Thinking about the Infantry Attack

[vonGarvin]

ArmyRick:
I like the ORBAT you put forth.  Now, I'm not sure about the ALAWS' capability, but if it has a HEAT warhead (which I believe that it does), then it, combined with the modernised 60mm (which you also propose, and makes perfect sense), would give all effects capabilities less canister without having the 84.  I do like the 84 for its simplicity, effectiveness, etc; however, I would hate to have to find some place to put "the other one" when using one of the systems in the ALAWS section.  Ideally, have both, but there are manning issues...

 

[daftandbarmy]

I like the new 'Commando 21' orbat the Royal marines use. Hurray for 4 x manoeuvre companies!

http://www.armedforces.co.uk/navy/listings/l0038.html

• There are 4 x Manoeuvre Companies:
• 2 x Close Combat Companies each with 3 x Fighting Troops (5 x officers and 98 other ranks).
• 2 x Stand Off Combat Companies one of which is tracked (Viking armoured vehicle) and the other wheeled. Each Stand Off Combat Company has 1 x Heavy Machine Gun Troop with 6 x 0.5 HMG, 1 x Anti-Tank Troop with 6 x Milan and 1 x Close Combat Fighting Troop (5 x officers and 78 other ranks).
• Total personnel strength is 692 all ranks.
• A Troop (Tp) roughly equates to an army platoon and consists of about 30 men.

 

[baboon6]

I like the new 'Commando 21' orbat the Royal marines use. Hurray for 4 x manoeuvre companies!

http://www.armedforces.co.uk/navy/listings/l0038.html

• There are 4 x Manoeuvre Companies:
• 2 x Close Combat Companies each with 3 x Fighting Troops (5 x officers and 98 other ranks).
• 2 x Stand Off Combat Companies one of which is tracked (Viking armoured vehicle) and the other wheeled. Each Stand Off Combat Company has 1 x Heavy Machine Gun Troop with 6 x 0.5 HMG, 1 x Anti-Tank Troop with 6 x Milan and 1 x Close Combat Fighting Troop (5 x officers and 78 other ranks).
• Total personnel strength is 692 all ranks.
• A Troop (Tp) roughly equates to an army platoon and consists of about 30 men.

Javelin has now replaced Milan in the anti-tank troops. Since this orbat was introduced the HK 40mm GMG has come into service- presumably in the HMG troops. Also the Hirtenberger M6 60mm "Commando" mortar which has replaced the 1x 51mm mortar in each close combat troop. (These weapons are also used by the British Army)

It is also worth mentioning the Command Coy:
Commando Tac and Main HQs
Coy Hq
Recce Troop (including sniper section)
Anti-Tank Troop (6x Javelin firing posts)- OC of this troop acts as the CO's anti-tank advisor
Mortar Troop (9x 81mm mortars + 4 MFC parties)
Medium Machine Gun Troop (? x GPMG-SF, I have seen the number as 6 and 13. Close Combat Troops also include GPMGs in the light role).

The sixth coy in each commando is the Logistic Support Coy.

What seems to happen in practice is that there is a lot of mixing and matching between the various heavy weapons troops and then, like in a British Army rifle coy, each of the  coys ends up with what is termed a "Manoeuvre Support Group" or "Fire Support Group" (not to mixed up with Fire Support Team, which combines FOOs, FACs and MFCs), made up variously according to what is needed, can include Javelins, sniper pairs, 81mm and 60mm mortars (another version of the Hirtenberger M6 has been issued in some units when the 81mm is considered too heavy), GPMGs, .50-cals and GMGs. In the army the HQ for each MSG or FSG comes from one of the fire support coy platoons; in the RM there are of course ready-made HQs in the stand-off combat coys.

How would you outline your role?

I am commander of Manoeuvre Support Group within the Commando Unit and manage a team of about 45 heavy-weapons personnel. We use Javelin anti-tank missile systems, 50 calibre and general purpose machine guns, together with grenade machine guns.

http://www.connexions-direct.com/jobs4u/index.cfm?pid=85&catalogueContentID=2400&parent=2212

Corporal Birch was a proud 'Tankie', a Heavy Weapons Anti-Tank Specialist. As a Section Commander within 6 Troop, X- Ray Company, his responsibilities placed him at the vanguard of troop and company action. With his specialist skills he provided intimate fire support to the front line of the fighting troops with a variety of Crew Served Weapons; Heavy Machine Gun (HMG), Grenade Machine Gun (GMG) and the JAVELIN missile system. As an experienced Corporal he was instrumental in the success of his Troop and Company.

http://www.flickr.com/photos/84788821@N00/3108504449/

The section on Z Coy 2PWRR in Afghanistan in the PWRR 2008 journal has a lot more on this unfortunately it is no longer available to download on the regimental website.

