement thread)

[SupersonicMax]

GW: that's my point, they don't need to be loitering, doing essentially nothing. If you need sensors overhead for a specific period, use UAVs.  They can loiter for much longer and are relatively cheap to operate. Have aircraft fly overhead virtually constantly.  Heck, get them to check in with FACs in the vicinity and give the authority for FACs to divert aircraft as required, when things heat up. Use them when you need heavy weapons or the gun.  This concept has been applied since WW2 (minus the UAVs)

I understand what an OP PLAN is.  The ground war is a single aspect of an operation.

As much a throwaway it is, flexibility is the key to airpower.

 

[Baz]

I understand what an OP PLAN is.  The ground war is a single aspect of an operation.

As much a throwaway it is, flexibility is the key to airpower.

The problem is that Air Forces all too often forget that the ground war, or some other part of the operation, may be the whole point.  They always want to execute that "shock and awe" plan whether it is appripriate or not, and other areas are considered less important.  In the face of that those other Commanders feel the need to bring their own close support air to the table, so they can force it to support them as required.

Flexibility is the key to air power, which sometimes means the flexibility to use most of it to support somebody else.  This often gets forgotten amongst those who end up making policy decisions for Air Forces.

 

[Transporter]

Making aircraft loiter waiting for something to happen is generally not the most efficient use of those assets (while there is a time and place for it).

It's nice to be efficient but it's imperative to be effective. When the shit is hitting the fan, effective ALWAYS trumps efficient.

 

[George Wallace]

GW: that's my point, they don't need to be loitering, doing essentially nothing. If you need sensors overhead for a specific period, use UAVs.  They can loiter for much longer and are relatively cheap to operate. Have aircraft fly overhead virtually constantly.  Heck, get them to check in with FACs in the vicinity and give the authority for FACs to divert aircraft as required, when things heat up. Use them when you need heavy weapons or the gun.  This concept has been applied since WW2 (minus the UAVs)

I understand what an OP PLAN is.  The ground war is a single aspect of an operation.

As much a throwaway it is, flexibility is the key to airpower.

Sorry.  You just don't understand.  Out of politeness, I will not go into what this discussion has turned into, but I will now have to change my favourite cartoon and saying from "Infantryman" to "Fighter Pilot". 

 

[SupersonicMax]

George,

I am certain I understand CAS, from planning, to execution, to learning the lessons. But I will leave it at that too...

 

[KevinB]

Max I do not think you do.

You understand theory but not practice.  Which is not surprising based on the idea that you see clear lines and targets.

A ground element may have no clue its about to need CAS until ambushed or other chance encounter.

I appreciate that it's not the SIGMA6 answer - but the fact of the matter is unless you have a clearly delineated enemy that has the common decency to have distinct formations your view is not applicable.

 

[SupersonicMax]

Kevin,

I never suggested clear lines and targets for CAS that is for the interdiction piece. I have planned and executed CAS probably a hundred times with Special Forces and in support of FAC training with up to 16 aircraft in the stack.  The way we conduct CAS in training is a mean to practice getting effects on target as quickly and safely as possible.

Again, it's no faster to take assets out of their CP/IP, give them a talk on and bring bombs on target than getting an airplane transiting through the area (with prior coordination of course otherwise this doesn't work) and do the same thing, especially with the tools we have today (like L16). This has been succesfully conducted since WW2. 

I am not saying that pre-planned CAS doesn't have it's time and place but it should not be the default answer to all support ground troops need.

I understand it doesn't satisfy ground troops but it is the most efficient way to employ in a conventional war, given that we have limited assets.

Efficiency and effectiveness are not mutually exclusive.

 

[GAP]

conventional war

 

[Transporter]

@ Supersonicmax

How about this. You go fly your mission over bad guy land without any planned/dedicated AAR support for you. Just call when you're low on fuel, and someone will see if they can re-task an airborne tanker asset somewhere in your area if they're available. It's more efficient that way, but what does it do for your pucker factor?

Ultimately, I don't think the guys on the ground really care about how it gets done, just that when they call, they get the effects they need. Having to re-task an asset to achieve that as opposed to having it readily available isn't a real confidence builder.

