The Pakistani Border Safe Area Puzzle

[54/102 CEF]

I was following the Benazir Bhutto thing - and reading the instant experts so I thought I'd try my own quick reading of the tea leaves

It seems to me that this is just the beginning of a long deployment that is welcomed at first,  then as it "doesn`t end in the current APS" is left for a few years to figure out what to do (from a high level political perspective - our Battlegroups knowing what they have to do), and then once the active fighthing phases taper off - the "what`s next" kicks in. Nobody ever knows whats next and because its driven at the top by politics - we are just bystanders at the bottom.

A BULLET POINT ON THE CDS DAILY BRIEF Sometime in 2010

In 25 words or less - local interests have got to be persuaded that Al Quaeda and regional Instability is against their interests - this is a classic technique that was used by Brits to counter Indians Allied with the French in North America -

SOME THOUGHTS - FEEL FREE TO PILE ON - I THINK WE CAN ALL FIGURE THIS OUT BETTER THAN ANY NATIONAL MEDIA TALKING HEADS

My view of why Pakistan can't appear to do anything is that there is fragmentation inside Pakistan proper with respect to the Armed Forces - Counter Terror outside of Pakistan is a low priority since the end of the 2003 Conflict and earlier with the end of the Russian Rule. When the Russians left - the Taliban who were the link to Pakistani influence against the Soviets were not demobilised. Most of the heavy work had been done by indigenous warlords on Afghanistan who are also very fragmented - i.e. they have no total government control - but they control this or that district in a patchwork coalition that adapts and contracts as required to local situations. As the Taliban wondered what was next - in came Al Qaeda without any checks and balances from the west or from Pakistan.

So the recap is

* Russians Out
* Taliban Expand Power
* Al Qaeda brings in $$$$$ which the Taliban needed
* Al Qaeda allowed to operate in a safe haven
* West (incl Pakistan) did not check them
* Then West Came in and wiped out Taliban government in 3 weeks in 2003 after 911
* Taliban then fled across the border to the Tribal Homelands which are not firmly controlled by the central powers in Islamabad as a contractual agreement for the creation of Pakistan way back in the late 40s. So NATO keeps the Taliban on the run - but the homelands are not allied to Islamabad and are a large logistic problem to clean up when the main event has been India vs. Pakistan where presumably the best and the brightest are focussed - and in any bureaucracy - they will resist change until the road to the top of the military and government in Pakistan is seen as leading from a reduction of direct or indirect support of rag headed radicals in the Tribal Home Lands
* To get change at the top you probably need at least a political force in power that sees it in their best interest to assist the Afghanistan efforts on a reciprocal basis - while balancing the political interests of the various governors of the tribal homelands which many describe as being failed or ba$tard states in the best of cases.
* And this doesn't even consider the fact that much of the Taliban - not Al Qaeda, has a large following originating (look up the Deobandi Movement on Google) in the late 1800s in Pakistan that focuses against a statist government as anti Islamic from the word go. Now mix in low levels of education and demagoguery on a scale we probably can't even imagine and you have two solutions - Genghis Khan - piles of skulls everywhere - which the Russians seems to have tried and screwed up royally - or a long slow bleed out of the purported extremists - you fight them with water wells and health care so the farmers can get stuff to market and generate cash on a predictable basis which removes the attraction of falling in with the Taliban or their fire breathing ilk. Net result sees a lot of small scale Khandahar deployments like Canadians do in this version - there is no massive Armies Sweeping across the Plains of Helmand province because there is no massive insurgent Armies that will come out to meet you.

Andy Leslie's Tea Leaf reading thus resolves to this:

1. The Canadian and Allied battalions clean out the garbage

2. The Special Forces operate beyond them to flush out the ones and twos that are called "Wilderness Ghazi" ---- the term is explained here http://www.jhuapl.edu/POW/notes/two_enemies.pdf

3. Repeat treatment as necessary, back off as local forces come on line in a consistent manner

4. National leadership has to marginalise the do nothing approach of the appeasement driven Liberals and the amazingly defeatist NDP and Bloc

Some links

Background to the area in the 1890s - and it probably hasn't changed since - you only control the area your rifle can hit ..... http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/congress/maxboot_29jun06.pdf  --- the writer is one of THE EXPERTS on the subject of cooperating with the locals

``It seems that everyone wants a piece of some ungoverned space but nobody wants to take on the real problem of Pakistan and its unwillingness or inability to control its own territory.`` http://blog.washingtonpost.com/earlywarning/2006/04/pirates_just_what_pakistan_nee.html

2008 - A good link to cover all bases in War on Terror http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/

NYT article - What MAY happen as the west attempts to step up the action in the tribal homelands http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/19/washington/19policy.html?_r=1&th&emc=th&oref=slogin

Finally - why be serious?

