USS FITGERALD Collision: June 17, 2017

[Good2Golf]

I am obviously not a OOW....but I have been on the bridge, a lot.

From my observation, everytime something significant happens, it is loudly communicated and acknowledged by the various parties on the Bridge.

PD question from a green aviator, does the AIR O usually have a presence on the Bridge?

 

[MARS]

From the geometry, was thinking the same, "kick right rudder, reverse thrust on #2..."

Is there not a protocol on the bridge for the IC to loudly announce commands and them to be read back, or have I watched too much 'Red October' ([CO] "Helm: transfer throttles to the Lee Helm."  [Helm] "Transfering throttles to the Lee Helm, Aye..."  [Lee Helm] "Helm, I have the throttles.") ???

Closed-Loop Communication.  Its purpose is three fold: An acknowledgment that the person responding to the order has heard it; the whole exchange is captured in an audio recording for any future investigation; and, most importantly, the person giving the order hears is repeated back to them.

On a couple of occasions, my brain was saying "come left 30 degrees" but my mouth said "come right 30 degrees" and I didn't realize the brain-mouth disconnect until I heard my order reported back to me, which enabled me to correct it.

Basic Bridge Resource Management, which the RCN has been practising since forever.

 

[jollyjacktar]

There is a lot to reflect on here.

On the plus side, it appears that USN damage control training and procedures are sound. I am not sure an RCN crew would do as well or better against that kind of flooding/multiple space damage.

With the trade amalgamation that has occurred, advanced DC is no longer going to be taught.  Many of my fellow "former HT" fear this will come to bite us hard one day and there will be serious consequences.  Right now, I wouldn't sell our guys short.  A couple of years from now...  :dunno:

 

[Stoker]

On the plus side, it appears that USN damage control training and procedures are sound. I am not sure an RCN crew would do as well or better against that kind of flooding/multiple space damage.

The air force is all of a sudden DC experts are they? I find your opinion ill-informed as my primary job is to assess ships crews in DC and FF.

 

[Good2Golf]

The air force is all of a sudden DC experts are they?  :rofl:

Maritime aviator aboard PRO fire and other incidents, perhaps not sell him short?

 

[Lumber]

Is there not a protocol on the bridge for the IC to loudly announce commands and them to be read back, or have I watched too much 'Red October' ([CO] "Helm: transfer throttles to the Lee Helm."  [Helm] "Transfering throttles to the Lee Helm, Aye..."  [Lee Helm] "Helm, I have the throttles.") ???

I'll give you a real life example of where something similar happened to me personally aboard a frigate. Thankfully, it didn't result in a collision.

There is a helm console on the bridge. At the console, you can control the rudder using two methods: with the steering wheel, and with buttons.

Normally, you use the steering wheel, but if that fails, you switch to the buttons. In order to switch between the two methods, there are two buttons located several inches apart. One says "Follow-Up" (that's the wheel), and the other says "Non-Follow Up" (steering by buttons). As soon as you push one of those buttons, the button will illuminate, and the selected method of steering in enabled.

If both methods fail, you make an order for "emergency steering" to form-up, and a team of sailors takes control of steering from a console back at rear part of the ship. This console is connected directly to the steering gear. This team then steers the ship from there, with the Officer of the Watch passing his conning orders to them via intercom or sound-powered phone.

Now, once you've fixed whatever problem was causing the bridge helm console not to work, you can pass steering back to the bridge, and here is where inexperience caused my team to be without any control of steering for several seconds. When we switch to "emergency-steering", the method of steering that was last selected at the bridge helm console was "non-follow up" (steering with buttons). When emergency steering passed control of steering back the the bridge, the helmsmen immediately tried to steer with the ship's wheel, which did absolutely nothing, because that method of steering was not selected. Despite several people standing around, most of whom had sufficient amount experience, no one could figure out why the ship's wheel wouldn't work. Luckily, everyone was still assembled back in emergency steering, so we simply told them to take back control of steering. The entire period that the ship was without steering was probably only about 15 seconds. Further, the ship was completely safe, because it's standard procedure that before you change between methods of steering, you ensure that the rudder in centred, that the ship is travelling in a straight line, and that there are no other vessels around you that you can run into if the steering system does something stupid while changing methods. I finally noticed that the button that read "Non-Follow Up" was illuminated, and pointed that out to the quartermaster and helmsmen, and we were ready to revert back to bridge steering.

