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The Optimal Battle Group vs. the Affiliated Battle Group

"Ahem"

Back to the regularly scheduled argument

I am with Infanteer on this. SBCT companies or '80's vintage Canadian Mech Infantry battalions have the combined arms mixture and flexibility to work across a wide range of scenarios; the biggest change would be to add an "echelon" platoon (for lack of a better word) to the company to keep up with logistical requirements of fast moving and widely dispersed elements.

Grafting these kinds of units to a strong and flexible C4I and CSS "Spine", and being able to graft of additional heavy or specialist elements from the "pool" depending on the mission (and given the lack of resources this may be the only way we can do this) seems to be the model for our future structure. Neither fish nor fowl, the ideal ( >:D) Canadian solution.
 
The SBCT has both battalion and brigade resources. the permament structure of a stryker rifle coy is
-HQ
-Sharpshooter det
-Fire Support det (We call it FOO)
-Ambulance
-Mortar Section (2 x 120mm mortars, good fire power at the OC's finger tips)
-MGS Platoon (they group them in 3s for some reason)
-3 x platoons of infantry

I beleive this structure is a great start, it gives certain capabilities immediately availible to the OC.

I think back to when the mortars were handed over to the arty and we were told we would still have access to them. Thats that, the battalions never or see of 81mm again and I beleive the arty does what should do (focus on the big boom 155mm) but they under employ the 81mm (quick and fast fire power).

The SBCT has some other assetts as brigade tools
-A company of TOW
-an armoured regiment of cavalry/armoured recce troops (they call a regiment a squadron, go figure)
-a combat engineer company
-UAV capabilities

there is more but I can not remember off hand exactly what they are.

The way I see it is the coy comd has the most important aspects to win the fire fight and for bigger and more in depth missions, he can get engineers, arty, recce, etc, etc.

I do beleive this is a step in the right direction. I wonder if our OBG will follow a similar route or will we have a million people with their versions of it?

Interesting to see how this turns out.
 
ArmyRick said:
The SBCT has both battalion and brigade resources. the permament structure of a stryker rifle coy is
-HQ
-Sharpshooter det
-Fire Support det (We call it FOO)
-Ambulance
-Mortar Section (2 x 120mm mortars, good fire power at the OC's finger tips)
-MGS Platoon (they group them in 3s for some reason)
-3 x platoons of infantry
....
The SBCT has some other assetts as brigade tools
-A company of TOW
-an armoured regiment of cavalry/armoured recce troops (they call a regiment a squadron, go figure)
-a combat engineer company
-UAV capabilities
.
We are, in my professional opinion, re-inventing the wheel.  The Stryker Company looks remarkably similar to a combat team.  In fact, I seem to remember drafting an order (very recently) with a very similar ORBAT.  Though thankfully we don't have MGS, but Leo 2A6M CANs instead.

As for the "Brigade combat team", it reminds me of our Brigade Group of old.
TWO companies of TOW (we called them "platoons", go figure)
A brigade armoured recce squadron
A combat engineer BATTALION (we call them "regiments", go figure)
Aviation for C2 and Ln and Obsn.

The wheel, she keeps on turning...
 
ArmyRick said:
The SBCT has both battalion and brigade resources ...
Just to confirm that we are all working on the same sheet, An SBCT is a Brigade.

Mortarman Rockpainter said:
As for the "Brigade combat team", it reminds me of our Brigade Group of old.
Excactly.  SBCT is not something new.  It is just the US moving the size of independent formation from Div down to Bde.  We were there with CMBGs.  In some cases, our CMBGs were even better resourced than an SBCT (ie. CER vs Engr Coy).
 
Great discussion.  I see a lot of comments about smaller but fully manned brigade groups.  Good idea.  It would be nice to some day see a fourth brigade stood up.  Dreaming I know. 

On the topic of the tanks; wouldn't a squadron per brigade group be a good compromise?  It is pretty unlikely that Canada would actually deploy a regiment of tanks together.  A squadron would allow for some collective training and would allow each regiment to have some tanks and would let the ffiliated squadrons work with their infantry battalions on a somewhat regular basis. 

The Australian Army has recently purchased 59 M1A1 Abrams MBTs.  They have formed them into one armoured regiment with three squadrons of 13 tanks and a RHQ of 2 tanks.  That's 41 tanks in the regiment and 18 for training stocks.
 
Mountie said:
The Australian Army has recently purchased 59 M1A1 Abrams MBTs.  They have formed them into one armoured regiment with three squadrons of 13 tanks and a RHQ of 2 tanks.  That's 41 tanks in the regiment and 18 for training stocks.