The Chinese Mobster is having vision problems so he goes for a eye check-up in Chinatown. The Ophthalmologist says ``You have cataract``. The Mobster says - no no - ``I drive Rinkin``

From the Sopranos Season 2 DVD collection

 

[Cheshire]

"The Chinese Mobster is having vision problems so he goes for a eye checkup in Chinatown. The Ophthalmologist says ``You have cataract``. The Mobster says - no no - ``I drive Rinkin`"

LOL....... ;D Very funny.

Some good Points. But can it work? How many more young Canadians will come home via Trenton as happend today, before Canadians want the troops home? We cannot win a war of attrition with these people. No matter how small a unit we have in province. Especially now, that we are  6 years in....and there are kids born into this world, who only know hatred of the west since birth. Those kids are now 6. In another 6 years, they are 12, and learning how to fire an AK-47, toss a grenade, or pack their own suicide belt, if not learning already.

What I really want to know is.....where does this end? For all of our predictions, for all of our estimates, what will it take to end this war on terror.  Frankly, I cannot see the west changing it's values and beliefs. The USA will not leave Saudi, and Israel will always be on a war footing for it's own survival. And little countries, like North Korea and Iran want to have the nuclear genie.

So, What will end the war on terror? Should we negotiate? Find out what the terrorists really want?

 

[Greymatters]

"The Chinese Mobster is having vision problems so he goes for a eye checkup in Chinatown. The Ophthalmologist says ``You have cataract``. The Mobster says - no no - ``I drive Rinkin`" LOL....... ;D Very funny.

Actually, no.  Its a blatent ethnic insult and not even contextually appropriate as this thread has nothing to do with China at this time...

Some good Points. But can it work? How many more young Canadians will come home via Trenton as happend today, before Canadians want the troops home? We cannot win a war of attrition with these people. No matter how small a unit we have in province. Especially now, that we are  6 years in....and there are kids born into this world, who only know hatred of the west since birth. Those kids are now 6. In another 6 years, they are 12, and learning how to fire an AK-47, toss a grenade, or pack their own suicide belt, if not learning already.

When good men and women go to fight for the freedom of others, expect bloodshed.  Instead of moaning about how their sacrifice bothers you, how about praising them for doing something that only a small percentage of men and women in this country have the personal fortitude to do?  To give their life in the belief they were doing something good for people they hardly knew? Not because 'the military' sent them, but because their elected government sent them, and they volunteered to join and accepted the mission.

Next, over that six years you describe, a few kids will have grown up in an environment of hatred and will pick up an AK to fight the hated West.  But just as many will see that Canadians and other Western countries arent Satan, or whatever devil they are painted to be, who do good work and help locals when the opportunity arises.  If you had ever worked on a foreign deployment you would know that this type of action peeves off local opposing warlords to no end, because the truth of our actions defeats the lies of the fighting warlord who is trying to keep the population ignorant and obediant.  Our actions reveal how oppressive, selfish and power-centric they really are. 

What I really want to know is.....where does this end? For all of our predictions, for all of our estimates, what will it take to end this war on terror.  Frankly, I cannot see the west changing it's values and beliefs. The USA will not leave Saudi, and Israel will always be on a war footing for it's own survival. And little countries, like North Korea and Iran want to have the nuclear genie.  So, What will end the war on terror? Should we negotiate? Find out what the terrorists really want?

If you would study your history you would learn that war and terrorism has always existed, exists today no more than it has before, and will continue to exist as long as no one opposes dictators and terrorist organizations.  You should also study your history to learn that failure to combat foreign civil wars, terrorism and dictatorial governments has fatal consequences for other regions of the world and comes home to our country whether we like it or not.  What will it take?  A lot of money, time and people willing to do the job, just like every operation before.  Although it helps if you keep the different 'terrorist groups' you refer to seperated rather than heaping them all together into one pile - Iranians, North Koreans, and the other you lump into the terrorist question all have different issues and different solutions...