 

[Baz]

This all started because of this statement:

In the end, I don't think who owns the aircraft makes a difference.

I certainly don't understand the details of CAS, not my part ship.  What I do understand is why the Army and Navy feel the need to own their own air assets, having been a planner at both operational and strategic levels in the Air Force, Navy, and Joint.

The view of the Air Force, which SM has been quite clearly explaining, is that all air assets should be C2d by the JFACC.  If there is a need for something not in the plan, for example CAS, the JFACC will receive the request and then decide whether to fulfil it or not based on their priorities.  As well, the Air Force wants to own all those assets so the other Commander's have very little leverage to disagree.

Those other Commander's, based on experience, do not trust the Air Force to always prioritize correctly.  Therefore, they want to own their own assets (like Apache's, or at least have dedicated assets (like A-10s), so they have the leverage to tell the JFACC to go F!@# themselves when required.

 

[SupersonicMax]

@ Supersonicmax

How about this. You go fly your mission over bad guy land without any planned/dedicated AAR support for you. Just call when you're low on fuel, and someone will see if they can re-task an airborne tanker asset somewhere in your area if they're available. It's more efficient that way, but what does it do for your pucker factor?

Ultimately, I don't think the guys on the ground really care about how it gets done, just that when they call, they get the effects they need. Having to re-task an asset to achieve that as opposed to having it readily available isn't a real confidence builder.

Been there done that. In some missions, we don't need AAR support or SEAD supports.  In others, there is no way around it because of a commander's intent (ie acceptable level of risk) or simply because otherwise it is impossible (not enough fuel).

For example, on a night strike package (24 planes), the plan didn't require AAR for us and we even had extra fuel.  A no-go item for the package was SEAD because of the threat in the target area and the commander's intent wrt the threat.  We get to our marshall point and SEAD is late by 30 minutes.  That means we will need fuel to complete the mission.  We called AWACS and told them we needed gas.  Within 10 minutes we were gerting gas from a KC-10 (we weren't fraged to get gas) and back to the marshall before SEAD got on station, on-time for the new push time. 

We breathe and live contingencies.  A re-task is no big deal.  The important thing in a war is that all involved work toward a common goal, and not towards their own individual service goals and perceived priorities.

 

[Baz]

The important thing in a war is that all involved work toward a common goal, and not towards their own individual service goals and perceived priorities.

... and the Air Force is one of the worst at promoting their individual service goals and perceived priorities.  They are continuously promoting centralized operational targeting and ISR without giving a rat's a$% about the needs of the other Commanders, even when they are the supporting commander.

Even though I'm in the Air Force, I would much rather be Naval Air.  At least then there would only be one Commander ignoring us.  You have any idea how hard it is to work in an environment that your own command knows so little about what you do (Maritime Air) that they rename you ISR?

 

[SupersonicMax]

Baz,

I agree that domestically, for Force Generation, there should be air/aviation specific to all services.  MH should be owned by the Navy, Tac Hel by the Army (there are some drawbacks to it but it's not the point of this discussion).  However, when it comes to Force Employment, in large scale operations at least, other than very specific platforms (like MH), assets should be given to the ACC (who doesn't need to be Air Force although in most cases, it makes the most sense).  There are a bunch of issues with splitting AORs to different service (they tried in Vietnam with Route Packages and failed): coordination nightmare, engagement authority and reduced flexibility to name a few.

The problem to delegating CAS platform to the LCC is that most CAS platforms are multi-role and do much more than CAS. If you delegate those platforms to LCC, good luck getting them, even when they are not used by the LCC.
I believe the problems wrt to prioritization are canadian specific and cannot be broadly applied to NATO/US.

 

[Baz]

I believe the problems wrt to prioritization are canadian specific and cannot be broadly applied to NATO/US.

I don't, I believe the problem emanates from the US Air Force.  Some have gone as far as getting rid of the USAF, like here: http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/140574/robert-farley/ground-the-air-force, but I don't agree with going that far.

Canada is attempting to model its Air Force after the USAF, on a much smaller scale.