We found the 4 tank Troop, in a 4 Troop Squadron, with three tanks in SHQ (2 Command and 1 Dozer), to work fairly well and facilitate the odd occasion when it may be required to split the Sqn into  "Half Sqns".  19 Tanks per Sqn, in three tank Sqns per Regt brings us to 59 per Regt of Tanks. 

A Sqn per Regt, as we currently stand will help maintain the necessary skills that Tankers need.  It would also allow each of the current Bdes to have troops in the other Arms familiar with the characteristics of Heavy Armour.
 
SBCT stands for Stryker Brigade Combat Team

Americans are using the term Brigade Combat Team to describe what we call a Brigade Group. Its basically a mounted infantry brigade with bells and whistles.

The only big differences between their SBCT and our older Brigade groups that I see is
(1) The armoured unit is all armoured recce
(2) The MGS are attached permamently to the companies (their is no MGS squadron or anything like that).
(3) They have fewer engineers (A coy vs a regiment as we did).

Its good for the yanks to move away from the Div centric formation and move in to brigade combat teams. They actually do deploy brigades.

We do not deploy as a brigade (lets stop pretending that we will in the near future) and we deploy as battle groups for our primary maneuver unit. Maybe this OBG is a step in the right direction for us?

"If an idea is absurd then it must be a good idea" or something to that effect, trying to qoute Einstein.

This is where I now take cover as a barrage of anti-permanent battle group remarks are hurled at me.

 
I wasn't suggesting smaller squadrons.  I was just stating the Australian organization and how they grouped all their operational tanks  into one unit.  I would also suggest staying with 19 or maybe 18 tank squadrons.  As you stated that would allow the squadron to split in half when required.  With only two infantry battalions in the brigade this would allow a half squadron to affiliate with each battalion.  I don't know how the logistics or command and control of a half squadron would work.  I doubt it is sustainable.  But perhaps during brigade-level operations it would work (if that every happens). 
 
Here is another crazy thought (I am really going to get pelted today with rocks)

Move into 9 OBG based on the following models

Each Brigade has 3 OBG
2 x Infantry and recce based OBG
1 x Tank and infantry based OBG

Fold the third battalions of each infantry regiment (Ducking, first barrage of rotten tomatoes coming right at me and jeers). Use the man power from those battalions and to form 2 rifle coys for each Heavy OBG.

The Infantry/Recce BG
-BG HQ
-Recce Squadron (based on C SQN RCD model, check their web site)
-3 x LAVIII Mounted Companies
-Engineers and Arty attachments as required

Tank and Infantry BG
-BG HQ
-Tank Squadron (the new standard of 3 troops? or they old model of 4 troops?)
- 2 or 3 x LAVIII mounted infantry companies (do we have enough LAVIIIs?)
-again arty and engineers as required

I would also add in a service support company with a unique twist, it would be a mixed formation of various trades including lots of armoured types. i am basing this idea on the Royal Marines Commando 21 structure
The SVC SPT COY would be
-Coy HQ
-3 or 4 x A Echelon Platoons (crewed by 011, they are the best at doing this)
-B Echelon Platoon
-Medical station
-Rations platoon
-Maintenance platoon (second line, maybe part of B ech?)

Thoughts? Ideas? Or do you want to hammer me with rocks, rotten tomatoes, mouldy apples and angry cats while booing me off the stage?
 
Honestly folding the 3rd Bn's is not a bad idea, seeing as all Inf Bn's are now going to the 2 Mech 1 light concept.

I would cravat that by saying fold the Jump Coy's into one 3 Coy Bn a la 2 Can Para. Adding one more Maneuver element and Unit without loosing a beneficial capability.
 
I think both the OBG and ABG could work.  But the most important thing is to fully man whatever units we have to stop this force generation mess where one rifle company comes from one battalion or brigade and another company from a different battlion or brigade and an armoured squadron with a troop from each regiment, etc.  Fully man however many units we can afford to and temporarily stand down the others until there is $$, PYs and equipment to stand them back up.  Regardless, of what the units look like I think we should be looking at 6 battle groups for the time being. 