So, it can happen.

 

[Furniture]

The air force is all of a sudden DC experts are they?  :rofl:

Don't have to wear a sailor suit to know a thing or two about DC, and whether or not a crew are good at it.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Sent this around the office, a lot of head shaking and several Master Mariners were not surprised by the USN lapses.

 

[Stoker]

Don't have to wear a sailor suit to know a thing or two about DC, and whether or not a crew are good at it.

I think I also have a handle on how good crews are in DC at my job at Sea Training Atlantic than to make that statement that they're not. Of course everyone who sails has an opinion including aviators and whoever. I think in my informed opinion stating that our DC of our crews is somehow sub par is ill informed and wrong. If fact I have no doubt in a similar situation we would fair the same and god willing better.

 

[Oldgateboatdriver]

I'll give you a real life example of where something similar happened to me personally aboard a frigate. Thankfully, it didn't result in a collision.

There is a helm console on the bridge. At the console, you can control the rudder using two methods: with the steering wheel, and with buttons.

Normally, you use the steering wheel, but if that fails, you switch to the buttons. In order to switch between the two methods, there are two buttons located several inches apart. One says "Follow-Up" (that's the wheel), and the other says "Non-Follow Up" (steering by buttons). As soon as you push one of those buttons, the button will illuminate, and the selected method of steering in enabled.

If both methods fail, you make an order for "emergency steering" to form-up, and a team of sailors takes control of steering from a console back at rear part of the ship. This console is connected directly to the steering gear. This team then steers the ship from there, with the Officer of the Watch passing his conning orders to them via intercom or sound-powered phone.

Now, once you've fixed whatever problem was causing the bridge helm console not to work, you can pass steering back to the bridge, and here is where inexperience caused my team to be without any control of steering for several seconds. When we switch to "emergency-steering", the method of steering that was last selected at the bridge helm console was "non-follow up" (steering with buttons). When emergency steering passed control of steering back the the bridge, the helmsmen immediately tried to steer with the ship's wheel, which did absolutely nothing, because that method of steering was not selected. Despite several people standing around, most of whom had sufficient amount experience, no one could figure out why the ship's wheel wouldn't work. Luckily, everyone was still assembled back in emergency steering, so we simply told them to take back control of steering. The entire period that the ship was without steering was probably only about 15 seconds. Further, the ship was completely safe, because it's standard procedure that before you change between methods of steering, you ensure that the rudder in centred, that the ship is travelling in a straight line, and that there are no other vessels around you that you can run into if the steering system does something stupid while changing methods. I finally noticed that the button that read "Non-Follow Up" was illuminated, and pointed that out to the quartermaster and helmsmen, and we were ready to revert back to bridge steering.

So, it can happen.

I am going to play devil's advocate here, Lumber.

That was a steering gear breakdown drill, wasn't it? And you, good Sir, did not check your Bridge Pack to make sure you didn't miss a step, didn't you? 

First, let me check that terminology hasn't changed. On the 280's, the wheel was called "primary steering"; the "buttons" system was called "secondary steering"; and, the direct steering in tiler flats was called "emergency steering".

So, in normal order of things, the helmsman would have reported to you "Ship does not answer the helm" (I am cutting out the "Sir or M'am" part). You would then have ordered "Switch to secondary steering". The order would have been repeated, followed by the report "ready to steer by secondary steering". You would then have given helm orders to prove the secondary was working (I am underlining this part because one thing we are all taught in the RCN is that anytime at all you switch between two systems or two location for control, you always prove to yourself the switch worked - this does not appear to have been done in the case of the McCain).

