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The Optimal Battle Group vs. the Affiliated Battle Group

I would think so as well.  I thought I read a post a few months back on that topic.  I thought armour/infantry drivers were going to drive the Bison Ambulances for a Roto to Afghanistan?  Guess not.
 
Mountie said:
Fair enough.  Obviously I don't have the practical experience to know that.  So let me ask you a few questions?  Would career transition from a LAV-III Crew Commander to a Coyote Crew Commander (or visa versa) be easier than from an LAV-III Crew Commander MCpl. to a dismounted section commander Sgt.?  There is going to be a conversion process regardless during career progression.  My point was that from infantry crew commander to recce patrol crew commander would be easier than from dismounted to mounted.   Career progression from a Coyote gunner to a LAV-III crew commander (or visa versa) or a LAV-III driver to a Coyote gunner would be a more logical progression than from dismounted to mounted and back and forth, wouldn't it? 

I know its hard to put the regimental affiliations aside.  I think that is such an obstacle to true combined arms theories.  I would hate to see the loss of the regimental system but for discussion sake I was thinking of truely combined units something like the USMC where everyone belongs to a numbered, non-regimental type unit.  You would have an infantry platoon with dismounted soldiers wearing the crossed rifle cap badge of the infantry and the LAV-III crewman wearing the iron fist cap badge of the armoured corps and nobody wearing a regimental cap badge such as the PPCLI or LdSH(RC).   The battle group mortar platoon/troop might have armoured crewman driving the mortar carriers with gunners in the back manning the mortar.  Similar to how I believe Bison Ambulances are crewed; don't armour/infantry drive the vehicle while medical technicians are in back treating the patients?  You don't need a medic to drive the vehicle.  Likewise, you don't need an infantrymen to drive a LAV-III, let the armoured crewman be the vehicle experts and let the infantry concentrate on dismounted close combat.

It's not a matter of having to set aside regimental affiliations to discuss this.

The positions you are comparing have similar technical skill-sets with regard to the vehicles.  But each, infantry and armour, are also expected to be skilled at a much broader Corps (Branch if you prefer) skill-set which is not readily inter-changeable just because they use similar vehicles. It's a bigger question than whether crew commanding a Coyote has skills over-lap with crew-commanding a LAV.

When I see a rental cop standing in a public building with a gun on his hip, I see him "doing" the same skill set as a City Officer doing a similar task.  They look alike (somewhat) and at least one of them wants me to believe they have similar skill-sets and bring similar advantages to the task - but I know they're not inter-changeable across the full spectrum of duties I would expect the City cop to do.

 
Michael O`Leary said:
It's not a matter of having to set aside regimental affiliations to discuss this.

The positions you are comparing have similar technical skill-sets with regard to the vehicles.  But each, infantry and armour, are also expected to be skilled at a much broader Corps (Branch if you prefer) skill-set which is not readily inter-changeable just because they use similar vehicles. It's a bigger question than whether crew commanding a Coyote has skills over-lap with crew-commanding a LAV.

When I see a rental cop standing in a public building with a gun on his hip, I see him "doing" the same skill set as a City Officer doing a similar task.  They look alike (somewhat) and at least one of them wants me to believe they have similar skill-sets and bring similar advantages to the task - but I know they're not inter-changeable across the full spectrum of duties I would expect the City cop to do.

Point taken.  As I said I don't have the experience to back up my theory so I'll have to believe you folks that do.  I agree with the cop analogy, that I do have the experience to backup.  I was thinking more along the line of specific job functions such as "driving a LAV/Coyote" rather than the broader sense that you are thinking.  Perhaps that is narrow minded of me.  I was comparing to my own organisation.  We have so many Regular Members (cops) occupying positions in administrative/support units that could filled by Civilian Members.  I was thinking along those lines when I said just because its a medical Bison there is no need to have a medic driving it and wasting his/her medical skills.  To compare to my organization, in my provincial headquarters we have an Inspector, a sergeant and a corporal just to manage the computer tech section that fixes and maintains our computers.  The section only consists no more than a dozen Civilian Members and there is a Civilian i/c for the unit as well.  Why do we waste three Regular Members to supervise computer techs, who have their own unit i/c anyway when we are in a manpower crisis like never before??  It doesn't require a police background to fix a computer in a police service, put the cops on the streets and let the civies fix the computers.  Just like I don't think it takes a medical background to drive a Bison Ambulance.  Just my opinion though.
 
Anything new on the Optimal Battle Group Experiment?  I read one article in the Canadian Army Journal  "Forging Land Forces for the Army of Tomorrow - Battle Group 2021". 
 
I was wondering if we have anybody from 2RCR floating around on here that could provide some feedback on the OBG experiment (they are the ones heading it up, right?).

I was reading an article about the OBG concept and it started with a quote from general Vokes staing back in the early 1950s that artillery, infantry and armour be placed together in a single unit but the regimental system will get in the way. Kind of mind boggling.