I'm interested in comments about the infantry battalions having 2 mech and 1 light rifle companies.  Why?  Doesn't the battalion typically deploy as one or the other?  Bosnia always required a mechanized battalion.  The first deployment to Afghanistan was a pure light battalion.  The Kandahar mission has been pure mech companies I thought.  Wouldn't it be more beneficial to maintain pure battalions?  I would even suggest combining the jump companies and the CSOR into something closer to the US Army Ranger Battalions or Australian 4 RAR (Commando) battalion.  They would be capable of traditional light infantry operations and more specialized operations in support of JTF II.  Basically a Special Operations Capable (SOC) light infantry battalion.  1st and 2nd Battalions, Canadian Guards????  Just throwing out a name for fun.  Don't mean to start a three day debate over a title.
 
You have the role and model of CSOR and 4 RAR very confused....

CSOR and 4 RAR are not akin to the US Army Ranger model, I wont get into what it is they do and what model they use for OPSEC reasons.

You could use the Jump Coy's folded into one Bn to do that sort of task however.
 
I realize there is a difference.  I'm saying that the role of CSOR is to support the JTF2 similar to the Special Forces Support Group of the UK, which is similar (but not exactly the same) as 4 RAR and the US Army Rangers.  I was more suggesting convert the CSOR and jump companies into something in between a regular infantry battalion and the CSOR. 
 
Mountie PM inbound, I will clear up some confusion for you...

Again yes CSOR has ONE task of support to JTF2 but there is a lot more.

4 RAR has moved even further away from that to now have a domestic CT role for all of eastern Aus, putting them on par with the ASAS. It has become a more symbiotic relationship for them there are some areas where the ASAS are still and forever will be the SME's but 4 RAR is not just a support unit and neither is CSOR.
 
Going to add though that the Jump Coy's folded into one unit would be perfect for the role that the Rangers fill. I would say they would relish it.

On that note I will add an AIRBORNE! to my jumping friends
 
First off, we don't really need to discuss CMBG's and Stryker Brigades.  Whatever we do with "optimizing" or "affiliating", the CMBG's will largely have the same resources.

I highlighted the Stryker Company and Battalion because this is where the real change is happening and this is where we are interested in.  I mentioned the Armored Division's Manuever Battalion as a good example:

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/images/bct-heavy-toe.gif

As for the light/mech question I believe that, for the line infantry battalions, it is largely a false dichotomy.  I would rather lose the para capability, letting CSOR (who would most likely employ it) and focus on 9 Battalions with a mechanized capability.  I say mechanized capability vice mechanized as all battalions should have the ability to leave the LAV's behind and conduct dismounted ("light") operations - it's a function of leadership.  I know CLS was interested in an Army (vice CANSOFCOM) "light" battalion, but I want to see 4 full strength companies per battalion first.
 
Infanteer said:
First off, we don't really need to discuss CMBG's and Stryker Brigades.  Whatever we do with "optimizing" or "affiliating", the CMBG's will largely have the same resources.

I highlighted the Stryker Company and Battalion because this is where the real change is happening and this is where we are interested in.  I mentioned the Armored Division's Manuever Battalion as a good example:

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/images/bct-heavy-toe.gif

As for the light/mech question I believe that, for the line infantry battalions, it is largely a false dichotomy.  I would rather lose the para capability, letting CSOR (who would most likely employ it) and focus on 9 Battalions with a mechanized capability.  I say mechanized capability vice mechanized as all battalions should have the ability to leave the LAV's behind and conduct dismounted ("light") operations - it's a function of leadership.  I know CLS was interested in an Army (vice CANSOFCOM) "light" battalion, but I want to see 4 full strength companies per battalion first.

Would you bring back a proper support coy i.e. one with anti-tank, assault pioneer and mortar platoons?
 
Back a million years ago, or at least circa 1966 when I was a lieutenant liaison officer in HQ 4 CIBG, CFHQ forwarded a proposal for restructuring the brigade to the commander for comment. The details are a bit fuzzy as it was a long time ago and the brigadier and the BM did most of the analysis themsevles. In outline each infantry battalion would include a squadron of tanks and three mech companies, and I can't recall what exactly happened to the armoured regiment, but it still had tanks and picked up some mech infantry. This may have entailed converting the manpower spaces from two of the mech companies to armour, so that the regiment had two tank squadrons and a mech company. I dunno!

The proposal was rejected because of its tactical inflexibility and the perceived lowering of training standards of the sub-units sent out of their normal home. On the administrative side the reasons against it included a large construction bill for not only hard standings and upgrades to roads, but the need for rail sidings, larger gates, tank hangers, etc. And of course, everybody got agitated about cap badges and the colour of berets and mess kit and all that good stuff. I wonder what might have happened if the idea had originated inside the formation, as was the case for the mortar reorginization into groups a couple of years later. 
 