At that point (since it was a drill  ;D) the helmsman would have again reported the ship not answering the helm and you would have gone through the "steering gear breakdown" pipe/contact MCR/switch to emergency steering procedure, and then, proven the emergency steering.

When it cam time to secure the exercise, however, you missed a step, didn't you: You did not order "revert to primary steering" on the bridge before ordering the emergency steering position to transfer control back to the bridge console.  :tsktsk:

Am I right or am I wrong?  ;D

 

[FSTO]

On McCain I would think that when you order 10 knots from 20 you would feel a significant change in the deck plates as the GT's wind down. Now if the stbd shaft is still cranking away at 20 knots there should still be some sort of vibration and that should have tweeked the CO or XO that something was wrong.
It still floors me that when we do SGB drills, many OOW's will continue rolling along at 15+ knots and don't ever think of slowing down (if safe to do so) to give themselves some time to control the ship.

In Fitzgerald I am floored at the total lack of awareness of other ships, traffic lanes and rules of the road.

 

[MARS]

In Fitzgerald I am floored at the total lack of awareness of other ships, traffic lanes and rules of the road.

Bullies of the Seas, IMHO.  I really cannot recall an instance in my time at sea where I heard something other than "This is Naval Unit xy - request you maintain a 2 mile CPA on my vessel", exercising that exception in COLREGS as it pertains to government vessels.

That kind of thing can really erode your ability to operate in close-quarters.  Generally not how we do things in the RCN, operational requirements excepted.

 

[Oldgateboatdriver]

I agree FSTO, the difference in speed from each shaft should've been noticeable.

What I was driving at, however, is that it appears that, after ordering the lee helm to take throttle control, its execution does not appear to be reported to command, nor does the captain, immediately after ordering the change give any throttle order of sufficient magnitude to prove to himself that the transfer worked (he in fact appears to give no speed order at all). Had he given such order to "prove" the transfer, the other officers might have clued in that  something had changed and inquired as to what exactly it was.

That's all I am saying.

As for the Fitz: No decent comments I can make here.  :facepalm:

 

[FJAG]

Command and control issues aside; is anyone as surprised as me with the amount of debris (lockers, beds, etc) that tore loose almost immediately to impede safe exiting of the berthing spaces in both instances? I would have thought those items would have been more solidly incorporated into the frame.

:cheers:

 

[FSTO]

I agree FSTO, the difference in speed from each shaft should've been noticeable.

What I was driving at, however, is that it appears that, after ordering the lee helm to take throttle control, its execution does not appear to be reported to command, nor does the captain, immediately after ordering the change give any throttle order of sufficient magnitude to prove to himself that the transfer worked (he in fact appears to give no speed order at all). Had he given such order to "prove" the transfer, the other officers might have clued in that  something had changed and inquired as to what exactly it was.

That's all I am saying.

As for the Fitz: No decent comments I can make here.  :facepalm:

Agree.

 

[FSTO]

Command and control issues aside; is anyone as surprised as me with the amount of debris (lockers, beds, etc) that tore loose almost immediately to impede safe exiting of the berthing spaces in both instances? I would have thought those items would have been more solidly incorporated into the frame.

:cheers:

That will likely be a focus of another report (one of several that will focus on specific factors of the accidents)

 

[Lumber]

I am going to play devil's advocate here, Lumber.

That was a steering gear breakdown drill, wasn't it? And you, good Sir, did not check your Bridge Pack to make sure you didn't miss a step, didn't you? 

First, let me check that terminology hasn't changed. On the 280's, the wheel was called "primary steering"; the "buttons" system was called "secondary steering"; and, the direct steering in tiler flats was called "emergency steering".

So, in normal order of things, the helmsman would have reported to you "Ship does not answer the helm" (I am cutting out the "Sir or M'am" part). You would then have ordered "Switch to secondary steering". The order would have been repeated, followed by the report "ready to steer by secondary steering". You would then have given helm orders to prove the secondary was working (I am underlining this part because one thing we are all taught in the RCN is that anytime at all you switch between two systems or two location for control, you always prove to yourself the switch worked - this does not appear to have been done in the case of the McCain).