I was also reading an interesting article on British army and their future brigade structure (they will be identical) with the following
-Armoured Tank Regt
-Armoured Recce Regt
-Warrior (Heavy) Infantry battalion
-Bulldog (medium) infantry battalion
-2 x Light battalions

Is it directly related to the OBG vs ABG? Not entirely, but if you look at the size of our army and they way we fight, maybe we really should go with the OBG.

The structure for it would be interesting. Someone brought up that the arms CO and RSm provide the proper mentoring and training to their arms until its time to put the BG together for deployments.

Someone one even called it a train wreck. Thats not the way it should be. For sub unit trg and lower, why not have the arms (engineers, armoured, artillery) receive guidance from their appropriate schools? Ideas or thoughts on this one?

 
Not from the 2RCR BG but, I'll say that I believe an OBG is too dependant upon predicting what your enemy will look like (otherwise it's a waste of resources).  The makeup you mention above sound like a great wrecking crew but, unless your up against the hordes it will likely be a lot of weapons and persons doing nothing.

The ABG works just fine now where a Bde Cmdr is tasked to provide a BG for a specific task and he then goes to his COs to execute.  As well, subunits and even sub-sub units can cross Bdes.

Comparing a BG to a weapon.  For a weapon you must figure out what you need to defeat i.e. Armour, Walls, Mountain Caves.  Once you figure out what you need to defeat, you can design the weapon.

In order to design a BG would work the same in my mind.  What do you need to defeat? 

If you can figure out what our enemy will look like in our next conflict and every conflict thereafter,  you could be a rich man.
 
As someone else stated, build a BG around a worst case scenario and then you can anticipate success for lower intensity missions.

We still have on going issues with other arms not working with each other (including incidents of our guys going blue on blue overseas, luckily the one incident I am thinking of there was no casualties, BTW it was our armour firing on our infantry).

I personally beleive we need more combined arms training and getting used to use to working with each other. What we do now works, but i strongly beleive we can do better. I also beleive people fear change. Its my opinion, good luck selling me on something different.

If you have a sound argument, sell it.
 
I still can't believe that someone had come up with the "Plug 'N Play" philosophy for deployments.  OK...... Here it comes........A 4 CMBG story....... What was wrong with the Cbt Team that we used in the past?  In 4 CMBG each Sqn, Coy, Engrs and FOO Party were more or less teamed up with the same members of the other Arms on every Ex and Alert.  B Sqn RCD would work with the same Coy of R22R, and have the same Engr C/S and  FOO Party everytime they deployed out the gate.  It worked, and people developed a good working relationship knowing how their 'peers' in the Cbt Team worked.  Why has someone decided to reinvent the wheel?



Oh!  With all this rain coming down, I think that this Winter is being brought to us by President's Choice Memories of Lahr.    ;D
 
To my tiny mind, any difficulties in working together, including potential blue on blue, would not be solved by creating permanent mixed battle groups. In fact, the challenges would not be solved by permanent affiliations either, given the lack of combined arms collective training that has gone on in the army over the last decade and abit. I know, we plug the various bits and pieces together into a battle group well in advance, but even then t he training climate leads to running before the various components can even walk together properly.

Part of it is a result of resources or the lack of same; part of it is a result of the three factors that work against force generation - population, distance and climate; and part of it is a lack of knowledge of the other arms' capabilities and limitations. I could launch into a giant rant, but I'll just opine that until the army can build some stability and routine into its organizations and training cycles, no amount of fiddling with organizations will matter a whit.

In the mid-sixties 4 CIBG, which was a mechanized formation, looked at reorganizing into affiliated battle groups. The plan involved including tank squadrons in infantry battalions and vice versa with the armoured regiment. Not all the battalions would gain a squadron and/or lose a company. The gunners and the sappers were left alone. This brain wave actually was at the behest of CFHQ and was proposed for, if I recall correctly, the flimsiest of reasons. The proposal failed the logic test, not because of cap badge politics, but because little or nothing was gained in terms of combat effectiveness, and all sorts of tactical flexibility was lost.

To sum up: there is no magic solution, especially if the army is unable to conduct formation operational training.
 
George Wallace said:
I still can't believe that someone had come up with the "Plug 'N Play" philosophy for deployments.  OK...... Here it comes........A 4 CMBG story....... What was wrong with the Cbt Team that we used in the past?  In 4 CMBG each Sqn, Coy, Engrs and FOO Party were more or less teamed up with the same members of the other Arms on every Ex and Alert.  B Sqn RCD would work with the same Coy of R22R, and have the same Engr C/S and  FOO Party everytime they deployed out the gate.  It worked, and people developed a good working relationship knowing how their 'peers' in the Cbt Team worked.  Why has someone decided to reinvent the wheel?