Mortarman Rockpainter said:
I have an idea.  Let's form SECTION Ops Centres.  I mean, why stop at Coy level? [/sarcasm]

Let's face it.  Our military is currently jumping a shark.  Our HQs are bloated, ineffective and very VERY slow.  A boy scout could out-OODA loop even our once-lean BGs!

ADO is just the latest in useless buzz-phrases that add no value.  "Spread out" is one way to say "dispersed", and we do that already.  Same with "Adaptive".  Do they mean FLEXIBLE?  I mean, come on: why do we really need to label wheels every time someone re-invents them?


Many things have become redundant and ridiculous but you can't lump all things in that category b/c you don't see a particular use for it.  DO & by extension ECO do not fit in that category.

Starting with DO the Goal of the experiments was to see exactly how far you could push a Marine Infantry Plt.  They experimented, trained Fire Teams & Squads to act Independently of their command structure over extended ranges.  Gave them Advanced Patrolling, Reconnaissance, Observation & Surveillance, Man Tracking, & Long Range Communications training.  Authorized the Sqds to call in Level II CAS & the 2 Plt HQ Cells to call in Level I & to Direct & Control Aircraft. 

Then set them loose in 2 Combat Zones in A'stan & the Philippines & found they were capable of that level of training & more.

However the System was & is not ready to handle that level of advancement, not the Training Pipelines or the Logistics&Support Lines & Definitely not the Ops & Intel Cycle.

So then the focus shifted to, "Ok, at what level would those systems be best optimized to support Ops that could potentially breakdown to a level that involved Independently Operating Squads; if the mission dictated it".  The answer was the Comp Level,  "Enhanced Company Operations" was born.


So if your just pulling capabilities out of the air saying "yeah that's nice & how about a little of that too", of course it would be stupid but thats not what happened.  They followed a path to its logical conclusion, & that led to where they're at now. 

Future applications are widespread.  One is the SC MAGTF construct currently being developed & debated.
 
The Security Cooperation MAGTF—Fighting the Long War

By LtCol Chuck Risio, USMCR
May 2008


In the not-too-distant future, Marines will be fighting the global war on terrorism in a new, more fundamental way. The Long War Concept, recently approved by General James T. Conway, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, is part of a Department of Defense effort to better meet the irregular threats and other causes of instability we are likely to continue to confront.

The Long War Concept is a vision for Marine force employment that provides a persistent, forward-deployed Marine pres­ence across key regions in the world, while still providing the nation with the ability to conduct full spectrum operations. This is accomplished with the Security Cooperation Marine Air-Ground Task Force (SC MAGTF). For leathernecks and their fam­ilies, that means a return to a familiar Ma­rine Expeditionary Unit-like Operation­al Cycle, but with an added capability.

Security Cooperation is a mission require­ment for all Geographic Combatant Com­manders, and the SC MAGTF provides the capability to meet that requirement—which the Marine Corps is uniquely able to provide. Security cooperation is founded on the idea of cooperative activities between the United States and other countries with similar values and interests in order to meet common defense goals.

A partial list of activities that fall under the security cooperation umbrella include Partner Nation Capacity Building; Security Assistance; Information Sharing/Intelligence Cooperation; Counter-Drug Assistance; Humanitarian Assistance; Small-Unit Training in Tactics, Techniques and Procedures; Staff Training; and Small-Unit Leader Development. Any number of other possible activities could arise depending on the circumstances and the partner country’s resources, abilities and needs.

The SC MAGTF will be similar to the MEU(SOC) that has served our nation so well during the past decades. Built around an infantry battalion, it would have a composite aviation squadron and a combat logistics element. The deployment workup would include the Block 1 through Block 4 packages currently in the predeployment training plan, and also the more traditional evolutions, such as combined arms exercises (CAXs), mountain warfare training and amphibious exercises.

The purpose of each particular SC MAGTF would determine additional attachments and training. So the SC MAGTF headed to the Middle East might take along a larger attachment with anti-armor capabilities, while the one deploying to South America perhaps would need more engineering support, medical capability and rotary wing augmentation.

Just as some regiments habitually supported the MEU(SOC) deployment cycle and others supported the unit deployment pro­gram cycle, the parent regiment of each SC MAGTF would have a habitual region­al focus. Some would support South Ameri­ca, others would support the Middle East, and others would support the Pacific area.