My last job, up to 8 months ago was SHAPE J2 ISTAR Targeting.  The USAF, represented in NATO by ACC Ramstein, has convinced themselves that Operational Targeting campaigns are the solution to all problems.  That scares a lot of people, that we are going to focus so much energy on that, and end up with a non-scalable response.

Trust me, I am a big fan of Operational Targeting campaigns are amazingly effective in some situations... it gives the Commander the unheard of capability to reach out and touch an adversaries center of gravity at a time and place of his choosing.  But, it also isn't a be all and end all.  When other methods are more important the ACC should become a supporting Commander and either be told where to put his airplanes, or give the right ones up as required.

Taken Ocean Shield (Med) or Horn of Africa ops.  Ramstein couldn't care less, and doesn't want anything to do with scheduling, but they do want to keep control of all the aircraft.  Couple that with a general lack of MPAs (because Air Forces would rather give them up than their "important" ISR and Strike aircraft), it leaves a gapping hole in air support for these ongoing ops.

 

[KevinB]

What is an MPA?

And I for one never saw the point of giving the Air Force ISR control - I always figured that was best for ground folks (unless AWACS etc is considered ISR)

 

[Colin Parkinson]

The number of "multi-role fighters" being acquired is decreasing. The air force brass will grow more and more reluctant about close in CAS which is what the A-10, SU-25 type aircraft are really meant for from my view. I guess we should distinguish between Air support and & Close in air support. It would seem the type of aircraft that can do the air support and be safe from most of the low level risks is fairly broad. The type of aircraft that can really get down into the weeds and perform there is limited. So with the retirement of the A-10 CAS mission is left to rotary aircraft and Air support is given to the Air force and their Marine/Navy counterparts along with all their other tasks.

So for the people that have the numbers do they have a breakdown of air support vs close in air support where the aircraft is down below a certain threshold engaging targets?

 

[Privateer]

What is an MPA?

Maritime patrol aircraft.  (Unless I'm mistaken in this context; I will delete the post if so informed.)

 

[Loachman]

UAVs ... relatively cheap to operate.

Who told you that?

The Mighty Sperwer, all 13-foot wingspan of it, was the most expensive aircraft, per hour, in the whole CF to operate during its time.

I signed for about $1.5 million worth of them that I did not sign back in over one three-day period.

An awful lot of money has been spent so that UAV operators can go to the washroom in comfort and dignity and have pizza delivered to them - the only significant difference between UAVs and manned bombers.

 

[SupersonicMax]

Colin:  the "close" in Close Air Support doesn't refer to the proximity to the ground troops but rather to the level of integration with ground troops.  In general, anything between the FLOT and the FSCL (or whatever coordination line you may have) will be considered CAS (because you'll need to talk to someone on the ground coordinating fires in that area) whether it's a strafe down to 250 feet at a range of 2500 ft on a moving target or a JDAM strike on a fixed target from 35 000 feet and 15 miles.

David: ISR is mostly used within the targeting cycle which is by nature joint.  If it flies above 50 feet (or any coordination altitude), it should be under the ACC for efficiency but also for better coordination (read safety and flexibility).  FWIW, most multi-role platform are ISR platforms because of the sensors it has (not only EO/IR).  Should we give F-16s,F-15s, F-18s and F-22s to the LCC?

Loachman: a pred costs 1300$ an hour to operate.  Reaper? 3250 an hour.  An F-15C? 26000$ an hour (http://www.americansecurityproject.org/the-us-and-its-uavs-a-cost-benefit-analysis/). And they are cheaper to acquire.

I don't think UAVs will take our cockpits anytime soon.  But they will someday.

 

[dimsum]

Loachman: a pred costs 1300$ an hour to operate.  Reaper? 3250 an hour.  An F-15C? 26000$ an hour (http://www.americansecurityproject.org/the-us-and-its-uavs-a-cost-benefit-analysis/). And they are cheaper to acquire.

I don't think UAVs will take our cockpits anytime soon.  But they will someday.

A significant portion (I would guess the vast majority) of the cost of UAVs isn't the airframe itself, although each Reaper, etc. is probably about the 5 million-dollar mark (significantly higher for Global Hawk/Triton).  The real cost comes with the satellite bandwidth involved in running satellite-controlled UAVs.