 

[54/102 CEF]

Actually, no.  Its a blatent ethnic insult and not even contextually appropriate as this thread has nothing to do with China at this time...

Sorry ref the Joke - it was oriented to Criminals not any ethnic origin.

 

[Kirkhill]

First off CEF - Good One.

Cheshire I can only agree with Greymatters and CEF on the war on terror.  It is a matter of incrementalism. It is a matter of nibbling away at the edges and taking the ground that is offered to you and holding it.  It is a matter of constantly extending the secure zone and allowing the refugees to enter and take up residence.  They will attract more people that want more of what the secure refugees have draining the supply of angry young men in the insecure zone.  Have you ever seen what an angry granny can do to her 21 year old grandson?  If granny says the clan is leaving the troubles behind the troubles are left behind.

As noted elsewhere as security is established in a given area then soldiers give up their cannons for machine guns, then the machine guns for rifles, their rifles for pistols and conceivably their pistols for truncheons.  They give up their cammies for DEUs and wander the streets openly.  By that time we call them Police Officers.  But Police Officers still get shot.  Gangsters still want to carve out turf.  Radicals still want to try their luck in violent demonstrations.  Occasionally neighbouring states decide to try and upset the applecart.  And very occasionally some "entrepreneurial" idiot will decide he wants to start all over.

1873 - 500 Mounties with rifles in Western Canada
2007 - 10,000 Mounties with pistols backed up by the 60,000 men and women of the CF with some very big bullets.

As GM says.  It never ends.

PS - Sorry GM, as an ethnically-challenged individual that has been the butt of many a joke myself I have to say that I laughed.  Cheers.

 

[Greymatters]

PS - Sorry GM, as an ethnically-challenged individual that has been the butt of many a joke myself I have to say that I laughed.  Cheers.

I might have over-reacted on that ... 

 

[Greymatters]

So, What will end the war on terror? Should we negotiate? Find out what the terrorists really want?

Instead of my rant, here is a piece by the Ruxted Group (from May 2006) that outline the issues in a much more reasonable and factual tone:

http://ruxted.ca/index.php?/archives/17-Terrorism-is-Information-Warfare-disguised-as-Military-Action.html

Take special note of paragraphs 6-9 which would address your questions...

 

[devil39]

From the Nov/Dec Foreign Affairs article by Philip Gordon Can the War on Terror be Won?  http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20071101faessay86604-p10/philip-h-gordon/can-the-war-on-terror-be-won.html

Summary:  It can, but only if U.S. officials start to think clearly about what success in the war on terror would actually look like. Victory will come only when Washington succeeds in discrediting the terrorists' ideology and undermining their support. These achievements, in turn, will require accepting that the terrorist threat can never be eradicated completely and that acting as though it can will only make it worse.

PHILIP H. GORDON is Senior Fellow for U.S. Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution. His latest book is Winning the Right War: The Path to Security for America and the World (Times Books, 2007), from which this essay is drawn.

The United States and its allies will win the war only if they fight it in the right way -- with the same sort of patience, strength, and resolve that helped win the Cold War and with policies designed to provide alternative hopes and dreams to potential enemies. The war on terror will end with the collapse of the violent ideology that caused it -- when bin Laden's cause comes to be seen by its potential adherents as a failure, when they turn against it and adopt other goals and other means. Communism, too, once seemed vibrant and attractive to millions around the world, but over time it came to be seen as a failure. Just as Lenin's and Stalin's successors in the Kremlin in the mid-1980s finally came to the realization that they would never accomplish their goals if they did not radically change course, it is not too fanciful to imagine the successors of bin Laden and Zawahiri reflecting on their movement's failures and coming to the same conclusion. The ideology will not have been destroyed by U.S. military power, but its adherents will have decided that the path they chose could never lead them where they wanted to go. Like communism today, extremist Islamism in the future will have a few adherents here and there. But as an organized ideology capable of taking over states or inspiring large numbers of people, it will have been effectively dismantled, discredited, and discarded. And like Lenin's, bin Laden's violent ideology will end up on the ash heap of history.

I would imagine that one thing is probably certain, and that is that we will not kill our way out of this war.  Unless we are prepared to pull a "Genghis Khan" and carry out the equivalent of piling the skulls up in pyramids outside of every village.  Certainly not my recommendation and probably the "throwaway COA". 