What really sets the SC MAGTF apart from traditional MEU(SOC)s is the regionally focused language and culture training. Building cul­tural awareness and language proficiency through this regional focus makes the SC MAGTF a much more useful and potent or­ganization for the combatant commander.

This regional focus starts well before the SC MAGTF is formed. Marines are screened for language skills as early as possible, even while at the recruit depots. Native speakers might attend language schools along with those who volunteer or are assigned.

Certain regiments then will be tasked with providing habitually assigned battalions to their designated area and be staffed accordingly. For example, Marines with a Hispanic or South American background would be assigned to the regiment that is tasked with the habitual support of South America. These Marines would experience all the other parts of a typical military career including recruiting duty, staff assignments, etc. But most of their time in the operating forces would be spent in a deploying battalion whose parent regiment focuses on a certain region.

The tool that makes this happen is the Career Marine Regional Studies (CMRS) program. Newly commissioned lieuten­ants at The Basic School and sergeants in the sergeants’ course are introduced to cultural concepts and their application in military operations. Two follow-on professional military education courses complete each region’s study packages.

Regional Affairs Officers and Foreign Affairs Officers (RAOs/FAOs) also will be billet-coded to this regiment and tasked out to deploying SC MAGTFs as needed. The entire SC MAGTF undergoes region­al training. Under coordination from the Marine Corps Training and Advisory Group (MCTAG), the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA) provides detailed and specific country studies, and the Center for Advanced Operational Cul­ture Learning (CAOCL) conducts tailored training packages relative to the destination area for each SC MAGTF.

Another distinguishing feature of the SC MAGTF is how it gets to and operates in its area. The U.S. Navy is moving forward with its Global Fleet Station (GFS) concept, which is related to the Long War Concept. GFS is intended to provide a persistent sea base from which to conduct shaping operations.

The composition of these sea bases would depend on the needs of the Combatant Commander, the needs of the host nation, the operating environment and the missions to be conducted. Platforms for the GFS sea base could range from LHAs; LPDs; surface combatants, such as destroyers or frigates; intra-theater high-speed vessels (HSVs); or perhaps even a new class of ship specifically built for security cooperation type missions.

The idea is to allow the GFS sea base to operate a self-contained headquarters with the capacity to provide command and control facilities, classroom space, medical facilities, combat service support and on-ship repair facilities.

Just as Marines start training with the basics and progressively move to advanced techniques, the partner nations that we work with would start from the ground up. This doesn’t mean that Marines would be running partner nations’ boot camps, but it might entail advising partner nations’ drill instructor training courses. The basics, in this case, are the presumption of a certain level of proficiency and willingness to improve certain skills.

One of the most sought-after basic train­ing programs has been the Marine Corps Martial Arts Program (MCMAP). For the training providers and recipients, equipment and facility requirements are minimal, progress is immediately measurable, and it provides a tremendous morale boost.

Basic and Advanced Marksmanship train­ing is another relatively simple exercise series to conduct, as are Combat Lifesaving, Patrolling, Combat Engineering and more. Building on these basics, more advanced training can take place. Small-Unit Leader Professional Development is an area in which the Marines excel. Other activities include bilateral training in peacekeeping operations, basic Foreign Internal Defense, Counter-Insurgency and Border Patrolling.

All of these activities are conducted throughout the entire SC MAGTF area of operations(an entire geographic combatant command). These training events, and the units conducting them, are spread out. A Reinforced Platoon might conduct marksmanship training in one area, while a Reinforced Squad is conducting MCMAP training in another province, while another Company, reinforced with Engineers, is training in ob­stacle clearing in yet another area or even a neighboring country.

An important thing to keep in mind is the fact that the SC MAGTF shouldn’t be thought of as a “MEU-light.” Because of the regular pre-deployment training, the SC MAGTF is fully capable of rapidly join­ing back together as a single cohesive unit and conducting combat operations just as expected of any other MAGTF.

MEUs that now deploy are well prepared for Iraq because of the intense training at Exercise Mojave Viper conducted at Marine Corps Air-Ground Combat Center Twentynine Palms, Calif. But it wasn’t so long ago that MEUs and Battalion Landing Teams did CAXs, Amphibious Operation Exercises and Training in Urban Environment (TRUEX) exercises in preparation for Western Pacific or Mediterranean Sea floats. As the Commandant, Gen Conway, stated, the demands of Iraq meant less attention to the traditional missions of Ma­rines. He is concerned that we are not do­ing the other types of training that make us capable of meeting threats across the full spectrum of conflict.