At that point (since it was a drill  ;D) the helmsman would have again reported the ship not answering the helm and you would have gone through the "steering gear breakdown" pipe/contact MCR/switch to emergency steering procedure, and then, proven the emergency steering.

When it cam time to secure the exercise, however, you missed a step, didn't you: You did not order "revert to primary steering" on the bridge before ordering the emergency steering position to transfer control back to the bridge console.  :tsktsk:

Am I right or am I wrong?  ;D

Ugh.  :waiting:

Fine! First, I used terms like "buttons" for the lay people here. No use throwing around "Emergency Steering Position", "Close-Up". Anyways, here's how it went!

OOW: "Midships"
Helmsman: "Midships"
ESP: "Midships...Midships indicated on the rudder post"
Helmsman: "Midships indicated on the rudder post"
OOW: "Revert to Primary Steering"
Helmsman: "Revert to Primary Steering"
ESP:"Revert to Primary Steering... Ready to steer by primary steering"
Helmsman: "Ready to steer by primary steering, Sir"
OOW:  "Very Good, Starboard 15"
Helmsman: "Starboard 15.... ship does not respond to helm, Sir"
ESP: <shit shit shit> "Port 15!"
Helmsman: "Port 15... ship does not respond to helm, Sir"
OOW: <shit shit shit> "Steer by Emergency Steering!"
Helmsman: "Steer by Emergency Steering!"
ESP:"Steer by Emergency Steering, <clickk> Ready to steer by emergency steering"
Helmsman: "Ready to steer by emergency steering"
OOW: "Very Good, Stbd 15"
Helmsman: "Stbd 15"
ESP: "Stbd 15... 15 of stbd wheel indicated on the rudder post."
Helmsman: "15 of stbd wheel indicated on the rudder post."
OOW: "Very good, steer 320"
Helmsman: "steer 320""
ESP: "steer 320... steering course 320"
Helmsman: "steering course 320"
OOW:  "Very Good... Ok guys, wtf?!"
Helmsman: "I don't know, Sir!"
QM: "Doy?"
OOW: "Wait.. do you have follow-up or non-follow up selected?"
Helmsman: "Uhh... non-follow up...Sir..."
OOW: <ffs...> "Select Follow-Up"
Helmsman: "Select Follow-up... <click> follow up selected, Sir"
OOW: "Very Good...Midships"

You get the rest.

 

[Oldgateboatdriver]

You have my full apology, Lumber.

My attempt at levity was wrong and improperly impugned you. I am sorry.  :surrender:

This said, however, your proper actions (not followed by the helmsman and QM who both forgot to switch back to primary before reporting they were ready), taken in accordance with the procedures as laid out, with the situation resolved after a few seconds as a result of your full knowledge and understanding of the functioning of the helm, executed when it was safe to do so, is not only a contradiction of your own original post - which seemed to show empathy for the situation on the McCain - but actually an extra indictment of their lack of procedure or knowledge of the operation of their own systems, as far as I am concerned.

You just showed how it's supposed to be done and why, they showed how not to do it.

 

[SeaKingTacco]

PD question from a green aviator, does the AIR O usually have a presence on the Bridge?

The Air O doesn't really have a role in the bridge, no.

That said, it is usually where you find the Captain. And frequently, OOWs have to be liaised with/and/or mentored- depending on how much experience they have at Air Ops.

 

[SeaKingTacco]

The air force is all of a sudden DC experts are they? I find your opinion ill-informed as my primary job is to assess ships crews in DC and FF.

Pull your neck in, Chief. I was not criticizing RCN DC skills. I was trying to say the USN crews appear to have done very, very well at saving their ships. It was a complement to say that I don't think we could have done much better. The Arliegh Burke is one tough ship class. I am not sure how a frigate would come out in a similar collision. I never want to find out, either.

And although I am not SeaTrg Staff, I have enough real world experience at DC such that I have a pretty good idea of my arcs. And I am pretty comfortable that I am still in them. If you want my CV, PM me. I will be more than happy to provide you my resume of ships.

Have a great Navy day.