 

[Greymatters]

A lot of good individual ideas and historical information, but no meat... outlines all the things that are being done wrong, outlines all the extreme measures we could take, but fails to identify a good strategy for winning other than waiting for AQ popularity to recede.  He pretty much implies that the best thing to do is sit at home and wait for the Muslims to get tired of it.  Also spends far to much time trying to compare the current situation to the Cold War, which was a completely different type of animal.  Unfortunately, also completely ignores the potential impact that the military can have in combating terrorist operations, and does not mention the combined law enforcement/intelligence/military success in interdicting many planned attacks, typical of poli-sci strategists...

 

[54/102 CEF]

....... Unfortunately, also completely ignores the potential impact that the military can have in combating terrorist operations, and does not mention the combined law enforcement/intelligence/military success in interdicting many planned attacks, typical of poli-sci strategists...

The governments of the regions impacted have to drive this individually and collectively - the military only know certain means that can pave the way for the governments to act.

 

[devil39]

A lot of good individual ideas and historical information, but no meat... outlines all the things that are being done wrong, outlines all the extreme measures we could take, but fails to identify a good strategy for winning other than waiting for AQ popularity to recede.  He pretty much implies that the best thing to do is sit at home and wait for the Muslims to get tired of it.  Also spends far to much time trying to compare the current situation to the Cold War, which was a completely different type of animal.  Unfortunately, also completely ignores the potential impact that the military can have in combating terrorist operations, and does not mention the combined law enforcement/intelligence/military success in interdicting many planned attacks, typical of poli-sci strategists...

From Gordon's essay...

If, on the other hand, Americans accept that victory in the war on terror will come only when the ideology they are fighting loses support and when potential adherents see viable alternatives to it, then the United States would have to adopt a very different course. It would not overreact to threats but instead would demonstrate confidence in its values and its society -- and the determination to preserve both. It would act decisively to reestablish its moral authority and the appeal of its society, which have been so badly damaged in recent years. It would strengthen its defenses against the terrorist threat while also realizing that a policy designed to prevent any conceivable attack will do more damage than a policy of defiantly refusing to allow terrorists to change its way of life. It would expand its efforts to promote education and political and economic change in the Middle East, which in the long run will help that region overcome the despair and humiliation that fuel the terrorist threat. It would launch a major program to wean itself from imported oil, freeing it from the dependence that constrains its foreign policy and obliging oil-dependent Arab autocracies to diversify their economies, more evenly distribute their wealth, and create jobs for their citizens. It would seek to end the large U.S. combat presence in Iraq, which has become more of a recruiting device for al Qaeda than a useful tool in the war on terror. It would stop pretending that the conflict between Israel and its neighbors has nothing to do with the problem of terrorism and launch a diplomatic offensive designed to bring an end to a conflict that is a key source of the resentment that motivates many terrorists. It would take seriously the views of its potential allies, recognize their legitimate interests, and seek to win their support and cooperation in confronting the common threat.

Keeping in mind that this is a strategic level "thought piece" this isn't too bad.  Can't expect Foreign Affairs essayists to site your firebase and machine guns for you.  Some potential enemy and friendly strat level CG-CC-CR-CV material throughout the article.

 

[Infanteer]

I would imagine that one thing is probably certain, and that is that we will not kill our way out of this war.  Unless we are prepared to pull a "Genghis Khan" and carry out the equivalent of piling the skulls up in pyramids outside of every village.  Certainly not my recommendation and probably the "throwaway COA".

Agreed Devil39.  The Soviets had free reign for 10-years and that did them no good.  I recently finished reading a book on the Rhodesian Bush War - viscious on both sides but it never helped the Counter-Insurgent side to have a "free fire" permit.

The "Hama" approach only works if you go to "10" on the applied violence scale and stay there - this is Rome's "make a wasteland and call it peace" that includes wholesale slaughter and selling the rest into slavery.  Anything from "2-9" on the scale probably doesn't work - I'd venture that it achieves limited tactical results at best and is counterproductive at worst.  "1" is, I suppose, the "hearts and minds" level, probably something more familiar with a law enforcement officer than a soldier.