Oh!  With all this rain coming down, I think that this Winter is being brought to us by President's Choice Memories of Lahr.    ;D

Isn't this the same idea they are doing with 2 RCR? There is an embedded Field Section (or is it troop) from 4 ESR and also C Sqn RCD (IIRC)......
 
Not really.  The 2RCR setup is more like the US Cav where the unit has all those resources integral to the unit.  In the Cbt Teams, the different units were 'teamed' together for operations, but still belonged to their original Regt/Bn and were usually supplied by their 'mother' units or the unit with the largest Ech.
 
After talking with a couple friends (both Arty friends).  One from the 2RCR BG and the other from a an Army tasking position.  Both of them have told me that the 2 RCR BG has conducted no more combined arms training than if they were with a regular Bde. 

In specific, my friend from 2RCR said the combined arms was nothing out of the ordinary and trade specific skills were suffering.  My friend from tasking summed it up kind of like I would think. " An OBG is great if you have a 150,000 man Army".

As far as the plug and play concept.  I think it's our best option considering all of our crappy factors.  That is why we have and need to maintain national standards.  Considering our national standards are probably simaliar in size to a Marine Div or Corps if we're lucky it should be attainable.
 
Your "Plug 'N Play" comment has set me off.  Perhaps you could go back and ask your friend at 2 RCR if he would fit in with their org easier if he were "Plugged in to Play" with them from Shilo on 24 hrs notice? 

I, as you can see, see "Plug 'N Play" as a great leap backwards from what we had and what your friend at 2 RCR is experiencing.
 
Further,  factoring for worse case scenario would be a nice convieniance but, when the task calls for something smaller and more specific, you would end up with a bunch of unused and unhappy soldiers waiting behind waiting to be plugged and played.
 
I will add to my comments.  I neglected to say, my friend from the 2RCR BG also said that the command relationship within the 2 RCR BG is top notch.  A very important consideration that took my regular BG probably 1/3 of the way throught our tour to accomplish.
 
GnyHwy said:
I regress.  I neglected to say, my friend from the 2RCR BG also said that the command relationship within the 2 RCR BG is top notch.  A very important consideration that took my regular BG probably 1/3 of the way throught our tour to accomplish.

That is my point.  Your friend has an intimate relationship with the Comd staff of the unit, an established working relationship with them, and knowledge and experience with their SOPs and little 'idiosyncrasies'.  You don't get that with "Plug 'N Play" when you hit the ground running.
 
Roger,  I will agree with your point on  the command relationship, which is extremely improtant.  That does not yet compensate for the 1500 troops that might not be exercised as well as their own COs (with direction from Bde Cmdrs) might be able to accomplish i.e Eng, Arty, Comms.

I ask, because I am unsure.  When was the last time as far as a real BG is concerned, were we needed to hit the ground running?



 
 
GnyHwy said:
.....  When was the last time as far as a real BG is concerned, were we needed to hit the ground running?

Well.....With year long or longer work up training for a ROTO it would seem that we don't.  However, there are still last minute substitutions and replacements, that may not come from the org deploying.  At the same time, there are other orgs deploying in other capacities that may have absolutely no familiarity with the orgs that they are to work with or for. 

We can look at the various handovers the BGs have done with each ROTO to see that "Plug 'N Play" is a fantasy.  There would be a smooth transition and the new ROTO would carry on where the other left off.  We have seen that this is not true.  Each ROTO has followed their own 'agenda', their own SOPs, their own priorities.  If "Plug 'N Play" were reality, there would be no difference between one ROTO and another.  The ultimate test, I suppose, of "Plug 'N Play"........the ROTO handover.

 
I agree with all but,  because I like to debate I will choose the other side.

At the same time, there are other orgs deploying in other capacities that may have absolutely no familiarity with the orgs that they are to work with or for.

An arguement for Plug and Play and national standards.

We can look at the various handovers the BGs have done with each ROTO to see that "Plug 'N Play" is a fantasy.

Various BGs will have the same effect as COs will always have different missions.

Each ROTO has followed their own 'agenda', their own SOPs, their own priorities.  If "Plug 'N Play" were reality, there would be no difference between one ROTO and another.  The ultimate test, I suppose, of "Plug 'N Play"........the ROTO handover.

Get an Army Cmdr to pull this together.  Without, nothing has changed.
 
GnyHwy said:
An arguement for Plug and Play and national standards.

Oh, I agree, unfortunately we know that every Bde, every Cbt Team, every Unit and every Sub-unit has their particular variations of what may very well be a National/Corps/Branch SOP.  "Ten Minutes Notice to Move" may be "Saddles" for one unit and "Cougar" for another.  Insert a Sub-unit into that Organization from the other end of the country, and confusion reigns for quite a period of time.

What person, at what level of Command, came up with the idea that personnel could be switched around in positions like replacing a light bulb that was burnt out?  Perhaps we should have pointed out to this genius that not all the light bulbs on the shelf were of the same Wattage as the one needing replacing.
 
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