EDIT:
Here is an excerpt from it though:

An MSG is a platoon sized group with a section from each of the Support Platoons: Mortars, Machine Guns, Javelins and Recce (including snipers). Each MSG is commanded by one of the support platoon commanders with the 2IC coming from another of the platoons- to give a spread of knowledge. The Mortar Platoon HQ was kept integral to run a Fire Planning Cell for Battle Group deployments. Each MSG was allocated to a rifle company to form a "Company Group" giving the numbers and fire power required on operations.

A lot of cross-training was done before the deployment to Afghanistan so that all soldiers in the MSG could at least operate the Javelin and the GPMG-SF, if not the .50-cal and GMG too (dosn't mention cross-training in mortars, though I presume this happened as 60mm mortars were included as well as 81s). MSG soldiers also brushed up on their rifle platoon tactics so that they could operate in this role if necessary.

 

[Ducimus23a]

The infantry attack taught and executed at section level is meant for training on fire and movement and comm, it is not realistic to think that a section would be out somewhere in an offensive posture, wondering thru a FIBUA or Open area in ack ack - all alone.....

, the frontal is used to define your DEBTH, and since you are in an offensive posture, you need your frontal section to actually engage with the EN, not perform an individual action on two lone soldiers under a tree, this is a big picture thing, once a pocket or sniper is recognised, that is the markings of a KZ that you just tripped on, at that point, section level actions may be considered, such as probing, flankings, withdrawl, and cont the advance TO CONTACT....(EFFECTIVE).

Therefore, I have an issue with the question, why a frontal at section level....because unless you are advancing on a known obj and can define the size and DEBTH of the EN, you had better be sure that the right flanking is not in their KZ and the sniper fire is not effectively performing it's msn of disrupting your advance.

This is my opinion.......simple words to explain how I see it......(OK, open fire on my line of thought...., I am waiting....)

Hhahahaha

 

[tango22a]

I may be out of my lane but Lind's "Maneuver Warfare Handbook" is available at  www.abebooks.com

Cheers,

tango22a

 

[daftandbarmy]

The infantry attack taught and executed at section level is meant for training on fire and movement and comm, it is not realistic to think that a section would be out somewhere in an offensive posture, wondering thru a FIBUA or Open area in ack ack - all alone.....

, the frontal is used to define your DEBTH, and since you are in an offensive posture, you need your frontal section to actually engage with the EN, not perform an individual action on two lone soldiers under a tree, this is a big picture thing, once a pocket or sniper is recognised, that is the markings of a KZ that you just tripped on, at that point, section level actions may be considered, such as probing, flankings, withdrawl, and cont the advance TO CONTACT....(EFFECTIVE).

Therefore, I have an issue with the question, why a frontal at section level....because unless you are advancing on a known obj and can define the size and DEBTH of the EN, you had better be sure that the right flanking is not in their KZ and the sniper fire is not effectively performing it's msn of disrupting your advance.

This is my opinion.......simple words to explain how I see it......(OK, open fire on my line of thought...., I am waiting....)

Hhahahaha

Say again sober, over  ???

 

[Michael OLeary]

The infantry attack taught and executed at section level is meant for training on fire and movement and comm, it is not realistic to think that a section would be out somewhere in an offensive posture, wondering thru a FIBUA or Open area in ack ack - all alone.....

, the frontal is used to define your DEBTH, and since you are in an offensive posture, you need your frontal section to actually engage with the EN, not perform an individual action on two lone soldiers under a tree, this is a big picture thing, once a pocket or sniper is recognised, that is the markings of a KZ that you just tripped on, at that point, section level actions may be considered, such as probing, flankings, withdrawl, and cont the advance TO CONTACT....(EFFECTIVE).

Therefore, I have an issue with the question, why a frontal at section level....because unless you are advancing on a known obj and can define the size and DEBTH of the EN, you had better be sure that the right flanking is not in their KZ and the sniper fire is not effectively performing it's msn of disrupting your advance.