 

[54/102 CEF]

I vote for the 1 level as shown by Infanteer. This is extensively developed by Thomas Barnett`s book the Pentagon;s New Map. Its also probably nothing new - all sides have to agree on rules that all abide by - so all get measurable benefits. The fighting and enforcement clash should be the exception rather than the rule - the arbitration of the local issue will demand all the people skills of all the soldiers and the PRT type units long into the future. For a good example of this try and find the book called The Mission by Dana Priest. You can check it out on Google or Amazon. Very worthwhile.

 

[enfield]

I think, Infanteer, there are more options than that and levels 2-9 are good possibilities. What is key is not the level of violence, but what happens afterwards - what we're willing to expend to control and administer what we win, whether that be territory, a city, or a tribe who's leadership we just killed. Canada's "3-D Approach" is a half-hearted, under-resourced, recognition of this.

Pulling a Genghis Khan, while effective, is of course not an option. The Soviets had free rein, yes, but they were also unprepared, utilized a  heavy handed approach, and were crippled by their own ineffective structures. As I recall, more Soviet soldiers died of disease than enemy action - a dubious distinction. The Rhodesian example is also tricky; the embargoed white government was outnumbered and out gunned, and while well-organized and well-led, the white forces were fighting from a position of economic, material, and political weakness. Neither was in any position to administer what they gained or controlled, making the level or type of violence they used irrelevant.

You mention the Roman approach; 'make a wasteland and call it peace'. However, there is a second side to that: for 300-odd years the army of Rome was about 250,000 men, but they kept in line an empire of tens of millions of subjects. It was Rome's ability organize and administer their provinces, and bind them with lasting cultural, economic and political bonds that maintained the empire. Rome kept the peace through civilian structures, not direct military might. (It did, however, keep the outside 'barbarians' out through military might).
The British Empire serves as a similar example - very strong, permanent political and economic structures that kept in line an empire of hundreds of millions. Hordes of civil servants, colonial agents, and administrators ruled the empire. Military force was a secondary tool of imperial maintenance, and British forces remained tiny throughout the Imperial era - but the threat of near-genocidal military action lurked behind the civil servants and colonial agents.

I don't believe, however, that a 'colonial administration' solution like these two imperial examples are any more likely than the Genghis Khan solution. The real solution is a third way, which I believe we're following: create a proxy regime to rule in our stead, a time-honoured tradition also practised by Rome and Britain. Pump them full of weapons and money, and let them to do the administering and dying.

 

[Kirkhill]

Meanwhile the "Safe Areas" issue may be working itself out.

Pakistan blowback against al Qaeda

AFP/Dawn:



Thousands of armed tribesmen of South Waziristan met here on Wednesday, vowing to organise a Lashkar to hunt down Al Qaeda-linked militants blamed for killing nine of their kinsmen.

The tribal jirga in Wana came three days after militants stormed two offices and killed nine tribal elders of a government-sponsored peace committee.

The jirga ordered tribesmen from every household belonging to the Wazir tribe to come to Wana with arms to prepare for action, a local official said.

“One man from each house should come to Wana with a gun at 10am on Thursday to plan our defence and act against those who are responsible for disorder,” tribal chief Malik Ghaffar told the gathering.

Wazir tribe chief Maulvi Nazir, who earned fame after he drove out hundreds of Uzbeks from the region last year in bloody clashes, is expected to address the Lashkar on Thursday.

...

Baitullah Mehsud is accused by the government of masterminding a spate of suicide attacks in the country, including the December 27 assassination of former prime minister Benazir Bhutto in a gun and bomb attack in Rawalpindi. Mehsud has denied any involvement in the killing.

...

The anthropologist on the al Qaeda staff need some remedial work on the reaction of the tribal societies to attempted intimidation by al Qaeda. You would think that they would have a vivid memory of the reaction of the Anbar tribes to their persuasion through mass murder. It is how they lost Iraq and it is how it will lose Pakistan. The tribes meeting on this are prime targets for counterinsurgency cooperation.

Add Mullahs being fired by central command, OBL aides being picked up in Lahore, Anti-Taliban demonstrations in Quetta by Pashtuns, general signs of internal division in the hills and it seems time for another Pollyanna moment.  Things are never as bad as they seem.  Somebody somewhere has overplayed their hand.

Relying on the inherently weak "structure" of the tribal system as a base to support operations does not seem to be a winning strategy for Al Qaeda.  They need cohesion to supply space to work and to supply a tax base.  By contrast all the West has to do is to allow the tribes to be tribes.  Individually they are no threat and equally, individually, they are amenable to coercion and persuasion.