To appreciate how all these elements work together in the Long War Concept, it’s helpful to see an example of what a proposed SC MAGTF goes through in its entire cycle. Set in the future, roughly four or five years from now, you will see how this unit conducts predeployment train­ing, deployment, primary mission ex­ecution, contingency mission execution and redeployment.

In this example, since we’re in the near future, we’ll assume that most of our DOD and Marine Corps initiatives are well underway. The MV-22 Osprey has replaced the CH-46 Sea Knight helicopter in half of the medium-lift squadrons, the internally transportable vehicle (ITV) is fielded, and the new geographic combatant command, United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM), is fully operational.

The Second Marine Regiment is designated as the “Africa Regiment” and has the responsibility of rotating its three battalions to Africa on a six-month deployment as an SC MAGTF. The 2d Battalion, 2d Marines is designated SC MAGTF 2/2 and is about to execute the predeployment training program. The unit already is locked on for CAX, including the entire Range 400 series, and amphibious landing exercises with USS Mesa Verde (LPD-19). There are 19 Marines in 2/2 who speak lan­­guages native to West Africa, 23 more who speak French, and another eight Marine linguists attached as individual augments.

Further specialized training on the region is provided by MCIA, with cultural orientation provided by CAOCL. Supporting 2/2 is a civil affairs detachment, a combat engineer platoon, a military police platoon and an explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) detachment. Other agencies contributing personnel include federal law enforcement officers from the FBI, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the National Intelligence Community.

The aviation element is a composite squadron of MV-22s and CH-53 Super Stallions. With a combat logistics element, SC MAGTF 2/2 will operate aboard USS Mesa Verde and the littoral combat ship USS Independence (LCS-2), which will meet them in theater. Command and control is accomplished by augmenting the headquarters of 2/2 with additional personnel from the regiment, thus making the battalion headquarters element also serve as the SC MAGTF headquarters element. This headquarters element provides direct command and control of its security cooperation activities, as directed by the AFRICOM combatant commander and coordinated through the regional Marine Corps Training and Advisory Group.

After completing predeployment training, SC MAGTF 2/2 deploys by air to Rota, Spain, marries up with its equipment and embarks on the ships. The SC MAGTF headquarters, the subordinate element headquarters and Company E, acting as the reserve, remain aboard ship. Weapons Company leathernecks also remain aboard ship.

“Fox” Co, reinforced with the engineer platoon, deploys directly from Rota to southwest Algeria to train with the Algerian military on patrolling techniques and border enforcement. The military police, along with the federal law enforcement agents, head to Lagos, Nigeria, to work with government security forces on antidrug-smuggling efforts.

Finally, Golf Co conducts dispersed operations with three platoons, reinforced with explosive ordnance disposal and civil affairs Marines, conducting humanitarian operations with USAID and the United Nations World Food Programme as well as de-mining efforts across the trans-Sa­hel region of Africa with U.N. and African Union forces.

SC MAGTF 2/2 is able to support all of these widely dispersed operations by lev­eraging the advantages of the sea-based GFS and organic logistics element supported by the long-range Ospreys, as well as contracted local services.

In our example scenario, with six weeks remaining in the deployment, SC MAGTF 2/2 is ordered to respond to the U.S. ambassador’s call for help in Sierra Leone. Large violent riots threaten national elections with the additional possibility of a military coup in the capital of Freetown. The headquarters element and Echo and Weapons companies, still operating at sea, sail for Freetown.

MV-22s gather platoons from Golf Co and fly directly to the capital, with Fox Co boarding C-130 aircraft sent from Rota. SC MAGTF 2/2 remains in Freetown pro­viding additional embassy security and safeguarding the nearby municipal soccer stadium and port facilities in preparation for a possible noncombatant evacuation operation. With the arrival of the 24th MEU, the situation calms and SC MAGTF 2/2 returns to its original mission.

This example shows one possible deployment cycle of an SC MAGTF, but even more important is the continuous forward presence established with this concept. As SC MAGTF 2/2 is leaving West Africa, another SC MAGTF is ready to immediately replace it, falling in on the same gear.

Although only an example, with notionally identified units and assets, this concept is already on its way to becoming reality. The Marine Corps always will main­tain the capability to provide well-trained and -equipped general-purpose forces. The SC MAGTF is another versatile tool to engage in irregular warfare and to meet the challenges of an uncertain security environment.

Editor’s note: LtCol Risio is a Marine Corps Reserve infantry officer currently ac­tivated and assigned to Plans Branch, PP&O, HQMC. He previously was activated and deployed in support of Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom.
 
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