This is my opinion.......simple words to explain how I see it......(OK, open fire on my line of thought...., I am waiting....)

Hhahahaha

Did you happen to start your review of this topic with post No. 1?

My opinion papers are linked from there, so I'll refrain from a detailed rebuttal.

 

[SeanNewman]

Well, as my first post on this thread I'll stay focussed on Post #1.

First, I think that the primary reason a Section has only been focussed on a one-directional attack is that there isn't really a manouevre element.  Being the devil's advocate, one could say that you could theoretically have the Sect 2IC control the 2 x C9s as a firebase and the IC take the 4-5 or so remaining riflemen on the assault, and that may in fact happen in some small cases like OMLT cases when you don't have a Combat Team to work with.

Either way, when you get to Platoon level doctrine, you'll almost always do flankings (at least as trained), be it Ph3 (DP1.1) for officers or 3B for Sgts soon to be WOs.

The reason is that the Pl is the first (smallest) organization that can realistically be expected to have support weapons, and then an assault that includes its own integral foot on the ground fire and movement with sections, and then another reserve section for contingencies.

I fully agree with you that it will rarely happen step-by-step as taught, but you need to do it properly by the book before you can start cutting corners.

No you're not going to get a section who is fixed in place, with a ridge to site your MGs 300m away with a convenient treeline on one side that you can do a perfect flank through that miraculously doesn't have obstacles or an OP for your 90 degree flanking.

However, once you understand the DS solution and you've practiced it, even at the section level you can shape your assets in such a way that if you did come under contact you could still do an oblique frontal with the same advantages of a flank.  Take a look at this extremely simple 5-minute MS Paint asset shifting:

Whatever your formation on the move, if you have a general idea where an enemy will be you can have your support assets pushed to a flank so as soon as you take any fire they are almost immediately in place and winning the firefight, and your assault only has to do a quick re-orientation but for the most part is still right into a relatively quick and easy to control frontal.

The anti-thesis with this is of course "What if you get hit from a different direction?", and "Well we get taught from day 1 not to converge", but no solution solves every contingency.  This is not a Rommel solution, it's just a quick example of a way that you could get the benefits of a fixed firebase and perpendicular assault without the added time and pain-in-the butt of working out a full set of hasty attack orders.

 

[Kirkhill]

For those of us with Grey Hairs that remember the C2s, the section assault that you describe looks awfully familiar.  The C2s were grouped as a pair so that one gun/rifle was always firing.  Fire discipline required that bursts and magazine changes were staggered. That was necessary because of the limited magazine capacity - 30 rounds per.  But wouldn't that same type of fire discipline with a pair of LMGs make the LMGs more effective - especially if under the control of the 2ic equipped with a grenade launcher.

With the advent of the fire team and each team having its own LMG has something been lost?  Flexibility perhaps?  The concept of the section being able to act independently within the platoon?

Also,  a couple of threads on here have made reference to the Rise, Fall and Rebirth of the Emma Gees.... by putting the LMGs within the fire team, rather than concentrating them as a support base, does that contribute to a loss of appreciation for the full capabilities of MGs generally?  Does it mean that skills that could be employed at section level (fixed arcs, target registration....) are not passed along?

 

[SeanNewman]

Yes, also a good point.  Whether you say "always site MGs in pairs" or "two is one and one is none", you are certainly dividing your forces by putting one per team (as well as the M203s).

Nothing is ideal though, if you ended up putting the M203s and C9s together and the 4 x C7s together, you'd have some people saying it's not flexible enough and now you don't have two equal teams that can support each other by taking turns...you'd almost be fixed into always having a support and assault element only, instead of each group being able to walk the other on with fire and movement.

Either way, I think the answer is just being flexible in general and if the commander wants to group them equally or support / assault, they can both be justified depending on what effect he's going for on the bad guys.

 

[Michael OLeary]

Either way, I think the answer is just being flexible in general and if the commander wants to group them equally or support / assault, they can both be justified depending on what effect he's going for on the bad guys.

Well, within 24 pages we have once again come full circle.

In any tactical situation, the section commander must balance the platoon commander's intents and tasks against his (or her) own preferred tactical solution. At times, anticipated tasks may cause the platoon commander to direct the section to adopt a particular organization, otherwise it may remain open for the section commander to select an appropriate organization. This degree of flexibility is complemented by the requirement to assess each situation for assigned tasks, the threat, the personnel and weapons available in the section, the encountered enemy and the ground over which the section will execute its task. These conditions rarely result in repetitive circumstances, the section commander therefore needs alternatives to meet each situation with a tactical solution best suited to success.

