Australia’s Next-Generation Submarines
04-Nov-2009 17:06 EST
In its 2009 White Paper, Australia’s Department of Defence and Labor Party government looked at the progress being made in surveillance-strike complexes, and the need to defend large sea lanes, and dropped something of a surprise. They proposed increasing Australia’s submarine fleet to 12 boats by 2030-2040, all of which would be successors to Australia’s a current fleet of advanced Collins class submarines.
The Collins class was designed with the strong cooperation of ThyssenKrupp’s Swedish Kockums subsidiary, and built in Australia by state-owned ASC.
The class has encountered a number of issues, including significant difficulties with its combat systems, issues with acoustic signature, major cost growth to A$ 5+ billion, and schedule slippage. Worse still, reports indicated that the RAN can only staff 2 of its 6 submarines put a huge crimp in the fleet’s usefulness. High-level attention led to 29 recommendations aimed at improving conditions and staffing on Australia’s submarines, and those are now being implemented. Their long term effect remains to be seen.
So, too, does the nature of Australia’s future submarine project – and its eventual cost…
Updates and Key Events
Nov 5/09:
Acting Minister for Defence Greg Combet highlights the major challenges facing Australia’s next generation submarine project in a speech to the Sydney Institute. Excerpts of “From Collins to Force 2030: The Challenge of the Future Submarine”:
”...the White Paper recognises that the aim of establishing sea and air control in our primary operating environment does not entail a purely defensive or reactive approach. Rather, we must be able to conduct proactive combat operations at a distance from our shores. This demands a mix of intelligence, defensive and strike assets to ensure both deterrence and, if that were to fail, an ability to impose unacceptably high costs…. Put simply, we need to be able to take warfare to an adversary’s front door. Submarines are able to stop an adversary from deploying its’ fleet by maintaining sea denial. By imposing disproportionate costs on an adversary, submarines represent an asymmetric threat well suited to Australia’s defence.
....In planning for the future submarine, we need to consider a range of engineering and production solutions, ranging from the acquisition of a Military Off The Shelf (MOTS) design, options consistent with the Kinnaird/Mortimer reforms, to a developmental solution designed indigenously…. Electric Boat have a rule known as the ‘law of 1:3:8’, that is, a task that takes an hour in module construction takes 3 hours when the hull has been assembled and 8 hours when the submarine is in the water. In other words, make sure the design is mature before you start cutting steel.
...Studies have shown that 90 per cent of the discretionary decisions that affect the outcome of a project are made in the first 7 to 12 per cent of the project’s life. There are three things that we must get right… adequately define the operating concepts and requirements for the future submarine…. develop a sophisticated acquisition strategy [which may include rolling production or batch buys].... understand the interaction between capability and the acquisition strategy. It is often the interaction between these two processes that leads to trouble.
One of the matters that we will need to tackle early in the project is the need to invest in and develop a sustainable industrial base that is capable of designing, constructing and maintaining 12 large submarines [which will include cooperation with US Navy facilities].”
Nov 3/09: The Sydney Morning Herald quotes Acting Defence Minister Greg Combet, who says that the USA’s RAND Corporation will be conducting a study related to the submarine project, due in February 2010:
”(Defence) is undertaking a number of studies to identify and explore all the options to ensure we have the appropriate design capability to support our submarines throughout their life.”
Oct 29/09: The Australian Strategic Policy Institute releases “Strategic Insights 48 – How to buy a submarine: Defining and building Australia’s future fleet.” ASPI projects an $A 36 billion (currently about $32.6 billion) cost to field 12 built-in-Australia diesel-electric submarines – a sum comparable to buying 12 of the USA’s most advanced SSN-774 Virginia class nuclear fast attack submarines. OIt adds:
“As described, the resultant boats are likely to be the largest, most complex and, at $3 billion each, the most expensive conventional submarines ever built. The industrial capacity and capability to produce these vessels does not exist in Australia at the moment. By the time construction commences, it will be over fifteen years since the last Collins-class submarine was launched. Hard-earned lessons from that process will need to be re-learned in many cases and the required engineering and construction skills will have to be built up to the required level…. This paper, authored by Sean Costello and Andrew Davies, surveys the complexities that have to be negotiated and suggests a way ahead that makes best use of the resources available to government.”
See also Full report [PDF].
May 2/09: Australia’s 2009 Defence White Paper is released. One of its goals is a fleet of 12 non-nuclear diesel-electric submarines with Air-Independent Propulsion, capable of launching land attack cruise missiles, to be assembled in South Australia. Design to be determined. ASC is not guaranteed the contract, however, something Fitzgibbon had pledged during the election.
The subs could be upgraded versions of the existing Collins class, or a foreign partnership around a sub like Spain’s S-80, which will already be designed to launch Tomahawk missiles.
The Collins class will also receive sonar and other upgrades during their lifetime.