The Canadian Infantry Section Attack, Part Two: Initiative is Always an Option

 

[daftandbarmy]

For those of us with Grey Hairs that remember the C2s, the section assault that you describe looks awfully familiar.  The C2s were grouped as a pair so that one gun/rifle was always firing.  Fire discipline required that bursts and magazine changes were staggered. That was necessary because of the limited magazine capacity - 30 rounds per.  But wouldn't that same type of fire discipline with a pair of LMGs make the LMGs more effective - especially if under the control of the 2ic equipped with a grenade launcher.

With the advent of the fire team and each team having its own LMG has something been lost?  Flexibility perhaps?  The concept of the section being able to act independently within the platoon?

Also,  a couple of threads on here have made reference to the Rise, Fall and Rebirth of the Emma Gees.... by putting the LMGs within the fire team, rather than concentrating them as a support base, does that contribute to a loss of appreciation for the full capabilities of MGs generally?  Does it mean that skills that could be employed at section level (fixed arcs, target registration....) are not passed along?

If we had 2 x GPMGs per section, like the Parachute Regiment still does, then it wouldn't be an issue as each group could blast their way through just about anything. This is true flexibility!

 

[SeanNewman]

Well, within 24 pages we have once again come full circle.

Hey, sorry about that.  Like most annoying people, I came into this conversation late and injected my opinion that may or may not have already been said a dozen times.

 

[Kirkhill]

I have come to really like the work of J Boyd.  We advance in circles.

 

[SeanNewman]

Pfft...not really sure we're winning the OODA loop in our current theatre.

We've found a lot of caches, and still waiting for the Annex of Found Items to read:

4 x 100-page op orders;
3 x projector screens;
5 x OPP charts; and
1 x OrBat with 5:1 support/command:fighter ratio.

 

[Kirkhill]

Pfft...not really sure we're winning the OODA loop in our current theatre.

We've found a lot of caches, and still waiting for the Annex of Found Items to read:

4 x 100-page op orders;
3 x projector screens;
5 x OPP charts; and
1 x OrBat with 5:1 support/command:fighter ratio.

Actually what you describe is the antithesis of Boyd's OODA Loop.

If we acted according to Boyd's thesis then you would have section commanders Observing - Orienting - Deciding - Acting and Platoon Commanders and higher facilitating their operations.

Or as Wellington would apparently have had it "....no officer......(should be) debarred......from.....his primary duty - which is, and always has been, so to TRAIN (my emphasis) the private men under his command that they may, without question, beat any force opposed to them in the field".

Privates as in private individuals, privately held companies and privateers - competent individuals hired of their own free will, not coerced, trained to perform a task and then released to perform the task with "higher" training, equipping and supplying direction.  Or as has been noted elsewhere Rugby not Football.

 

[SeanNewman]

Actually what you describe is the antithesis of Boyd's OODA Loop.

Thank you Captain obvious.

Did you not get it that I was suggesting that is what we do and it's why we're losing the OODA loop race?

 

[Kirkhill]

Sorry mate..... I'll pack it in.

Cheers.

 

[SeanNewman]

No need to be like that, buds.

I fully agree with you that the OODA loop give the winner s decided advantage; I'm just saying that its not us.

 

[KevinB]

No need to be like that, buds.

I fully agree with you that the OODA loop give the winner s decided advantage; I'm just saying that its not us.

While I like using the OODA loop to describe gunfighting (and I guess we need to credit the AirForce from its Dog Fighting origins), I'm not sure you can relate it to a COIN operation where one side has a huge (and partially required) logistical tail, while another has a scratch your ass and come to work if you feel like it ability for an 'insurgency'.

  Secondly just because the conventional side requires a mountain of paperwork to slide over, don't mistake that when a HVT tgt pops up, they get theirs in spades quite quickly.


Now back to the attack.


I've never likes firebasing LMG's (or the C2's and yes I do remember them with not a lot of fondness) I think that we (as a western military force) where taught to place to much emphasis on "suppression".  Frankly effective fire suppressed when it causes casualties.  I think your a much more flexible entity with a dispersed armament, worse case for a specific role that is identified you can always group things.